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INTRODUCTION
The Oregon Question concerned the sovereignty of 
the vast region west of the Rockies between 42^ N. L. and
54° 40* N. L., an area of some 500,000 square miles. Russia 
and Spain were originally involved in the controversy but by 
1825 the issue was narrowed to one between the United States 
and Great Britain. Spain*s exclusive claims were limited by 
the Nootka Sound Convention of 1790 and what was left of them 
after that date was transferred to the United States in 1819.
In 1825 Great Britain made a treaty with Russia whereby the 
parallel of 54° 40* was established as the boundary between 
the territories of these two countries on the Pacific Coast.
The dispute between the United States and Great 
Britain was not so easily settled. Britain, which maintained 
that both the United States and herself had rights in Oregon, 
based her claims on the Nootka Sound dispute and subsequent 
Convention of 1790 with Spain, the explorations of Captain Cook 
in 1778, of Captain Vancouver in 1792, of Alexander Mackenzie 
and others, the occupation and settlement of the territory by 
the British North-West Company. The United States, on the 
other hand, based their claim on the discovery of the mouth 
of the Columbia River by Captain Gray in 1792, the cession of 
Louisiana by France in 1803, the explorations of Lev/is and 
Clark in 1804-1806, the transfer to the United States of the 
Spanish title in 1819, the establishment of Fort Astoria at 
the mouth of the Columbia by the American Pacific Fur Company 
in 1811, the restoration of Astoria after the War of 1812, and 
the contiguity of their western possessions to Oregon south 
of the 49th parallel.
V
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A treaty between the two was negotiated in 1818, 
but it effected only a temporary settlement* Nine years later, 
after more than one unsuccessful attempt at adjustment by 
negotiation, it was agreed to throw open to the citizens of 
both powers all territory west of the Kocky Mountains which 
was claimed by both*
The next fifteen years saw the Oregon Question 
thrust into the background, but from the initiation of the 
Webster-Ashburton negotiations of 1842 until the Oregon Treaty 
of 1846 there was constant negotiation* The terms of the 
Treaty, itself a "triumph of reason and goodwill,” proved to 
be insufficiently clear in their attempt to define the boundary 
line west of the mainland on the 49th parallel, and out of 
this developed a new dispute - the Water Boundary or San Juan 
Controversy - which gave trouble until it was settled by 
arbitration in 1872.
- 1 -
CHAPTER I
THE NOOTKA SOUND CONVENTION: 1790
Although the Oregon area did not assume inter­
national importance until 1790, the coast of this region had 
had geographical importance for nearly two centuries and had 
beai touched by several famous navigators. Sir Francis Drake, 
for instance, seems to have reached the forty-eighth parallel 
in 1579, while in 1592 Juan de Fuca, a Greek, got as far north 
as 47°. The first Spanish explorers had touched the North 
West Pacific in 1542, but it was not until the 17701s that 
Spanish Visits became more or less regular. Juan Joseph Perez 
Hernandez was sent northward from Mexico in 1774 and he claimed
to have anchored at 49° 30*, the latitude of Nootka Sound, a
(1)
point whose name later achieved considerable fame. In the
following year Bruno de Hezeta was sent also from Mexico. He 
found the mouth of the Columbia and, while he approached the 
coast near the entrance of the Strait of Juan de Fuca, he 
made no landing there. He did, however, claim to have made 
landings at three distinct points between 47° and 58°•
The name Oregon*, which was generally applied at 
least after 1822 to the whole territory in dispute between 
Great Britain and the United States, that is, to the whole 
territory west of the Rocky Mountains between 42° and 54° 40*, 
appears first in the travels1 of Jonathan Carver, published 
in 1778. Carver used the name to refer to the 1 Great River 
of the West* whose source he had hoped to discover in an 
attempt/
1. nA strong presumption exists that Perez actuaJly anchored 
much farther south.” H. R. Wagner, *The Cartography of the 
North West Coast of America to 1801,* p. 173, I, 2 vols. 
Berkeley, 1937. This excellent work brings up to date the 
findings of R. Greenhow in his history of Oregon and Cal­
ifornia,* Washington, 1844.
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(2 )
attempt to cross the continent in 1774.
In 1776 Captain Cook undertook, under Government 
auspices, to conduct an expedition to discover the North-West 
Passage. His instructions ordered him to touch the coast of 
*New Albion1 (the name given to the north west coast by Drake), 
situated about the forty-fifth parallel, and to proceed north­
ward to 65°♦ He was particularly warned against touching any
Spanish dominions and interfering with any settlers on the
(2)
north west coast. Cook was to take possession for Great
Britain of all convenient stations not already discovered; 
he was to distribute among the natives such things as would 
prove his having visited them; inscriptions signifying that 
possession had been taken of them were to be posted on un­
inhabited places.
On 12th July, 1776, Cook set sail from Plymouth; 
on 7th March, 1778, he sighted land near 44°• a fortnight 
later he reached the forty-eighth parallel and turned south­
ward, examining the coast along the next degree of latitude 
in the hope of discovering the strait which de Fuca had cal­
culated to lie between 47o and 48°. Falling in this, he 
entered Friendly Cove (Nootka), in 49° 30*, and began to trade 
with the natives. Later he sailed to 59°, a point farther 
north than any ever reached by Spanish navigators; he saw 
Mount St. Elias (described by Bering, a Dane in Russian employ 
who visited the region in 1741), and examined the coast between 
59° and 54°. On 9th August, 1778, Cook reached 65° 46*, which 
he took to be the western extremity of the North American 
continent. Cook*s journals, with his maps and charts, were 
not/
1. *Travels,* London, 1778* An estimate of the value of 
Carver1s Journal appears in an article by E. G. Bourne in 
the *American Historical Review,* XI, 287-302.
2. J. Cook, *A Voyage to the Pacific Ocean,* London, 1785.
The Admiralty* s instructions to Cook appear in the Intro­
duction, pp. xxxi-xxxv. His account of his visit to Nootka 
is to be found in Vol. II, Book IV, Chapters I, II.
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not published till 1784-85. Their appearance made public the
possibilities of the north west coast and, as early as 1785,
an English commercial company sent a ship to establish a post
for 11 securing the trade of the continent and islands adjacent."
In the years immediately following the publication
of Cook* s journals, English ships frequently visited Nootka
and strengthened the British claim by developing the resources
of the country. Captain John Meares, an English mariner,
visited Nootka in 1786 and returned thence in May, 1788, with
(1)
two ships, the ’Felice* and the ’Iphigenia.* These ships
were purely English, owned by Daniel Beale of Canton, although 
they sailed under Portuguese colours in order to evade pay­
ment of the high port charges demanded by the Chinese from all 
but Portuguese vessels.
Meares received from a native Indian chief, 
Maquilla, the grant of a small piece of land on which to 
build a house and, In return, handed over two pistols.
The English later contended that Meares thereby bought a
(2)
title to the land. Meares proceeded to erect his house,
a structure of two storeys, and threw up a breastwork to in­
clude a considerable area. He maintained that he unfurled 
the Union Jack also, but other witnesses asserted that the 
Portuguese/
1. Accounts of Meares*s voyage appear in his ’Narrative1 
and in his ’Memorial.1 As the former was written first 
and the latter written later to convince the Cabinet
of the justice of his cause, the ’Narrative’ appears to 
be the more trustworthy. The best account of the whole 
controversy is that of W. R. Manning, ’The Nootka Sound 
Controversy,’ in the American Historical Association’s 
Annual Report for 1904, pp. 281-478. Where no other is 
mentioned, this is the authority used by the present 
writer.
2. Manning says that there is no mention of the title in 
Meares*s account, and he concludes therefore that Meares 
did not purchase with the intention of acquiring a title. 
At best it is doubtful if Meares sought to establish a 
permanent settlement (pp. 295-96). See also, in this 
connection, J. H. Rose, ’Pitt and National Revival,* 
London, 1923.
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(1)
Portuguese flag was flovfn.
On 24th. September, Meares left the north-west 
coast for China on the 1Felice* after leaving instructions 
for the other ships to continue coastal trading. His in­
tention was, so he alleged, to return with more settlers.
True enough, when in Macao he entered into part­
nership with Etches and Company of London, an organisation 
formed to plant a colony at Nootka, received a licence for 
five years from the English South Seas Company to trade north 
of 45°, and sent off Captain Colnett with two good ships, 
a newly-purchased one, the TArgonaut,! and the ’Princess 
Royal.’ Colnett was also to control the operations of the 
’Iphigenia’ and the ’forth West America,’ both still in 
American waters. These ships, which were definitely British, 
had on board a number of Chinamen, which Professor Rose 
considers as proof that the occupation of Mootka was to be 
permanent. Colnett’s instructions, dated 17th April, 1789, 
directed him to form a treaty with the native chiefs, to 
monopolise the trade of the region, and to establish a factory 
attractive/
1. It is impossible to determine v/hich account was correct, 
for Meares was a notorious liar and the other witnesses 
v/ere biassed either against Meares or in favour of Spain. 
The latter’s admission that a flag was flown rather sub­
stantiates Meares’s story because his instructions to the 
captain of the ’Morth West America’(a little ship he built 
at Hootka) were that no flag was to be unfurled unless 
on taking possession of new land.
Judge F. W. Howay has, in ’ Tp_e Dixon-Meares 
Controversy,’ p. 22, London, 1929, examined the accounts 
of Captains Dixon and Meares, and he concludes that f,he 
[Meares] made many statements, important and unimportant, 
•without any knowledge of the facts, with a reckless dis­
regard of the truth or with knowledge of their untruth; 
that in the discussion of the price of sea-otter skins 
(which was to him the subject of importance) he has omitted 
material factors, falsified documents; and that, in con­
sequence, he is not entitled to have credence placed in 
his unsupported testimony. This opinion has been shown 
to be in accord with that of his contemporaries.”
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attractive to the Indians - 11 a solid establishment and not 
one to be abandoned at pleasure.11
Meanwhile, the Spaniards, who looked upon Nootka
as part of California and had made no effort to establish
a permanent post there before they heard of the Russian and
English activities in the region, were not inactive. Estevan
Jose Martinez, in command of the frigate, 'Princesa,* was
sent by the Viceroy of Mexico in 1788 to examine the position,
to forestall the Russians by occupying Nootka, and to warn
(1)
off intruders. Since the royal sanction had not arrived
when he left, it cannot be maintained that the Spanish Govern­
ment sanctioned, at least formally, Martinez's expedition 
or his orders to seize british vessels. He was instructed 
to set up a permanent establishment, to prove politely to 
the English, Americans and Russians that they had no claim 
to the region, to land missionaries and colonists, to survey 
the coast from San Francisco to Nootka.
The Spanish claims to the north west coast rested 
upon the four bulls of Pope Alexander VI of 1493 and the 
Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494, dividing the New World between 
Spain and Portugal, as well as upon the later discoveries of 
Perez.and Hezeta. The accounts of these voyages, however, 
had not been published when Cook sailed, a fact which detracts 
considerably from the validity of the Spanish claim based 
upon them. The Spanish Government were very much aware that 
Perez claimed to have landed at Nootka four years before Cook, 
and throughout the dispute they acted upon the conviction that 
their/
1. Dr. Manning contends that there was no intention to 
interfere with the English, but H. R. Wagner does not
agree and argues that the Viceroy must have noted Cook's 
remarks on the potentialities of the region so far as 
the fur trade was concerned. See Wagner, op. cit., I, 215.
their claim was irrefutable. Besides her claim by discovery,
Spain had a right by virtue of the contiguity of her Mexican
dominions. It was the threat to her title at Nootka from
English, Russians and Americans that prompted the steps she
took in 1788. Her agents were conversant with the terms of
the royal decrees of November, 1692, and October, 1776,
which enjoined upon all Spanish viceroys, governors, and
commandants to prevent foreign ships from navigating the
South Seas without permission.
Martinez landed at Nootka Sound on 5th May, 1789,
and finding no visible sign of a previous establishment, he
was consequently justified in taking possession for Spain
(1)
and in maintaining his position by force. Professor Rose
does not agree that there were no signs of MearesTs establish­
ment, arguing that the reverse is antecedently probable and 
is asserted in Meares*s 'Memorial.' Martinez (according to 
Dr. Manning) found only a Portuguese ship, the 'Iphigenia,' 
under a Portuguese captain with Portuguese instructions,
flying the Portuguese flag and, though its crew was English,
(2)
furnished with a Portuguese passport.
Martinez demanded to see the captain's instructions, 
and found that they advised resistance to force by force. He 
affected to discover in them an excess of all reason and right 
if they were the instructions of a private individual. He 
at once ordered the seizure of the 'Iphigenia* and the 'North 
West America,' though upon their agreeing to return to China 
both were later released.
On/
1. Manning, op. cit., p. 314.
2. Nominally, Don Viana was captain with the English Captain 
Douglas as super-cargo on the 'Iphigenia.' The instructions 
were written by a Portuguese, Juan Carvalho. The seizure 
was the result of a faulty translation of the instructions.
’The whole episode to this point seems to have been a 
series of blunders and would not merit careful consideration 
had not the consequences been so serious for the home 
gov ernmen t s .1
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On 24th June, basing his action upon the Bull 
of Alexander VI and the discovery of Perez, Martinez took 
formal possession of Nootka Sound for Spain*
Colnett arrived at Nootka on the *Argonaut1 on 
2nd July, 1789. He intended to establish a factory, build 
a fort, and plant a colony at Nootka. Martinez reminded 
him of Spain!s claim but permitted him to land.
Resulting mainly from misunderstandings caused 
by an inaccurate interpreter, a quarrel developed between 
Martinez and Colnett, as a consequence of which the English 
captain and his ship were seized. The Spaniard feared that 
if Colnett were allowed to go he would establish a post 
elsewhere and armed force would be necessary to dislodge him.
On 13th July, when the *Princess Royal* arrived, she also 
was captured on the flimsy pretext that she might carry word 
of the 'Argonaut's* seizure before the arrival of reinforce­
ments for Martinez. The ships were conducted to San Bias
(1)
where they arrived in August.
On 10th February, 1790, the Marquis del Campo,
Spanish representative at London, wrote to the Duke of Leeds,
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, explaining the circumstances of
the incident at Nootka and requesting punishment of the English
officers who had encroached upon what was exclusively Spanish.
territory. Pitt, whose mouthpiece Leeds was, had no intention
(2 )
of doing that. Britain*s answer was surprising to Spain,
the Spanish Government never having anticipated the haughty 
reply/
1. Manning's account is derived from the following sources:
1. Martinez's letter to Viceroy at the end of the affair.
2. Colnett*s letter three months later.
3. Colnett*s account in his ’Voyages,* written nine years 
later.
4. The letters of Duffin (second in command) in Meares*s 
*Memorial.'
5. The letter of Gray and Ingraham, American captains at 
Nootka during the quarrel, to Quadra, sent by Spain in 
1792 to negotiate with Vancouver. See Greenhow, op. 
cit., Appendix, letter of 3rd August, 1792.
2. Rose, op. cit., p. 566.
reply of 26th February written by Leeds from the original 
draft in Pitt's handwriting. Britain insisted upon satisfaction 
and demanded restoration of the captured vessels. The Spanish 
Prime Minister, Count Floridablanca, was alarmed, and after 
intimating to Anthony Merry, English charge' at Madrid, that 
Britain apparently wanted war, he gave orders for Spain to arm.
Del Campo was instructed to inform Leeds that the 
Viceroy of Mexico had liberated the captive British sailors 
who had probably acted in ignorance of Spain's exclusive sov­
ereignty founded on treaty, ancient laws and discovery. Spain 
was prepared to be magnanimous about the sailors' mistake, and 
she declared the matter closed.
Leeds replied that del Campo's answer was unaccept­
able, and he took particular exception to the statement that 
restitution was made on the ground of a supposed ignorance of 
the extent of the property of Spain whereas there was a British 
title based on Meares's purchase and the unfurling of the Union 
Jack. Great Britain cannot admit the existence of a Spanish 
claim, distinctly asserted in the answer, to exclusive rights 
of sovereignty, navigation and commerce in the South Seas.
She demands, therefore, the restitution of the c aptured 
vessels, together with indemnification to the individuals 
concerned in the ships, and “above all’1, an adequate repar­
ation to His Majesty for the injury to British ships sailing 
under the protection of the British flag in a part of the 
world where British subjects have Han unquestionable Right 
to a free Enjoyment of the Benefits of Commerce, Navigation 
and Fishery, and also to the possession of such Establish­
ments as they may form, with the consent of the Natives in
(1) *
Places unoccupied by other European Nations.” Leeds's
reply/
1. F.O. 72/17.
9-
reply is valuable as a declaration of Great Britain*s 
position on the question of the rights of colonisation* 
and Professor Rose sees in it the * charter* of the future
colony of British Columbia.
When Meares returned to England to exaggerate 
still further, for the Cabinet* s benefit, his earlier highly 
coloured statement, it was decided to demand immediate satis­
faction. An Order-in-Council was passed on 3rd May, 1790,
for fitting out a considerable fleet because of preparations
(2)
in Spanish ports. At the same time Leeds assured Merry
that the King wanted peace and that if he was satisfied that
(3)
Spain reciprocated England was prepared to disarm.
as an earnest of their pacific intentions, the
Government sent Alleyne Fitzherbert to Madrid early in May,
(4)
his mission being to prevent war. Yet Britain began to
arm, even the Opposition agreeing that the insult to the
British flag and the confiscation of British goods demanded
(5)
adequate satisfaction.
Leeds amplified his instructions to Fitzherbert 
by a despatch of 16th May, and this time the tone is rather 
more temperate. Adequate reparation is still demanded, but 
His Majesty*s Government do not wish to go into the question 
of abstract right, unless the Court of Spain renders it un­
avoidable. a  modus operand! for the future which will do 
j’ustice to the rights and interests of both parties and 
remove occasions of misunderstanding is necessary; then 
follows/
1* Manning, op. cit., p. 377. The Memorial to Merry appears 
in F.0. 72/17.
2. Flint to 3rd May, in F.O. 72/17.
3. Leeds to Merry, *Secret and Confidential,* 4th May. 1790- 
in F.O. 72/17. *
4. The text of his instructions appears in F.O. 72/17, dated 
7th May. Till his advent Merry was in charge at Madrid.
5. Parliamentary History, XXVIII; and Annual Register. XXII. 
285. * *
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follows the statement of the English conception of what con­
stitutes a title to sovereignty; "only where they have actual
(1)
occupation is their title good."
Fitzherbert presented his terms on 13th June,
but five days later they were rejected and modified terms
of adjustment suggested by Spain. England refused to accept
these unless* Spain agreed to give satisfaction amounting to
admission that she had no exclusive sovereignty over Nootka,
no proof of which could be adduced. Floridablanca did agree,
however, to give satisfaction for the seizure of the ships
(2)
at Nootka. Great Britain reiterated her contention that
discovery alone, not followed by actual occupation and estab-
(3)
lishment, gave no right to exclude other nations.
a number of circumstances hastened a settlement
of the Nootka Sound Controversy. When Spain attempted to
secure assurances from her allies that they would help her
in the event of war, she had no success. In England there
was discontent at the slow progress of negotiations and the
prolonged maintenance of an expensive armament. Moreover,
at this time the ambition of Catherine the Great, who had
recently made peace with Sweden and was closely pressing
the Turks, threatened Europe and "in this fact we find the
last, and perhaps most cogent, reason why Pitt and his
colleagues resolved to have done with the Spanish dispute
(4)
before the Eastern Question came to a crisis."
On 2nd October, therefore, Leeds sent two drafts 
of a treaty to Fitzherbert, one providing for a definite 
territorial demarcation, ten days being allowed for acceptance 
or/
1. Tftis letter is accompanied by Meares*s ’Memorial* and 
thirteen other enclosures relating to the controversy.
2. Manning, op. cit., p. 402.
3. F.O. 72/18.
4. Rose, op. cit., p. 582.
-11-
or rejection. After that time the British Ambassador was 
to leave Madrid. Floridablanca*s immediate reaction to this 
made war appear imminent. However, knowing that no assist­
ance was forthcoming from his allies, he sought to have the
terms modified. Fitzherbert agreed to minor modifications,
(1)
and the Convention was signed on 28th October, 1790. Thus 
ended the Nootka Sound Controversy, the first episode in the 
development of the Oregon Question.
We shall find that, in subsequent negotiations 
over the Oregon Question, the Nootka Sound Convention is 
frequently mentioned and its terms are appealed to by both 
sides to prove their cases. It will be well, therefore, to 
consider the conclusions to be drawn from the dispute and 
from the terms of the convention.
1. Since Great Britain dictated the terms of
(2)
the convention it is true to say that her aims were achieved. 
First of all, she wanted recognition by Spain of the more 
modern, British, conception of what constituted a title to 
sovereignty. Her efforts did not extend to obtaining new 
lands. Discovery alone was insufficient to establish a title, 
but must be followed by occupation and settlement, it was 
ridiculous for Spain to maintain that by virtue of the papal 
award of 1493 - an award from a source whose powers Great 
Britain had not admitted for nearly three hundred years - 
she could prohibit alien settlements in the South Seas.
2. Britain sought not to replace Spain*s claims 
to exclusive sovereignty by her own, but to obtain the 
admission that she had an equal claim; hence, the convention 
established a form of joint sovereignty. It was as though 
Pitt
1. See Appendix for the convention.
2. a comparison of the terms of the final settlement 
with those of Leeds*s memorial of 16th May, 1790, and 
of 17th August (P.O. 72/17) proves this conclusively.
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Pitt had said to Spain: "You have rights and we have rights
on the north-west coast of America; neither of us has a 
clear, exclusive title; let us, therefore, open the whole 
area to the activities of our seamen, and may the better 
side win!"
By agreeing to grant satisfaction for wfcongs 
done to Meares and Colnett, Spain was recognising the right 
of Meares and Colnett to be at Nootka. Spain, therefore, 
recognised that she had no exclusive claim; that made the 
way clear for Pittfs policy of leaving the whole area open 
to the enterprise of both English and Spaniards.
The matter of satisfaction seems to argue that 
Spain admitted England!s claims. In essence, it was a 
recognition - perhaps a negative one - of England* s sovereignty. 
If Spain challenged England* s position why did she agree to 
pay compensation? The Spanish Court steadfastly refused, as 
long as possible, to grant satisfaction for the injury done 
to Colnett and Meares, in defence of the principle involved. 
Spain, however, by the very act of restitution, was repud­
iating the action of her servants at Nootka. Her grant of 
satisfaction was tantamount to recognition of the right of 
British seamen to be at Nootka* Floridablanca knew that.
Pitt purposely made no effort to suggest limits 
to the jurisdiction of the respective countries because he 
had confidence in the ability of his compatriots to combat 
Spanish competition successfully. At the same time, in view 
of what he considered to be an approaching struggle with 
Russia, and in view of the uncertainty regarding the attitude 
of France, he wished to avoid excessive severity in dealing 
with Spain. The latter, therefore, relinquished her title 
Q^ cclusive sovereignty, navigation, and commerce, but the 
convention avoided the question of title, and Britain did 
not/
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no t Ipso facto obtain such a title* Pitt was satisfied;
“the terms (he said) will be found to secure all that we
\ *L /
could demand in justice, or had any reason to desire.“
3. But for Britain*s activity (owing to Pitt*s 
foresight), the north-west coast would have been divided 
between Spain and Russia, and even the United States migjit 
have been excluded from the position there which they
eventually attained.
The question of rights did not enter into the 
convention, though in the negotiations mention was of necess­
ity made of the subject. Spain had priority in discovery 
and exploration if we ignore the claims of Drake, but this 
advantage was nullified by her neglect to publish the results 
of her exploration. Britain did not make this mistake and 
the establishment of her legal right by publication of her 
results outweighed the Spanish right by discovery and explor­
ation alone.
The English were the first to develop the trade
of the area besides being the first to make actual establish-
(2)
ments there. Even if Nootka was abandoned in 1789, : it
was to be made a permanent settlement in the following spring* 
If the signs of settlement were absent when the Spaniards 
arrived just before the return of the English - a point 
upon which no one can speak with certainty - this would 
counterbalance the British claim of prior settlement in the 
autumn of 1788. So far as title by occupation is concerned, 
there is no doubt that the British claim was much more valid 
than the Spanish.
It should be mentioned in this connection that
the/
1* Pretyman MSS., quoted by Rose, op. cit., p. 584.
2. Professor Rose and Dr. Manning disagree on this point.
- 14-
the Spaniards ultimately withdrew from Nootka, their reasons
for doing so appearing in a translation of a letter, dated
12th April, 1793, by Count Revilla—Gigedo, in the British
Embassy Archives in Madrid# Nootka is expensive to maintain,
it is not so useful as almost any other establishment in
California, and its occupation is a pretext for trouble with
England. "A free and entire cession" to the British would
be a sop to them inasmuch as they desire to hoist the Union
Jack at Nootka,. "being rather incited by motives of vainglory
than by any solid reasons for the profits from the fur trade
(1)
which are problematical in the extreme." This memorandum
was followed by an Anglo-Spanish convention of January, 1794,
which provided that the subjects of both nations could make
temporary use of Nootka but that "neither the one nor the
other of the two parties shall make any permanent establishment in
the said port or claim there any right of sovereignty or
territorial dominion to the exclusion of the other." This,
it will be seen, confirmed the agreement made in 1790 and
(2)
recognised the existence of claims on both sides.
The Nootka Sound Controversy, therefore, did much 
to clarify one aspect of the greater and later Oregon dispute| 
the claims of the British to the north-west coast, or to parts of j 
it at least, were brought out. These claims rested upon the 
voyage of Drake to *New Albion1, the discoveries and surveys
1. A copy of the letter appears in P.O. 5/1470, the title 
being *Proposal for the free surrender of Nutka to the 
English.* Captain Vancouver and Don Juan Francisco de 
Bodego y Quadra had met at Nootka in 1792 to execute 
Article 1 of the Nootka Sound Convention, but they had 
failed to agree. The Convention of 1794 arranged for the 
appointment of officers by both sides, "Her Britannic and 
His Catholick Majesties being desirous to remove and ob­
viate all doubt and difficulty relative to the execution
of the first Article of the Convention [of 1790.] The terms 
were duly carried out at Nootka on 28th March, 1795, by 
commissioners representing both countries.
2. The Convention of 1794 was not published until 1842, and it 
was never used by either side in the diplomatic arguments 
over the Oregon Question.
of Captain Cook, and most important of all, the attempts of 
the British to occupy and develop the country* Meares*s 
establishment at Nootka was the first actual establishment 
in that region and, though abandoned shortly afterwards, the 
intention was to erect a permanent post there* The expedition 
of Meares, it can be argued, was a national undertaking inasmuch 
as his licence to trade at Nootka had been issued with the 
sanction of the Government: his ship flew the British flag
(this fact is, of course, debatable); he made a trade agree­
ment at Port Cox with a native chief by which a monopoly over 
trade was secured for the English; Meares certainly instructed 
the captain of the *North West America* to hoist the British 
colours over all newly discovered land; he himself took 
possession of the Straits of Juan de Fuca in the name of
the King with the forms that had been adopted by preceding
(1)
navigators on similar occasions*
1. Manning, op* cit., p. 293*
CHAPTER I I
THE CHOICE OF THE 49 th PARALLEL
1. Establishment of British and American Claims.
In accordance with the terms of the Nootka Sound 
Convention, Captain George Vancouver, who had served with Cook, 
was sent out by Britain in 1792 to determine what lands and 
buildings were to be restored by Spain and the amount of indemn­
ity to be paid by her to Britain. He was instructed also to 
survey the coast from 35® N. to 60® A belief still prevailed 
that the Straits of Anian connected the Pacific with the At­
lantic, and it was hoped that a water passage would be found 
connecting the Canadas with the Western Sea. Vancouver actually 
found evidence of an opening but, unfortunately for England, he
came to the conclusion that the opening was of insufficient
(1)
importance for commercial purposes.
(2)
At this point the Americans enter the controversy.
In the same year, Captain Hobert Gray in the American ship, 
'Columbia,' arrived in the northern Pacific, and on 17th May, 
1792, just two weeks after Vancouver, crossed the bar of a 
river and explored the estuary for nearly twenty miles. He 
named the river after his ship. Vancouver subsequently left 
his lieutenant, Broughton, to explore the Columbia for over 
a hundred miles more, formally taking possession of the land 
in the name of Great Britain.
In 1793 a British fur trader, Alexander Mackenzie,
ascended/
-•unericans had been members of Cook's crew.
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ascended the Peace River to the Rocky Mountains and crossed
to the Pacific Ocean, touching the coast at latitude 52°
20* N. He was the first white man to reach the Pacific by
(1)
an overland route. Another Scots fur-trader, Duncan
McGillivray, ascended the North Saskatchewan River and, by
means of Howse Pass and the Blaeberry River, crossed the
Rockies. He was the first white man to discover the upper
waters of the Columbia River. In 1807-1808 Simon Fraser
passed down the river which bears his name to its mouth near
the modern city of Vancouver.
The United States' claims were strengthened in
1803 by the cession by France to the United States of the
large and ill-defined province of Louisiana. The western
and northern boundaries of this territory never having been
determined the Americans naturally extended them as far as
possible. They argued that Louisiana extended to the Pacific
and insisted consequently that they were now the successors
to the French claim to that region. The United States later
consistently advanced this Louisiana Purchase as a connecting-
(2)
link in their claim to the Oregon Territory.
The United States bought Louisiana from France 
with the same extent it had when Spain retroceded it to 
France/
1. See A. Mackenzie, 'Voyages from Montreal,' London, 1801, 
for an account of the journey.
2. This view is now quite discredited, and W. I. Marshall, 
an American authority, reviewing the arguments in his 
book, 'The Acquisition of Oregon,' concludes: "I think
whomever will read carefully the whole of the negotiations 
preceding the treaty in so far as they relate to the 
questions of territory ceded, and limits defined, and 
compensation to be paid, and will examine with care the 
instructions given to our negotiators in '26-'27 will be 
satisfied that in the opinion of Monroe and J.Q. Adams, 
who certainly ought to know the truth about the matter 
better than any one else, no part of Oregon was included 
in the Louisiana Purchase.” I, 154, Seattle, 1911.
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France in 1800. It was distinctly asserted by Marbois, the
negotiator of the Treaty representing Napoleon, that the
French never owned any part of North America west of the
(1)
Rocky Mountains.
In the following year, 1804, President Jefferson 
commissioned two explorers, Captains Lewis and Clark, to 
explore the Missouri River to its source and to seek a water- 
communication to the Pacific. They were successful, crossing 
the Rockies and descending by the Snake and Columbia Rivers 
to the Pacific. They took formal possession at the mouth of 
the Columbia of land which Vancouver had claimed a dozen 
years previously. By virtue, therefore, of Gray's discovery 
of the mouth of the Columbia, of the exploration of its 
source and branches by Lewis and Clark, and of the cession 
of Louisiana to the United States, the American Government 
felt that they had established a claim to the area west of 
the Rockies, extending from the northern boundary of Calif­
ornia (about 42° N.) at least to the latitude of the most 
northern tributary of the Columbia.
The British claim so far (by 1805) was also 
rather strong. Great Britain set store by Cook's priority 
of discovery, followed by the explorations of Captain Van­
couver, joint occupation with Spain as the outcome of the 
Nootka Convention, and the explorations of traders like 
Mackenzie and McGillivray. To strengthen this claim, the 
North West Company of Montreal were preparing to extend oper­
ations beyond the Rockies and were establishing trading- 
posts/
1. J. J. Anderson, 'Did the Louisiana Purchase Extend to the 
Pacific?' p. 3, New York, 1882. Greenhow also, writing 
in 1844, refused to base any American claim to land west 
of the Rockies upon the Louisiana Purchase. There is a 
considerable literature on the subject of the Purchase, 
a transaction having little or no bearing on the Oregon 
Question but which, owing to ignorance or to a generally 
accepted false conception of its value, exerted influence 
upon many who upheld the United States' claims in Oregon.
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posts or 'forts' throughout the region. Fort Fraser in 
latitude 54° N., established by the Company in 1806, was the7 x
first civilised settlement on the mainland north of latitude
42°. Other posts of the North West Company were Fort Kootenai
at the head-waters of the Columbia (1807), Kullyspill House
(1)
(1809), Saleesh House (1809), and Spokane House (1810).
The boundary line between British and United 
States' territory on the American continent had never satis­
factorily and fully been agreed upon. The Treaty of 1783 
provided for a line of demarcation starting in "the northwest 
angle of Nova Scotia ••••.. ” to the northwest corner of the 
Lake of the Woods Tf and from thence on a due west course to
the river Mississippi .... . u It was erroneously believed
in 1783-(the negotiators used Mitchell's Map, which they inter-, 
preted incorrectly) that this line due west would intersect the 
great river. Shortljr after 1783 the error was discovered9 and 
Article 4 of the Jay Treaty of 1794 sought to rectify the 
position by providing for a joint survey to establish the 
line accurately. This, however, was never undertaken.
Article 5 of the Hawkesbury-King Convention of May, 
1803, moved one step further by arranging that the line of boun­
dary should be the "shortest line" that could be drawn between 
the north-westernmost point of the Lake of the Woods and "the
nearest source of the Mississippi  ....  ”
In the meantime, on 30th April, 1803, the 
cession of Louisiana had been concluded and, since Article 
5 of the Hawkesbury-King Convention seemed to compromise the 
whole northern boundary of Louisiana, the Senate refused to 
accept/
1. See Map in Appendix. For the history of this association 
see G. C. Davidson, 'The Northwest Company,' Berkeley, 
California, 1919.
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accept this article. The British Government rejected any 
other settlement and would not agree to the amended treaty.
In 1807 negotiations were renewed in London, 
Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney representing the United States 
and Lords Holland and Auckland representing Great Britain.
The latter proposed a boundary line along the 49th parallel 
from the Lake of the Woods, "as far as their said respective 
territories extend in that quarter," though this was not to 
be construed as extending west of the Rocky Mountains. The 
American negotiators accepted this line but the proposal was 
never presented to the Senate because Britain refused to give 
satisfaction on the collateral problem of impressment.
During the first years of the 19th century, there­
fore, a new 'cloud in the west' was gathering and threaten­
ing to precipitate trouble at a most unpropitious moment 
when Anglo-American relations were not good. The war with
t . Ivvi- t
t  \ t. - * -  s I
Napoleon, which produced the Berlin^Decreesr and ^ Orders-in- ]
Council, produced also great difficulties for neutrals. In 
exercising the right of search British officials searched 
neutral American ships for British deserters even though
these had become American citizens according to United States*
law. Unpleasant incidents arose from this, notably the 
'Chesapeake* affair in 1807. The Orders-in-Council and the 
Continental System dealt a severe blow to American export 
trade and shipping, the Orders-in-Council particularly, 
because of British supremacy on the seas. President Jeffer­
son was faced with the alternatives of alliance with one 
of the belligerents or strict neutrality. He chose the 
latter. The freedom of French harbours to American privateers, 
the prevalence of pro-French sympathies in the southern states, 
and/
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and American acquiescence in Napoleon's seizure of United 
States* vessels all embittered English feeling* The inevit­
able war which followed in 1812 produced surprises and dis­
appointments for both sides; the failure of the Americans to 
take Canada, a series of United States' naval successes, the 
terrible destruction of the mercantile marine of the two 
countries, the disasters on land suffered by both sides.
2. Astoria.
The first United States' establishment in Oregon
was that of the Missouri Pur Company on the Snake River In
1810; it was abandoned, however, and does not enter into the
dispute. Nevertheless, in March, 1811, Mr. J. J. Astor, a
naturalised American, and his Pacific Pur Company built Port
Astoria at the mouth of the Columbia near where Lewis and
Clark had taken formal possession for the United States.
Astor had nine partners with him in the company, six of them
(1)
Scots who had formerly served with the North West Company. 
Astor had evidently forestalled the British Company for, in 
the very next month, the astronomer of the latter, David 
Thompson, visited the mouth of the Columbia with a view to 
establishing a settlement "there. The presence of the Amer­
icans was a severe disappointment to him.
Both sides were therefore cognisant of the vital 
importance of the Columbia River. In the struggle for con­
trol of the valuable fur trade of the region, possession of 
the river was essential. Ite discovery by the American, Cray, 
and its subsequent survey by the Englishman, Vancouver, meant 
that/
1. T. Twiss, 'The Oregon Question Examined,* p. 277,
London, 1846.
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that both, countries knew of its value* It was the only 
navigable river in the region, while the extent of its pene­
tration of the interior, its flat, level banks which fitted 
it admirably for colonisation, made its possession particu­
larly desirable* It is to be remembered that the idea was 
current at that time that the cession of the mouth of a 
river gave a title to all territory washed by its banks; 
moreover, the establishment of a settlement at such a strat­
egic point could be used to assert a claim by right of 
occupation*
Word of the outbreak of the War of 1812 reached 
Astoria in June, 1812, and when the British North-West Company 
offered to bp.y out the American Pacific Pur Company, the part­
ners of the latter, most of whom were British subjects, real­
ising their isolation, transferred their effects to the British 
company for S50,000. Most of the employees of the American 
Company entered the service of the North-West Company at the 
time of the transfer*
The Admiralty, also, we re evidently not unaware 
of the importance of Astoria for, in December of the next 
year, the sloop, ’Raccoon,1 under Captain Black, entered 
the Columbia for the purpose of destroying Astoria. This 
being unnecessary because of its purchase, Black hoisted 
the Union Jack and renamed the post Port George.
Nor was Astoria forgotten in the Foreign Office 
when peace came to be discussed. A memorandum in the Public 
Record Office headed, ’A Compressed View of the Points to 
be Discussed in Treating with the United States of America,* 
dated 4th July, 1814, and addressed to Lord Castlereagh, the 
Foreign Secretary, advises that a treaty should be made with 
Russia/
Russia to make her territory on the Pacific coast convenient
to her Asiatic possessions and the “most advantageous part"
of the coast would be reserved to Great Britain from 58
(1)
degrees to the Columbia at 46 degrees#“ It may be argued 
from this that the British Government tacitly recognised 
some justice in the American claim to the north-west coast 
at least south of the Columbia River. At the same time, it 
may be taken as the initial assertion of the British prop­
osition for the line of the Columbia as boundary between 
the possessions of the United States and those of Great 
Britain on the coast.
That this plan was the direct outcome of Alex-
(2)
ander Mackenzie!s advice contained in his book is 
obvious from the latter part of the same memorandum, a line 
of internal communication was to be drawn across the continent 
to protect and develop commerce, while a colony was to be 
established at Nootka Sound at the extreme western end of the 
line, a note in the Foreign Office records of a week later 
suggests that Mackenzie* s assistance might be sought in found­
ing the colony. Mackenzie*s actual words are: “By supposing
a line from the Atlantic, East, to the Pacific, West, in the 
parallel of forty-five degrees of north latitude, it will, I 
think, nearly describe the British territories in North 
America. For I am of the opinion that the extent of the 
country to the South of this line, which we have a right to 
claim, is equal to that to the north of it, which may be claimed
by/
1# In F.O. 5/103. It is quoted by Miss K. Judson in an
article, *The British Side of the Restoration of Astoria,1 
in the * Oregon Historical Quarterly,’ XX, 248. Miss 
Judson attributes this memorandum to Pitt; but Pitt 
died in 1806. It ifi the work of Lord Bathurst who had 
control of the War Office which supervised colonial affairs 
in 1814.
2. Mackenzie, op. cit., p. 16.
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by other powers • ••••«'* By opening up intercourse between 
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and forming establishments 
throughout the interior, along the coasts and at both ex­
tremes, the entire command of the fur trade of North America,
at least north of 48°, with the exception of the slight part
(1)
held by the Russians, would be in British hands*
In the light of these British ambitions one 
understands why the possession of Astoria and the Pacific 
north-west coast became a matter of discussion during the 
negotiations at Ghent which followed the War of 1812* Article 
1 of the Treaty signed on 24th December, 1814, attempted to 
dispose of the matter by providing that "all territories, 
places and possession whatsoever taken by either party from 
the other during the war, or which may be taken after the 
signing of this treaty, excepting only the islands herein­
after mentioned Jin the Bay of PassamaquoddyJ shall be 
restored without delay.”
This clause created a situation upon which the 
United States could be depended to seize. Accordingly, on 
18th July, 1815, the Secretary of State, J. Monroe, raised 
the matter of the restoration of Astdria td the British 
charge* in Washington, Anthony St. J. Baker, basing a demand 
upon the above Article. The subject took Baker by surprise, 
but he suggested that the possible reason for the delay in 
restoration was the absence of any person at Astoria by whom 
or to whom restoration could be made. At the same time,
Baker professed himself to be ignorant of any transaction 
between the two Governments which recognised the claim of 
the/
1. Mackenz ie, op. cit., pp. 397-411. Mackenzie had written 
to the Board of Trade on 10th March, 1808, suggesting a 
line of forts across the continent to secure the boundary 
line he advocated. See B.T.S., Xx, 470, in the Public 
Record Office, quoted by G.C.Davidson, op. cit. pp. 123-4.
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the United States to any part of the coast of the Pacific
(1)
Ocean. Monroe suggested the despatch of a letter from
Baker to the British commander in the Pacific authorising
restoration, but Baker replied that he had no instructions
from his Government and suggested that, if such instructions
existed, they would be in the hands of Rear-Admiral Dixon
(in command in the Pacific). At the same time, the British
representative wrote to Dixon, reminding him that the United
States* claim rested solely on the Treaty of Ghent and that
(2)
Great Britain had never recognised any American title.
Unfortunately, no instructions were sent to Baker governing
this matter, and this gave rise to the United States* argument
that the British silence constituted tacit recognition of
their title. Moreover, in the formal document of restoration
there is no adequate qualification of the restoration.
For over two years the astoria issue was allowed
to remain unsettled by the United States. Two reasons for
this suggest themselves: if there was co-operation between
the United States* Government and Astor, it is probable that
the former were awaiting Astor*s decision to resume operations
(3)
on the north-west coast. Possibly also, the reason 
adduced/
1. Baker’s account of his interview is in his despatch to 
Castlereagh, F.O. 5/102. Monroe’s letter (copy) and a 
copy of Baker’s to Rear-Admiral Dixon are enclosed.
2. See the despatch in F.O. 5/107. The British explanation 
why Astoria was not specifically mentioned in the Treaty 
of Ghent was that "requiring from the Americans any re­
cognition or guaranty of His Majesty’s rights thereto 
might tend to cast doubts upon a Title which was already 
sufficiently clear and incontrovertible." See the state­
ment of S, McGillivray, prtner of the North-West Company, 
March, 1815, drawn up in Washington. McGillivray quotes 
Bathurst to the above effect, declaring that it was never 
Lord Bathurst’s intention when framing article 1 to restore 
Astoria. The statement appears in F.O. 5/125 and there is 
a copy also in C.O. 6/6.
3. J. Schafer, ’The British Attitude to the Oregon Question,1 
p. 281, in the American Historical Review, XVI, 273-299#
-26-
adduced by Baker, that there was no one there to whom restor­
ation could be made, carried weight with the American Govern­
ment. Britain’s attitude was one of delay and neglect governed 
by two circumstances: Astoria was remote; it seemed of small
immediate import.
In 1817, however, the Secretary of State, John 
Quincy Adams, determined that the United States should gain 
control of as much of North America as possible and seeing
Britain as an impediment to his plans, was under the impression
that England was avoiding the Astoria issue purposely and in­
tended to treat the restoration of the post much as she had 
treated her undertaking to restore the frontier posts after 
the Treaty of 1783, that is, by alleging American neglect to 
implement certain terms of the Treaty of Ghent she would evade 
fulfilment of other obligations imposed upon her by the Treaty.
C l )
Adams determined to take steps to prevent such an eventuality.
Accordingly he arranged for sending off a sloop, the ’Ontario,1
ostensibly for the southern Pacific but actually to the Col-
(2)
umbia Elver.
Sir Charles Bagot, British Minister in Washington,
reported the matter to the home government immediately and also
took the precaution of writing to Sir John Sherbrooke,
Governor of Upper Canada, advising him to put the North West
(3)
Company on their guard. A despatch in cipher to the
Foreign/
1# Adams’s diary reveals his antipathy to Great Britain; thus 
he wrote to Gallatin and Rush, American representatives in 
the negotiations of 1818, on 28th July,^1818, as follows: 
^From the earnestness with which the British government 
now return to the object of fixing the boundary, there is 
reason to believe that they have some other purpose connected 
with It, which they do not now avow, but which, In their 
estimation, gives it an Importance not belonging to it, 
considered in Itself .n American Stare Papers, IV, 377, 
quoted In Schafer, op. cit., footnote, 285. ^ ^
2. Intimated by Bagot on 7th November, 1817, in m.C. b/125.
3. Bagot wrote'later that, owing to the severity of the winter 
'n^Canada, Sherbrooke could not send word In time to antic-
ipa te th e ’ On ta r I o • ’ F.O. o/15 0 •
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Foreign Office, dated 24th December, from bagot announced that, 
in reply to his request for information on the subject, Adams 
had stated that the ’Ontario’s’ mission was not to form a settle­
ment. Despite this assurance, one of the partners of the North 
West Company, Simon McGillivray, wrote to Bagot intimating that 
word had reached him, presumably through the fur-traders, that 
Fort George (Astoria) was to be seized. To clarify matters Bagot 
asked Adams for a conference on the subject when he was told that 
the sloop was not sent to interfere with the Company’s trade; it 
was dispatched because Baker in 1815 had explained that no restor­
ation had been made owing to the absence of an American to receive 
Astoria and an Englishman to restore it. At the same time Adams 
declared that it would not be v/orth while for Britain to quarrel 
over such a remote land. Suspecting the matter had a deeper sig­
nificance, bagot composed a formal note demanding an explanation
(1)
and outlining the basis of the british claim.
The Foreign Secretary, Lord Castlereagh, after
having seen Richard Rush, the United States’ Minister in
London, who said he was unacquainted with the grounds of the
(2)
British claim to Astoria, instructed bagot on 4th Feb­
ruary, 1818, to advance his view that there was no doubt . 
that, by the terms of the Treaty of Ghent, the United States 
were entitled to return to the state of possession of 1812;
the settlement of Astoria would be restored, but he was to deny
(3)
the validity of the American title to the land. Bagot
was/
1. F.O. 5/125.
2. R. Rush, ’Residence at the Court of London,’ 2 vols., 
Philadelphia, 1845, I, 107.
3. This was executed verbally and therefore rightly ignored by 
the United States. Unfortunately also the reservation deny­
ing the American title was not Included In the formal act of 
retrocession. See the terms of retrocession in the Appendix. 
It is difficult to understand Castlereagh’s contention. The 
settlement at Astoria had been sojd by the American Pacific 
Fur Company to the British North West Company, and Castlereagh 
was agreeing to nullify a perfectly normal and legal trans­
action. Yet he asserted the British right of domain upon 
which Astoria was deemed to be an encroachment.
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was to assure Adams that no time would be lost in making the
(1)
transfer in order to obviate any unpleasant collision* At 
the same time, he was to inform the United States1 Govern­
ment that His Majesty1s Government deprecated the step taken
by the Americans in commissioning the Ontario1 without first
(2)
communicating with their representative in Washington*
The present, continued the Foreign Secretary, was a suitable
time to settle the northern boundary of the United States,
for it is always easier to come to an arrangement on such
subjects when the territory in dispute is little known or
little cultivated. Bagot was to propose the extension of the
arrangement - arbitration - provided in Articles 4, 5, and
6 of the Treaty of Ghent for settling the boundary between
Canada and the United States*
With these instructions Castlereagh enclosed a
despatch of the same date marked, *Separate and Confidential,*
the purpose of which was to amplify the public despatch* In
it he suggested the division of the boundary settlement into
two parts; from the Lake of the Woods to the Mississippi;
(3)
from the Mississippi westwards* Bagot was to settle the 
dispute over the Columbia River first, however* Castlereagh 
presses the 1 reasonableness1 of arbitration as a method of 
settling differences, pointing out that the Americans them­
selves demanded such a mode of adjustment for the slave 
question.
Lord Castlereagh is to be commended for his 
foresight in realising the necessity for immediate settle­
ment of the boundary dispute; as events proved, the earliest 
settlement/
1* An American historian has admitted that in the visit of 
the * Ontario* “there is an exhibition of devious winding, 
political manoeuvres by John Quincy Adams which we would 
rather hide*1' K. Judson, op* cit*, p* 243*
2. F.O. 5/129.
3. Idem*
settlement would be the bdst one from the British viewpoint. 
His policy, had it succeeded, would ha-ge secured for Great 
Britain a line several degrees of latitude south of that 
ultimately accepted in 1846, His method of fixing a boundary 
line between the United States and British North America 
was to establish first the points at either end of the line 
and then trust to the intermediate part being in England*s 
favour. In other words, "he regarded the coveted position 
in the Mississippi as a political fulcrum, in which, by the 
dexterous use of the commercial lever, every portion of the 
territory north of a right line extending to the Pacific
(1)
might be quietly lifted into the British sphere of control,"
The British interpretation of the Treaty of 1783 was that
Britain was to have access to the Mississippi and, that
being so, the fairest line would be that agreed upon by the
(2)
Hawkesbury-King negotiators in 1803* The source of the
, (3)Mississippi lay in latitude 42° 38 , At the other end
of the line Castlereagh hoped to establish as starting
point the mouth of the Columbia in 46° 20!* Probably this
explains the equanimity with which he viewed the American
occupation of Astoria, Unfortunately for his plans, the
United States refused the offer of arbitration knowing well
that he would suggest as arbiter the Russian Tsar, whose
favourite he was; they agreed, however, to take back
(4)
Astoria,
This/
1* Schafer, op, cit,, p, 285,
2« Castelreagh* s words make it clear that he expected the 
Mississippi to be the eastern starting-point of the line 
of boundary, P.O. 5/129, ‘Separate and Confidential.*
3. The United States* position was that the Treaty of Utrecht 
had established latitude 49° a@ the northern boundary of 
Louisiana which, since the purchase of that province in 
1803, had been in American hands. How the American stand 
was based on a conventional but erroneous foundation is 
explained below,
4, Cf. P.O. 5/129 and Schafer, op. cit., p. 285. Hagot»s 
account of the reception of this despatch by Adama is 
reported In his despatch to Uastlere&gh, 2nd June, 1818, 
in 9«0, 5/132.
This 1 Confidential1 despatch of 4th February, 1818, 
initiated the British policy of conciliation in the Oregon con­
troversy. Great Britain was recognising the existence of some 
sort of American claim to Astoria, and Castlereagh hoped that
the arbitrating commissioners would assign a frontier which
(1)would !part1 accommodate the United States.
5. The Significance of the Restoration of Astoria.
The actual retrocession of Astoria was made on 6th 
October, 1818. The restoration was a mistake which surrendered 
a position that could be retrieved only by war. The original 
British intention had evidently been not to surrender the fort, 
and Bagot acted throughout, until his instructions were changed, 
as though there was no possibility of retrocession. Moreover, 
he was instructed to advise the North West Company to antici­
pate the voyage of the 1 Ontario.* The English negotiators of 
the Treaty of Ghent were quite convinced that Article 1 of the 
Treaty did not comprehend the retrocession of the post. Bold 
handling of the situation in the face of the vigorous policy 
of Mr. Adams was required, but Lord Castlereagh1s general 
policy did not aliow this. His aim was to avoid all *tenden- 
cious discussion* and to sow the seeds of friendship. He had 
long felt that more friendly relations between the two countries
were of far more importance to Britain than any brilliant
(2)
diplomatic victory. The Foreign Secretary believed that
a di s p l a y  of friendship and evidence of a desire to appreciate 
the American point of view would go far towards breaking down 
the/
1. F.O. 5/129.
2. C. K. Webster, * The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh,* p. 453, 
London, 1925; cf. R. Rush, ‘Residence at the Court of 
London,* 2 vols., London, 1845, II, 2.
( 1 )
the strong American anti-British prejudice. To this desire
for peace and goodwill Fort George or Astoria was sacrificed; 
possession of the post gave the United States a claim they 
could not otherwise have sustained; it furnished them with a 
diplomatic success - minor though it appeared at that time - 
which fortified them in future negotiations with Great Britain.
The arguments against restoration greatly out­
weighed those in favour of it. The expedition of the Pacific 
Fur Company was not a national undertaking inasmuch as it had 
no governmental sanction and of the ten partners six were 
Britons who, in the event of war, were guaranteed protection 
as British subjects. The post, which was not even a military 
fort, was the saleable property of a private fur company, and 
the great evil of the retrocession, therefore, from a British 
point of view, was that it amounted to recognition of a 
national American claim. That the erection of a stockade or 
trading station by private traders, and its retention for a 
few months until its free sale, could be claimed to give, years
after it had been abandoned, the sovereignty of a country
(3)
nearly twice as large as France, seems ridiculous. Astoria
was an isolated post, whereas the British North ¥/est Company
had a number of posts in the region of the Columbia River.
Greenhow reveals that Astor made no bid for Government approval
(4)
of his enterprise until 1813, and then it was refused.
Actually/
1. Adams did not correctly divine the real nature of Castle­
reagh1 s policy, which he described as "wavering and un­
steady," "willing to wound and yet afraid to strike." See
H. W. V. Temperley, * Life of Canning,1 London, 1905, p. 178
2. Castlereagh1s instructions to Stratford Canning of 20th 
July, 1820, when Canning was appointed to Washington, ill­
ustrate the consistency with which the Foreign Secretary 
sought to keep peace with the United States. "The mainten­
ance of peace was to be my principal care, and with this in 
view it was desirable that I should be rather observant 
than active, slow'to take offence, and in the management of 
current affairs more tolerant of adverse pretensions than 
ready to push my claims to an extreme." S. Lane-Poole,
1Life of Stratford Canning,* London, 1888, p. 297.
3. Cf. *Edinburgh Review,* IX, 259.
4. Greenhow, op. cit., Appendix, ’Relative to Astoria.’
Actually, he invited the North ’West Company without success 
to assume a one-third interest in his enterprise. This proves 
conclusively that his undertaking was that of a private 
individual.
One is forced to conclude that from the utilitarian 
as well as the legal aspect the transfer of Astoria was a 
mistake. In the first place, once the United States possessed 
the fort, they were in no hurry to settle the boundary and, as 
we shall see more clearly later, time was on the side of the 
Americans. The earlier the settHenent, the more territory west 
of the Rockies would Britain acquire. Again, it was most in­
consistent of the Government to assure the North West Company
several times prior to 1815 that Astoria was British property
(1)
and then to return it to the United States.
The British claim to Oregon had a twofold basis - 
by right of discovery and by right of occupation; on the other 
hand, the claim of the United States, before the restoration of 
Astoria, was confined to discovery and their negligible claim 
as heirs to the French in Louisiana. By international law 
discovery must be followed by a formal act of taking possession 
and, within a reasonable time, occupation and settlement. 
Possession of Astoria gave the Americans this additional claim 
by right of occupation. The actual instructions of the 
managing director of the North West Company in London to the 
Company's agents on the Columbia River governing the retro­
cession of Astoria contain these words: "I understand the
orders to be to give up the actual ground possessed by the 
Americans before our occupation but not to relinquish the 
Trade/
1* See the statement of Simon McGillivray in F.O. 5/125 
and C.O. 6/6. McGillivray was one of the partners of 
the Company*
U)
Trade or to abandon the Country.” The agents were to
deliver up Astoria "without however admitting the right of 
that [united States* ] government to the possession in question." 
This reservation seems never to have been made, and later 
efforts of British diplomacy to prove its existence in English 
records were rightly met by the Americans with the answer that 
private documents did not concern them; all that mattered was 
the actual declaration of retrocession.
It was,, however, in its effect upon future negot­
iations that the restoration of Astoria was most seriously 
felt. George Canning was the first British statesman to 
realise correctly the future importance of the north-west 
coast and, during the negotiations with the United States in 
1824 and 1826, he found his hands tied by the effect of the
restoration of the post, a concession which he denounced in
(2)
the strongest terms. ^e even contemplated surrendering
the British position on the north-west coast because of the 
unfortunate retrocession. All subsequent British negotiators 
found their efforts similarly affected, and one described the 
act of retrocession as the only case in which any person acting 
with the authority of the United States* Government formally 
occupied any part of Oregon.
1. Greenhow, op. cit., p. 310.
2. "I do not hesitate to say that our decision on that occasion 
was absolutely unjustifiable. Compare the Bill of Sale by 
which the settlement or blockhouse of Astoria was made over 
for a valuable consideration by a company half British and 
half American to a wholly British company, with the first 
article of the Treaty of Ghent stipulating the restoration 
of places taken in war, and read Lord Bathurst*s despatch 
directing the surrender to the Yankees •••••• " See E. J.
Stapleton, *Some Official Correspondence of George Canning,* 
2 voIs•, London, 1887, II, 71.
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4. The Negotiations of 1818.
Though the Treaty of Ghent had successfully 
disposed of some of the difficulties in the way of Anglo- 
American friendship there remained many outstanding matters 
of difference between the two countries; the Fisheries, the 
renewal of the subsisting treaty of commerce, the problem of 
the slaves withdrawn from the United States in 1814, the 
intercourse betv/een the United States and brutish North 
American and West Indian colonies, the delineation of the 
boundary west of the Lake of the Woods and, of course, the 
question of title on the Pacific north-west coast. The United 
States were particularly keen to adjust these matters of dis­
pute, and on their initiative arrangements were made in the 
autumn of 1818 for the meeting of British and American pleni­
potentiaries. The Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, 
hoped to induce Spain to transfer to his Government her claims 
north of a specified boundary line, and Britain, he hoped, 
might accept the 49th parallel as her boundary right to the 
Pacific Ocean.
The British representatives, Frederick J. Robin­
son and henry Goulburn, were instructed by the Foreign Sec­
retary to seek solution of the Columbia River difficulty by 
amicable discussion, but if that method failed they were to
propose arbitration along the lines laid down in the Treaty 
(i)
of Ghent.
The American diplomatists, Richard Rush and Albert 
Gallatin, were disinclined from the very outset to accept 
arbitration because they desired to keep their interests 
altogether free from European interference; moreover, the 
difficulty/
1. Castlereagh*s instructions to Messrs. Robinson and Goul­
burn, dated 24th August, 1818, are to be found in F.O. 
5/138.
- 35-
difficulty of securing an impartial arbiter was great. The 
Americans contented themselves, therefore, in the early 
stages of the negotiations with a recital of the bases of 
their claims on the north-west coast.
At the fifth conference of the plenipotentiaries,
Britain took a step forward by proposing that the region
between 45° N. and 49° N. should be free and open to both
countries, neither exercising sovereign authority therein;
this should be supplemented by the concession of free
British navigation of the Mississippi. The latter proposal
(1)
was summarily rejected, and in reply to the former pro­
ject, Messrs. Rush and Gallatin asserted that they could not 
open to joint occupation an area to which they did not recog­
nise any British claim, while they pointed out that, since 
the boundary line west of the Lake of the Woods was to be 
along the 49th parallel (by another article proposed by 
Castlereagh), they could not consent to make 1 common stock* 
of any territory south of latitude 49° and west of the Rocky 
Mountains. They pointed out quite correctly that they could 
hardly be expected to throw open to joint occupation only 
the area south of 49° when they had for a number of years 
been trading north of that parallel.
Additional conferences served only to convince 
the British commissioners that the full American pretensions 
were so utterly inconsistent with the principles upon which 
they conceived the subject to stand that it was impossible 
at that time permanently to define any boundary in the region 
■under discussion. They decided to accede, therefore, to the 
American/
1. Robinson and Goulburn to Castlereagh, No. 7, 13th October, 
1818, in F.O. 5/138.
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proposal that **any country west of the Rocky Mountains claimed
by either country shall, with its harbours, bays ...... be.
free and open for ten years to the vessels, citizens, and 
subjects of the two powers.” They argued that this arrange­
ment removed the prospect 6f immediate collision while, at 
the same time, it did not preclude further discussion of a 
basis of permanent settlement. It was, in short, an agree­
ment that reserved to Great Britain every advantage of actual
(1)
possession.
We may now sum up the results of the settlement
of 1818 and attempt to estimate its relation to the subject
as a whole. By acquiescing in the United States* refusal to
give access to the Mississippi, and by accepting the 49th
parallel as the line of demarcation east of the Rockies,
Great Britain was thus early departing from her plan of a
(2)
short time before. It is true that she was demanding
the line of 1807, but this line was prejudicing the British 
claim west of the Rockies by encouraging the American con­
tention based on contiguity, that is, the argument that 
United States* territory east of the Rockies extended north 
to the parallel of 49°, and once they had settled west of the 
Mountains up to this parallel (and the agreement of 1818 
allowed such settlement) they could with confidence, claim­
ing contiguity, urge the final adoption of that parallel as 
boundary line right to the Pacific.
The satisfaction with which the British pleni­
potentiaries viewed the settlement they had made was quite 
justifiable so far as the immediate effects of the arrange­
ment/
1. Robinson and Goulbum to Castlegeagh, No. 9, 20th Oct­
ober, 1818, in P.O. 5/138. See Appendix for the terms 
of the Convention of 1818.
2. Supra, pp. 22-23.
ment were concerned. The Convention ostensibly laid the 
whole area open to the commerce of both nations, but this 
apparent equality was only superficial, inasmuch as the 
British companies were building up a monopoly of the fur 
trade and were gradually becoming powerful enough to ex­
clude foreign opposition. This, in turn, also had a bad
effect, for it did not take into account the possibilities
(1)
of future American opposition and competition. The 
longer the arrangement of 1818 lasted, the greater would be 
the attraction to the Americans of the British fur trade 
interests, and ways and means would be adopted to undermine 
them. Once that time arrived, the Americans would become 
as thoroughly established as the English, and an adjust­
ment of the boundary consonant with British hopes would
(2)
become increasingly difficult. It must be remembered 
that American expansion westward was still limited to the 
territory east of the Rocky Mountains and that vast area 
would have to be settled and built up before the eyes of 
United States* settlers could look beyond the mountains*
The Treaty of 1818 gave validity to the convent­
ional, though erroneous idea, that the Treaty of Utrecht had 
established the 49th parallel as the northern boundary of the 
United/
1* By 1818 the Americans had as much of the fur trade-as 
the British. Their influence ’was, however, only tem­
porary, for after the amalgams.tion of the North-West and 
Hudson’s Bay Companies in 1821, control of the trade was 
regained by the British, and by 1827 the Hudson’s Bay 
Company had established a virtual monopoly. See an article 
by F• W. Howay in the Canadian Historical Review, IV, pp. 
26-44.
2* Professor Schafer says of the Convention of 1818 that "in 
both particulars the immediate advantage of the Treaty lay
with Britain.....  Since their [ the British] possession
of Oregon could thereafter not affect the country east of 
Oregon toward the Mississippi the American government was 
deprived of the most urgent reason for wishing to dislodge 
the British from the Columbia•" Op. cit., p. 287. Un­
fortunately the immediate advantage, so far as Great 
Britain was concerned, was negligible and not to be com­
pared with the ultimate advantage.
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TJnited States west of the Lake of the Woods. The Treaty 
sounded the death-knell, therefore, of the British plan, 
and of the policy of pioneers like Mackenzie and David 
Thompson, who had envisaged the forty-fifth parallel as 
boundary over that area. Mackenzie had engaged Thompson 
in 1797 for the North-West Company, and Thompson’s survey 
had established that the source of the Mississippi was in 
47° 38*. A boundary line somewhat south of this was Macken­
zie’s demand because it was necessary for the retention of 
certain posts of the Company which were situated below 49°; 
moreover, it would be valuable in finally securing a favour­
able line on the west side of the Rockies.
5. The 49th Parallel as Boundary.
I-t may be said here that the tacit acceptance
of the 49th parallel as a boundary by both parties, event­
ually right to the Pacific, was the result of an interesting 
misunderstanding. The Treaty of Utrecht had appointed no 
limits between English and French territory in North America, 
but Article 10 provided for the appointment of commissioners 
by the powers concerned to settle the boundary. The Hudson’s 
Bay Company during the negotiations had approached the British 
Government to s ecure a line running from Cape Perdrix on the 
coast of Labrador to 58° 30*, and running thence north-west­
ward to Lake Mistassni (the source of Rupert’s River) in
(1)
western Quebec, and thence through that lake.
In 1714 the Company suggested extension of this
line/
1. David Mills, ’Report on the Boundaries of Ontario,’ p. 
157, Toronto, 1877. Cf. C. 0. Paullin in the Canadian 
Historical Review, IV, 127-131.
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line, "from the said lake a line to run south-westward into
49 degrees north latitude •••••• and that that latitude be
(1)
the limit." This constitutes the first mention of the 
49th parallel in connection with the international boundary.
In 1719 commissioners were appointed in accord­
ance with the tenth article of the Treaty of Utrecht. The 
Company wrote to the Lords of Trade and Plantations suggest- 
ing exclusion of the French from north of 49° 57*. This was 
duly carried out, the commissioners being instructed "that 
where the said line shall cut the 49th degree of north 
latitude, another line shall ]gegin and be extended westward 
upon the 49th degree of northern latitude." The efforts 
the commissioners proved unavailing, however, and no agree­
ment was reached.
These negotiations led cartographers and his­
torians erroneously to imagine that a settlement of'the
(2)
boundary had been effected. Thus, Thomas Salmon in 1738.
(3)
and William Douglass in 1749, in defining the limits of
the Hudson’s Bay Company’s territory, have the boundary line
extended in detail along the 49th parallel and "thence due
(4) (5)
west indefinitely." The cartographers Huske and Sayer,
in company with others, have made the same error, extending
the boundary line right to the Pacific.
No accurate survey was made until 1797-8, when
David/
1* Mills, p. 158, quoted by Paullin.
2* T. Salmon, ’Modern History, ’ IV, 349, London, 1738.
3* W. Douglass, ’A Summary, Historical and Political,* I, 278, 
London, 1749.
4* ’New and Accurate Map of North America*’ London, 1755.
5. ’Accurate Map of North America*’ London, 1763.
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David Thompson, astronomer of the North-West Company, explored
and surveyed the region between the Rockies and Hudson Bay
(1)
north to Lake Athabaska and south to the Missouri River.
The results of this survey were made known to the world by
Mackenzie’s ’Voyages’ in 1801. Thompson did not write his
’Narrative’ until 1850.
No attempt at final demarcation of the line was
made in 1763 or 1783, but during the Jay Treaty negotiations
Britain sought to secure Grand Portage (between Lake Superior
and the navigable part of Pigeon River), and offered two
alternative lines. One would have moved the American frontier
of Western Canada south to the latitude of the present city
(2)
of Duluth* while the other would have given Great Britain 
a wedge along the south bank of the Mississippi. Had either 
of these been adopted, the United States could never have 
obtained the 49th parallel.
In 1804 when the United States had acquired 
Louisiana, the Secretary of State, Madison, wrote to MOnroe, 
at that time Ambassador to Great Britain, to the following 
effect: "There is reason to believe that the boundary be­
tween Louisiana and the British territories north of it was 
actually fixed by commissioners appointed under the Treaty
of Utrecht, and that this boundary was to run from the Lake
(3)
of the Woods westwardly in latitude 49°•"
The boundary west of Lake of the Woods had, as 
we have seen, never been finally defined, but the ever alert 
American diplomatists would very promptly seize upon the 
apparently/
1* Dm Tyrrell, ’David Thompson,’ London, 1922.
2m Sm Fm Bemis, American Historical Review, JiXVXi, 465.
3. American State Papers, ’Foreign Relations,* III, 90, 
quoted by Paullin.
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apparently favourable cartographical circumstances, and would 
expand and develop them till they had convinced even themselves 
that their claim was exclusive* Thus, in 1806 Jefferson 
asserted that the 49th parallel was the legitimate boundary 
of Louisiana. No doubt the fact that the Hudson1s Bay Company 
had, during a hundred years, never claimed below 49° was an 
excellent, if negative, argument for the American position; 
yet the failure of the British Government to be properly 
informed upon the whole issue and the apathy with which they 
viewed the development of the United States* claim hardly 
inspired confident hopes for the future conduct of the 
boundary difficulty.
It is clear then that Britain*s first decision
to limit her claims east of the Rockies was made as early as
1719. Later, at the end of the century, she saw the mistake
of thus restricting her claims and accepted Mackenzie*s
advice that she should attempt to secure a line west of Lake
of the Woods that would throw the source of the Missouri into
British territory* The Americans showed in 1818 that they would
never accept this line and Britain fell back, therefore, upon
(1)
her earlier line - the 49th parallel*
1* Paullin, op* cit*, p* 131*
4
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CHAPTER I I I
SPASMODIC NEGOTIATIONS: 1819-1827
1, The Florida Treaty*
On 22nd February, 1819, Spain concluded with the 
United States the Florida Treaty, whereby she surrendered to 
the Americans all her claims and pretensions to the north­
west coast of America* Thus, the earliest of the four arrivals 
on the Pacific north-west scene was first to retire*
British policy had always been directed towards 
allowing East Florida to remain in the hands of a comparatively 
weak power like Spain; this was to balance the proximity of 
the United States to the British West Indies. In furtherance 
of his policy of peace with the United States, however, Castle­
reagh had tended to reverse this policy and was prepared to 
induce Spain to arrange with the American Government a frontier 
in keeping with the latter*s pretensions*
On a very flimsy pretext, General Jackson invaded 
East Florida in 1818, and in the initial operations two 
British settlers were killed* The Secretary of State, J. Q* 
Adams, condoned this, and, in spite of Monroe*s denunciation, 
the deed went unpunished and Jackson remained in command*
Public opinion in England was greatly incensed over the whole 
episode, and press and Parliament were almost unanimous in 
their demand for securing redress by war. According to Rush, 
Castlereagh alone prevented such a calamity.
The United States and Spain were able, in conse­
quence of the disturbed nature of Anglo-American relations 
to make the Treaty of 1819, the terms of which went further 
to consolidate the United States* claim to the Oregon terri­
tory/
tory by making the Americans heirs to Spain in respect of
title* Whatever doubts they might have had concerning their
title were now dispelled for the Americans, and the signing of
the Florida Treaty initiated a period of agitation in official
as well as unofficial spheres in the United States. So far,
only spasmodic attention had been paid to the Columbia River
territory in Congress, but the western fur traders were finding
the Hudson*s Bay Company*s stranglehold on the trade of the
Columbia irksome, and this feeling soon had its reaction in
Congress. In the House of Representatives in December, 1820,
Mr* Floyd of Virginia suggested an inquiry into the conduct
of the American settlement on the Pacific, with a view to
establishing the expediency of occupying the Columbia River
area. A committee was appointed to consider the matter, and
its report contained some striking conclusions. It was said
that, by virtue of the Louisiana Purchase, of the Florida
Treaty, and of discoveries and settlements by American citizens,
the United States* claim from latitude 42° to latitude 53° was
unassailable* The trade of this area was very valuable, and
the committee advised the establishment of trading-posts at
(1)
salient points to encourage American immigration.
Stratford Canning, British representative in
(2)
Washington, became alarmed at this report, and when a
bill was introduced on 25th January, 1821, providing for the 
settlement of the Oregon territory, he decided to broach 
the matter to Mr. Adams and remind him of Great Britain* s 
claim/
1* Greenhow, op. cit., Chapter XVI, pp. 331 -354*
2* Several circumstances concurred to increase the alarm*
The mention in Congress by a member with official con­
nections that the United States* Government intended to 
establish settlements beyond the Rockies, in conjunction 
with an article on the subject in the *National Intell­
igencer* (the semi-official organ of the President), made 
the matter serious* Canning*s despatch, No. 3, 28th 
January, 1821, in F.O. 5/157, reflects his state of mind*
claim to the Columbia River region, and. how much the proposed 
measure might prove at variance with the Convention of 1818* 
Canning had had considerable success in his relations with 
Adams up to this point and he was totally unprepared, there­
fore, for the most determined and acrimonious tone in which 
the Secretary replied. The territory, Adams said, belonged 
to the United States, and they could make there what settle­
ments they wished. Canning reminded him of the British 
claim and of the circumstances attending the restoration of 
Astoria in 1818, but Adams raised objections on these points 
and advised him to raise the matter in the form of a note. 
Canning again reviewed his instructions and, 
finding that he had none bearing directly on the subject, 
he consulted those of his predecessors in Washington, Two 
of these seemed important - Castlereagh*s despatch of 4th
a)
February, 1818, to Bagot, and the latter*s answer. In 
the light of these Canning concluded that it seemed to 
follow that his first duty was to keep the question as much 
as possible on its current footing. He seemed to consider 
erroneously that any United States* settlement in Oregon 
was a breach of Article 3 cfthe Convention of 1818, and he 
was of the opinion that, if the report of the committee on 
the occupation of the Columbia River district was repudiated 
by the Government, then the repudiation should be public.
If, on the other hand, the American Cabinet intended to give 
official sanction to the report and was going to follow it 
with an establishment on the Columbia, the least it might 
have done was to have communicated its intention to him at 
a second meeting, Adams scored when he retorted that it 
would/
1, Supra, p. 27,
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would be time enough to protest when actual violation of
the Convention occurred. Canning*s answer was the query -
What would the United States* Government do if Great Britain
sent an expedition to Oregon? The Secretary of State evaded
(1)
the question by describing it as *captious,*
Castlereagh realised that Stratford Canning had
misinterpreted Article 3 of the Convention of 1818 to mean
that it forbade either party*s making settlements in Oregon
(2)
for ten years and, in his reply, after paying due notice 
to the Ambassador* s zeal, he advised him to let the matter 
drop and not to resume discussion of it without special in­
structions, Castlereagh pointed out that British rights were 
not affected by the 1818 agreement and that the third article 
merely conceded mutual right of intercourse with the settle­
ments of either state, "The rights of both parties were 
saved for subsequent adjustment, but no attempt was made 
either to determine those rights, to define what might be 
regarded as the existing state of occupation, or to preclude 
either party from forming new settlements
There was, of course, nothing in the Convention 
of 1818 to preclude the United States from establishing in 
Oregon an American counterpart of the Hudson*s Bay Company, 
nor were they debarred from erecting there a number of *forts* 
or trading-posts in the manner of the British Company, They 
might even have established United States* courts conducted 
in accordance with American law for American citizens in 
Oregon without in any way infringing the terms of the Con­
vention. Until there were appreciable numbers of Americans 
in the disputed territory, and until the area directly east 
of/
1. A re'sume' of Canning *s conversation with Adams appears in 
Canning*s despatch in F,0, 5/157,
2. 10th April, 1821, in F.O. 5/156.
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of the Rockies was settled by Americans, the policy of the 
United States1 Government was to take no official step that 
might effect a breach of the spirit of the Convention, which 
had aimed primarily at preventing the development of disputes 
in Oregon.
Events proved Stratford Canningfs anxiety and
activity unnecessary, for the Bill of 1820 failed to pass
Congress. Castlereagh, who realised that Canningfs demands
upon Secretary Adams were embarrassing to the latter, was
able to give correct advice in the circumstances because he
was aware that the United States* Government were unlikely
to give the bill their support, and that, if it did succeed
in passing through Congress, the British Government must
wait to see the manner in which its terms were executed
before taking action. Though attempts to hasten judgment
of the dispute, by means of the introduction of similar
bills in Congress, became a matter of annual recurrence in
the next fifteen years, they never succeeded in disturbing
the peaceful relations between the two countries, and successive
Governments, British and American, elected to take no notice
of them. So far as Great Britain was concerned, the Foreign
Office continued to follow the policy initiated by Lord
Castlereagh. Full reports of the debates, many of which
were decidedly anti-British, were sent home by successive
ambassadors at Washington, and the Foreign Office reply was
always based upon Castelreagh*s despatch to Stratford Canning
(1)
of 10th April, 1821.
The/
1. Even when it was proposed that Oregon should be made
into a * territory1 of the United States, as, for instance, 
in February, 1822, Canning was advised to adhere to the 
Instruction of the previous April, and he was toid that 
it was unlikely that "the Cabinet would eventually ......
decide on departing from the policy1* initiated by Lord 
Gastlereagh. See Bathurst to Stratford Canning, 8th 
March, 1832, in F.O. 5/166. Cf• Addington to Foreign Office, 
28/12/24 in F.O. 5/186 or Palmerston to Fox, 2/5/58. in 
F.O. 5/321. > / / >
The truth is that the two countries were drawing
more and more closely together and, though trouble-makers
on both sides continued to clamour, the two Governments were
anxious to put aside all tendentious issues and to develop
(1)
their common interests in closer amity. This of course
affected the Oregon controversy, retarding its solution, which 
was a British loss and an American gain. Settlement of the 
question was not considered, and Britain, since she had the 
advantage of sharing possession, was quite ready to acquiesce 
in delay.
Ever since the Treaty Of Ghent enlightened opinion
in England had recognised the advantages of American friend-
(2)
ship and had hoped for a close, alliance. There were
several reasons for this. Great Britain1s position as a
commercial and industrial nation caused her to turn more and
more to the western hemisphere. An island at the centre of
(3)
the world, expanding at a tremendous rate, must have new
markets: her industrial pre-eminence gave Britain access to
world-wide markets. World-wide markets necessitated a world­
wide diplomacy. Furthermore, her position in Canada and the 
West Indies made her an American power. In the British press 
and in parliamentary speeches the new attitude was revealed,
and the former annoyance at American independence gave place
(4)
to a desire for friendship with the United States. The
commercial/
1. Mention of this appears in a confidential despatch from 
Stratford Canning of 27th April, 1821, wherein the writer 
reports the substance of a conversation with Mr. Adams. 
Remembering the recent clash between the two, Adams ex­
pressed the hope that nothing would occur for a long time 
to weaken their mutual dispositions of peace, and his 
offer to take any steps calculated to "draw closer the 
amicable relations of the two countries" was very welcome.
2. See G. M. Trevelyan, *History of England,1 p. 662, London, 
1926, and also Webster, op. cit., passim.
3. .Her exports in 1807 were over thirty times what they were
in 1701.
4. Later the pendulum swung in the opposite direction.
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commercial classes were buying seats in Parliament and their
interests in colonial and maritime questions far outweighed
(1)
European considerations.
2. Russian Intervention.
During the early development of the new friendly 
atmosphere, an act of a third power directed against the common 
interests of the two countries helped to forward, temporarily 
at least, the friendship and. furnished an opportunity for co­
operation between the two. This was the promulgation of a 
Russian ukase in September, 1821, which forbade all foreign 
vessels, not only to land on the coasts and islands between
Bering Strait and latitude 51°, but also to approach them within
(2)
one hundred Italian miles, under penalty of confiscation.
Sir Charles Bagot, now Minister in St. Petersburg, 
requested of Count Nesselrode, the Russian Foreign Minister, 
an explanation of the Russian pretensions. He was informed 
that the primary aim of the ukase was to abolish the * commerce 
interlope * of the Americans in sea-otter skins. No question 
was raised by Bagot at the interview as to why Russia extended 
her claim as far south as 510 North. Since the United States’ 
claim was now deemed by the Americans to extend at least as 
far north as the source of the Columbia River in the fifty- 
first parallel, the ukase was considered by the British' Govern­
ment to be tantamount to a contemptuous dismissal of British 
(3)
claims. Unfortunately, however, for the success of the
scheme/
1. Webster, op. cit., p. 21.
2. It is unnecessary to examine the validity of the Russian 
claim here. It is sufficient to note that it was based 
primarily on the voyage in 1741 of Vitus Bering and his 
lieutenant, Tcherikoff, who had discovered land in 55° 41*.
3. Bagot’s account of his interview with Nesselrode appears 
in P.O. 65(Russia)/l29.
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k -
scheme, the clause of^ukase forbidding foreign trade in the 
area mentioned deeply concerned Great Britain and the United 
States, and the latter, having in view a joint policy,, were 
prepared to come to an understanding with the British Govern­
ment on that point.
Mr. Adams suggested this to Stratford Canning in 
May, 1823, and the latter communicated the proposal to the
new Foreign Secretary, George Canning, who had succeeded
(1)
Castlereagh in the previous autumn. Before this despatch
arrived, however, the Foreign Secretary, at the instance of
the Russian Ambassador, Count Lieven, had instructed Bagot to
(2)
negotiate a settlement with Russia.
When Bagot broached the subject to Henry Middleton,
United States' Minister in St. Petersburg, who was awaiting
instructions to negotiate jointly with Great Britain, he
was greatly perturbed to learn that Middleton and Nesselrode
(3)
had had several talks on the subject of the Russian ukase.
Bagot suggested a convention with a view to establishing 
either joint occupation or a definite line of demarcation. 
During the discussions with Nesselrode, Bagot received 
private instructions in cipher from Canning, intimating 
that the fifty-seventh parallel would be a suitable line 
of frontier between British and Russian territory, and 
warning/
1. See F.O. 5/176, No. 47. In view of the subsequent 
American claims in Oregon, a significant sentence appears 
in this despatch: "He [Adams] added that the United States 
had no territorial claims of their own as high as the 51st 
of latitude.11 Yet in 1845 Adams was a vigorous 'Fifty-Four 
Forty' man.
2. F.O. 65/138.
3. Middleton was originally instructed to propose to Russia 
the division of the whole north-west coast with her. Bagot 
felt that the United States were guilty of duplicity in the 
negotiations. See his despatches to the Foreign Office 
dated 17th and 28th February, 1824. He wrote in a despatch
of 29th October, 1823; "  in regard to the Americans,
any fixed boundary may be better than none; and the ad­
journed question of the Columbia Kiver would be ended." In 
F.O. 65/139.
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warning against a settlement for a limited period as keep­
ing alive a subject of jealousy and contest.
In October, 1823, Bagot reported that Middleton 
had received his instructions and claimed for his country 
equal rights with Britain and Russia up to latitude 61°, 
besides an absolute right to any division of it. The 
United States acknowledged that no country had an absolute
sole claim but maintained that they, as heirs to Spain,
(2)
had the best claim.
Since this went rather further than expected
in Britain, Bagot wrote home for fresh instructions and
(3)
was rewarded with a long despatch. Britain was quite 
prepared to make a joint arrangement on maritime affairs 
but not on the territorial question. Russia might have either 
Britain or the United States as neighbours on the north-west 
coast - not both - and in view of the Convention of 1818, 
there was no cogent reason why a tripartite agreement 
should be entered into. "To have thrown that convention 
loose would have wantonly to have added to the embarrass­
ments of the question, which, so far as we were at that 
moment concerned, had reference only to Russia. But inde­
pendently of these considerations, there was betrayed 
on the part of the United States a secret partiality for 
the/
1* 25th July, 1823, in F.O. 65/138. It is evident from
this that Canning condemned the Convention of 1818 with 
the United States, for it was the only agreement to 
joint occupation with an expirable period into which 
Britain had entered.
2. 17th October, 1823, No. 48, F.O. 65/138. An account 
of the Russo-British negotiations is omitted from this 
essay except in their bearing upon the American claim 
because the finally established ’international' line
of boundary concerned only Great Britain and the United 
States. Mention of the negotiations on the maritime 
claim of the ukase of 1821 is also omitted, that part 
being, unless in a very minor sense, irrelevant to the 
main issue.
3. 15th January, 1824, in F.O. 65/147.
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the Russian side of the question, ill-adapted for the
(1)
purpose of joint occupation.” The United States
proposed that the 55th parallel should be the boundary
line between British and Russian territory, and latitude
(2)
51° that between British and American territory.
The answer to this proposal was conveyed 
verbally to Mr. Rush, as a marginal note in Canning’s 
handwriting explains, but a written record was kept for 
use in future negotiations. Canning explained to Rush 
that Russia, and Britain disputed a small area in North 
America - less than one degree of latitude separating the 
settlements of the two countries. United States* inter# 
vention was therefore unnecessary, especially since the 
Americans put forward no claim (here Canning interposed 
the sarcastic ”1 understand") to actual occupation of the 
area in dispute between England and Russia. The southern­
most Russian post lay in latitude 57°, yet Rush’s memorandum 
suggested latitude 55° as the line of demarcation between 
Russian and British territory. ”lt can hardly be apprehended 
that the United States, having themselves no interest in 
the question, would wish to interfere in it for the express 
purpose of suggesting to Russia an extension which she 
cannot want, and of retrenching from Great Britain a space 
of which she is already in possession.” Great Britain, he 
quite correctly pointed out, did not interfere in the 
negotiations between Spain and the United States in 1819, 
although/
1. A. G. Stapleton, ’Political Life of George Canning,’
III, 118, 3 vols. London, 1831.
2* This proposal was made in a memorandum from Rush'to 
Canning who answered it on 29th January, 1824. The 
answer is in P.O. 5/194, and it explaims Britain’s 
position with regard to the suggestion of tripartite 
negotiations.
although she had an interest in them.
Canning went on to examine Rush’s proposed 
boundary arrangement and noted that it excluded Britain 
from the Columbia, “this essential requisite to the pros­
perity of the colony.” He affected to discover in the 
American proposition - possibly correctly - a previous 
understanding between the United States and Russia, or, 
what was more likely, a disposition on the part of the 
Americans to promote Russian interests where they clashed 
with those of Great Britain. This confirmed the wisdom 
of Canning’s opposition to a joint agreement by the three 
powers, an opposition which had been greatly strengthened 
by the famous Message of President Monroe of December, 1823# 
The Message was inspired by the maritime pretensions of the 
Russian ukase (as well as by other causes irrelevant .to the 
present subject) besides the American desire to;confine 
within the narrowest possible limits the British claim to 
Oregon.
Canning’s aims at this period are admirably 
summed up in a letter from Stratford Canning, dated 28th 
December, 1823, to be found among the Stratford Canning 
papers in the Public Record Office. It was proposed:
(1) to obtain by separate negotiation a disavowal by Russia 
of her twofold, obnoxious pretension; (2) to settle with 
the United States* plenipotentiaries in London a suitable 
boundary west of the Rockies (in which sense the Anglo- 
American and the Anglo-Russian negotiations of 1824 were 
inter-dependent); (3) to settle the Russian boundary 
separately. ”ls it not principally by contracting our 
claws to the North that we may hope to obtain a permanent 
share/
- 5 3
share in the possession of the great outlet of the Columbia?"
The reasoning here appears to be that ultimately the United. 
States would agree to an approximately equal division of terri­
tory with Great Britain, and the lower the Anglo-Russian bound­
ary, therefore, the less there would be to divide equally 
between Britain and the United States. That would mean a 
more southern boundary and, since the chief British aim was to 
safeguard commercial interest by obtaining the Columbia River,
the British Government might hope for a line of demarcation
(1)
along that river.
Bagot was unable to conclude an agreement with
Russia, and it was left to his successor at St. Petersburg,
(2)
Stratford Canning, to do so. The latter ultimately
succeeded in his object on 28th February, 1825, the United
States having previously made a convention with Russia governing
the terms of the ukase of 1821. The convention between Britain
and Russia established the parallel of 54° 40* as the line
of boundary west of the Rockies for the territories of the
two countries. The Hudson*s Bay Company had been consulted
in 1824, and they had advised the Government to close with
(3)
the Russian offer. Canning prophesied that "we shall
have a squabble with the Yankees yet in and about those 
regions/
1. Enclosed with this letter is a project by Stratford 
Canning which suggests that the region between 42° and 
61° might be open to the subjects of the three powers; 
that Russia should extend south to 57° with the right
to fish and trade down to 55°; that Britain should have 
from the mouth of the Columbia to the 57th parallel; that 
the United States should hold from 42° north to the Col­
umbia River with trading rights up to 57°.
2. See Bagot*s last despatch in F.O. 65/143.
3. Canning to Bagot, 24th April, 1824, quoted in J. Bagot, 
*George Canning and His Friends,* London, 1909, p. 265.
In drawing up the terms of the convention, "I pressed into 
my service another hand (that of Lord St. Helens) [Alleyne 
Fitzherbert, Supra, p. 9] which has not lost its cunning 
altogether, though thirty-five years have passed since it 
settled the dispute of Nootka •*•••• It has been submitted 
to both the furry and the finny tribes - the Enderleys, the 
Pellys, and the Barons."
-54-
regions. But Russia will be out of it^ which is as well for 
herself as for us - indeed better."
Thus Russia, which might have been a formidable, 
if uncomfortable, ally of the United States, was dismissed 
from the contest for possession of Oregon, and the only danger 
remaining to Britain was that, somehow or other, the United 
States, her remaining opponent, might obtain 54° 40* as the 
northern boundary and so exclude Britain from the Pacific 
completely.
3. Anglo-American Negotiations of 1824.
In July and August, 1823, the American Minister
at London, Richard Rush, was instructed by Secretary Adams
to treat with Canning upon a number of differences between
their respective countries, notably the suppression of the
slave trade, commercial intercourse between the United States
and the British North American colonies, the fisheries, the
completion of the boundary line between the United States and
British North America, the debatable questionsof maritime law,
(2)
the Russian ukase of 1821. The Foreign Secretary welcomed
the American overtures, and he expressed his hope that H after
a lapse the irritation was forgotten, the force of blood would
again prevail and the daughter and mother stand together
(3)
against the world." He demonstrated his view of the im­
portance of the negotiations by choosing as his representatives 
William Huskisson, President of the Board of Trade, and Strat­
ford Canning, experienced and successful diplomatist.
When the western boundary line came up for
discussion/
1. Canning to Bagot, 29th July, 1824, J. Bagot, op. cit., 266.
2. R. Rush, op. cit., II, 85.
3. Report of speech at Liverpool in fMorning Chronicle* on 
22nd September, 1823.
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discussion the Americans laid claim to all lands watered 
by the Columbia, arguing that it is a canon of international 
law that discovery of the mouth of a river carries with it 
the title to the whole interior watered by the river and its 
tributaries. Their claim therefore extended as far north as 
latitude 51°. Huskisson felt constrained to deny the validity 
of such a claim, whereupon Rush suggested that the whole area 
should be left open for ten years, provided that during that 
period Great Britain should make no settlement between the 
parallels of 51° and 55°, while the United States would agree 
to make none north of 51°. Had this proposal been accepted, 
the Americans would have been able to settle south of 51° 
and, by prohibiting British settlers from entering the same 
area, they would have been able to put forward the accepted 
principle of international law that settlement must accompany 
discovery to give effect to a title. In other words, accept­
ance would have been tantamount to complete surrender of the 
British title to the region between latitudes 42°and 51°•
On 31st May, 1824, Canning answered the reports
of the British representatives and in the same letter laid
down for the first time a well-defined permanent British
policy on the Oregon controversy, a policy the points of
which remained the basis of all British negotiations almost
(1)
till the day of final settlement.
Much as Great Britain desires to improve and 
cherish her good relations with the United States, begins 
the Foreign Secretary, it cannot be expected that from mere 
feelings of goodwill and complaisance she should surrender 
substantial claims, or make important concessions, without 
receiving/
1. Copies of the letter appear in F.O. 5/191 and P.O. 5/194.
Copies of the plenipotentiaries* reports and of Canning*s 
instructions appear in F.O. 5/191.
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receiving reasonable equivalents. He professes a "cordial 
disposition" to complete the boundary line right to the 
Pacific, though Hush*s offer, in view of its reserved pre­
tensions, is to be summarily rejected.
The keynote to Canning's policy is that Great 
Britain is prepared to treat on the basis of reciprocal 
concession and convenience because the region is one of 
growing importance. If Great Britain agrees to the American 
suggestion to abstain from forming settlements south of 51°, 
she will be giving up an area within which lies llootka, and 
Canning asks under what pretence can the United States ask 
Britain to give up her claim to a part of the coast for
which, when Spain attempted to exclude her in 1790, she
successfully upheld her right after running the risk of 
war. The Columbia, he goes on, is the only great navigable 
river in the Oregon territory and the whole region is dotted 
with the posts of the Hudson's Bay Company. The river was 
surveyed by British officers at the expense of the British 
Government many years before the citizens of the United 
States were active there.
The United States* title to Oregon, argues the 
Foreign Secretary, is weak, resting on any one, but never all, 
of the following bases:-
A. The purchase of Louisiana.
B. The Florida Treaty of 1819 with Spain.
Cm The discoveries and acts of settlement of the
Americans themselves.
But these three titles are incompatible one with another, 
and the United States can base a claim on one only of the 
three - not on the three together. The recent Message of 
the/
the President (the Monroe *Doctrine* pronouncement) contains 
a principle which Britain rejects "in the most unequivocable 
manner," inasmuch as Great Britain claims the right to 
colonise where she will*
Canning then proceeds to examine and dispose of 
the United States* claims piecemeal:- 
A* By the Louisiana Purchase.
The United States imagine that 
by the purchase of Louisiana they acquired possession of the 
vast region to which the French had applied the name. The 
French right was based on the voyages of French-Canadians 
who followed the course of the Mississippi, forming establish­
ments at convenient intervals along its banks, or explored 
the forests in its neighbourhood. Louisiana therefore could 
only have been co-extensive with the Mississippi and its 
tributaries. Even that is a very generous estimate because
the sources of some of the tributaries rise within acknow-
(1)
ledged British territory.
B* By the Treaty of 1819.
Since Spain had no settlement 
north of San Francisco, her title can be based on discovery 
only. But Britain can contest priority of discovery with 
Spain because as early as 1579 Jcanning, in error, says 1573J 
English ships went north of San Francisco, and Drake, after 
receiving/
1* As a matter of fact, both Jefferson and Marbois, who
negotiated the transfer, denied that Oregon was included 
in the cession. In 1712 Louis XIV granted to Antoine 
Crozat the exclusive right to trade in the region "drained 
by the waters entering, directly or indirectly, into 
the Mississippi." Since no tributary of the great river 
crosses the Rocky Mountains, it cannot be claimed that 
the grant included Oregon. Crozat*s grant, with Illinois, 
was returned to the Crown in 1717 and the territory 
remained a French province till 1763, when it was ceded 
to Spain. Spain retroceded it in 1800, and three years 
later it was given to the United States.
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receiving the voluntary submission of the natives, called 
the region *New Albion*• Canning continues not wholly correctly: 
11 All question of title derived from Spanish discoveries to 
the north of San Francisco was, however, set at rest by the 
Treaty concluded with Spain in October, 1790.rt If the United 
States are determined to assume the Spanish title they must 
be bound by the restrictions and modifications pertaining 
to that title*
C. By American Discovery and Settlement,
The American is
inferior to the British claim even if discovery is considered 
independently of settlement. The casual arrival of Gray*s 
ship on an intermediate point of the coast, other parts of 
which on both sides, if not indeed the particular spot so 
visited, had been long before known and frequented, can 
hardly be set against the "expensive and laborious surveys” 
executed at the charge of the British Government in the years 
1777 and 1778.
Regarding the claim based on occupation, continues 
Canning, there are two distinct branches'of inquiry:-
(a) To what extent can thet wo parties make good their claims 
to specific areas? The United States have never formed 
an establishment west of the Rockies, except Astoria, 
and it was sold to the North-West Company. After peace 
was signed this post was given back nominally - on a 
liberal construction of the first article of the Treaty 
of Ghent. The Hudson* s Bay Company still hold that post; 
the Americans are not there and evidently therefore have 
no use for it. Indeed, there was a complete network of 
Hudson*s Bay Company establishments connecting the north­
west coast with Canada down to 48°or 470.
(b) Does/
(b) Does territorial possession when vested in one exclude
the other? It is impossible to determine precisely a
line of demarcation between the territories of the two
countries calculated on the basis of their respective
claims by right of discovery and occupancy; for an
amicable arrangement compromise is essential.
The British plenipotentiaries were accordingly
instructed by Canning to propose that the boundary should run
along the 49th parallel to the Rocky Mountains, thence by the
main northeastern branch of the Columbia into the Columbia
(1)
itself and thence on to the Pacific.
Britain was thus giving up all her claim to the 
area between 42° N. and the Columbia, Canning explained, but 
he conceived that she would obtain a satisfactory return for 
these concessions by securing the only points of substantial 
interest to England, that is, the undisturbed possession of 
the whole country on the right bank of the Upper Columbia, 
and a free issue for its produce by the channel of that river. 
In executing their instructions the commissioners were to 
take great care to provide effectually for this object. If 
necessary, Britain would not oppose free access, over a 
number of years, by citizens of each part of the territory 
to the other part. Thus, for example, the Hudson*s Bay 
Company might be allowed to retain their posts south of the 
Columbia for the period agreed upon. If the comprehensive 
proposition just outlined were not entertained, then Great 
Britain would stand by the Convention of 1818 rather than 
consider the surrender of "our just claims."
On 29th July, 1824, the British representatives
(2)
reported the tenor of Rush*s reception of the proposition. 
Rush/
1* No. 5, P.O. 5/191. The "main northeastern branch" of the 
Columbia was called in maps of the period "McGillivray*s 
River," though in present day maps the Columbia is deemed 
to extend beyond the 51st parallel. See Map in Appendix.
2. in same, No. 91
Rush, was unable to mention a single district west of the 
Rockies oecupied by the United States but at the same time 
he was obstinate in his defence of the American claim to all 
land between the parallels of latitude covering the mouth 
of the Columbia and its tributaries. The farthest he would 
recede from his position was to agree to accept the 49th 
parallel instead of the 51st as the northern boundary. 
Huskisson and Stratford Canning, the English plenipotent­
iaries, felt it necessary to reject this offer as wholly 
inconsistent with equity and the*fair expectations* of Great 
Britain. The Americans were reminded that the posts of the 
Hudson*s Bay Company already extended more than a degree to 
the south of the 49th parallel, that the Columbia and the 
streams falling into it from the north and east (the only 
outlets for British merchandise) had been habitually navigated 
by the agents of the Company.
Unfortunately, the positions of the respective 
negotiators proved to be irreconcilable, and the negotiations 
were abandoned without result.
4. The Influence of Canning.
Owing largely to Canning Britain*s position had 
been clarified. Her claim west of the Rockies now was for 
the line of the Columbia and she had therefore given up all 
between the river and latitude 42°. Her proposal reveals 
her desire for compromise and her eagerness to settle a 
question which might prove a source of irritation. At the 
same time, it is to be noted that the line proposed by 
Canning would have secured all that v/as necessary to preserve 
British interests. Canning*s offer was eminently fair to 
the American claim at that period. Though it was not he 
who/
who initiated the negotiation of 1824, he plainly saw the 
necessity for an early settlement; and he made a dignified 
stand against extreme American pretensions. Before estimat­
ing his influence on the conduct of the Oregon controversy, 
the progress of the question up to the time of his death 
must be reviewed.
Congress always sought to keep the north-west
dispute alive, and in December, 1824, a bill passed the
House of Representatives by 113 to 57 votes for the occupation
of the Columbia River area. H. U. Addington, who was at
that time British representative in Washington, saw a threat
to British interests in this vote and, in spite of the fact
that it was in no way a breach of the Convention of 1818, he
felt constrained to do all he could to ensure its being
(1)
thrown out.by the Senate.
Canning, disappointed at the failure of the 
negotiations in 1824, was resolved to reopen discussion 
at the first favourable opportunity, and he proceeded to 
gather data for a fresh attempt at settlement. The agitation 
in the United States in favour of occupying the disputed area 
demonstrated the danger a danger that was ultimately 
realised - that the Americans would augment their already
formidable claim by establishing a title by right of
occupation. Not only would this make them more determined 
in their demands, but it would also make real the danger
of local collisions in the disputed area.
He neglected no deposit of information in form-, 
ulating his policy and naturally therefore was in constant 
touch with the Hudson* s Bay Company. The Governor of the 
Company was Sir J. H. Belly, whose first letter to Canning 
on/
1. A d d i n g t o n*s despatch is dated 28th December, 1824, in 
F.O. 5/186.
on the boundary issue in the Government records - the first
in a long, intimate series - is dated 9th December, 1825,
(1)
though mention is made of previous communications. Pelly, 
after recapitulating the points of the British argument, 
indicates the benefits to British manufacturers of the Com­
pany’s trade in Oregon. He considers the possession of 
Fort Vancouver and the right to the navigation of the Col­
umbia River to be absolutely necessary to the Company’s
carrying on to advantage not only the trade of the upper
(2)
parts of the river, but also that of the interior. A boun­
dary agreement ought to be reached, and the Company would 
suggest one "starting from latitude 49° at the Rocky Mountains 
Jfrom which J the Line ought to be continued Southward along 
the height of land to the place where Lewis and Clark crossed 
the Mountains, said to be in latitude 46° 42’, thence westerly 
along the Lewis’s River, until it falls into the Columbia 
and thence to the Sea, leaving the navigation of both these'
O )
rivers free to the Subjects of both Nations.1
For the purpose of obtaining more first-hand 
information of the area and with a view to co-ordinating 
the Government’s policy with that of the Company, a list 
of questions was prepared, in the Foreign Office, on Canning’s 
instructions, for answer by the officials of the Company.
The answers were written on 51st December, 1825, and both 
questions and answers are Illuminating# Questions as to 
the soil and climate of Oregon, the extent of the fur trade, 
land and water communications, and other natural facilities 
are asked, and the answer §, by comparing the Columbia and 
Fraser/
1. The letter appo^rs in 0#0« §/b#
2. Fort Vancouver had built t© repluo© Fort George in
1824# It became the Qomgaayis ehief b&a© in Oregon. See map.
3. ’Lewis’s Kiver* is the mMerft Snake Hiver. Lewis and Clark 
had reached the mouth §f the Columbia from Louisiana by way 
of the Clearwater and lueke Hiver§#
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Fraser Rivers, establish very clearly the importance of the 
former. On this subject the Hudson!s Bay Company!s adviser 
writes in unequivocal terms that if the navigation of the 
Columbia is not free to the Company, and the territory to 
the northward is not secured to them, they must abandon and 
curtail their trade in some parts and probably be constrained
(i)
to relinquish it on the west side of the Rockies altogether*
Ultimately, the opportunity desired by Canning 
was presented in 1826 when Mr. Gallatin was sent to London 
to negotiate a treaty comprehending all questions in dispute 
between the United States and Great Britain. On the Oregon 
issue he was instructed to renew Rush*s. offer of 1824 (the 
line of the 49th parallel right to the Pacific) with the 
additional concession of the free navigation of any branches 
of the Columbia which happened to cross the line at navigable 
points.
Great Britain, on the other hand, adhered to her
(2)
former proposition as a basis of negotiation. Canning
receded slightly from his former position, however, by 
intimating that he would be prepared to grant to the United 
States the use. of the harbour of Port Discovery in the 
Straits of Juan de Fuca, with a radius of land five miles 
in breadth encircling that harbour.
If this was not acceptable, the British 
commissioners were authorised to offer, as a final terri*» 
torial/
1. The answers were prepared by Mr. (later Sir) George 
Simpson, who had wide practical experience of the fur 
trade in Oregon. (C.O. 6/6). "There was no element of 
the fur trade from the Athabasca Country to the Sandwich 
Islands, from Hudson Bay to the steppes of Siberia, that 
he did not acquaint himself with by personal visit. He 
was a dynamo of energy, tireless at his work, whether at 
his desk or on the march." F. Merk, "Fur Trade and Empire," 
Harvard Historical Studies, No. 31, Introduction, p. xviii, 
London, 1931.
2. Supra, p. 59.
torial concession, the whole peninsula comprised within
lines described by the Pacific to the west, de Fuca’s
Strait to the north, Hood’s Canal to the east, and a line
drawn from the southern point of Hood’s Canal to a point
ten miles south of Gray’s Harbour to the south. In addition,
free navigation of the Columbia would be granted. On two
points Great Britain cannot yield. She could not cede any
part of Vancouver Island, which is intersected by the 49th
parallel, without the same risk of collision as exists in
the system of joint occupancy: nor could she surrender the
right to navigate the Columbia because she would thereby
deprive her settlers of their main outlet for trade. If
the United States rejected this revised and somewhat novel
offer Huskisson and Addington, the commissioners, were to
propose renewal of the arrangement of 1818 for ten or fifteen
(1)
years•
An impasse soon developed because the American 
representatives would not depart from the 49th parallel as 
their basis of discussion. The detached morsel of land 
offered by the Foreign Secretary was deemed useless. The 
English negotiators sought thereupon to secure continuance 
of the arrangement of 1818 with the saving clause that all 
claims to exclusive sovereignty should be held in abeyance. 
Gallatin, however, refused to agree to any restriction of 
the United States1 right to assume and exercise at all times 
exclusive sovereignty in the disputed territory.
At length, in August, 1827, almost synchronising 
with the death of Canning, a new convention was signed which 
renewed/
1. See his letter, No. 1, 10th November, 1826, in F.O. 5/219. 
Gallatin’s offer is discussed in Twiss, op. cit., Chapter 
XVI. Accounts of the negotiations appear in F.O. 5/219 
and 5/230. For the extent of the ’Olympic Peninsula* see 
map in Appendix.
renewed the arrangement of 1818 for an indefinite number of 
years but made it terminable by either party at a yearfs 
notice.
Canning*s attitude had been, as usual, firm and
in the best British interests. A letter of his to Lord
Liverpool, the Prime Minister, of 7th July, 1826, explains 
(1)
his position. After deploring the blunder of the restoration
of Astoria, he expresses the hope that he will be able to
retrieve the mistake if the present position is maintained
immovably. Retreat will make the cession of Astoria the
first of a series of signs of weakness. It must be borne
in mind that the Americans* "ambitious and overbearing"
views are daily becoming better understood in Britain and
that the trade between the Eastern and Western Hemispheres,
direct across the Pacific, is the trade of the world most
susceptible of rapid augmentation and improvement* In ten
years the East India Company*s monopoly will expire and
"though at that period neither you nor I shall be where we
are to answer for our deeds, I should not like to leave my
name affixed to an instrument by which England would have
foregone the advantage of an immense direct intercourse
between China and what may be, if we resolve not to yield
them up, her boundless establishments on the North-West
(2)
Coast of America."
This letter together with his instructions of 
1824 illustrate and summarise Canning’s policy and, had he 
lived to carry it to fruition, we may well believe that the 
line/
1* To be found in e* J* Stapleton, op. cit., II, 73«
2. Mackenzie, Thompson, and other pioneers concurred in 
this view.
line of the Columbia for which he stood so resolutely would
have formed the basis of the boundary settlement west of the
Rockies. He was the first British statesman to realise fully
the importance of the subject and to recognise the possibilities
of trade with the Orient by way of the north-west coast of
North America. The line he proposed and negotiated for so
determinedly was the best possible in view of the retrocession
of Astoria. Canning was aware that British interest in Oregon
was primarily commercial and was directly represented by the
fur traders; it was his policy to encourage and protect that
interest. Since 1821, when the Hudson*s Bay Company absorbed
the North West Company, the former had controlled the fur trade
in Oregon. Their method of operation was to establish trading-
posts or *forts* at strategic points in the interior, to which
the Indians would bring their furs to exchange them for articles
(1)
of British manufacture. In this aspect of the trade, there­
fore, the Hudsonfs Bay Company assisted British industry. The 
furs were sent down the Columbia River, whence they were trans­
ported to China which provided a lucrative market for them. It 
is obvious that the success of this trade was largely dependent
on the use of the Columbia, the possession or the use of which
became, therefore, from Canning’s time a sine qua non of Brit­
ish negotiators. He thought of it as the ’St. Lawrence of the 
West,’ and it was deemed to be the only suitable western outlet
to the sea in British North America. Canning appreciated the
Americans* desire to have the use of the excellent harbours 
north of the Columbia for their whalers and fur-traders, and 
this explains his offer of the * Olympic Peninsula;* but both 
banks of the Columbia must be retained by Great Britain. ...
It is true that Canning established a dangerous
precedent/
1. For an account of the fur trade see Beckles Willson, *The 
Great Company,* London, 1888, or K. Coman, *The Economic 
History of the Far West,* 2 vols., New York, 1912, or F. 
Merk, ’Fur Trade and Empire,’ London, 1931.
-67-
precedent by offering, for the first time in the negotiations 
between the two countries, to cede a relatively small area 
north of the Columbia, but the offer represented a real attempt 
to conciliate the Americans at a time when it was desirable to 
settle outstanding disputes between the tv/o countries. More­
over, the Americans had initiated the Oregon discussions and 
Canning deemed it correct, as a gesture of friendliness, to 
make a slight recession in British demands. The important 
consideration is that he perceived the extreme necessity of a 
speedy settlement.
Canning’s general policy towards the United States 
was to depress the influence of that country in the western 
hemisphere, and he aimed, therefore, at continuing Pitt’s plan 
of an understanding with the South American colonies which he 
wished to align with Britain. Whereas, by the Monroe Doctrine, 
Europe and America were to be absolutely separate and independ­
ent of each other, Canning wanted intercourse between the two
to be free with the American states playing their part, if riec-
(1)
essary, in European politics. He saw Mexico, which he said
must "be either subservient to or jealous of” the United States,
as the potential counter-poise to the latter, and he believed
(2)
that any United States* expansion would be towards Mexico. His 
policy with regard to the north-west coast was therefore governed 
by his desire to bring Mexico closer to Britain, territorially 
and in spirit. The Oregon boundary must be as far south as 
possible to achieve this, and Canning could not contemplate the 
loss of prestige among the South American colonies that would 
follow recession from the line of the Columbia.
1. H. W. V. Temperley, ’The Later American Policy of George 
Canning,1 American Historical Review, XI, 779-797, p. 780.
2. From memo, in Vansittart Papers, written by Vansittart and 
inspired by Canning, in British Museum, Ad. MSS. 31, quoted 
by Temperley, p. 781. For Canning's American policy see 
also, H. W. V. Temperley, ’The Foreign Policy of Canning,1 
London, 1925, p. 487 ff.
CHAPTER IV
A PERIOD OF DIPLOMATIC INACTIVITY: 1827-41
So far as Anglo-American diplomacy was concerned 
the Oregon controversy languished for some time after the 
agreement of 1827. So far as the domestic politics of the 
United States were concerned, however, the question continued 
to obtrude itself more and more* True to their traditional 
tendency to avoid an issue, the British Government and public, 
fortunately for the ultimate peaceful settlement of the dispute 
invariably ignored the high-spirited discussions on Oregon 
conducted in the United States Congressf
The conciliatory American policy of the Castle- 
reagh era was not so positively maintained after Castlereagh’s 
death and the effect was soon evident* Till 1830 the Tories 
were enjoying in Britain their long innings of power, and 
contemptuous dislike of the Americans was common among them# 
This aristocratic party had not yet forgotten the loss of the 
American colonies and many regarded the Yankees as traitors* 
Many English periodicals and magazines of the eighteen-thirties 
affected to despise and ridicule ’Brother Jonathan’ whose 
culture v/as so inferior to that of ’John Bull*’ Harriett 
Martineau, for example, retained the old attitude towards 
American affairs, while Mrs. Trollope’s ’Domestic Life of 
the Americans,’ (1832) aroused those feelings of ridicule 
and scorn which other writers of repute sought to preserve. 
True, there were exceptions like Cobden, who maintained that 
"British Policy should be directed more with reference to 
American conditions than along the ancient lines of the balance
69-
(1)
of power in Europe,” but these exceptions were rare.
Whatever hope there was of a close entente between 
the two countries disappeared with the concurrence of a number 
of events immediately following the accession of Queen Victoria, 
First of all, there occurred the Canadian Rebellion, the leaders 
of which fled to Vermont and New York and from there conducted 
a number of border forays into Canadian territory. The United 
States* Government made no satisfactory attempts to prevent 
them from addressing public gatherings and recruiting troops. 
However innocent the Americans were of complicity in these 
raids, the fact remains that the United States provided the 
rebels with a safe and accessible refuge.
Trouble arose also over the *Caroline* incident 
and much bitterness was engendered by its sequel - the McLeod 
affair. The * Caroline* was a ship used to transport men and 
ammunition to Canada. A number of Canadian soldiers crossed 
to American territory, seized the ’Caroline*, and, directing 
it towards Niagara Falls, cut it adrift. In a skirmish which 
accompanied the escapade, an American was killed. Great 
agitation followed, and the United States* Government demanded 
redress. Then followed the ’McLeod incident.1 In 1840 a 
Canadian named Alexander McLeod boasted in New York that he 
had taken part in the ’Caroline* affair and that he had 
killed a man. When McLeod was arrested Great Britain demanded 
his release, but this was refused. Tfte incident was not 
satisfactorily disposed of until the Webster-Ashburton negot­
iations in 1842.
The United States in the late thirties were
suspected/
1, Quoted in W, A, Dunning, ’The British Empire and the
United States,* p, 85, New York, 1914. Cf. H, L. Keen- 
leyside, ’Canada and the United States,* New York, 1929,
On the problem of the right of search see W. L, Mathieson, 
’Great Britain and the Slave Trade,* Chapter I, London,
1929.
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suspected of encouraging Texas to obtain its independence 
from Mexico, whereas the British Government, prompted by their 
crusading enthusiasm for the abolition of slavery and their 
anxiety that Texas should remain as a buffer between the 
United States and Mexico, feared the acquisition of the region 
by the United States.
The old question, too, of the right of search 
continued to agitate the minds of the Americans* In 1841 a 
treaty was signed by five continental powers conceding re­
ciprocal right of search and agreeing to solicit the con­
currence of the United States. General Cass, a leading 
Senator who later became Secretary of State, instituted a 
strong agitation against the treaty after it was signed*
Prance*s recent failures in Egypt and Syria induced her sym­
pathy with Cass. The latter contended that exercise of the 
right of mutual search was impossible because one state might 
have scores of cruisers and another might have only a few*
The United States persistently refused to entertain the 
distinction that Great Britain made between the right of 
search and the right of visit*
Finally, the Oregon question itself was attracting 
more attention because, in addition to the discussions in 
Congress, preparations were being made for American emigration 
into the disputed territory*
Having regard to conditions prevalent in the 
period under review(1827-41) therefore, we must conclude 
that in view of the tenacity with which the rival Governments 
held their claims in Oregon and the mutual dislike and suspicion 
of the two peoples encouraged by the series of incidents we 
have noted, it was perhaps fortunate that no agreement was 
imperative/
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imperative at that time. Yet the British Government might 
have secured a very satisfactory settlement had they pressed 
for one, prepared to go to war if necessary, or had they 
enthusiastically taken up the challenge so often thrown down 
by Congress. Once American immigration into Oregon had begun, 
the British position was seriously weakened, and in proportion 
as it increased in numbers, the maximum British claims lost 
their chance of realisation.
It will be well to notice also the slight diplo-
(1)
matic progress effected in this period. As early as
February, 1829, the British Government had taken cognisance
of Lloyd’s Bill* which was introduced in Congress at the
end of 1828 authorising the establishment of a fort at the
mouth of the Columbia and the organisation of an exploring
expedition to Oregon. The erection of such a fort would not,
of course, have been a breach of the terms of the Convention
of 1827, though it would have violated its spirit. So great
was the clamour in the United States, particularly in the
west, for the occupation of Oregon, that something had to be
done to satisfy public opinion, or at least to calm its
(2)
nbisier element. The British Government, fortunately
for the preservation of peace, wisely ignored the agitation, 
relying on the belief that the better sense of the American 
people and, in particular, the prudence of the Government 
would prevail. They understood the anti-British polemics 
of vote-seeking American politicians; indeed, the British 
press/
1. So far as the British public were concerned, Oregon might 
never have existed. Oregon was of interest only to the 
Foreign Office, the Colonial Office, and the Hudsonfs 
Bay Company.
2. Many memorials were presented to Congress urging this, 
and private companies were actually formed for the purpose 
of organising emigration to the Pacific coast. See a 
letter of 21st February, 1829, from Backhouse (Foreign 
Office) to Hay (Colonial Office) in C.O. 6/7.
press at this period very trenchantly derided this peculiar 
feature, among others, of American politics.
While the agitation for the forcible seizure of 
Oregon continued in the United States, therefore, and bills 
for the occupation of the territory were annually presented 
in Congress during the thirties, the British attitude was 
generally one of^^ripassivity towards American threats to 
abrogate the Convention of 1827. But this policy of scornful 
apathy could be carried too far, and while Britain looked on, 
American immigrants were pouring into Oregon, their presence 
adding a further complication to the general controversy.
When the Convention of 1827 was signed the Amer-
(1)
icans had not a single settlement in Oregon, while the
Hudson*s Bay Company had .many posts scattered throughout the
land between 42° N. and the Russian boundary. United States*
immigration commenced in 1835, when Methodist ministers with
their wives set out overland from Missouri for the Columbia
River; by the autumn of 1836 they were established on the
(2)
river. Their perseverance in the face of tremendous odds
Inspired others to follow their example, and their glowing 
reports of the natural wealth of the region and the fertility 
of its soil prompted considerable numbers to enter it.
The growth in population was at first slow, but 
the annual spectacle of scores of American families setting 
out on a long, dangerous journey to new homes in the wilder­
ness had its due effect upon a nation whose love of adventure 
and patriotic display is proverbial. These heroic pioneers, 
it was afgued, must have the protection of the United States* 
flag/
1. See President Adams *s Message of 12th December, 1827.
2. An account of the activities of these missionaries appears 
in J. Barrov/s, * Oregon,* Chapters XV, XVI and XVII, New 
York, 1886•
flag on their journey, and so the question of establishing 
military posts along the immigrants1 route was mooted in 
Congress and press. In order that the title to their home­
steads* might be given permanent validity, an agitation arose 
for the termination of the agreement of 1827 and for the 
settlement of a final boundary line between British and 
United States* territory in Oregon. Congress could make no 
grants of land till the Convention expired; in consequence of 
this, the Americans retained their settlements in the southern 
part of the disputed area.
Petitions were presented to Congress that the 
protection of the American flag should be extended to Oregon, 
and by 1838 these had become so numerous that Lord Palmerston, 
the Foreign Secretary, warned Mr. Fox, the British Ambassador 
in Washington, that he must not make any communication to the 
United States* Government upon the bill in Congress to send
a military force to Oregon until he was given specific in-
(1)
structions.
With the increase in American attention to Oregon,
there was a corresponding increase in British interest, and
we find the United States* records of the Foreign Office
after 1838 more and more devoted to the Oregon controversy.
There is, for example, a noteworthy *Memo. on Relation between
Treaties between United States and Britain and intended
(2)
Massachusetts Emigration to Oregon,* drawn up in the
Foreign Office by Mr. Fox-Strangeways and forwarded to Mr. 
(later Sir) James Stephen, Permanent Under-Secretary at the 
Colonial Office. After giving the gist of the Conventions 
of/
1. Palmerston to Fox, No. 12, 2nd May, 1838, in F.O. 5/321.
2. In C.O. 6/l3, 12th August, 1839.
of 1818 and 1827, the memorandum expresses alarm at the 
proposed movement In Massachusetts. It is, however, in its 
annotations by members of the Cabinet that the memorandum 
carries importance, for these show that some members of the 
Government at least were alive to the dangers of the situation.
The important Mr. Stephen, for instance, has in­
serted in pencil his endorsement of Fox-Strangeways*s opinion 
that abrogation of the Convention of 1827 should be in Eng­
land* s interest. Whether his conclusion was drawn from con­
sideration of the policy of his predecessors or was his per­
sonal estimate .of the best policy to be adopted at that 
foment, it is difficult to say. Stephen concludes his note 
with the remark that ,fIt is not stated that Lord Palmerston 
adopts them Fox. Strangeway s * s views J." The general tone 
of the inter-departmental correspondence - especially the 
annotations of Ministers like Lord John Russell and permanent 
officials like Stephen - indicates British policy*s being 
framed to meet the exigencies of the moment; it betrays also 
the general apathy of the Government upon the Oregon dispute. 
Although Russell had been in the Government for several years, 
his marginal note to Sir John Pelly*s letter of 2nd March,
1840, addressed to Viscount Palmerston, illustrates his
a)
ignorance of the facts of the controversy. In spite of
Pelly*s warnings the Government refused to be forced into 
action other than to advise the Hudson*s Bay Company to do 
all/
1. Pelly in this letter expresses alarm at the Senate*s
request to the President to abrogate the arrangement of 
1827, and outlines the services rendered by the Company. 
They employ over 1,000 British settlers; they have de­
veloped the land at great expense to themselves. If the 
United States* Government carry out the Senate*s advice 
the Company will be ruined and Britain deprived of 11 the 
only position on the shores of the Pacific that can be 
valuable to the Country, either for colonisation or com­
mercial pursuits, while the only safe and commodious 
harbours on that Coast will be in possession of jealous 
rival Powers ...... rf InC.O. 6/l4.
all possible to discourage American immigration into the -
(1)
area in dispute*
It is apparent that, in so far as the British 
Government were interested in the controversy at all, they 
felt that their hands were tied by the terms of the Convention 
of 1827* During Palmerston*s tenure of the Foreign Office, 
while nothing was done to encourage the United States* move­
ment for abrogation (rather the contrary was true as his advice
(2)
to Fox in 1838 proves) no step was taken to counteract
its possible evil effects or to replace it by a final boundary
settlement. Greville summarised Palmerston*s policy thus:
f,We are all in the right and the Americans all in the wrong,
never give up anything, insist on having the things settled,
in your own way, and if they won*t consent, let it remain 
(3)
unsettled."
The period 1827-41, then, is characterised by 
three things all of which retarded an accommodation of the 
boundary controversy. Anglo-American relations were not 
good enough to justify the opening of negotiations. The 
dispute was allowed to languish in semi-oblivion so far as 
the Foreign Office was concerned, and, while the permanent 
officials of the Government and the officers of the Hudson*s 
Bay Company reflected the influence of Canning in their view 
that a speedy settlement was most desirable, the Cabinet was 
apathetic and disinclined to move. The third circumstance, 
namely, the extensive immigration of American settlers, was 
developing ominously for Britainj the numbers of immigrants 
were increasing substantially each year, and the clamour for 
their protection en route and in their new homes was in­
creasing proportionately.
1. Commander Belcher complained to the Government of the 
political activities of the American missionaries in 
Oregon., bdlieving for some obscure reason that they were 
employed by the Company.
2. Supra, p. 75.
3. II, 126, edition of 1885*
CHAPTER V
EFFORTS OF THE PEEL GOVERKMBHT AT SE'PTT.mreM'P: 1841-45
1» Preparation of Data.
With the accession to power of Sir Robert Peel,
"one of the most wisely peaceful ministers England ever
(1)
had,” in September, 1841, there was evinced by Lord 
Aberdeen, the new Foreign Secretary, a desire to end the 
Oregon controversy along with other outstanding matters of 
dispute between Britain and the United States.
Aberdeen!s first step was to obtain all the 
existing data on the subject, and so we find the Under­
secretary, Mr. Backhouse, instructed to examine all relevant 
documents. The position is therefore brought up to date in 
a memorandum submitted by Backhouse on 28th October, 1841. 
After a brief revieYtf of the terms of the existing treaties 
and the results of negotiations, the author describes the 
matter as one of "manifestly vast importance." The disputed 
area is of easy access to the United States which have a 
rapidly increasing population and every disposition to meet 
the demands of settlement by the acquisition of fresh terri­
tory. The whole subject may soon be once again one of ardent
(2)
debate in Congress; it is to be hoped that this will
occur before the Canadian forces are reduced to their ordinary 
strength.
The/
1* Or. M. Trevelyan,1 Hi story of England,* p. 684, London, 1926
2. "The nation [ United States ] in the forties was permeated 
with a sense of power and of destiny that tolerated no 
suggestion of limit in any direction." Dunning, op. cit., 
p. 138. For an outline of the !Manifest Destiny* movement 
see Part II, *The San Juan Controversy,* below.
The recent opening of commercial relations with 
the East inspired in England increased attention to the Pacific 
coast of America, and the possibilities of Oregon, in view of 
the rapid extension of steam navigation and the probability 
of regular passage across the Isthmus of Panama, were greatly 
enhanced.
The new Foreign Office activity over Oregon in
the winter of 1841-42 produced several important letters,
notably a series from the Hudson*s .Bay Company, compiled at
the behest of the Government and perused and annotated by
the competent expert of the Government, G. M. Featherstonhaugh.
(1)
Two of these, written by Simpson to the governors of the
Company, dated 25th November, 1841, from Fort Vancouver, and
10th March, 1842, from Honolulu, respectively, are of great
moment because they had the salutary effect of increasing
the attention and Importance attached to Oregon by the British
Government, besides serving to stiffen their attitude on the
(2)
boundary dispute#
The first letter gives a full and exact account 
of the extent and resources of the Oregon territory, with the 
remark that the plains between the Cowlitz River and Puget 
Sound - all connected with the Strait of Juan de Fuca - will 
become in time as valuable as the Willamette Valley which
(3)
the Americans call the *Eldorado of the Northern Pacific•»
The prosperity of this region surprised Simpson, v/ho found 
it peopled by about 350 Canadians and 150 Americans and nearly
1,000 Indians.
The second letter contains mention of an interview
which/
1. See p. 63, footnote, supra.
2. The first letter is to be found in F.O. 5/397, and the 
second in F.O. 5/388. Copies of both appear in the
* American Historical Review,* XIV, 70-94, with an intro- 
3# duction by J• Schafer.
See Map in Appendix.
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which the writer had had with Lieutenant Wilkes, who had been 
sent to Oregon on an exploring expedition by the United States* 
Government* Wilkes made it clear to Simpson that he had 
formed a high opinion of the strategic value of the Oregon 
territory, particularly of the harbours in and near the Strait 
of Juan de Fuca. Simpson*s letter concludes, therefore, with 
expression of the hope that "you [ Pelly ] will urge H* M* Gov­
ernment not to consent to any boundary which would give to 
the United States any portion of the territory north of the 
Columbia River, as any boundary north of that stream would 
deprive Great Britain of the only valuable part of the terr­
itory, the country to the northward of the Straits of de
Fuca not being adapted for agriculture or other purposes
(1)
connected with colonisation*"
Lord Aberdeen's desire to adjiBt all disputes 
with the United States, the spread of interest in the con­
troversy, and the successful termination of the war in China 
concurred in impressing tpe need for a settlement. The
policy of the Foreign Secretary, "the most ladjLike member
(2)
of the government," was always pacific, and he hesitated 
to allow the Americans to abrogate the Convention of 1827 
without making some effort towards an amicable adjustment 
of the whole dispute. The period of Aberdeen's tenure of 
the Foreign Office, therefore, extending from September, 1841, 
to/
1. Pelly dispatched these letters to the Foreign Office, 
and after consideration of them by the Cabinet, Aberdeen 
asked the Admiralty to send a ship from time to time to 
the Columbia to protect British interests there and to 
obtain first-hand information about the region. The 
officer in charge was instructed not to interfere with 
the settlers of whatever nationalty, nor was he to assert 
for Great Britain an exclusive claim to any portion of 
the territory. Addington (Foreign Office) to the Admir­
alty, 7th February, 1843, in F.O. 5/399. The 'Thalia* was 
sent from Bombay to the Columbia at the end of the year. 
See also Addington to the Admiralty, 18th October, 1843, 
in F.O. 5/402.
2. P. Guedalla, 'Palmerston,' p. 253, London, 1926.
to July, 1846, was by far the most important on© in the 
progress of the dispute, and it was a remarkable coincidence 
that his demission of office synchronised almost to the day 
with his successful conclusion of the whole affair - a settle­
ment due in very large measure to his ability, patience, and 
perseverance*
2* Lord Ashburton*s Mission: 1842.
On 8th February, 1842 (two weeks after the receipt 
of Simpson*s letters), Lord Aberdeen commissioned Lord Ash­
burton to go to Washington to negotiate and conclude arrange­
ments for the settlement of outstanding disputes between
(1)
the United States and Great Britain* These were the
north-eastern boundary, the north-western boundary, Oregon, 
the *Caroline* affair, and the right of search*
Congress were again considering the abrogation 
of the Convention of 1827, and Ashburton was accordingly 
instructed to propose a line of boundary "commencing at the 
mouth of the Columbia River; thence by a line drawn along 
the middle of that River to its point of confluence with the 
Great Snake River; thence by a line carried due East to the 
Rocky or Stony Mountains; and thence by a line drawn in a 
northerly direction along the said Mountains -until it strikes 
the/
1. The wisdom of this step was attested by Sir Charles Bagot, 
who was so we11 qualified to estimate the temper of the 
American people* His letter addressed to Lord Stanley, 
the Colonial Secretary, is to be found in C*0* 42/490* 
"American Settlements , he writes, "are rapidly increasing 
on the Western side of the Rocky Mountains, and if Great 
Britain delays only for a few years to plant there a 
population connected with herself and attached to her 
Institutions, she will find herself extruded completely 
from the Country by her more active competitors **••••
I would, therefore, most earnestly recommend that Her 
Majesty*s Government should at once decide on the course 
to be pursued by them, and act on it without delay, and 
thus anticipate the pretensions which will otherwise be 
put forward by the United States.”
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the 49th parallel of North Latitude* The Southern bank of 
the Columbia River would thus be left to the Americans, and 
the Northern band to the English; the navigation of the 
river being free to both.*'
In the event of this proposal being rejected,
Lord Ashburton was to propose a line starting from the point 
where the 49th parallel strikes the Rockies and running along 
that parallel to its intersection with the Kootenay River, 
thence along that river to the Columbia and thence to the 
Pacific* But he was to reject the proposal, formerly made 
by the United States, if it was repeated, of establishing 
the 49th parallel as the boundary right to the Pacific. If 
it was impossible to arrive at a settlement and the United 
States insisted upon abrogation of the existing Convention, 
their representatives were to be informed, as they had been 
in 1824 under similar circumstances, that any attempt to dis­
possess by force the British occupants would be considered 
a *manifest infraction1 of the rights of Great Britain*
Ashburton*s reception in the United States presaged 
well for the success of his mission* He was conversant with
(1)
the difficulties in his way and he was a very able negotiator. 
That his judgment was good we have evidence in his reflections 
on the slave trade, the right of search, the *Caroline* case, 
and the Maine boundary. He correctly gauged American opinion 
on Oregon when he saw that the United States were looking in 
that direction for a harbour on the Pacific. The mouth of 
the/
1. ** .......the minister of the day is frequently deterred
from doing what he approves by the scrutiny of a lower 
description of public opinion than that which influences 
opinion in any other parts of the world and of which all 
men, holding or seeking office, stand dismally in awe*” 
Ashburton to Aberdeen, No. 2, 25th April, 1842, in F.O.
5/379. See F.O* 5/378 for the instructions given to Ash­
burton* The negotiation was conducted on the United States* 
side by Daniel Webster, the Secretary of State.
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the Columbia was fcarred, and they were therefore seeking a
suitable port to the north of it,
President Tyler was an expansionist and conceived
the idea of making-use of British influence in Mexican counsels
to gain Northern California in return for a minor concession
on the Oregon dispute. He was prepared to agree to the line
of the Columbia to its junction with the Willamette, whence
a line should be drawn northwards to Puget Sound. This would
secure for the United States the very important harbours on
the Sound. Webster suggested, therefore, that Britain might
use her good offices to secure the Mexican port of San Fran-
(1)
cisco for the United States. This proposal, however, was 
not accompanied by a suggested line of demarcation in Oregon,
and Tyler's line was never actually put forward,
Ashburton very wisely considered this a good 
opportunity for Britain to secure the boundary she desired; 
if Mexico made a voluntary transfer to the United States, 
Britain could not interfere; if the Americans attempted a 
forcible seizure, she would be unlikely to intervene; would 
it not be wise, therefore, for Great Britain to avail herself 
of the American ambition to secure San Francisco for the 
purpose of reaching a satisfactory settlement of her own 
boundary difficulties with the United States? He concluded - 
unfortunately in error - that the Americans were unlikely 
"within any reasonable period of time to make any considerable 
lodgment on the Pacific, and he felt that the Indians, who 
were naturally hostile to them, were in too great force there 
to/
1. Possession of San Francisco would have been of inestimable 
value to the United States. It would have given them a 
footing in fertile, mineral California, besides the best 
port on the Pacific, six weeks closer to China than any 
of the British ports. The Americans were very anxious to 
secure it. President Tyler, in December, 1842, instructed 
his minister to Mexico to urge its cession to the United 
States, See the 'National Intelligencer,' (United States), 
for 3rd January, 1843.
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(1)
to make permanent settlement possible.
Ashburton’s views must have greatly encouraged 
Britain’s -unfortunate failure to colonise Oregon. British 
policy at this period was opposed on general principles to 
further colonisation, the colonies being considered an in­
tolerable burden. Indeed, instead of acquiring new territory, 
the Government actually gave consideration to the proposal 
to free -unprofitable colonies. The Hudson’s Bay Company were 
opposed to colonisation of the Pacific coast because they 
were a trading, not a land-developing, organisation; moreover, 
as Simpson’s despatch above shows, they hesitated to colonise 
the country lest such an action might attract the Americans 
to it. Ashburton’s ideas were based, of course, on the mis­
taken notion that Oregon was inaccessible to the United States, 
a notion which displayed lack of appreciation of American 
enterprise and perseverance as well as of the expansionist 
propaganda of the Democrats.
At this point in the negotiations (June, 1842), 
the Wilkes exploring expedition returned from Oregon and 
confirmed the view that the Columbia was dangerous to navi­
gation; the expedition also established the excellence of 
the ports to the north. Wilkes enumerated the arguments 
against the line of 49°: a large area is affected; acceptance 
of the line of the 49th parallel would, by giving up command 
of all the water routes, place all south of 49° at the mercy 
of the nation possessing north of it; the line of 49° gives 
up what must become one of the great highways to the interior 
- the Fraser River; giving up all Vancouver Island means 
surrendering the navigation of the Strait of Juan de Fuca; 
finally, and most important of all, it means losing five
important/
1. Ashburton to Aberdeen , No. 2, 25th April, 1842, in 
F.O. 5/379.
important harbours which offered everything that could be
(1)
desired as safe and good ports for naval establishment.
Tyler and Webster at once changed their opinions; in the
face of the Wilkes Report they could not in any way contract
the American claim; thenceforward, therefore, they insisted on
the 49th parallel as the final boundary in Oregon. Ashburton
had to write home that Wilkes’s return had blasted his hopes
(2)
of settling the Pacific coast boundary dispute.
Ashburton did ultimately succeed, however, in 
settling the pressing controversy over the north-eastern 
boundary; so that his mission was by no means fruitless.
3. Difficulties in the Way of Settlement.
In the United States discussion of the controversy 
continued and increased in volume, for it was kept alive by 
anti-English politicians and aggressive westerners who re­
sented the prosperity of the Hudson’s Bay Company. The great 
danger was that hasty and prejudiced opinions and declarations 
might be made in the United States, which would more than 
likely/
1. A copy of Wilkes’s Report to the Secretary of the Navy, 
sent to the Senate on 1st July, 1842, but not printed until 
1911 appears in the ’Oregon Historical Quarterly,’ XII, 
269-299. Wilkes’s account of his exploring party appears in 
C. Wilkes, ’Narrative of the United States Exploring Exped­
ition,* Philadelphia, 1845, notably Chapters 9-14, Vol. IV.
2. No. 10, to Aberdeen, 29th June, 1842, in F.O. 5/379. TIThe 
public is at present busy with this subject and little in 
a temper for any reasonable settlement.” A private letter 
from Lord Ashburton in the Aberdeen MSS. in the British 
Museum suggests that Webster kept the Oregon Question open 
in the hope that he would himself be sent to England as 
special emissary to settle it. At any rate, the Senate, 
in Ashburton’s opinion, would never have ratified any pro­
position consistent with his instructions which he might 
have made. HI have a bad opinion of the good fa^ith of the 
party likely to be in power and they must^treated according-^ 
ly." It would be inadvisable in the existing state of Amer­
ican politics, with ’expansion’ on the lips of everyone,
to make any concession, lest no treaty be made and the con­
cession used in future negotiations as a basis of discussion.
likely find an echo in England*
The Peel Government remained anxious to adjust
the Oregon difficulty, and Mr* H. S. Pox, the British Minister
at Washington, fras on 18th October, 1842, instructed to
suggest to the President the despatch of a special mission to
England to end the controversy* Tyler merely played with
the idea, however, and used it for his own ends. The United
States* Secretary, Mr. Webster, informed Pox, when the latter
opened the subject on 14th November, that a special mission
was to be sent to end the dispute and to arrange a tripartite
agreement between Great Britain, the United States, and Mexico,
whereby the last-named should cede to the Americans a part of
(i)
California containing the port of San Francisco. The
mission never materialised, and it is doubtful if Tyler ever
genuinely entertained the idea of sending it. At any rate,
Webster, who would likely have conducted the mission, fell into
disfavour with the American people who alleged that he had
sacrificed American interests in concluding the treaty with
(2)
Lord Ashburton. Tyler, therefore, did not venture to seek
(3)
from Congress an appropriation for the mission.
The general scheme of the United Skates* Govern­
ment at this time seems to have been to convey to their people 
the impression that they were doing all in their power to 
bring about an agreement on Oregon, while the British Govern­
ment were deliberately pursuing a policy of procrastination 
and/
1# Pox reported this in a despatch marked * Confidential, * 
dated 24th February, 1843, No. 20, in P.O. 5/391*
2* Webster and the President had failed to obtain concessions 
which they had pretended to have secured, and when dis­
cussion of the 8th Article of the Treaty began in the 
Senate the true state of affairs became apparent*
3« Aberdeen persisted in hoping for the appointment of the 
special mission for a long time, and in the autumn of 
1843 he still hoped for its dispatch. See his No. 5,
18th August, 1843, to Pox in P*0* 5/390* Tyler confid­
entially consulted the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives, and they advised against any 
appropriation.
and obstruction. A deliberate attempt was made by Tyler in
his Message of 5th December, 1842, to suggest this by stressing
his desire for settlement of the Oregon controversy and at the
same time omitting all reference to the British proposal of
the preceding August. His obvious intention was to let it
be thought that all initiative was confined to the Americans:
(1)
Pox had to report that the desired effect was obtained.
Bills for the occupation of the Oregon territory 
continued to be introduced periodically, and Lord Aberdeen1s 
first experience with this form of American activity was 
evidently alarming to him. Palmerston had ignored the debates 
in Congress upon similar bills, possibly because he was pre­
pared to take adequate military measures if Congress passed 
one of them. Aberdeen, on the contrary, could not ignore 
the new bill of January, 1843, in which he saw a menace to 
peace and possible controversial settlement; consequently,
he urged Pox to remind the Secretary of the terms of the Con-
(2)
vention of 1827 and of the recent British proposal. If 
the reminder was ignored Pox was to inform the Secretary that 
Great Britain would take the necessary steps to safeguard her 
interests. At the same time, Pox was to use his influence 
with those members of the Senate whom he could approach to 
explain the British attitude and exhort them, by pointing 
out the danger to peace if the bill passed, not to support 
it. The bill actually passed the Senate by a majority of two 
and was thereupon sent to the House of Representatives. The 
latter referred it to its Committee on Foreign Relations which 
on 3rd March recommended its rejection.
Other circumstances inimical to agreement on
Oregon/
1. Webster's explanation of the Incident was weak. He ex­
plained that that part of the President's Message which 
concerned Oregon had been written before the British pro­
posal was made. See Fox's No. 20, 10th March, 1843, in 
P.O. 5/391. Webster and Tyler did not get on well together, 
a fact which may have had some influence.
2. Aberdeen to Pox, No. 5, 3rd February, 1843, in P.O. 5/390.
Oregon were accumulating to increase Aberdeen's difficulties. 
The indifference of the British public towards the dispute 
facilitated his initial efforts to obtain a settlement, the 
general English lack of interest in American affairs con­
tributing to allow him freedom in outlining a policy. But the 
American negotiators were not so free to act. Without the 
probability, amounting almost to certainty, that their max­
imum demands would be met, they had neither the liberty nor 
the desire to make a move. Besides the difficulties we have 
noted - American dependence on public opinion, political 
peculiarities, the aggressive policy of representatives from 
the western states, the readiness of the President to mis­
represent the British efforts at solution and to use the 
negotiations to increase his personal prestige - two other 
thorny matters presented themselves.
The first of these was the Irish policy of the 
British Government* The United States* press was overwhelm­
ingly pro-Irish, and in the summer of 1843 sympathy with the
movement for Irish Repeal - which had for some time lain
(2)
dormant - was revived. Associations were formed through­
out the Union, and Tyler himself addressed a branch in New 
York. The revival was but temporary and ephemeral but so 
long as the source of the trouble remained the agitation was 
likely to be resuscitated whenever convenient. The general 
result was to inflame the American public mind and prepare
(3)
it to receive and foster the most extreme claims in Oregon.
1# Thus in March, 1843, many Senators voted for Linn's Oregon 
bill because its passage meant that Linn, whose only means 
of livelihood was politics, would be elected Senator for 
Missouri. See Aberdeen's memorandum in P.O. 5/418*
2. Pox noted the revival and reported it to the Foreign Office 
in his despatch, No. 81, 13th June, 1843, in P.O. 5/391.
3. O'Connell's speech at the C o m  Exchange, Dublin, in July, 
1843, did much to counteract the adverse influence of 
these Repeal associations. O'Connell denounced the 
institution of slavery and rejected the assistance, moral 
and financial, of a people who tolerated and defended it.
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4. Texas and Oregon.
The second of the thorny matters mentioned above, 
one which was directly concerned with Oregon, was the situation 
in regard to Texas where developments were producing further 
obstacles to mutual trust and confidence.
Texas had become virtually independent of Mexico 
after the battle of San Jacinto in 1836 although Mexico did 
not recognise the independence. Annexation to the United 
States was widely mooted both in Texas, where in 1830 there 
were over 15,000 Americans, and in the United States, partic­
ularly in those states where slavery was practised. These 
saw the menace to slavery of the movement for its abolition, 
to the support of which Lord Aberdeen had committed Great 
Britain, and they sought to counteract its development by in-
CD
corporating slave-holding Texas in the Union. England,
although she had recognised Texan independence in 1840 when 
its achievement had become inevitable, naturally opposed the 
annexation, and her influence in Mexican counsels assisted 
her in maintaining her attitude.. It was her policy, then, to 
guarantee independence in the belief that she would thus 
counter the American movement for annexation. Her efforts 
to carry out this policy were obviously open to misrepresent­
ation. Thus it was generally believed in the United States 
that British recognition of Texan independence and her influence 
in Texas, directed towards defeating and nullifying the move­
ment for annexation, were prompted solely by.dictates of am­
bitious self-inteiest and ulterior, unworthy motives. This 
quickened the expansionists, and consequently in April, 1844, 
a treaty providing for the annexation of Texas was drawn up.
The Senate, however, rejected the treaty, and it was not until 
late/
1. The influence of Texas in diplomacy is discussed in G. L. 
Hives, !The United States and Mexico,1 2 vols., New York, 
1913, II, Chapters, XXVIII - XXXI.
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late in 1845 that Texas entered the Union by act of legislation.
American agents like Duff Green, a newspaper editor 
whose opinion carried more weight with the President than the 
despatches of the accredited Minister, Edward Everett, were 
wrong in th^ir attempts to divine Great Britain’s policy with 
regard to Texas. Green, for instance, wrote from London in 
August, 1843, that England was prepared to forward a substantial 
loan to Texas in order to prevent annexation. President Tyler 
took this to be part of a general British plan to abolish 
slavery throughout the world in order to retain Britain’s
(1)
commercial supremacy against states employing slave labour. 
British official correspondence proves that the President’s 
views were unjust to the British Government. Lord Aberdeen 
specifically denied any occult design in urging upon Mexico 
speedy recognition of Texan independence beyond the natural 
interest attaching to the general extension of British commerce. 
Britain used her influence with Mexico, he admitted,•simply to 
secure from Texas as a quid pro quo, in return for recognition 
of her independence, the abolition of slavery in Texas. But 
Britain would not interfere unduly with either Texas or Mexico. 
She desired to see the independence of Texas finally and for­
mally recognised by Mexico, but this desire did not arise from 
ambition or self-interest. Britain’s objects were purely com­
mercial, and she had no thought or intention of seeking to 
act, directly or indirectly, on the United States through 
Texas. Though she wanted to see slavery abolished, she would 
neither openly nor secretly resort to any measures which might 
tend to disturb the internal tranquillity or affect the pros­
perity/
1. For a full definition of Tyler’s policy and views see J. S. 
Reeves, ’American Diplomacy -under Tyler and Polk,* New York, 
1907, p. 130.
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(1 )
perity of the United States.
The influence of this clash of interests in Texas 
upon the progress of the Oregon controversy is obvious inasmuch 
as the acquisition of free Oregon would be sought by the abol­
itionists as a counterpoise to a slave-holding Texas. Its 
influence upon the relations between the two countries is 
also apparent. An independent Texas would interfere with the 
United States* expansion westward, and would be fatal to the 
achievement of all that was involved in the idea of ’Manifest 
Destiny.* The annexation of Texas would be a measure of self­
protection on the part of the United States against the encroach­
ments of Great Britain which, by obtaining an influence over 
Texas, might dispute with the United States the commercial and 
naval supremacy of the Gulf of Mexico.
If Texas gave up slavery she would become an object 
of incitement to slaves in the United States^ if she remained 
a slave-state, on the other hand, the southern bloc would be 
consolidated in the inevitable conflict over the slavery issue. 
Only annexation to the United States would furnish a satis­
factory solution so far as the Union was concerned and, in 
spite of the clear and unequivocal nature of Aberdeen’s defin­
ition of British policy, the average American believed that 
Great Britain stood in the way of annexation. Texas must be 
annexed to the Union in order to protect the slave interests of
the southern states, so threatened by Britain’s advocacy of
(2)
abolition in Texas.
1. See Aberdeen to Pakenham, No. 9, 26th December, 1843, in 
F.O. 5/390. Cf. Aberdeen to Wellington, 2nd March, 1845,
in Aberdeen MSS. in British Museum. Pakenham was instructed 
to show the despatch of 26th December to the Secretary of 
State, who unfortunately did not publish its contents.
2. J. C. Calhoun, later Secretary of State, was the leader of 
a formidable party which expounded these views.
CHAPTER VI
A CRISIS APPROACHES
1. Pakenham*s Negotiations: 1843-44.
The urgency of the matter and the need of a speedy 
settlement were impressed upon the Government by the letters 
of private individuals who had personal experience of the 
Oregon territory. Thus, the eminent geographer and sole sur­
viving pioneer of the 18th century, David Thompson, was at 
great pains to put the Government on their guard against 
American claims* He wrote to the Prime Minister, the Colonial 
and Foreign Secretaries urging an early agreement; after 
enumerating the wonders and excellences of the territory - 
its temperate climate, tremendous pines, myriads of salmon, 
naturally fortified harbours, and other attractive features -
he states that the line of the Columbia should be insisted
(1)
upon.
There is also a letter from Sir George Simpson
to the Company which makes a similar demand for a speedy
settlement. The Americans are gaining ground rapidly and
Dr. White, an agent of their Government, wants to choose a
governor for Oregon. It is now, therefore, more than ever
desirable that the boundary question should be entirely
(2)
disposed of.
These representations and others like them, along 
*
with the developing complications of the political situation, 
spurred/
1. Thompson's letter, dated 21st July, 1843, is in F.O. 5/401.
2. 21st June, 1843, in F.O. 5/401.
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spurred the Foreign Secretary to action. While he was dis­
cussing with the Prime Minister, Sir Robert Peel, the steps 
'to be taken, the United States* Government took the initiative 
in the reopening of negotiations, and the fact that both sides 
were thus keen in the autumn of 1843 to solve the Oregon prob­
lem was an excellent augury for the success of their efforts. 
Daniel Webster had resigned as Secretary of State in May, 1843, 
and had been succeeded two months later by Axel P. Upshur. On 
9th October the new Secretary dispatched lengthy instructions 
and full powers to negotiate a settlement to the American 
Minister in London, Edward Everett.
In recapitulating the bases of United States1 
claims to Oregon, namely, discovery, exploration, the voyages 
of American navigators, the Lewis and Clark expedition, the 
rights transferred from Spain, and the settlement and restor­
ation of Astoria, the despatch submits that the "exclusive 
right of the United States to the whole territory between 
the 42nd degree of latitude and the parallel of 54 degrees
40 minutes is believed to be now susceptible of very satis-
(i)
factory proof." For the first time the claim through con-
. %
tiguity is formally adduced. The Oregon territory lies con­
tiguous to the United States* settled country, and is a mere
extension of their acknowledged boundaries. "The natural 
spread of our population must cover it, without any direct 
effort, on our part, to settle or colonise it. It is important
to our peace and security that it should belong to us." As
the Union spreads westward access to the Pacific is imperative 
while, on the other hand, possession of the area in dispute 
is of slight importance to Britain, particularly since the 
fur trade has markedly declined. In a sincere desire 11 to 
preserve the existing harmony between the two countries1 the 
President/
1. American State Fapers, Foreign Relations, VI, 662.
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President will consent to equitable compromise. He is not 
prepared to go further than conceding the line of the 49th 
parallel, together with the right to navigate the Columbia.
He will negotiate either in London or in Washington.
In the meantime, however, Peel and Aberdeen had 
decided to recall the Ambassador at Washington, H. S. Fox, 
who in their opinion was "not calculated by his manners or
habits to smooth difficulties," and to replace him by Mr.
(1)
(afterwards Sir) Richard Pakenham. When Everett sought,
therefore, to open negotiations he was informed by Aberdeen 
of Pakenham1 s appointment, and, though he continued to exert 
considerable influence upon the Foreign Secretary1s policy, the 
scene of negotiations was transferred to Washington.
(2 )
Pakenham was to propose the line of boundary 
suggested by Britain in 1826 because it was obvious that a 
proposition of that kind once submitted must always involve 
the practical difficulty of subsequently assuming any less 
extensive basis of negotiation. If this proposal was rejected, 
he was to offer any other port south of 49° on the mainland or 
Vancouver Island that the United States might desire. In the 
event of that being refused also, he was to offer t6 make all 
ports free south of 49o. Arbitration was the next alternative, 
and if that failed Pakenham should suggest renewal for ten 
years of the Convention of 1827. Failing that, he was to ex­
press his regrets and drop the whole negotiation.
There was now little chance of the boundary line 
proposed - Canning*s of seventeen years before - being con­
sidered acceptable to the Americans because of their newly- 
found, wider imperial aims; expansionism was now in full 
efflorescence./
1. Pakenham was gazetted on 14th November, 1843, but did not 
arrive in Washington until the following February. For 
Peel*s opinion of Fox see Peel to Aberdeen, 31st August, 
1843, in Peel MSS., 40453 (British Museum).
2. Supra, p. 63.
efflorescence. The bill (Atchison*s) introduced in December,
1843, for instance, for the occupation of the Oregon territory,
was even more presumptuous than its predecessors inasmuch as
it sought to extend United States1 jurisdiction over all Oregon
as far as latitude 540 40*. Nor had the tone of the United
States* Government improved because Tyler*s Message of the
same month contained, inrespect of Oregon, the same mis-
(1)
representation as that of the previous year.
Besides the Atchison Bill in the Senate, a bill 
was Introduced in the House of Representatives by Mr. Hughes 
of Missouri providing for the organisation of the Government 
of Oregon and the construction of a road to the Columbia 
River. Further, the American citizens of the Oregon territory 
drew up and presented a petition for a definition of the 
boundary. Fortunately for the cause of peace, there was a 
party in the United States which argued that time was on the 
American side; by allowing the peaceful occupation of Oregon 
and encouraging immigration into it the Government would be 
co-operating in a movement through which, in the course of 
a few years, the territory would become overwhelmingly Amer­
ican; Britain, to assert her claim, would have to resort to 
war which would outrage and unite American sentiment, if it 
were not, indeed, impossible for her to contemplate war at 
all. Americans of the highest integrity, of the type repre­
sented by Calhoun and Choate, belonged to this school, and 
their influence was invariably in favour of peace*
On 28th March, 1844, Secretary Upshur was killed 
and succeeded by J. C. Calhoun, the leader of the Fabian party 
just mentioned. As a matter of policy, therefore, Calhoun
sedulously/
1. Supra, p. 85.
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sedulously avoided discussion of the Oregon question with
Pakenham, and the latter suspected that the Secretary had
some sinister design in mind; at the same time, he felt
that he would not be justified in forcing the matter contrary
(1)
to Calhoun*s expressed desire. The presidential election
campaign intervened to provide a further reason for delay,
and it was not until the end of August, 1844, when Calhoun
returned from a vacation in the south, that he intimated his
(2)
readiness to treat on Oregon.
The first conference was held on 23rd August, when 
expressions of mutual regard and desire for settlement pre­
ceded the actual parley. Pakenham, in accordance with Lord 
Aberdeen*s instructions, proposed the line offered in 1826 
together with control of any port on Vancouver Island. This 
was summarily declined, Calhoun giving the British Minister 
to understand that his minimum concession would be the line 
of the 49th parallel with the possible addition of Vancouver 
Island to Britain and the recognition of a free Columbia 
River. Pakenham understood by this time the obstinacy with 
which the Americans would assert their claims, and he wrote 
home corroborating Calhoun*s view that the Senate would not 
sanction any line south of the 49th parallel. It became Pak­
enham* s considered opinion that the American Secretary had 
formed rather high expectations as to the length to which
Britain would be likely to go in the way of concession for the
(3)
sake of getting rid of this troublesome dispute.
Aberdeen*s private opinions at this stage of the
controversy/
1. He seems to have suspected that the Americans might send
a secret naval force to the Pacific with a view to the
forcible seizure of Oregon. See his despatch, No. 47,
13th May, 1844, in F.O. 5/405.
2. Pakenham*s No. 99, 29th August, 1844, in F.O. 5/407.
3 • Idem.
(1)
controversy may be culled from the Peel MSS. A letter 
to Peel, dated 25th September (that is, written almost 
immediately upon receipt of Pakenham1 s No. 99), expresses the 
opinion that the Americans would not be brought to concede 
more than the line of 49° with Vancouver Island. Such a line, 
with all harbours within Puget Sound down to the Columbia 
free to both countries and navigation of the Columbia free 
to both also, would constitute a most advantageous settle­
ment. The only alternative would be arbitration, though 
Great Britain would probably receive less by arbitration
than the above; but whether more or less, the Government
(2)
would be released from all responsibility.
These terms did not differ greatly from those
ultimately agreed upon, and they were merely a development
of Aberdeen*s earlier views when he thought that arbitration
would almost certainly be the eventual solution of the problem.
It is probable that the Cabinet, with one or two exceptions,
notably the Duke of Wellington who favoured a bold stroke for
(3)
the line of the Columbia, put its faith in arbitration.
Calhoun followed up his rejection of the latest 
British offer with a statement of his country*s claims through 
France, Spain, and settlement, and at the same time he did 
not fail to stress the comparatively new claim of contiguity, 
that is, the claim founded on "its great increase | in popu­
lation J, especially in the valley of the Mississippi, as well 
as the greatly increased facility of passing to the territory
1. British Museum, 40454. Aberdeen*s private papers show 
that at least as early as March, 1844, he was prepared 
to accept, if offered by the United States, the line of 
49° with all Vancouver Island, free navigation of the 
Columbia and free access to the ports south of 49°. His 
great difficulty at that time was to reconcile the nation 
to abandoning the Columbia River as line of demarcation.
2. Ibidem.
3. Peel, at any rate, "inclined to arbitration," as his 
private correspondence testifies. See his letter to 
Aberdeen of 28th September, 1844, in the Peel MSS. The 
Foreign Secretary was given a very free hand in the Oregon 
negotiations; see Grevllle, passim.
of more accessible routes; and the far stronger and rapidly
swelling tide of population that had recently commenced flow-
(1)
ing into it." The discovery of a new pass at the head of
the La Platte had brought Oregon very close, and scores of
Americans were pouring into it every year.
Pakenham answered this statement with customary
(2)
recapitulation of British arguments. He had two alter-
(3)
native proposals - arbitration and failing that, renewal
(4)
of the agreement to joint occupation. Neither was likely 
to succeed because even "England*s friends in the Senate" 
disliked settlement by arbitration, while "the clamorous 
party/
1« From Calhoun*s statement, enclosed in Pakenham*s despatch, 
No. 103, 12th September, 1844, in F.O. 5/408. A perfect 
right of contiguity is "the right which a nation enjoys 
to exclude all others from a territory, the command of 
which, though it be not actually within her occupation, Is 
essential to the convenience or to the necessity of her 
real possessions. " There is also an imperfect right of 
contiguity which is " a mere preferable right, to acquire 
by settlement a complete title to lands not actually 
settled, and not essential either to the safety or to the 
convenience of existing settlements, byt geographically 
connected with them." - *Edinburgh Review,* for July, 1845, 
pp. 238-265.
2. Copy in F.O. 5/408. Pakenham*s private views appear in a 
*Private and Conflidential* letter to Aberdeen of 29th 
August, 1844, in the Aberdeen MSS. ff. 1-53. The Americans 
will cling to the line of 49°; if indeed they do not 
claim something beyond it in order to strengthen that 
portion as an alternative. Calhoun said that if Britain 
agreed to the 49th parallel his Government might surrender 
Vancouver Island. This was the most so far conceded by 
the United States, and if to it had been added the minor 
concessions of free navigation of the Columbia and the use 
of the ports between that river and the 49th parallel, the 
situation anticipated by Aberdeen in his private letter
of 4th March (above) would have arisen.
3. As advised in Aberdeen’s despatch, No. 45, 1st November, 
1844, In F.0.5/403.
4. As advised in his despatch, No. 47, 18th November, in P.O. 
5/403. Arbitration was not a wholly successful method of 
adjustment, as England had found in the North-east boundary 
dispute with the United States, the latter refusing to 
accept the award of the arbiter. The United States* view 
regarding arbitration was that compromise by negotiation 
was a possible and definitely preferable method of settle­
ment. See in this connection also infra, pp. 142-43.
party there", which sought a summary method of settlement, 
was strong enough^ to defeat any attempt to renew the Con­
vention of 1827• Pakenham was unable to report progress, 
therefore, and the Imminence of a Presidential election 
meant the shelving of the question for the time being.
2. The Position with Regard to Mexico and California.
The question of Mexico and California was closely
interwoven with that of Oregon, and developments with regard
to the former were likely to hasten a crisis over the latter.
During the’forties the possibility that Great Britain and the
United States would become Involved in war as the result of
a clash of interests in Mexico was very real. In brief,
British policy sought to use all lawful means to prevent the
annexation of Texas and California to the United States. The
Americans, on the other hand, dominated by the Influence of
•Manifest Destiny*, considered the acquisition of these areas
to be Inevitable.
In the case of California as In the case of Oregon,
Lord Aberdeen desired settlement by negotiation; his policy
was to see what happened to Oregon before deciding what to do
about California, and, as a corollary, he must make sure that
Mexico did not commence hostilities against the United States
(2)
prematurely. "All the calculations of Mexican agents and
their fond hopes of foreign aid rested entirely upon the result
„ (3)of the pending negotiations over the Oregon question.
The/
1. "It is evident that they all expect that England may in
long run be teazed fsicj and worried into a compromise 
more advantageous to this country than could be obtained 
by the decision of an impartial arbiter." Pakenham*s No. 
140, 29th December, 1844, in F.O. 5/409.
2. G. L. Rives, *The United States and Mexico,* p. 99, New
York, 1913.
3. Rives, op. cit., p. 101.
The Mexicans we re depending -upon a breach between Great 
Britain and the United States over Oregon; their policy, 
therefore, was to defer action and prolong negotiation until 
the hour of alienation* Mexico had threatened to declare 
war if Texas* were annexed to the United States but, when in 
October, 1845, the people of Texas by popular referendum 
accepted annexation, the Mexicans did nothing.
The cession of California to Great Britain had 
been mooted at different times, and British holders of Mexican 
bonds before 1840 had acquired the right to possess lands in 
Mexican territory. Upper California was a very valuable area, 
and the various British consuls scattered throughout its 
extent never lost an opportunity to advocate its acquisition 
by their Government. Pakenham was fully alive to the value 
of the region, with its commanding position on the Pacific, 
its harbours and forests, and when British Minister to Mexico 
he had written home in the autumn of 1841 advising an arrange­
ment with Mexico to allow the establishment of British settle-
(1)
ments in upper California. Indeed, interest in California*s
future seems to have been very great in the early ^ forties*
The country was in the hands of a few 'indolent Spaniards,*
and had an entire population of less than 7,000. Yet it was
capable of supporting millions. Conditions were favourable^
to British seizure inasmuch as the Government were notoriously
ignorant and dissipated, while the Americans were hated by
(2)
the natives*
Palmerston might have done something to effect 
the acquisition of such a desirable region, but shortly after 
receipt of Pakenham* s despatch he was replaced at the Foreign 
Office by Lord Aberdeen. The Peel Government were t o m  
between/
2* Cf t^impson' 3 views in his despatch to the Company, 10th 
March, 1842, copy in F*0* 5/588*
between a desire to acquire California and reluctance to 
increase Britain*s responsibilities in a new, comparatively 
unknown country. On the one hand, the *hungry *fortiesf were 
a period during which the importance of emigration seemed vital 
to England. Excess of capital and population had lowered 
the value both of money and labour, with corresponding distress 
among the middle and lower classes. Emigration was a double 
benefit; it gave relief and ultimately comfort to the emigrants 
and created increased demand for employment of those who re­
mained. On the other hand, the recent rebellion in Canada 
and the troubles along the United States* frontier, together 
with other manifestations of colonial unrest, convinced Peel 
and his Cabinet that colonies were nuisances, and Lord Stanley 
expressed the prevailing view when he wrote from the Colonial 
to the Foreign Office in November, 1841, that he was not anxious 
for the formation of new and distant colonies, all of which in­
volve heavy expense, direct and indirect, besides multiplying
the possibilities of misunderstanding and collisions with
(1)
foreign powers.
The British Government in 1841, therefore, would 
have almost looked with complacence upon American annexation 
of California. Secretary Webster saw this,and felt bold enough 
in his negotiations with Lord Ashburton to urge a tripartite 
agreement between Great Britain, the United States, and Mexico 
for/
1. Quoted in Rives, op. eft., p. 51. British public opinion 
tended to be anti-imperial and it was the general feeliiig 
that "England had fought but too long for the privilege- 
of sending out lieutenant-governors to unprofitable col­
onies." See Fraser*s Magazine for 1845, p. 485. Radicals 
like Hume and Roebuck were in favour of relinquishing the 
colonies. "They were indeed the disregarded incumbrances 
of unsympathetic and somewhat surly step-parents. Of the 
two political parties one did not value, while the other 
did not want them." W. H. Dawson, *Richard Cobden and 
Foreign Policy * p. 183, London, 1926. Peel did not wish 
to retain Canada against her will as a letter of his to 
Aberdeen. 16th May, 1842, indicates: the commercial inter­
course. he points out, is all to the advantage of Canada. 
See C. S. Parker, *Sir Robert Peel,* II, 388, 3 vols., 
London, 1899.
for the cession of part of California to his country, it 
being understood that Britain1s participation would be re-
(1)
warded with a favourable settlement of her claims in Oregon.
But for the unfortunate (from England's point of view) Wilkes 
Report it is more than likely that Ashburton and Webster 
would have been able to use this tripartite arrangement to 
settle the Oregon question in 1842.
By the end of 1844, however, the British Government*
attitude towards California had undergone a change owing to the
complications and delay in effecting an agreement on Oregon.
We have seen that the difficulties in the way of agreement
were increasing, and there seemed in 1844 to be no immediate
prospect of settlement. To offset Aberdeen*s disappointment
at this, all the despatches of the British consul, Barron,
and those of the vice-consuls in Mexico emphasised the value
of California’s natural resources, its central location for
trade with the Orient, and the sympathy for Britain entertained
by its leading citizens who apparently desired a British pro-
(2)
tectorate established over California. The British Cabinet 
were faced, therefore, with the alternatives of pursuing an 
active policy in California and allowing the United States to 
do so. But the agencies against interference in California 
outweighed those in favour of it, and it was unlikely that 
the Foreign Secretary would now jeopardise peace by embarking 
upon/
1* Supra, pp. 84-85.
See Barron's Ho. 3, 20th January, 1844, in F.O. 50/179 
(Mexico) and also Vice-consul Forbes’s letter of 5th 
September, 1844, in same. These and other despatches 
all attempt to depreciate the value of Oregon as compared 
with California. They report the immigration into the 
latter of United States* emigrants who had been grievously 
disappointed with Oregon. This would have its influence 
upon the British Government by giving them an unfavourable 
opinion of,the area north of the Columbia. Lord Haddington 
had stressed the value of San Francisco to Aberdeen and 
had made the Government anxious to possess it. See A. H. 
Gordon (Baron Stanmore), ’Life of Aberdeen,* p. 183,
London, 1905.
upon an active Californian policy.
An important factor in assisting the Foreign
Secretary to arrive at a decision was the course likely to
(1)
be adopted by France, still a potential British enemy; 
efforts at joint Franco-British action over the annexation 
of Texas had, after much unnecessary and suspicious delay on 
the part of France, come to nought. Louis Philippe hesitated 
to risk his throne for an English alliance in an unpopular 
war, and the outcome of the negotiations was merely an agree­
ment to use only moral influence to prevent the annexation 
of Texas or California to the United States. This was a blow 
to Aberdeen who had at first hoped for a joint Anglo-French 
declaration guaranteeing the integrity of Mexican territory, 
but so long as there was a hope of Clay's succeeding at the 
presidential election and of the defeat of the annexationist 
party, he hesitated to hasten the issue of such a declaration. 
When the election resulted in the triumph of the expansionists, 
Aberdeen found that France was not ready to make common cause 
with him, and he had perforce - war being repugnant to him - 
to wait and hope for the best.
In spite of the exercise of moral influence, of 
what Guizot called "their good offices, their friendly counsels 
their energetic remonstrances, to prevent the Texans from
violating treaties," the annexation of Texas was becoming more
(2)
and more inevitable; Indeed, it was now becoming evident 
that/
1# "if we could succeed in enlisting France, for her own
interests, cordially to unite in resisting American aggress 
ion, it would be a great stroke of policy, and go far to 
change the whole face of affairs. They began well, but 
timidly in Texas; perhaps a direct interest may make them 
bolder in California." Aberdeen to Peel, 23rd September, 
1845, in Peel MSS. 40455.
2. See Pakenham*s despatches, F.O. 5/426 and F,0. 5/427. 
Aberdeen commended Pakenham for refraining from formal 
protest against the annexation of Texas. S©© No. 2, 18th 
March, 1845, in F.O. 5/403.
that time alone delayed even the acquisition of California
by the United States. The British agents in California had
been instructed by the Foreign Office that they were in no
way to encourage the impending outbreak in California; Britain
would not take that region under her protection, but if the
Californians threw off the Mexican yoke, it was important that
they should not assume any other which might prove inimical
(1)
to British interests.
The Cabinet gave serious consideration to the 
adoption of a more positive policy in California. It was 
suggested to them by the Mexican consul in London, Tomas 
Murphy, that a British colony should be established in Cal­
ifornia, but the plan was rejected. It was felt that the 
time for such a step was inauspicious because of the delicate 
nature of the Oregon negotiations. Had the colony been 
established before 1844, the position would have been some­
what different. In spite, therefore, of these temptations 
to act positively, Aberdeen's policy with regard to Cali­
fornia, right to the outbreak of war between the United States 
and Mexico, remained a negative one, and the consul, Bankhead, 
was instructed to recommend earnestly to the Mexican Govern­
ment; whether at war or not with the United States, to provide 
by every means in their power for the safety of California 
as the most vulnerable and dangerous point of the Mexican 
territories. Bankhead was not to commit Great Britain in any
way and was to content himself with "sound and useful suggest- 
(2)
ions." It was a policy of hoping for the best while fear­
ing the worst; and if the worst came, nothing could be done.
1. Peel favoured the planting of a colony. (Peel MSS.) Cf.
E. D. Adams, 'The English Interest in California,' in the 
American Historical Review, XIV, 744-763. The proposed 
scheme is outlined in a letter by vice-consul Mackintosh 
in F.O. 50(Mexico(183. Ten million dollars were to be 
paid to Mexico; a colonisation company was to be formed 
and given freedom of imports and exports together with con­
trol of the pearl fish industry for twenty years.
2. F.O. 50/183. A translation of Murphy's despatch is given 
by G. L. Rives in 'Mexican Diplomacy on the Eve of War with 
the United States,' American Historical Review, XVIII, 275.
3. The Presidential Election of 1844.
With the presidential election due in November, 1844, 
President Tyler, who sought re-election, developed an aggressive 
expansionist policy which he thought might attract the electors. 
In particular, he hoped to acquire Texas before the Democratic 
nominating Convention met in May, 1844, and with the same end 
in view he wanted the Oregon negotiations to hang fire until 
after the election.
The Democratic Convention duly endorsed the views 
of Tyler when it passed the resolution: "That our title to the
whole of the territory of Oregon is clear and unquestionable; 
that no portion of the same ought to be ceded to England or any 
other power." But instead of nominating Tyler the Convention 
chose the political ’dark horse’, James K. Polk, the protege"" of 
the arch-expansionist, ex-President Andrew Jackson. The in­
fluence of this choice upon the Oregon controversy cannot be 
overestimated, particularly as the candidate adopted as his 
campaign slogan, ’Fifty-Pour Forty or Fight;* that is, he In­
sisted that the United States* claim to the whole of Oregon 
ought to be asserted; so that Britain would be completely cut 
off from the Pacific Ocean, at the point of the sword if nec­
essary. It is obvious that the presidential campaign would 
stir up much ill-feeling against England. The Democratic cam­
paign caught the popular fancy, especially in the western 
states, and at the election in November Polk defeated the 
Whig candidate, Henry Clay, by a narrow margin. The unexpect­
edness of his candidature and subsequent election proved the 
strength of the expansionist sentiment in the United States, 
and Polk was exactly the type of man to see that his election 
promises were fulfilled, though the truth is that he had merely 
been shrevfd enough to identify himself with a growing, years- 
old sentiment that exalted expansion.
After/
After the Revolution the United States had been too 
occupied with domestic problems till early in the 19th century 
to devote much attention to territorial expansion* Their mild 
success in the war of 1812 was the first step in a series that, 
in the middle ’forties, engendered the idea of fManifest Destiny*1 
The promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine, the beginning of over­
land emigration to Oregon, the manoeuvres to secure Texas, were 
all steps in the movement which produced ultimately the election
in
cry, ’Fifty-Four Forty or Fight,1 and later ’Manifest Destiny#'
The expansionist movement was the expression of the 
American feeling that democracy had approached perfection in the 
United States, and Americans wanted to prove that democratic 
institutions could go hand in hand with territorial greatness 
and power. Accordingly it was inevitable that Texas, Mexico, 
California, and even Canada should all eventually come under 
the Stars and Stripes; indeed, it was the duty of Americans to 
extend their institutions to those territories. Thus, Lyman
Beecher claimed the United States to be H   still the
richest inheritance which the mercy of God continues to the 
troubled earth. Nowhere beside, if you search the world over, 
will you find so much real liberty; so much equality; so 
much personal safety, and temporal prosperity; so general an
extension of useful knowledge, so much religious instruction;
(2)
so much moral restraint..... " Standing in the way of
the achievement of ’Manifest Destiny* was one country - Great 
Britain* By her influence in Mexican affairs she was able to 
delay the acquisition of California; her place in the counsels 
of Texas retarded the annexation of that territory; by her 
claims in Oregon she stood in the way of United States* ex­
pansion on the north-west coast; her .possession of Canada 
presented a perpetual problem to the American expansionists.
1. The name ’Manifest Destiny’ does not appear until 1845, 
but the idea behind it was years old. See J. W. Pratt, 
’The Origin of Manifest Destiny,* American Historical 
Review, XXXII, pp. 795-798.
2. Quoted in E. D. Adams, ’The Power of Ideals in American 
History,* p. 81, London, 1913.
4+ Danger of War.
If the developing Mexican situation and the election
of Polk did not unduly trouble the British Government, other
events were concurring to drive them to consider extreme
measures, even war, over Oregon. The chief of these was the
passage in the House of Representatives, by the convincing
majority of 140 to 59, of a bill to organise the government
of Oregon after the expiration of the year stipulated in the
Convention of 1827. This peremptory method of settling
the Oregon question was, to say the least, distasteful to
the British Government, and Aberdeen urged Pakenham to have
(2)
it shelved by proposing arbitration.
Whatever hope there may have been of surmounting 
this fresh difficulty was swept away by the publication on 
4th March, 1845, of Polk’s inaugural address, wherein he 
threatened Speedy renunciation of the Convention of 1827.
The paragraph of the speech concerning Oregon runs as follows: 
"Nor will it become in a less degree my duty to assert and main­
tain by all constitutional means the right of the United States 
to that portion of our territory which lies beyond the Rocky 
Mountains. Our title to the country of Oregon is clear and 
unquestionable; and already are our people preparing to 
perfect that right by occupying it with their wives and 
children •••••• To us belongs the duty of protecting them
adequately wherever they may be upon our soil. The juris­
diction of our laws and the benefits of our republican in­
stitutions should be extended over them, in the distant 
regions/
1. Pakenham conveyed the news of this to Aberdeen in his No.
11 of 4th February, 1845, in F.O. 5/424. The Senate a 
month later postponed consideration of the bill. See 
Pakenham1s No. 23, 4th March, 1845, in F.O. 5/424.
2• Polk’s Secretary of State, James Buchanan, did not favour 
arbitration when Pakenham mentioned it to him in conver­
sation. See Pakenaham’s No. 40, 29th March, 1845.
regions which they have selected for their homes.” This
seemed to suggest that the United States were ready to go
to war if necessary, and Great Britain took steps accord-
(1)
ingly.
The first defensive move by Britain was taken 
immediately after receipt of news of the action of the House 
of Representatives. A few weeks before the publication of 
Polk’s inaugural address became public in England, it was 
realised that Britain must show the Americans, particularly 
the inhabitants of Oregon, that she was determined to assert 
her claims in the contested area. The Lords of the Admiralty 
were requested by the Foreign Secretary to s end a ship 
frequently to Oregon, and it was suggested that Rear-Admiral 
Sir George Seymour should visit there himself as soon as 
possible, ”with a view to give a feeling of security to our 
own settlers in the country and to let the Americans see 
clearly that Her Majesty’s Government are alive to their pro­
ceedings and prepared, in case of necessity, to oppose them.”
Instructions in keeping with the desire of the 
Foreign Office were dispatched to Admiral Seymour, who was 
also/
1% To Lord Aberdeen preparations for war were necessary if 
only as a threat to the United States, for he believed 
that evidence of British determination would have a good 
effect on them. See Aberdeen to Peel, 29th March, 1845, in 
Peel MSS. The inaugural address threw the American peace 
party into despair also. See Calhoun’s letter of 6th May, 
1845, in his correspondence printed in the Annual Report 
of the American Historical Association for 1899. Calhoun’s 
aim had been ”so to conduct the negotiation, that its 
failure should not involve a rupture of the friendly re­
lations between the two countries and in that case, to use 
the influence of the press and Government to curb in the 
West, so as to prevent the rescinding of the joint occupancy 
and the taking of any step that might be considered a viol­
ation of the Convention.” From a letter to J. T. Mason, 661.
2. Copy dated 5th March, 1845, in F.O. 5/440. A move was 
made directly on the advice of Peel who wrote a ’Secret’ 
letter to Aberdeen on 23rd February, 1845, expressing con­
sternation at the action of the House of Representatives 
and advising the despatch of a frigate to the Columbia, 
its destination to be known only to the Government. See 
Peel MSS. 40454.
also ordered to estimate the military value of Oregon by
detailing the number of forts, both British and American,
the number and strength of armed vessels, and acquiring
(1)
other pertinent information.
For the purpose of organising the Hudson’s Bay
Company’s forces in Oregon, it was decided to dispatch to
Oregon Sir George Simpson of the Company who, better than
any other, understood the conditions on the Pacific coast.
Simpson’s advice was first solicited, and he replied with a
review of the military and naval position, pointing out the
necessity of sending from Canada an agent skilled in military
(2)
science. The Company, at the behest of the Cabinet, sent
Simpson himself to Oregon with orders to take what measures
he considered necessary there. Pakenham was to keep him
(3)
advised of the diplomatic progress of events.
On the same day that he advised Pakenham of Simp­
son’s departure, Aberdeen wrote to the Colonial Office asking 
Lord Stanley, the Colonial Secretary, to take steps to learn 
the military position of Oregon, informing him that war was 
imminent owing to excitement in the United States, the uncom­
promising boldness of the American claims, and the terms of 
the new President’s inaugural address. It was suggested that
Stanley should have the Canadian Government send two officers
(4(
as private travellers.
The/
1. A copy of the Admiralty’s instructions is enclosed in the
letter of 5th March.
2. Simpson’s report, sent on 29th March, 1845, to the Foreign 
Office through Sir J. H. Pelly, appears in F.O. 5/440. He 
advises, if war comes, the use of 2,000 Canadian half- 
breeds for guerilla warfare; the despatch of three or 
four ships of war to the Columbia; the establishment of
a strong battery on Cape Disappointment; the organisation 
under the Company of the fish and grain produce of the
3. Se^Aberdeen’s «Confidential* despatch to Pakenham, No.
20, 3rd April, 1845, in F.O. 5/423. ^/AArs
4. Addington to Hope, 3rd April, 1845, in F.O. 5/440.
The next move was to obtain parliamentary sanction 
for the steps already taken, and Aberdeen hoped that the dis­
cussion in Parliament would have a salutary, sobering effect
on the American public mind by demonstrating the unanimity
(1)
and determination of the British nation. The question
was mooted in Parliament on 4th April, when Lord Clarendon 
in the Lords and Lord John Russell in the Commons demanded 
to know how Great Britain stood in view of the recent "blust­
ering announcement” of the President of the United States.
In his reply Lord Aberdeen said, " ...... we possess rights
which, in our opinion, are clear and unquestionable, and by 
the blessing of God and with your support, we are fully
prepared to maintain.” These words were greeted with ”loud
(2)
and general applause." Sir Robert Peel spoke to the
same effect in the Commons; Gre^t Britain considers she 
has rights respecting the Oregon territory which are clear 
and unquestionable, and if these rights are invaded, she is 
resolved and she is prepared to maintain them. There is 
nothing equivocal about these statements, and they we re met 
by great unanimity in Parliament, even the advanced Radical, 
Hume, withdrawing all opposition when a vote for 40,000 
seamen was made in the House of Commons.
But a fortnight later the Prime Minister went 
out of his way to reiterate the determination of the British 
Government to maintain their rights in Oregon. In the debate 
on the Maynooth grant he spoke of a "rising cloud in the 
West, and if that calamity £ war J should befall us, it is my 
earnest prayer that, when it shall occur, it shall find the 
people/
1. Aberdeen detained the American post in order that the 
report of the Proceedings in Parliament might reach the 
United States as soon as possible. See his despsteh to 
Pakenham, No. 21, 6th April, 1845, in P.O. 5/423.
2. Hansard. 3rd Series, Vol. 79, 4th April, 1845.
people of this Empire united in loyalty to the Throne, and 
in determination to support the common interests. It id my
earnest hope ......   that Ireland shall stand ranked with us
and then •••••• I shall await the result with perfect com­
posure." This celebrated speech was widely quoted in the 
United States, and there is no doubt of its effect. Buchanan 
denounced it to Pakenham as a breach of diplomatic etiquette 
at a time when negotiations were in progress, and he concluded 
from it, he said, that England was intent upon a quarrel.
5* A United States’ Proposition is Peremptorily Rejected.
It was gratifying to the Cabinet to learn that 
their recently adopted tone was alarming the Americans, par­
ticularly when Pakenham reported that he saw no reason to fear
(i)
that the alarm would produce anything but a good effect.
The debates in Parliament caused American attention to become
focussed upbn the Oregon question and prompted the press to
examine their title with a view to discovering if it was clear
(2)
enough to justify the extremity of war. English newspapers 
were quite widely read when they crossed the Atlantic, and the 
more reputable American papers began to admit the justice of 
the British claim and to deny that their title was perfect.
The door to negotiation being apparently closed, 
it was necessary to provide Pakenham with instructions. If 
the suggestion of arbitration was not acted upon, war would 
become "not improbable." He was directed to use temperate 
but firm language with everyone with whom he came in contact 
and/
1. Pakenham to Aberdeen, No. 54, 13th May, 1845, in F.O. 5/426
2. The Americans were familiar with the fulminations of 
politicians, and Polk’s inaugural address did not produce 
among them, therefore, the sensation that it did in England 
The United States’ public were astonished, therefore, to 
learn that war was being gravely discussed in Britain.
and to let it be understood that nothing would be conceded
(1)
to force or threats.
Pakenham was very glad to act upon this advice 
for there is little doubt, having regard to his changed tone, 
that he had become dissatisfied with his office of supplicant 
to negotiators whom he suspected of insincerity. The change 
was immediately reflected in his reports of conversations 
between himself and Mr. Buchanan. He testified to the sober­
ing effect on the American public of the discussions in
(2)
Parliament; the mercantile and moneyed classes, he per­
ceived, heartily disliked war, and even the more mischievous
and anti-English newspapers like the New York ’Herald1 became
(3)
more moderate in their criticism.
A full month elapsed before the subject was again
broached, and during that period Pakenham received Aberdeen’s
despatch of 6th April advising him of the possibility of war
and accompanied by copies of the parliamentary speeches of
recent date. The effect of these on the British representative
is noteworthy; from the role of supplicant he changed to
that of haughty, though courteous, patron; Buchanan was told,
not that Britain would suggest an alternative to arbitration,
(4)
but that the burden of making overtures rested upon him. 
Fortunately, Buchanan refused to take up the challenge 
implied/
1* The full instructions appear in No. 21, 6th April, 1845, 
in F.O. 5/423. Arrangements for war were also made in 
Canada as it was understood that, if and when war came, 
the Americans would attempt to satisfy their long suppressed 
ambition to possess Canada. Sir Caries Metcalfe advised 
the Colonial Office on the conduct of military operations 
should war be declared. Command of the Great lakes should 
be secured first; the states were to be conquered singly 
in order to effect a breach between North and South; the 
British navy was to destroy American commerce and blockade 
United States* ports; India was to supply a force to 
occupy Oregon. See W.O. 1/552.
2. The American Ambassador in London reported to his superiors 
the anti-American tone of the British press. See Paken­
ham’ s ’Separate and Confidential* despatch of 28th Septem­
ber, 1845, in F.O. 5/428.
3. See his despatch, No. 49, 28th April, written after receipt 
of English newspapers of 5th April, in F,0. 5/425.
4. No. 49, in same.
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implied in Pakenham1s words.
Pakenham, however, was determined not to let the 
matter rest, and in his conversations with the American 
Secretary of State he displayed an aggressive attitude alto­
gether foreign to his former manner. He asked Buchanan plainly 
if the United States were prepared to resort to war should 
the negotiations collapse. Buchanan had to answer in the 
negative and Pakenham, pursuing his preconceived plan, 
suggested that, if the United States did not want war as 
an alternative to settlement by compromise, it was their 
place to submit a proposal for accommodation. The British 
representative was suspicious of Buchanan who, he thought, 
wanted to gain time in order to allow the Mexican situation 
to develop; if the annexation of Texas, which Congress had 
decided upon by a resolution of 1st March, 1845, could be
managed without provoking war with Mexico, the American terms
(1)
for an adjustment about Oregon would become more stringent.
That is exactly what happened. The Texan difficulty 
was satisfactorily disposed of because Mexico, in the face of 
a unanimous resolution in favour of annexation to the United 
States passed in June by the Congress of Texas, could not do 
anything. Polk could now turn to Oregon, and on 12th July,
1845, Buchanan submitted a note to Rakenham outlining the 
United States1 claim and purporting to establish a perfect 
title to the whole Oregon area up to 540 40*. According to 
Buchanan President Polk was so profoundly convinced of the 
justice of his country’s claim that he had been in doubt at 
the time of his election whether he should immediately end 
the/
1. Pakenham*s account appears in his despatch, No. 53, 13th 
May, In F.O. 5/426. He was to propose, as a counter to 
Buchanan, the line of the Columbia with all ports between 
the river and the 49th parallel free to both nations; if 
Buchanan made no offer, Pakenham was to use his discretion 
about tendering one. See Aberdeen’s No. 22, 18th April, 
in F.O. 5/423.
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the negotiation. He felt, however, that the acts of his pre­
decessors in office constrained him to make concessions* His 
Government, therefore, magnanimously offered to agree to the 
49th parallel as the boundary line, and would concede to Great
Britain the freedom of any ports on Vancouver Island south of
(1)
that line* It is hoped that the offer will furnish a
"stable foundation of lastingpeace and harmony” as the line
will carry out the principle of contiguity for both, and it
will secure to each a sufficient number of commodious harbours
on the north-west coast*
In the meantime the American Government had decided
to replace Edward Everett at London by Louis McLane, and the
latter sailed on 16th July equipped with instructions to submit
a proposition similar to the above with the exception that
the United States offered to cede the ,fsmall cap” of Vancouver
Island south of 49°, “which would be of no importance to the
(2)
United States• "
We have seen that one direct result of the parl­
iamentary debates and the war preparations in England and 
Canada was to stiffen Pakenham in his negotiations with 
Buchanan, and we have noted two examples of the change* The 
American proposition of 12th July supplied the opportunity 
for a third. On the ground that this offer was less favourable 
than that made by the United States in 1826, Pakenham summarily 
rejected it, fortified, as he later admitted, by the tone of 
the debates in Parliament and its echo throughout the British 
nation. The free navigation of the Columbia had always been 
a/
1* A copy of Buchanan’s note is enclosed in Pakenham1s
despatch, Ho. 87, 29th July, in P.O. 5/427* Enclosure
2 is a copy of Pakenham1s reply.
2. "Afterwards, if the difficulty can only be resolved by the 
sword, we may then appeal with confidence to the world for 
the equity and justice of our cause, and may anticipate the 
smiles of Heaven upon the right." Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 489, 
29th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 27-32* Serial No. 478.
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a British sine qua non and adoption of such an unfavourable
offer ad referendum would have represented a diplomatic
(1)
victory for the United States* Pakenham professed to
see in the proposal a "shabby attempt" to keep up the blust­
ering tone of Polk’s inaugural address, and he wrote with 
contempt of the President’s effort to castigate his pre­
decessors who had aimed at an adjustment by reciprocal con­
cession*
Buchanan and Polk were quick to recognise the
tactical error involved in Pakenham’s action, and on 30th
(2)
August they withdrew the original offer of 12th July,
leaving matters as they had stood since September, 1844, and
transferring to the shoulders of the British Government the
burden of making further proposals for an agreement*
Lord Aberdeen was mortified when he heard of
(3)
Pakenham’s precipitate action and its sequel* While he
realised that according to the letter of his instructions the 
Minister was in the right, he deplored his not having taken 
the proposition for the consideration of the Cabinet so that 
an avenue of approach might have been left open.
Pakenham attempted to recover from the effects 
of his mistake by seeking to induce Buchanan to reconsider 
the decision to withdraw his offer of 12th July* But the 
Secretary of State in several conversations gave him to 
understand that the President could not recall what had 
already/
1* In a private letter to Aberdeen of 28th October Pakenham 
offered to resign his post, declaring that he had lost 
confidence in himself. His defence of his peremptory re­
jection appears in his No. 114, 29th October, in P.O. 5/429* 
2* Buchanan was absent from Washington during mast of August; 
hence the dela£ in answering. Moreover, he wanted to dally 
until relations with Mexico were clarified. Polk, on the 
other hand, saw no "necessary connection" between Mexico 
and Oregon. Diary, I, Memo, of 26/8/45.
3* Pakenham’s account of the withdrawal and his remarks upon 
it appear in his despatch, No. 95, 13th September. He 
concluded that Polk’s move was an endeavour to pander to 
party politics. Peel seems to have considered the offer 
as made for delay or evasion by a Government he considered 
insincere and "dishonest." See P.O. 5/429*
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already been done, nor could he modify in any way the with-
(1)
drawal of the United States1 offer.
At the same time Lord Aberdeen was discussing the
new situation with the newly appointed American Minister at
London, Louis McLane, to whom he reiterated the chagrin of his
Government at Pakenham’s precipitate action. He informed him
that the British Government would have welcomed the offer as
a basis of negotiation, and he expressed the hope that Polk’s
decision to withdraw the offer was not final. This he followed
up by suggesting arbitration as the mbst acceptable method of
settlement# Pakenham was instructed to propose this means of
adjustment, and if it was rejected "be the consequences what they
may,. Her Majesty’s Government will have no choice but to
maintain unimpaired those rights which they believe Great
(2)
Britain to possess." The great difficulty was, of course, 
that negotiations were entirely closed unless Pakenham with­
drew his note of rejection and Buchanan his reply. All the 
efforts of the British representative to effect this were 
opposed by Buchanan, however, and Pakenham had to wait for 
a favourable moment to offer arbitration.
It might be noted that the autumn and early 
winter of 1845 was a particularly unfavourable time for 
England to make a settlement of the Oregon question because 
the prospect of a peaceful understanding between the United 
States and Mexico was becoming brighter, the Mexicans having 
in August signified their willingness to negotiate and arrange­
ments were made to dispatch the Honourable John Slidell for 
that purpose. Slidell was to arrange for the peaceful annex­
ation/
1* Buchanan to McLane, No. 13$ 3th November, in Sen. Ex.
Doc. No. 489, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., Serial*No. 478, p. 34. 
Aberdeen to Pakenham, No. 64, 3rd October, 1845, in P.O. 
5/423 Buchanan in conversation with Pakenham reiterated 
his dislike of arbitration, but admitted that the thought 
of war was abhorrent to him.
2.
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ation of Texas and the acquisition of California. Of course,
if the negotiations failed, the United States were prepared
(1)
to take both by force.
The break in the negotiations gave Lord Aberdeen
an opportunity to reconsider his private views on Oregon, and
it is interesting to note that they had undergone little change
in the year or so that had passed. Events had merely confirmed
his opinion of March, 1844, and he still felt that Britain
should contend for the line of 49° to the sea, for Vancouver
Island entire with common navigation of the Columbia, for freedom
of access of both countries to all ports between the Columbia
and the 49th parallel on both the mainland and the Island. He
believed that this would give England everything really worth
contending for, and it seemed to coincide with the ideas of the
Hudson’s Bay Company, which had lately established its prin­
ts)
cipal settlement on Vancouver Island.
6. A Presidential Message.
Pakenham’s rejection of the American offer of July, 
1845, coming so soon after the President’s unequivocal inaug­
ural message and during the course of the critical situation
with regard to Texas and California, did much to inspire the
(3)
terms of the Presidential Message of 2nd December, 1845.
The Message had a threefold bearing, on Texas, on Mexico, and 
on Oregon. With regard to Texas the President was able to 
assure his people that forces were in preparation to ’protect’ 
the/
1* Slidell’s attempts at settlement went on over a period of 
months until the Mexicans sent him home without an agree­
ment. For an account of his efforts see Rives, op. cit., 
Chapter XXX.
2. Aberdeen to Peel, 17th October, 1845, in Peel MSS. Cf. 
below, Chapter IX, Section 3.
3. J. D. Richardson, ’Messages and Papers of the Presidents,’ 
IV, pp. 392-398.
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the United States from Mexico. Concerning Oregon Polk suggested 
that notice to abrogate the Convention of 1827 should be given 
and United States* jurisdiction extended over the whole region. 
He reminded his people that he was bound by the decisions of 
his predecessors in the Oregon negotiations. "The extraordinary 
and wholly inadmissible demands of the British Government and 
the rejection of the proposition made in deference alone to 
what had been done by my predecessors and the implied obligation 
which their acts seemed to impose afford satisfactory evidence 
that no compromise that the United States ought to accept can 
be effected.” Congress must take steps to protect citizens in 
Oregon, and "the protection of our laws and our jurisdiction" 
ought to be immediately extended over the territory. Polk goes 
on to recommend the erection of stockades and forts along the 
route to Oregon for the protection of immigrants against the 
Indians. In the papers accompanying the Message all documents 
dated after 12th July were omitted, and nothing was therefore 
said of the efforts of the British Government to reopen negot­
iations subsequent to that date.
The Message produced a sensation, particularly in 
Britain, and coupled with recent reports of increased activity
in English shipyards it caused an acute fall in Federal stocks
(1)
and in those of individual states. The Message proved one
thing conclusively, namely, that the President was determined 
to maintain his public role of champion against what he termed 
British aggression. His sincerity is not to be doubted. He 
had been elected on a ’Fifty-Four Forty’ platform, and he be­
lieved that had his offer of 12th July been accepted his Ad-
(2)
ministration might have been overthrown.
Yet/
1. Pakenham to Aberdeen, No. 134, 13th December, F.O. 5/430.
Of. Buchanan to McLane, No. 20, same date, in Sen. Ex. Doc. 
No.. 489, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., Serial No. 478, p. 36.
2. Polk, Diary, I, 107.
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Yet Lord Aberdeen was in no way disheartened by 
the Message; indeed, he looked upon it as another milestone 
on the road to settlement. It was just what he had expected; 
If the Senate adopted the advice contained in the Message, the 
whole controversy would be speedily brought to an issue# ”I 
have never been afraid of this Oregon question, and feel con­
fident that in the course of the year we shall see it finally
(1)
settled, either by arbitration, or by direct negotiation#”
The difficulty was how to reopen negotiations. 
Acting under instructions, Pakenham on 27th December suggested 
to Buchanan that the dispute might be submitted to the arbit­
ration of a foreign power. It was hoped by this suggestion 
that, if arbitration were refused, the way would be open for 
submission of a new proposition by either side. But the un­
equivocal answer of the Secretary of State simply made the 
prospect of a peaceful solution seem even more remote, and the 
optimism of the Foreign Secretary appeared to be hopelessly 
misplaced. In his letter rejecting the suggestion, Buchanan 
asserted that, besides ’’other conclusive reasons,” consent to 
arbitrate the controversy would be a confession on the part 
of his Government that their claim to all Oregon was not ir­
refutable, and arbitration would mean their consent to a com­
promise which would necessarily preclude them from claiming the
whole of the diputed area to which they asserted a clear and
(2(
unquestionable title.
1* Aberdeen to Peel, 28th December, 1845, in Peel MSS. 40455.
On 3rd December, that is, before the Message was made public 
he expressed himself similarly to Pakenham; ”as the crisis 
becomes more imminent the chance of settlement improves.”
He wrote to Everett to the same effect, (Aberdeen MSS.) while 
Greville v/as told much the same - II, 340, edition of 1885.
2. Pakenham’s No._3, 5th January, 1846, in F.O. 5/446. Cf.
Buchanan to Mcbane, No. 21, 29th December, in Sen. Ex. Doc. 
No. 489, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., Serial No. 478, p. 36. 
Buchanan’s memorandum on the subject is printed in Moore, 
’Works of James Buchanan,* VI, pp. 350-53.
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CHAPTER VII
PROSPECTS OP A PEACEFUL SOLUTION
‘i    - ■   — -----
il. Moderate American Opinion Desires Peace.
Though at the end of 1845 war had seemed close 
at hand, the next year was not far advanced when a peaceful 
settlement seemed much more likely. Towards effecting this 
change several influences were at work, and these were potent 
enough to justify the optimism of the British Foreign Secre­
tary. In the face of so much evidence to the contrary, Aber­
deen’s confidence in a peaceful solution appears unfounded, 
but the manifestations of peaceful intentions, not all of them 
public, on the part of the Americans seemed overwhelming to 
him. The friendly tone of the debates in the Senate and the 
absence of violence toward Great Britain in the American press; 
the fact that the impending repeal of the Corn Laws was wel­
comed by the South, and that the Whig manufacturers of the 
North, led by Clay and Webster, were for peace in spite of the 
fact that war would least affect them; the persistent assur­
ances of the President’s pacific intentions given by McLane, 
who, it is to be remembered, was sent to England by Polk with 
special instructions to facilitate the settlement of the 
Oregon controversy; the knowledge that the imminence of 
war with Mexico must influence the United States’ Government 
in favour of peace with England; the undoubted pacifism of 
the British press in 1846; the unanimity of the peaceful 
assurances/
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(1)
assurances from private American sources; all these
factors pointed in only one direction, namely, the certainty 
that the Oregon question would be settled peacefully.
The prospect of war was abhorrent to the commercial 
and financial interests in the United States, and a powerful 
peace party was developing in the Senate. The prices of stocks 
had suffered decline with the advent of Polk and with the 
trend of events in the direction of inevitable war they 
continued to depreciate.
J. C. Calhoun was at once one of the most prom­
inent members of the pacifist party in the Senate and the 
leading personality in the slave-holding states. His policy 
in Oregon was, as we have seen, to delay settlement and to 
encourage immigration, knowing that a claim by occupation 
and settlement would be the ultimate factor in establishing 
a title. The slave states wanted to annex Texas where slavery 
was recognised. The abolitionists wanted to annex the free
area of Oregon, and led by Adams and Geddings they wanted war
(2)
as a means of crushing Calhoun’s party. In spite of this
opposition, Calhoun was able at the end of 1845 to assure the
British Minister, Richard Pakenham, that he would be able to
defeat in the Senate any controversial measure likely to
(3)
produce war; indeed, by the spring of 1846 the peace
(4)
party controlled both Senate and House of Representatives.
The/
1. See Aberdeen MSS., passim.
2. See Calhoun’s letter to J. H. Hammond, 23rd January, 1846,
in Calhoun’s published correspondence in the Report of the 
American Historical Association for 1899.
3. Pakenham’s No. 1 of 2nd January, 1846, in F.O. 5/446. He
wrote on 26th February that Calhoun and Webster assured 
him that only seven senators would oppose an accommodation.
4. See Calhoun’s letter of 25th April in his published 
correspondence. His arguments against war were several; 
his country’s enormous debt and its rotten paper system 
were those he placed foremost. If war came, he argued, the 
United States would be surrounded by enemies - Mexico to 
the south, Indians in the west, Canada to the north, and
a British fleet on the Great Lakes.
The reports of Congress debates were all forwarded 
to the Foreign Office by Pakenham; so that the British Govern­
ment were fully conversant with opinion in the United States. 
Moreover, reports of the debates were given in British news­
papers. The Congress debates on the motion to give notice to 
Great Britain to end the Convention of 1827 lasted over two 
months, but they seldom showed doubt that Congress wanted a 
peaceful settlement.
The peace party in the Senate were anxious to 
produce tangible evidence in their efforts and with that in 
view overtures were made to Pakenham by Senator Archer of 
Virginia and by Mr. W. W. Corcoran, an eminent Washington 
banker who was on intimate terms with the members of the 
Government. They urged him to propose the line of the 49th 
parallel, with all Vancouver Island to Greet Britain, and 
navigation of the Columbia River free to both for a number 
of years. Pakenham was approached during the last weeks of 
December, 1845, and it is significant that Mr. Corcoran
(1)
entertained Polk for a few days early in January, 1846.
On 24th February, 1846, Senator Haywood informed
the President that Senators Calhoun, McDuffie and a number of
others wanted a compromise on Oregon, and Polk assured them
in reply that he would put to the Senate any British proposal
(2)
which had as its basis the line of the 49th parallel. The 
next day the Senators assured Pakenham that, if Britain were 
to offer an accommodation on the principle of ”equitable 
partition and compromise,” there was a positive majority in 
the Senate to support its acceptance. What the detailed 
terms were to be was not defined, but Calhoun offered to 
introduce/
1. M. M. Quaife (editor), Diary of J. K. Polk, 4 volumes,
New York, 1910, I, 306.
2. Idem, I, 249.
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in troduce in the Senate a resolution advising the President
to resume negotiation on the basis of Gallatin*s offer of 1826,
When Calhoun spoke of this to Polk on the 25th, however, the
latter vetoed the idea on the reasonable ground that failure
to pass such a resolution by the necessary two-thirds majority
(1)
would almost certainly have fatal consequences. The pacific
senators gave Pakenham positive assurances.thereupon that, if
his Government were to offer a settlement based on the line of
the 49th parallel with all Vancouver Island to Great Britain,
his proposition would be approved by the Senate without much
(2)
opposition.
It is obvious, therefore, that a cogent reason for 
Britain*s accepting the 49th parallel as the line of demarcation 
was that the United States would simply not accept less, and 
even the most moderate American statesmen - called *49 men*-were 
prepared to go to war if Great Britain proved adamant in demand­
ing more. Let contiguity settle the issue, they contended, and 
give Britain the area which is necessary for the protection of 
her interests - the fur trade - that is, give her north of 49°. 
American settlements were gradually being established in the 
intervening area between the United States and Oregon, from the 
Gulf of Mexico to the 49th parallel. If the land was to be 
divided unequally and one country was to receive the larger 
share, then surely, argued the Americans, the award should be 
made, not as a recognition of mere abstract right, but of those 
considerations which the proximity, numbers, past and present 
labours/
1. Diary, I, 252, Pakenham’s ‘Separate and Confidential* report 
detailing the above-mentioned overture was written on 26th 
February. According to Polk, Archer told Pakenham that 
navigation of the Columbia would never be conceded by the 
United States, but there is nothing in Pakenham*s despatch 
to substantiate this statement. Diary, I, 256.
2. Pakenham’s account of this offer appears in two despatches: 
No. 138, 29th December, 1845, and in one of the same date 
marked ’Separate and Confidential,* both in 5/446. If the 
offer had been made three months previously, he said, it 
would have been pared down in subsequent negotiations.
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labours of the American settlers introduced as necessary
elements in the adjustment of the dispute. Since England had
never attempted to establish settlements in the Oregon territory
while the United States had done so, let the latter have what
is essential for settlement, namely, the more fertile region
lying south of 49° • This argument is, of course, the natural
development of the Eabian policy advocated by Calhoun, and it
(1)
represented moderate opinion in the United States.
Another aspect of the controversy which influenced
moderate as well as extreme opinion among Americans was the
strategic importance of the area between the Columbia and the
49th parallel. It was the unanimous American opinion that the
harbours of Puget Sound were essential to the military safety
of the United States. The harbours are commodious and without
obstruction at the entrances; the entrances are deep and sheltered
by high mountains; the shores abound with valuable timber; the
Sound was likely to be the commercial centre and the western
(2)
railway terminus of the North Pacific.
There was no guarantee that the pacific attitude 
of the Senate would continue; indeed, there was distinct 
evidence that this was a mere transient phase of which Britain 
must take advantage. The minority war party in the Senate 
were/
1. Probably the most favourably disposed of the moderate men 
in the United States was Edward Everett, "United States1 
Minister to Britain till August, 1845, and now in retirement 
at home. A close friend of Aberdeen with whom he regularly 
corresponded, he too was a *49 man.* On 15th November, 1845, 
he wrote: "I cannot too strongly express the opinion that
no party, I had almost said no individual, would be willing 
to make a further departure from the forty-ninth degree, than 
to leave you the whole of Vancouver Island. As this con­
cession meets what you so frequently told me was an indis­
pensable condition of settlement, viz., some modification of 
the proposal which was declined by you in the former negot­
iations I sincerely hope that you will be able to agree
to it.” Aberdeen MSS. ff. 1-62. See also his letter of 10th 
December to the same effect.
2. The British Government also saw the Puget Sound area as ”the 
really valuable part of the territory.” See Aberdeen to 
Peel, 25th September, 1844, in Aberdeen MSS.
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were anxious to delay accommodation in order to resurrect
the ‘Fifty-Four Forty or Fight* agitation as a vote-catching
expedient at the next elections. Pakenham feared that the
elections might invest an anti-English expansionist majority
(1)
with power, and he conveyed his fears to his Government.
2. President Polk*s Attitude.
The President, after consultation with a small 
Cabinet of five or six members, was responsible for the official 
United States* policy, and it will be remembered that President 
Polk had been elected to office on the politically attractive 
cry of ‘Fifty-Four Forty or Fight.* There can be little question 
that, at first at any rate, he believed in the ‘clear and un­
questionable* title of the United States to all Oregon, but as 
so often happens in political life (Buchanan, who had been a 
bigoted ‘Fifty-Four Forty or Fight* man before assuming office 
and a very mild *49 man* after appointment, is an excellent 
and luminous example), experience of office led him to modify 
his claims and to reduce his demands appreciably. He was 
confronted, therefore, with the delicate task of reconciling 
public opinion to a diminution of his claim. If the United 
States* title to all Oregon as far north as 540 40* was clear 
and unquestionable in 1844, it was equally so in 1845 and 1846, 
and to reconcile a people almost fanatically in favour of 
territorial expansion to receiving considerably less in Oregon 
than he had promised during his election campaign was a stiff 
problem for Polk to solve. To understand why the United States 
ultimately/
1. Pakenham to Aberdeen , No. 34, 29th March, 1846, in F.O.
5/447. A private letter to Pakenham proves that Aberdeen 
was aware of this: "It seems generally to be apprehended,
with good reason, that if Congress should rise without our 
having previously come to any agreement, there is very 
little hope of any amicable settlement hereafter. Time, 
therefore, is of even more importance with you than with us.**!
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ultimately accepted the British proposition of May, 1846, it 
would perhaps he well, therefore, to outline the evolution of 
President Polk’s Oregon policy.
Although it appears difficult on the surface to 
comprehend Polk’s policy, a study of his ’Diary’ in conjunction 
with the public and private correspondence of Lord Aberdeen 
makes it reasonably clear that the President very soon found 
that his election promises were not easy of fulfilment. He 
was able enough and obstinate enough to obtrude his opinions 
upon the other members of his Cabinet, and his influence was 
potent in the final settlement of the Oregon problem as well 
as in determining the British attitude to the dispute. Polk 
seems genuinely to have wanted a peaceful settlement of the 
controversy, but the extravagance of his election policy and 
the popularity of his election demands made it necessary for 
him to bring public opinion to his view or, alternatively, to 
maintain publicly his ’Fifty-Four Forty or Fight’ attitude 
and privately to do everything possible to secure an amicable 
arrangement on the basis of diminished American claims. It 
was inevitable that he would choose the latter policy.
As early as 12th May, 1845, Polk was preparing
the American people for a compromise, his paper, the ’Union’,
stating, nSome people say we want war - some that we cannot
be kicked into war. Several predict that there will be war.
Now, without undertaking to say positively that there will be
war or that there will not be war, we venture to predict that
it is not Mr. Polk’s will to plunge his country into war, and
still less to sacrifice her rights and honour. He will never
(1)
abandon either •••••• ” Polk knew that war would be the
consequence/
1. Quoted in E. I. McCormac, ’James K. Polk,’ Berkeley, Cal­
ifornia, 1922, p. 568*
consequence of insistence upon an extreme American claim in
(1)
Oregon. The logical alternative to war was a compromise
of that claim. At that time, also, he offered the London
embassy to Van Buren as the man to bear the "olive branch"
(2)
across the Atlanticf and, though Van Buren was unable 
to accept, the offer indicates Polk’s anxiety for peace with 
England.
His next step was to seek arguments justifying 
a compromise because he well knew that mere rhetorical bom­
bast on the evils of war would not silence the anti-English 
Democrat*. His plea would be, he decided, that his hands 
were tied by the concessions of his predecessors. Secretary 
Buchanan’s letter of 12th July, 1845, to Mr. McLane explains 
the President’s policy. "The President at a very early period 
of his administration was called upon to decide whether he 
would break off or continue this negotiation. Placed in a 
responsible position he first inquired whether the national 
honour required that he should abruptly terminate it by 
demanding the whole territory in dispute. War before dis­
honour is a maxim deeply engraven upon the hearts of the 
American People, and this maxim ever shall regulate his con­
duct towards foreign affairs. But it was impossible for him 
to conceive that there could be dishonour in pursuing the 
course which had been adopted by Mr. Monroe, his patriot 
Revolutionary predecessor, more than a quarter of a century
ago, and had been either expressly sanctioned or acquiesced
(3)
in by all succeeding administrations.”
Pakenham’s/
i
1. Buchanan to McLane, 12th July. 1845, in J. B# Moore,
"The Works of James Buchanan, VI, 191, London, 1908-11.
2. "On great occasions the highest men are to be taken, where
war is to be averted, none but the highest •••••• If any­
thing can be adced to make the suggestion agreeable to you 
you may safely consider it as uttered by the President," 
wrote Bancroft, member of Polk’s Cabinet. See M. A. de
W. Howe, ’Life and Letters of George Bancroft,’ I, 269-271 
London, 1908.
3. Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 489, 29th C0ng., 1st Sess. Vol. 9 f p. 27
Serial No. 478.
Pakenham* s peremptory rejection of the offer made 
to him on the same date and the subsequent repudiation of his 
action by his Government (made known to Polk on 19th August 
by a letter from McLane which stated that Lord Aberdeen would 
agree to very liberal terms) emboldened him to instruct Buch­
anan to withdraw the offer of 12th July, and to reassert the 
United States1 claim to territory as far north as 54° 40**
The Foreign Secretary*s expression of regret at Pakenham*s 
precipitate action along with his declaration of a desire to 
reopen negotiations were to Polk a sign of weakness, and he
instructed Buchanan that if Pakenham offered the terms re-
(1) *jected by him (Pakenham), they were to be refused* In
short, the British representative *s arbitrary act was a precious
gift to the President as it gave him an excuse for insisting
upon the line of 54° 40* and enabled him to continue to play
his pre-election role of the patriot who was determined to
defend to the last his country*s pretensions* All moderate
men were conciliated by his offer of the line of 49°, while
the extremists were satisfied with its withdrawal and the
(2)
assertion of the whole claim*
Any fresh British offer would be rejected by Polk 
or put to the Senate* This move was the first hint of a new 
expedient* The Senate form a branch of the treaty-making 
power and their consent is necessary to the ratification of 
all agreements with other nations* Polk conceived the idea 
- an antiquated device not resorted to since Washington*s 
time - of putting any suitable offer before the Senate, and 
if they advised acceptance he could make them responsible, 
maintaining/
1* Polk, 'Diary,* I, 13. Also Sen Ex. Doc* op* cit* Cf# 
McCormac, op* cit* p* 575*
2* Buchanan to McLane, in J • B* Moore, op* cit*, VI, 342*
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maintaining that they had forced his hand. The Presidents 
Annual Message of December, 1845, was dravtti up in accordance 
with these views after review and approval by the Cabinet.
At the end of the year word reached Washington of 
the crisis of 5th December in England. The danger of the re­
appearance at the Foreign Office of the bellicose Palmerston 
was ominously real and, immediately upon receipt of this alarming 
news, Polk at a Cabinet meeting took one further step in retreat 
from his stand on a nclear and unquestionable title.” After 
consulting Senator Allen, Chairman of the Foreign delations 
Committee of the Senate, and other Senators, all of whom assured 
him that the Senate would approve, he let Buchanan know the 
minimum terms which he would submit to the Senate. These were:
a boundary line along the 49th parallel to the sea with free
(1)
ports to the United States north of 49°•
On the surface and in public Polk still adhered
to the view that 1 the only way to treat John Bull was to look
him straight in the eye; that he considered a bold and firm
course on our part a pacific one; that if Congress faultered^sic
or hesitated in their course John Bull would immediately become
arrogant and more grasping in his demands; and that such had
been the history of the Brittish sic Nation in all their
1 J (2) 
contests with other Powers for the last two hundred years.”
The nev/s from England was not reassuring, for when 
McLane broached to Aberdeen the matter of Britain1s extensive 
preparations for war he was told ”very promptly and frankly” 
that Great Britain could not disguise that she was preparing 
for a possible rupture with the United States, though the 
Foreign Secretary stated ”very positively and distinctly” that 
the/
1* Diary, I, 139. 
2* Diary, I, 155.
the preparations had no direct reference to such a rupture.
The significant fact for the President was that, though McLane
expressed unabated confidence in the frankness and honesty of
Lord Aberdeen, he could not ignore the fact that the increases
in the navy were exactly of a type calculated to assist in a
(1)
war with the United States*
At the end of 1845, therefore, the diplomatic
position was grave owing to the uncertain nature of the British
internal political situation and the British preparations for
war, directed unmistakably against the United States* But
President Polkfs position was clear enough* He knew that the
British Government merely sought an opportunity to offer the
line of the 49th parallel, and he knew also that such an offer
would more than likely pass the Senate upon whom the President
had decided to throw the onus of agreeing to a diminution of
(2)
the 1 clear and unquestionable* title of the United States*
By thus shelving responsibility, and by constantly reiterating 
his conviction of the right of the United States to the whole 
area in dispute, Polk, "relieved by the refusal of the British 
Government to accept his offer of compromise from the embarrass­
ment in which the acts of his predecessors had placed him,” 
felt that he was maintaining a degree of consistency* It is 
doubtful if he was as sanguine of a speedy peaceful settlement 
as Lord Aberdeen, but he seems never to have doubted the wisdom 
of his policy, and the events of the early months of 1846 quite 
confirmed, as will be seen, his estimate of the real position.
1* McLane to Buchanan, No. 30, 3rd Jan., in Sen. Ex. Doc. No* 
117, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 4* Serial No. 473, p. 243.
2* Twenty-five of the fifty-six Senators were of the more or 
less pacific Whig party while the thirty-one Democrats were 
not a solid entity. If Polk were to give the lead to the 
Democrats in favour of a peaceful settlement, there was no 
doubt that such a settlement would be reached.
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5. Public Opinion In Great Britain*
It is clear that with the advent of the year 1846
the prospects of a peaceful solution of the long-standing
Oregon controversy were increasingly bright. In the United
States a more or less pacific President, a pacific Senate,
and a pacific press were encouraging portents. Fortunately,
this general pacifism found an echo in England where the
prevalent feeling was that the people preferred a settlement
(1)
to a litigation, a compromise to a contest, peace to war.
The tone of the press in both countries reflected the new 
attitude, and it was obvious from the new conciliatory, tol­
erant tone that each side was attempting to understand the 
other*s case.
The *Times* at this period held a somewhat unique 
position. It had done a great deal towards overthrowing
Melbourne in 1841 and. though it was no ministerial organ,
(2)
its views carried great weight with the Cabinet. In 1845
this newspaper proved to be consistently conciliatory, and no 
attempt was made to disguise its dismay at the failure of the 
respective Governments to reopen negotiations after the re­
jection of the offer of 12th July. In January, 1846, the 
1 Times* suggested that Great Britain should offer what Gallatin
had proposed in 1826, namely, the line of the 49th parallel
(3)
with the Columbia River free to British subjects. Three
months later it added to these demands indemnity to the Hudson*s 
Bay/
1. Leading Article of 4th January, 1846* in *Times.*
2. 11 Its object and well-planned method being to control rather 
than to thwart their [the Government*s ] proceedings, and, 
above all, by securing early information as to the course 
of those proceedings and by putting a cloak of omniscience 
over its extensive knowledge, to give an appearance of lead­
ing where it might only be following ,•••••" See H. Fox 
Bourne, *English Newspapers,* London, 1887, p. 166.
3. Edition of 4th January, 1846, p. 4.
130-
Bay Company for the loss of their posts in the disputed 
area.
Scarcely less influential, the Whig ‘Edinburgh
Review,1 as early as July, 1845, in an excellent article
reviewing correspondence, pamphlets and books on Oregon,
attempted to find a solution of the boundary problem. After
expressing its faith in the fairness of the idea of arbitration,
the article concludes that the 49th parallel ought to be the
basis of the boundary. Great Britain would, of course, retain
all Vancouver Island and the right to navigate the Columbia.
This would give her the Island which, if she is ,fabsurd enough”
to plant a colony in the Northern Pacific, would be the least
(1)
objectionable site.
Throughout the course of the Oregon dispute, except 
where a point of honour was involved, Britain was always prompted 
primarily by commercial motives. Her interest in Oregon had 
been awakened by the commercial possibilities of the region; 
it had been increased by the opening of trade relations with 
China and by the possibilities of steam navigation which 
brought the region so much closer. She had now to consider 
the adoption of forcible means to assert her minimum claims 
in Oregon, realising that in doing so she would jeopardise 
her commerd al intercourse with the United States. Her great 
cotton/
1* Vol. 83, pp. 238-265. In an article in the American 
Historical Review, XL, pp. 38-62, ‘British Government 
Propaganda and the Oregon Treaty,1 Professor F. Merk 
shows that the article was composed by the economist,
Nassau W. Senior, who was working in collaboration with 
Edward Everett, United States* Minister at the Court of 
St. James. The-article shows that Everett, with Aberdeen*s 
approval, was attempting to influence the British public 
to accept the line of the 49th parallel. The article 
appearing in the leading Opposition organ caused something 
of a sensation, and brought forth the condemnation of come 
prominent Whigs, not for the nature of its conclusions but 
rather because it was deemed inconsistent with the policy 
that ought to be followed by an Opposition journal.
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cotton manufacturing industry, for instance, was dependent 
upon the southern states for supplies of raw material, and 
if war came tremendous distress would follow in Lancashire. 
Moreover, conversely war would assist American manufacturers 
in their competition with those of England. Yet, as will be 
seen later, the British Government were in the winter of 1845- 
46 grappling with the problem of distress in Ireland and to 
a less degree in England and Scotland. In these circumstances, 
therefore, it was realised that war would be folly.
The financial interests were also opposed to war
because of their huge investments in the United States. Of
the two hundred million dollars of state bonds issued it was
estimated that two-thirds were in British hands. War would
certainly stop payment of the interest on these securities
and might endanger repayment of the principal. That these
interests feared war is attested by the fact that on 27th
October, 1845, Mr. W. W. Ward of Boston, agent for the great
English banking firm of Messrs. Baring Brothers, called on
President Polk and demanded to know if the President favoured
peace or war because British bankers were anxious to determine
(i)
the safety of their commercial relations.
The financial and commercial classes in England 
thus affected were not slow to take what steps they deemed 
likely to maintain peace. Thus, the merchants of Manchester 
early in April, 1846, composed an address to American manu­
facturers in which they set forth the advantages of peace 
and the evils of war. The address was signed by such out­
standing figures as Cobden, Bright, and Lord Radnor. Similar 
addresses were prepared by citizens of Plymouth, Boston, and 
other/
1. Diary, I, 74. Polk, while suspicious that Ward was but
an agent of the British Government, assured him that peace 
was his policy at that time.
other English towns presented to towns of the same name in
(1)
the United States.
No less striking than this general desire for 
peace was the common English view of the intrinsic value of 
the object of all the trouble - Oregon. What country would 
resort to the extremity of war over a region which its Govern­
ment, Opposition, press and people considered quite worthless? 
2&e official correspondence abounds with illustrations of Lord
Aberdeen1 s efforts to impress upon Pakenham the trivial value
(2)
of the whole area; it would be sheer madness to go to war
for what the Foreign Secretary called a ”few miles of pine
(3)
swamp• " Lord Clarendon said in the Lords that war was
indefensible for the possession of an unoccupied territory
the whole fee-simple of which was well known to be of such
insignificant value as not to compensate the losses and
(4)
miseries that one single month of war must produce. Lord 
Ashburton felt that war for a question worthless in itself was 
unthinkable, and Lord John Russell addressed the House Of 
Commons to the same effect.
And so also with the English press which was 
unanimous in its estimate of the disputed area. The •Times* 
spoke for all but Palmerston and his *Morning Chronicle* when 
it said that "the Oregon territory sank in public estimation
to the slender Importance which really belongs to so remote
v  ^
and uninhabitable portion of the globe •••••• 11 ^
A
1. Some of these are reported in the ‘Times.1 See, for
instance, the edition of 6th April, 1846.
2. See, for example, Pakenham*s No. 18, 26th February, 1846, 
in F.O. 5/446.
3. Lady F. Balfour, ‘Life of Aberdeen,* London, 1898. Letter 
to J. J. Gurney of 20th February, 1842.
4. Hansard, Vol. 84, Lords, 17th March.
5. 14th July, 1846, p. 4. ’Blackwood’s Magazine,* another 
influential organ, LIX, 459, said that Oregon was Mthe 
last thing in the world that a decent nation would get 
into a passion about.lf The ‘Edinburgh Review* agreed 
that the greatest error of the whole controversy was the 
importance attached to the area. 83, 259.
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Add to these press reports the tenor of the advice 
to the Foreign Office of men like the very able vice-consul 
Forbes in Mexico. From the most unbiased accounts he had re­
ceived from servants of the Hudson*s Bay Company, employed 
for many years in Oregon, and from his own personal observation 
he did not hesitate to affirm that the Oregon territory was 
vastly inferior to the exaggerated reports given of it by in­
dividuals whose private interests had been connected with the
(X)
belief in the truth of these reports. It will be seen 
later that even the fur trade was no longer supplying the 
Company with profits.
This conviction that Oregon was of no real value 
strengthened the current conventional view of colonial 
acquisition. The growing success of the movement for free 
trade struck another blow at colonisation, for the two were 
considered to be mutually incompatible, foreign possessions 
were an advantage, it was believed, only so long as they pro­
vided the mother country with exclusive markets. Profitable 
trade relations with Oregon could not be hoped for; the 
Hudson*s Bay Company had a monopoly of what trade there was 
and no longer reaped a very handsome profit from it.
4. Corn Law Repeal and Oregon.
Another striking aspect of the commercial urge 
towards peace was the movement for free trade and repeal of 
the Corn laws. Though the question of repeal was not in 
itself new, it had entered upon a fresh phase in the winter 
of 1845-46 when the arguments in favour of repeal were im­
pressively illustrated by events in Ireland and Scotland. In 
August/
1. Forbes to Aberdeen, No. 5, 5th September, 1844, in 
F.O. 50(Mexico)/l70.
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August, 1845, the first word of the probable failure of the 
potato crop reached the Peel Government. Since the Irish 
peasantry were dependent almost entirely upon potatoes for 
sustenance the situation was very grave. A great deal of 
correspondence on the subject passed between the Prime Minister, 
the Home Secretary, and the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. Bad 
news continued throughout September and October, the infection 
spreading to Scotland towards the end of the latter month# 
Finally when the Cabinet saw the seriousness of the position 
they decided by a majority that to ameliorate the economic 
position they must repeal the Corn laws.
Peel*s party split on the issue of Corn Law Repeal,
and the Prime Minister on 5th December, 1845, tendered his
resignation to the Queen, suggesting Lord John Russell as
his successor in office and offering to co-operate with him
in repealing the Corn Laws and to support him in securing
an increase of the army and navy in view of the difficult
(X)
nature of Britainfs relations with the United States.
Lord John was unable to form a ministry because 
certain of his indispensable nominees for office, notably 
Grey, refused to sanction his choice of Lord Palmerston as 
Foreign Secretary. Palmerston would accept no portfolio but 
that of the Foreign Office and Russell in despair had to advise 
the Queen on 20th December that he was unable to form a 
government. Peel was therefore summoned and, with the Duke 
of Buccleuch converted to repeal and Lord Stanley replaced 
at the Colonial Office by Mr. Gladstone, he was able to re stone 
office.
The progress of these events was carefully followed 
in the United States, and Aberdeen took care that the details 
were/
!• Peel1s ^Memoirs1, II, 225-6, London, 1857
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were not delayed* Thus, in order that word of the momentous 
step decided upon by the Cabinet might catch the mail and be 
known in the United States as soon as possible, he prematurely 
communicated their decision to Delane, editor of the ’Times.* 
He knew that this would have a great effect in the United 
States, and would encourage pacific counsels, particularly 
in the western states where were the most inveterate enemies 
of England. Aberdeen felt that the free access of their 
grain to British markets would do much to mollify their anti-
n)
English sentiments.
5. Other Factors for Peace.
The continental political situation was not too 
reassuring, and the Prime Minister realised that a war with 
the United States might produce a coalition against Britain 
of the Americans and other countries, especially France and 
the secondary naval powers which, in the unsettled state of 
international law relating to neutrals, would welcome an 
opportunity to attack Great Britain. The visit of the Tsar 
to Queen Victoria in 1844 was viewed with much dissatisfaction 
in France and was denounced by the Opposition as a complete 
breach of the friendship between France and England. France 
and Great Britain were friends, at least nominally, but 
little was required to change the apparent friendship into 
open hostility. Even if the French Government were inclined 
to remain neutral at first, France v^ ould be tempted to take 
advantage of Britain’s temporary weakness owing to the massing 
of/
1. See Greville, op. cit., II, 312. Some indeed suspected 
that the whole affair was a device to deceive the United 
States into hastening on the Oregon negotiations. That 
Aberdeen put weight upon Corn Law Repeal is apparent from 
his private correspondence, particularly with Everett^ 
Peel, too, told Lord Francis Egerton that "the admission 
of maize v/ould go far to promote a settlement of Oregon.” 
Parker, op. cit., Ill, 324.
of her forces on the Pacific coast. She was still the
traditional enemy, and the Lords of the Admiralty, when
asked for their views on the situation, advised "a degree
of prudent precaution which, under the most flattering cir-
(1)cumstances of amity with France, must be observed.
Although the French Chamber of Deputies declared 
on 31st January, 1846, by a considerable majority (234 to 156) 
that France would remain neutral in the event of an Anglo- 
American war, the British Government remained suspicious. It 
was known that Guizot had pacific inclinations, but what guar­
antee was there that his successor would maintain his policy? 
France had a standing army of 350,000 men with a National 
Guard of a million. Peel, quite aware of these facts, stood 
between two fires in the Cabinet - Wellington and Aberdeen.
The former - and the majority of the Cabinet 3hared his views 
in varying degrees of conviction - defended the axiom bellum 
para, pacem habebis; the latter, on the other hand, denounced
it. Peel, after deliberation, inclined to the Wellington
(2)
point of view.
Still another reason why the settlement of the 
Oregon question came when it did and according to the terms 
it contained was the very real danger that the minor local 
conflicts in the disputed area between the United States* 
settlers and the Hudsonfs Bay Company might lead to a larger 
conflagration with very wide ramifications which would engender 
bittemews that could be dispelled only by war. With the in­
crease in the numbers of Americans the Company experienced more 
and/
1# See Confidential Report of Lords of Admiralty to Foreign 
Office, 10th June, 1846, in F.0. 5/461.
2. "When I see the weakness of Civil Authority in France, - 
the fruitful germs of war with France which will spring up 
in the event of war with the United States, - when I look 
back on the suddenness with which there have been within 
our short memories revolutions in the Government of France 
- and look forward to the events which may occur on the 
death of Louis Philippe - I cannot feel sanguine as to the 
future." Peel to Aberdeen, Peel MSS. 40455.
and more difficulty in protecting themselves* The Government 
had, as we have seen, been slow to furnish protection, and the 
area itself was not easily guarded. By joining the Provisional 
Government established in Oregon on the initiative of the Amer­
ican settlers the Company had surrendered whatever control the 
British Government might have had over British settlers in the 
contested territory.
Once the United States had given notice of the
(1)
abrogation of the Convention of 1827 their numerical 
superiority would enable them to plant their standard at all 
points where American citigens were to be found. They would 
administer justice, levy customs duties, and perform generally 
the offices proper to exclusive sovereignty. Britain1s position 
would be intolerable, and she would be faced with the alter­
natives of evacuation or war. With the notice of abrogation
more and more imminent as the early months of 1846 passed, an
(2)
honourable settlement became imperative.
6. British Party Politics and Oregon.
The more immediate circumstances connected with 
the settlement of the Oregon question centred about the 
domestic affairs of the British Government, and one of the 
most decisive factors on the side of peace was the uncertainty 
relating to the tenure in office of the Peel Government. Bae 
Conservative/
1. Notice was actually given on 28th April, 1846, and received 
at the Foreign Office on 16th May.
2. The summer of 1846 brought incidents which illustrate what 
might have happened. In July the United States1 vessel, 
•Shark,1 under Lieutenant Howison, arrived at Fort Van­
couver. The commander, though news of the settlement had 
not yet reached him, assured the American settlers in un­
equivocal terms that the United States1 Government would 
concede no territory on the mainland south of 49°• A move­
ment towards Vancouver was begun at once by land speculators 
to be in time for ,f a snatch at the Loaves and fishes."
Other incidents followed to illustrate the nervous tension.
Conservative party had split upon the free trade issue, and 
it was considered only to be a matter of time until the minor­
ity group of the party would take their revenge by coalescing 
with the Opposition in order to oust Peelfs Government from 
office. Somewhat naturally Peel was anxious to demit office 
with honour, and if he could settle the Oregon difficulty, 
which had been outstanding for so long and which had more than 
once so seriously menaced the good relations between his own 
country and the United States, he might earn the gratitude of 
his countrymen. He had sacrificed power to the ideal of free 
trade, an ideal which depended very largely for its realisation 
upon friendship with the United States; by settling the Oregon 
controversy he would have removed the most serious obstacle to 
peace between the two countries, and the fewer obstacles there 
were and the closer the friendship, the better chance free 
trade had of success. Peel knew, for instance, that before 
the recent war cry In the United States the dominant party 
there wanted a low tariff. He saw that a satisfactory arrange­
ment of outstanding differences between the two countries 
would encourage Congress to revise the tariff to England1s 
benefit. Events proved the wisdom of Peel*s calculation, for 
the United States* tariff was revised in the same session of 
Congress that brought agreement to the Oregon settlement.
Lord Aberdeen, as Foreign Secretary, had the Oregon
(1)
question as his special and, one might say, favourite problem.
His successor at the Foreign Office, he was aware, would be 
Lord Palmerston, a man of entirely different temperament who 
would never stand for the rebuffs and delays which Aberdeen 
had experienced. Palmerston believed that Britain*s foreign 
policy/
1. Greville, op. cit., passim.
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policy should be determined by the operation of either of two 
principles - hope or fear. Smaller countries ought to be en­
couraged to hope for British support in their time of danger. 
Powerful countries, on the other hand, should be taught to fear
opposition from England if they acted unjustly towards Britain 
(1)
or her allies. It was nothing but a sign of weakness, he 
felt, to yield to a foreign state and then boast that all such 
states were in good humour with Great Britain.
After the Ashburton Treaty of 1842 Palmerston had 
maintained in the columns of the *Moming Chronicle1 a most 
virulent campaign of denunciation of the Peel Government for 
having sacrificed British interests. While the Oregon negot­
iations were in progress he continued to attack the Government 
and to threaten what would happen if they gave the slightest 
concession to the Americans. It was desirable to maintain 
peace, he contended, and admiration of United States1 instit­
utions was permissible; but England must maintain her honour 
and her rights. To let the Americans have this so-called 
barren tract will not prevent war; rather will it invite one 
for, if England yields in this, the United States will soon 
pick a quarrel. The territorial frontier of the Columbia, not
the bare right of navigation, is the least that Britain can
(2)
demand and this she must demand as a right. Britain s 
foreign/
1. See Lord Dalling’s ’Palmerston,* p. 143. London, 1874. In 
of out of office he maintained these principles.
2. ’Morning Chronicle,* 17th January, 1846, p.4. Palmerston 
affected to see all attempts at compromise as preliminary 
to giving up all Canada. To surrender territory to the 
Americans is like handing over one’s travelling companion 
to propitiate an animal of prey; it only increases the 
desire for food. "The Yankees are disagreeable to deal 
with," totally unscrupulous and dishonest and determined 
somehow or other to carry their point. See Palmer son to 
Clarendon, 31st December, 1857, in Clarendon Papers, copy 
in American Historical Review, XLII, 500. Cf. F. Merk, 
’British Party Politics and the Oregon Treaty,* American 
Historical Review, XXXVII, p. 658.
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foreign policy is traditional, maxims and precedents of the 
Foreign Office serving as rules and principles. The leading 
principle in the Oregon affair has always been that the Colum­
bia should be the boundary, and to agree to the 49th parallel 
is to surrender all that the Americans had ever manoeuvred for; 
their claim to all Oregon is merely a tactical move to effect 
this. The slightest compromise will be interpreted as surrender*
There is no equivocation here, and there is not a 
shadow of doubt about how Palmerston would have dealt with the 
United States claims in Oregon. Peel and Aberdeen both felt 
that, if Oregon were not settled before they relinquished 
office., Palmerston would make it a pretext sufficient to just­
ify war with the United States. If war came, the whole success 
of Peel’s free trade scheme would be endangered. Moreover, 
the American Government were aware that the days of Peel’s 
Government were numbered and that Palmerston would soon control
a)
British foreign policy onee again. McLane had written home
that the Peel Government would not be in office after 1st July, 
and this prospect as much as any embarrassment caused by the 
Mexican War induced the Americans to seek peace.
Both in England and America, therefore, the agents 
and influences for peace in 1846 were multiple and potent. The 
best interests of economic and commercial policy, of domestic 
and foreign affairs, would be most effectively advanced, it 
was universally understood in Britain, by peace, and great 
sacrifices of ’diplomatic punctilio’ could be made to preserve 
it. In the United States, too, a friendly Senate, pacific 
President, well-disposed public all offered positive assurances 
of a peaceful settlement.
1. "Osborne [ the Queen’s residence] had already murmured some 
apprehension at the prospect; the bourse was nervous;
Guizot and Lieven shared a common fever; Louis Philippe 
denounced him openly as ’l’ennemi de ma maison;* even the 
reigning Rothschild complained that *il a 1*inconvenient de 
faire baisser les fonds de toute l’Europe sans nous en 
avertir.*" P. Guedalla, ’Palmerston,* London, 1926, p. 253.
CHAPTER VIII 
AMICABLE CONCLUSION OF THE CONTROVERSY
1. Resumption of Negotiations in 1846.
Negotiations between Pakenham and Buchanan con­
tinued during 1846. The British suggestion of settlement by- 
arbitration having met with unqualified rejection by the 
United States, Pakenham attempted, on his own initiative to 
differentiate between the matter of the title and that of 
equitable division by proposing that the title alone should 
be the subject of arbitration. Buchanan answered that such 
a proposition was not acceptable to the President who did not 
believe the territorial rights of the nation a proper subject
a)
for arbitration. Great Britain was reminded that in the 
last arbitration (that of the King of Sweden) the arbitrator 
had exceeded his powers by suggesting a boundary line of com­
promise. Furthermore, Oregon was essential to the United 
States because of its extent, its destiny as the home of 
Americans, and its position as an avenue for the commerce of 
the western states with Asia, advantages which would be placed 
in jeopardy by arbitration.
Arbitration/
1. Buchanan’s reply is enclosed in Pakenham’s No. 12, 5th
February, in F.O. 5/446. Aberdeen expressed entire approval 
of Pakenham’s efforts in his No. 8, 3rd March, 1846, in F.O. 
5/445. Cf. Buchanan to McLane, No. 22, 29th January, 1846, 
printed in Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 489, 29th Cong., 1st Sees.,
Vol. 4* Serial No. 478, p. 38.
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Arbitration had always seemed to Aberdeen to be 
the most reasonable method of adjustment, and whenever negot­
iations languished he brought it forth. The United States 
were consistently opposed to this method, and when in the 
earlier stages of the discussions a general arbitration had 
been suggested they had refused as flatly as in the later 
stages they had rejected Aberdeen’s offer to submit the subject 
of an ’equitable division’ of the Oregon territory to an 
arbitrator. This, the Americans felt, would have been to 
admit that Great Britain had a right to a portion of the 
territory. When the Foreign Secretary met this refusal by 
proposing that the question of title alone should be sub­
mitted to an arbiter with the instruction that he should 
divide the territory if neither had a clear title, the United 
States* Government were no less adamant. They contended that 
to instruct an arbiter in such terms would be tantamoimt to a 
clear invitation to him to effect a division of the region. It 
was their view that to agree to arbitrate was to run the risk 
of giving up their total stake in Oregon and to lose the 
valuable harbours of Admiralty Inlet and Puget Sound which 
Lieutenant Wilkes had valued highly. Arbitration was too slow,
and what hope had they that a European arbitrator would possess
(1)
the detachment necessary to reach a just decision?
Lord Aberdeen found the American dislike to 
arbitration difficult to understand. He felt that in the 
face of the position created by Polk’s withdrawal of his 
offer of 12th July, 1845, the British Government had gone 
as far as could be expected consistently with national pride 
toward/
1. For the official United States’ views on the subject of 
arbitration see Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 489, 29th Cong., 1st. 
Sess., Vol. 4, particularly Buchanan to MeLane, No. 21, 
29th December, 1845, same to same, No. 22, 29th January, 
1846, and same to same, 26th February, 1846. Pakenham has 
an excellent summary of these reasons in his despatch, No. 
12, of 5th February, 1846, in F.O. 5/446.
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towards reopening negotiations by offering arbitration as a 
solution. The complete rejection of that offer by the Americans 
was mortifying, and the Foreign Secretary then debated whether 
to submit a final proposition in the form of an ultimatum or to 
accept the alternative - war# The position was saved to some 
extent by the receipt by McLane of Secretary Buchanan's instruct­
ions of 29th January wherein it was stated that, though the 
President would accept nothing less than the whole territory 
unless the Senate should otherwise determine, it was left to the 
discretion of the Minister whether intimation should be made to 
Aberdeen that, if the British Government desired a peaceful 
termination of the controversy, they should immediately submit 
a proposition. The President would decide whether such a pro­
posal, if made, was of a character to justify its submission to
(1)
the Senate. This kept the matter open, but it did not go
far enough for Aberdeen, who wanted to know the minimum offer 
that Polk would submit to the Senate.
On the very day of the dispatch of the above in­
structions Aberdeen was seeing McLane to whom he expressed his 
chagrin at the rejection of the arbitration offer. He gave it 
as his conclusion that the President did not really desire peace, 
and he explained accordingly that he had withdrawn his objections 
in the Cabinet to the adoption of war measures directed against 
the United States. He made it clear also that he was not pre­
pared to make any new? offer in the circumstances.
The American Cabinet met on 24th and 25th February 
to consider McLane's despatch containing the gist of his inter­
view with Aberdeen, and the important despatch of 26th February P 
was the result. Beginning with the usual, though this time even 
more comprehensive, defence of Polk's decision to refer any offer 
to/
1. Buchanan to McLane, No. 22, 29th January, 1846, printed in
Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 489, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., Serial No. 478, 
p. 37.
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to the Senate, it goes on to define the terms which the Presi­
dent deems worthy of submission. They are: the line of 49°
with all Vancouver Island to Britain, together with the free 
navigation of the Columbia for a number of years. To what ex­
tent these terms were to be communicated to Aberdeen was left
to McLaneTs discretion, the President relying ’'with implicit con-
(1)
fidence in his sound judgment, prudence and patriotism."
Nothing was better calculated to clarify the diplo­
matic position or to establish hope of a peaceful solution. The 
terms likely to be acceptable to the British Government were 
known, and it was also known that the views of the Senate on 
Oregon coincided with British views almost exactly. All that 
was now necessary was formal presentation of a proposition by 
either of the disputants. But the British Government were 
in no hurry to move until the Senate had come to a decision 
on the notice of abrogation of the Convention of 1827. On 
the day that Buchanan disclosed to Mr. McLane the President's 
terms of settlement, Pakenham was advising the British Govern­
ment to make no proposition in the meantime. Calhoun and 
Webster/
1. Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 489, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., Serial No. 478, 
p. 40. Cf. Diary, I, 244. A private letter by Buchanan to 
McLane of the same date makes it clear that "there is not the 
least doubt but that the offer would receive the previous 
sanction of a constitutional majority" of the Senate. See 
Moore, op. cit., VI, 385. The despatch of 26th February 
supplies Polk's apologia: "The President, since the date of 
his Message, has seen no cause to change his opinion, either 
in regard to our title to Oregon or to the manner in which 
it ought to be asserted. But the Federal Consitituion has 
made the Senate, to a certain extent, a coordinate branch of 
the treaty making power. Without their advice and consent, 
no treaty can be concluded. This power could not be entrust­
ed to wiser or better hands. Besides, in their legislative 
character, they constitute a portion of the war-making, as in 
their Executive capacity they compose a part of the treaty 
making power. They are the representatives of the sovereign 
States of this Union, and are regarded as the best index of 
the opinion of their constituents. A rejection of the Brit­
ish ultimatum might probably lead to v;ar, and as a branch of 
the legislative power, it would be incumbent upon them to 
authorise the necessary preparations to render this war 
successful. Under these considerations, the President, in 
ctference to the Senate, and to the true theory of the con­
stitutional responsibilities of the different branches of 
the Government, will forego his own opinions ....... "
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Webster had assured him that no more than seven senators
would oppose a settlement on the principle of "equitable
partition and compromise," and certain senators had sought
his opinion as to the terms of accommodation that the Senate
(1)
ought to advise the President to accept.
The Senate debates on the resolution to give 
notice of abrogation of the Convention of 1827 continued to 
be conducted in the most friendly manner. The United States1 
press was playing its part too, and Senator Haywood, who was 
recognised as Polk's mouthpiece, was demanding in the 'Intell­
igencer' that there should be a compromise on the basis of 
the 49th parallel. He reminded his readers that the President 
was not bound by the resolution in favour of demanding all 
Oregon passed at the Convention which nominated him.
Events in another sphere were conspiring to 
hasten a decision on Oregon on the part of the American 
Cabinet. Mexican affairs which, as we have seen, were so 
closely linked with the Oregon question, were approaching 
a crisis. On 12th January the President had received news
(2)
that his attempt at negotiation with the Mexicans had failed. 
Preparations for war were at once begun; General Taylor was 
ordered to lead his army to the banks of the Rio Grande, and 
Conner's fleet was sent back to Vera Cruz. No definitely 
belligerent move was made and a policy of procrastination was 
pursued for it was agreed that an eye must be kept on Great 
Britain. Their patience almost exhausted, the United States' 
Cabinet decided early in April that it would be 'prudent* to 
await/
1. Pakenham to Aberdeen, 'Separate and Confidential,', 26th 
February, 1846, in F.O. 5/446.
2. Rives, op. cit., Chapter XXXII. On the following day 
Pakenham wrote home that "if the report •••••• of an
unfavourable turn in affairs with Mexico should be con­
firmed, the consequences would, I think, soon become 
visible in the Prevalence of more moderate views with 
respect to Oregon." See despatch No. 4, in F.O. 5/446.
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await the arrival of the next steamer from England. It was 
agreed that, provided the news from England was favourable, 
a Presidential Message on Mexico should be drawn up.
Finally, after prolonged debate, the Senate, by 
a vote of 40 to 14 passed an amendment to their resolution 
to give notice of the abrogation of the Convention of 1827 
agreeing to show a conciliatory disposition and framing the 
notice in friendly terms. After a conference between com­
mittees of the two Houses, the bill passed both on 23rd April 
and was approved by the President four days later. On the 
following day Secretary of State Buchanan advised the United 
States* Minister in London, Louis McLane, of the decision, 
and he also sent for Pakenham to tell him that notice "in
the kindest manner" had been sent to the British Government
(1)
through McLane. The United States considered peace as good
as settled; their Mexican ambitions were near realisation, 
and their policy with regard to Mexico could now be carried to 
fruition; a Presidential Message on Mexico was promulgated 
the following week.
The passage of this conciliatory notice of abro­
gation proved the turning point in the negotiations. The 
friendly nature of its terms and the guarantees to Pakenham 
of leading senators, together with the very friendly tone of 
Pakenham* a/
1. Reported by Pakenham in his No. 50, 13th May, 1846, in F.O. 
5/449. The notice ran as follows: "And whereas it has 
now become desirable that the respective claims of the 
United States and Great Britain should be definitely
settled; and that said territory may no longer than need
be remain subject to the evil consequences of the divided 
allegiance of its American and British population and of
the confusion and conflict of national jurisdictions danger­
ous to the cherished peace and good understanding of the
two countries.......that the attention of the governments
of both countries may be the more earnestly directed to the 
adoption of all proper measures for a speedy and amicable 
adjustment of the differences and disputes in regard to 
the said territory." Gf. Buchanan to McLane, 28th April, 
1846, printed in Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 489, 29th Cong., 1st. 
Sess., No.478, p. 46.
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Pakenham* s and Buchanan*s exchange of communications and the 
friendly tone of Buchanan*s despatches to Mclane (some of them 
shown by the latter to Lord Aberdeen) were sufficient for the 
Foreign Secretary to draft the articles of a convention#
2# Lord Aberdeen* & Terms#
It is true to say that throughout the negotiations 
the initiative had almost invariably lain with the British. 
Government, particularly in the *forties. Since July, 1845, 
the situation had, with the rejection of the American offer 
of that month, developed into a position of deadlock# More 
than one effort had been made by Great Britain to end that 
position, but the Americans had rejected these efforts with­
out submitting, at least formally, a proposition that would 
be acceptable to them. American Government circles and 
perhaps British Government circles were familiar with the 
terms wanted by the President, but the public of both the 
United States and Britain were kept in the dark# The Foreign 
Secretary was therefore faced with the risk of losing prestige 
and dignity by making a renewed offer, even though it was sure 
of acceptance. But after debating the matter with himself he 
came to the conclusion that it would be criminal if he per­
mitted considerations of diplomatic punctilio or etiquette to 
prevent his making every exertion to avert the danger of
calamities which he was nunwilling to contemplate but the
(1)
magnitude of which scarcely admitted of exaggeration•”
Aberdeen received the notice of abrogation on 16th 
May, interviewed Sir J. H# Pelly of the Hudson*s Bay Company 
the/
1# Aberdeen to Pakenham, No. 18, 18th May, 1846, in 
F.O. 5/809.
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(1)
the same day, and two days later forwarded a copy of his
suggested convention to the United States. The 49th parallel 
was to form the basis of the line of demarcation in Oregon, 
but all Vancouver Island was to go to Great Britain; the 
Columbia River was to be free to the Company and to British 
subjects trading with the Company; the possessory rights of 
the Hudsonrs Bay Company south of 49° were to be respected.
The offer was in effect an ultimatum, if an offer 
which is transmitted with something like a probability of 
acceptance can be so described. Pakenham was to send home 
any alternative offer proposed by the Americans, although his 
was to be an ultimatum as far as he was concerned. Even if 
the Peel Government remained in office there was little pros­
pect of any material alteration of the proposition being 
accepted; if a new Government came into office there was no 
chance whatever of their agreeing to a reduction of terms; 
and a change of government was expected at any moment. A
reference to England, therefore, would be equivalent to a
(2)
rupture of negotiations.
The terms he offered were considered by Aberdeen 
to be honourable and advantageous to both parties. Great 
Britain would obtain the harbours necessary for her commerce, 
as well as an increased security for her settlers and their 
possessions in lieu of the detailed district with its single 
harbour offered by the British plenipotentiaries in 1826. She 
did not wish to weigh very minutely the precise amount of com­
pensation or equivalent which might be received by either party, 
but was content to leave such estimate to higher considerations 
than the mere balance of territorial loss or gain*
When/
1. See Pelly to Aberdeen, 22nd May, 1846, in F.O. 5/809, 
recapitulating the burden of their discussion of 16th May.
2. See private letter to Pakenham, 18th May, in Aberdeen MSS. 
in the British Museum.
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When the Foreign Secretary showed the terms of his
ultimatum to Mclane on 18th May, the Minister, interpreting
(1)
his instructions literally, informed him that there was no
possibility of the Presidents agreeing to concede free navi­
gation of the Columbia. This threatened to create an impasse, 
because not only did it appear to McLane to be unacceptable 
but both Polk and Buchanan felt it to be a concession they 
could not make* McLane would have granted free navigation 
for a number of years to the servants of the Hudson*s Bay 
Company, but he would never advise granting a permanently 
free Columbia* He was unable to understand Aberdeen*s insist­
ence on this point, and he was much disappointed by the per­
tinacity with which it was "at so much risk" insisted upon*
He was unsuccessful in inducing Aberdeen to reduce the right 
of navigation to a number of years.
When Pakenham submitted the treaty draft of 18th 
May to Buchanan on 6th June the Secretary at once stated that 
"the strongest objection existed" to the grant of a perpet­
ually free Columbia. The matter was discussed in the American
Cabinet. Polk had told Calhoun on 25th February, Archer two
(2 )
days later, and Senator Benton on 11th March and again on
(3)
9th April . that if Great Britain insisted upon the perpetual 
free navigation of the Columbia River he v/ould reject the 
claim without even submitting it to the Senate* He now re­
ceded from this position to the extent of expressing the view 
in the Cabinet discussions that the right of navigation of the 
fiver was restricted to the duration of the Hudson*s Bay Com­
pany* s charter, which was due to expire in 1859* Yet in spite 
of/
1* See instruction of 26th February, already quoted.
2. Idem. I, 256*
3. Idem, I, 280 and 324.
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of dissatisfaction with Article 2 of the draft, Polk decided
to submit the draft to the Senate for their previous advice
because he realised that, if he : rejected it without making
(1)
an alternative proposition, "war was almost inevitable."
The words of the draft are clear enough, and McLanefs despatch
of the same date made it clear that Aberdeen*s intention was
in no way to limit the right; indeed, after the signing of
the Treaty MeLane freely and fully confirmed that he had
(2)
rightly understood Aberdeen*s intentions.
Maintaining that the article spoke for itself,
Pakenham offered to refer the subject to his Government with
the explanation that he could take no action without doing so.
Buchanan and Polk would not hear of this for, in the face of
the developing Mexican situation, delay was dangerous, and
they agreed to sign the Treaty as drafted by the Foreign
Secretary. The bare suggestion of a reference to England was
(3)
sufficient to overcome every difficulty.
Pakenham*s instructions were to withhold the
British proposition in certain cases, but the outbreak of
war with Mexico was unlikely to be one of these. Yet the
war provided Great Britain with an excellent opportunity to
cripple the competition of American shipping and to check the
(4)
expansionist movement in the United States. There is no
doubt that the Mexican Government confidently expected that 
irritation/
1. Diary, I, 453.
2. Aberdeen to Pakenham, 29th June, 1846, in F.O. 5/809.
3. Private letter of Pakenham to Aberdeen, 29th June, 1846, in 
Aberdeen MSS.
4. Peel announced in Parliament that "so far from being in­
fluenced in our views in regard to the policy of terminating 
these disputes about the Oregon by the breaking out of war 
between the United States and Mexico, the Government dis­
tinctly intimated to Mr. Pakenham that, although that event 
occurred, it did not affect in the slightest degree our 
desire for peace." Hansard, Vol. 87, p. 1053. There is no 
indication of this in the official corEespondence, though 
Pakenham had general povr-rs to withhold the offer if devel- 
opment s warran t ed•
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irritation over Oregon would gain for them English assistance. 
The tense situation that existed over the Oregon dispute in 
the winter of 1845-46 had given them such hope of an Anglo- 
American conflict that they had merely temporised with John 
Slidell, the special American minister plenipotentiary.
Had he cared to do so, Pakenham, without exceeding 
his instructions, could have threatened assistance to Mexico 
unless the most extreme British demands in Oregon were con­
ceded. But war with the United States would have been harmful 
to Britain*s best interests, and with the British public mow 
almost unanimous in holding the view that the line of 49° 
would secure all that was essential to their country’s honour, 
the pretext for war was manifestly slight and unworthy. Those 
moderate Americans who had so zealously supported the cause of 
peace would never be able to forgive any attempt to allow the
fluctations in the success of American arms in Mexico to in-
(1)
fluence the Oregon negotiations.
Fresident Polk*s difficulty was adroitly met by 
his putting the British terms to the Senate for their advice, 
and by his insisting in the Cabinet that the Convention, despite 
the precision of the apposite article, merely sought to grant 
free navigation for the duration of the Hudson*s Bay Company*s 
Charter. During the discussions in the Senate on the treaty 
draft it was proposed on 12th June to recast Article 2 so as 
to restrict the right of navigation to the period 1846-63, 
but the proposal was rejected. An amendment to the resolution 
for adopting the draft which suggested the line of 54°40* as 
the boundary was also decisively rejected, and 18th June found 
the Senate by 41 to 14 deciding to accept the draft convention 
of Lord Aberdeen without the addition or alteration of a 
single/
1. Aberdeen later completely endorsed Pakenham1s decision; see 
his letter of 30th June in Aberdeen MSS. "You have full 
liberty on the subject to decide whether, if I possessed 
knowledge of the facts, I should withdraw the offer,” were 
the instructions.
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single word*
It may be argued, therefore, that the concession 
by the Americans of a perpetual right to navigate the Columbia 
River to Br.itish subjects represents a distinct gain made by 
Lord Aberdeen and the concession proves that, while for the 
sake of peace he had receded from Canning’s line based upon 
the Columbia, he was by no means intimidated into accepting 
more than he was prepared to concede. In 1846 navigation of 
the Columbia appeared to be essential to the successful pro­
secution of trade in Oregon and by securing it in perpetuity 
the Foreign Secretary was merely protecting the commercial 
interests of his compatriots. Potentially, the right of 
navigation was of great value when it is remembered that the 
British Hudson’s Bay Company in 1846 controlled the economic 
life of practically the v/hole of Oregon. The Company would 
be able by economic action to restrict immigration into the 
Oregon territory; it would be possible for it to impede 
seriously the work of any territorial government which might 
be established by the Americans; it could, if it so wished, 
nullify United States revenue laws. The United States’ Govern­
ment realised all this, and Secretary Buchanan summed it thus: 
"To estimate the evils which would attend such a concession, we 
have but to imagine what would have been the consequences had 
the British Government succeeded in securing for its subjects
the free navigation of the Mississippi from its source to its
(1)
outlet in the Gulf of Mexico." As a matter of fact, this
clause ultimately became a dead letter because after the Treaty 
of 1846 the Company developed an alternative route by way of 
the Fraser River which, because of the commercial restrictions 
placed on the trade of the Columbia by American revenue officers, 
took the place of the southern river as a great trade artery.
1* Buchanan to McLane, 26th February, 1846, in Sen. Ex. Doc. 
Ho. 489, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 40. Cf. Moore, ’Works 
of James Buchanan,* VI, 192.
CHAPTER XX
(1)
THE HUDSON*S BAY COMPANY AND THE OREGON QUESTION
1* The Point of Honour.
In view of the consistent attitude towards the 
Oregon controversy of the British people and of their unan­
imous aversion to war with the United States, it is natural 
to ask whence sprang the incentive to war at all. The answer
is that it developed from the point of national honour in-
(2)
volved. This point of honour was twofold - abstract and 
concrete. The abstract principle was threatened by the possi­
bility of surrendering to American ’threats* a region to which 
Great Britain felt she had a just claim; there was also dread 
of loss of prestige among foreign powers. In other words, the
real impediment to a pacific settlement was the fear that con-
(3)
cession might encourage extortion.
The subject had long been one of international 
importance; in addition to the two contending parties, Spain 
and France had at one time been directly involved, and Russia 
indirectly interested, and these powers were therefore familiar 
with/
1. The hopes and pretensions of the Company can now only be 
- at least partially - a matter of conjecture for their 
archives are not open to students. The present writer 
was informed by the Company’s secretary that an archivist 
has been appointed and that the papers are being collected 
and catalogued.
2. That the Americans understood this and acted accordingly is 
evident from McLane’s published correspondence. Besides 
other testimony a letter from Tyler to Calhoun, in the latter 
published correspondence, p. 1059 ff., is noteworthy.
3. All contemporary newspapers note this. See the ’Spectator,’ 
1846, p. 158. Cf. Fraser’s Magazine,’ October, 1845, p. 485. 
"Yield only one inch and there will be no end of Yankee 
blustering and bravado."
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with the issues comprehended by the dispute. The question
(1)
was regularly discussed in the French press, and an 
official geographer, de Mofras, had been sent by the French 
Government to the Pacific to report upon conditions there.
^he concrete aspect of the point of honour involved 
the abandonment of the interests of the Hudson1s Bay Company 
in Oregon, and, so far as it concerned Great Britain, the Oregon 
controversy was very largely a matter of honour, the tangible 
aspect of which demanded adequate defence, moral and material, 
of the Companyfs interests in Oregon. Throughout the boundary 
negotiations the really debatable and contested area was that 
lying between the Columbia River and the 49th parallel inasmuch 
as, since the time of Canning, Great Britain had been committed 
to demanding the Columbia as boundary while the United States, 
in spite of the boisterous ”Fifty-Four Forty or Fight” agitation 
of 1844-45, were committed to the 49th parallel as their de­
mands in the north. It is important to remember that in this 
contested area British influence was paramount, greatly out­
weighing that of the United States, there being but eight
(2)
Americans settled within its confines in 1846.
The Hudson*s Bay Company controlled this disputed 
territory and guarded it jealously against United States* en­
croachment. Their chief factor there, Dr. John McLoughlin, 
succeeded in inducing the Americans to call this section
*Vancouver*, thereby giving *tacit recognitiontfso he main- !
(3) \
tained) of Britain*s claim to it. It was the policy of the
Company1 s/ j
- j
1. See, for example, the *Journal des Debats* of 10th March, 1846.1
2. An article by F. Merk, *The Oregon Pioneers and the Boundary* j
in the American Historical Review, XXlX, pp. 681-699,dis­
cusses this subject.
3. McLoughlin to the Company, 20th November, 1845, copy in 
F.O. 5/461.
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Company*s agents in Oregon to impress upon American settlers 
there that the ultimate boundary would be the Columbia, and 
no opportunity was lost of discouraging their crossing the 
river.
The Companyfs interests in the region between the
Columbia and the 49th parallel were very extensive in the fields
(1)
of the fur trade and agriculture. In all discussions of
the boundary the sine qua non of the Company was the right to
free navigation of the river which was the only one navigable
north of the parallel of 42°• Since water communication with
the interior was so essential to the success of the fur trade,
surrender of the use of the Columbia by the Government would
be to the serious detriment of the Companyfs interests. As
will be seen later, it was primarily a change in those interests
which prompted the British Government to relinquish with
equanimity their adherence to an accommodation along the line
of that river.
An estimate of the extent of the Company1s holdings
may be gleaned from two reports - that of Warre and Vavasour
and that of Captain Gordon and Lieutenant Peel. The first two
named were the military officers sent to Oregon by the Can-
(2)
adian Government upon the advice of the home Government.
Gordon, a relative of Lord Aberdeen, and Peel, a son of the
Prime Minister, were also sent out to secure information upon
the state of the United States* settlements in Oregon and ta
indicate to the inhabitants that Great Britain would not allow
(3)
her rights to be invaded.
The/
1. Their charter contained no power to acquire land and still 
less to give a title to lands. Consequently, no British 
colonies other than those of the Company*s servants were 
established in Oregon. The charter gave the Company tempor­
ary control of the ports they needed for their trade.
2. Supra, p. 107.
3. The Peel-Gordon report appears in F.O. 5/419. Their 
appointment dated from 2nd September, 1845.
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The central depot for the fur trade was Fort Van­
couver, the settlement established by the Company on Canning*s 
instructions in place of the restored Fort George in order to 
link up a claim by occupation to that by fight of discovery 
and exploration. There were also four other important stations
- Fort Okanagan, Fort Victoria, Cowlitz Farm and Fort Nis- 
(l)
qually. Each these was an agricultural centre as well
as a fur rendezvous and centre of supplies. At Vancouver over
a thousand acres of land were under cultivation and several
thousand cattle pastured there. The Puget Sound Agricultural
Company, an adjunct of the Hudson*s bay Company, had its centre
at Fort Nisqually and, though the Government*s agent, Captain
Gordon, considered the soil infertile, the fact remains that
nearly 2,000 acres were under cultivation and over 5,000 sheep
were pastured there. Cowlitz Farm, with 3,500 acres under
(2)
cultivation, was perhaps the most fertile region of all.
We have seen that all classes in hritain considered 
Oregon a useless, barren tract; its one valuable advantage - 
strategic location - was thought to be quite unworthy, of the 
fiery discussion excited by the desire for its possession. To 
the Company, however, it is obvious that Oregon was a source of 
profit and represented the investment of a large amount of their 
capital. The directors perceived that the trade of the terri­
tory was susceptible of extensive development and the intimate 
knowledge of its geography possessed by their factors indicated 
to them very clearly the immense possibilities of the area even 
north/
1. See map in Appendix.
2. The Company also had considerable interest in the region of 
the Willamette River upon which the American settlers had 
begun to settle. Methodist missionaries, for example, had 
seized the Falls of Willamette, and others had ms.de consid­
erable inroads upon the Company’s lands. In the winter of 
1841-42 it was estimated by Simpson that in the Y/illamette 
region there were 300 Canadians (servants of the Hudson’s 
Bay Company), 150 Americans, and 1,000 Indians. Of live 
stock there were 2,000 horses, 3,000 cattle, and 3,000 
pigs. See Simpson to Felly, 25th November, 1841, in F.0. 
5/399.
-157-
north of 49°• They hoped, therefore, to retain the region 
between the Columbia and the 49th parallel of latitude as a 
field for their operations. But they were not stubbornly in­
sistent upon it; if the Government had to surrender that terr­
itory, provided they (the Company) received adequate compen­
sation they would have few regrets in withdrawing from an area 
in which their servants were exposed to the insults of the 
worst class of American, and their property placed at the mercy 
of men who could invoke their patriotism as a pretext for 
robbery and depredation. The Company were so well established 
south of 49° that the British Government could not possibly 
ignore their interests involved in the controversy. This, 
therefore, provided a valuable incentive to the promotion of 
the British cause after Lord Aberdeen and Mr. Pakenham had 
wearied of the dispute, which they did long before its final 
adjustment.
2. The Company and Great Britain.
One now asks the question: Did the Hudson1s Bay
Company advance or prejudice the claims of the British Govern­
ment? Was their policy in Oregon and were their actions in har­
mony with the best interests of Great Britain? The answer 
briefly is that by exerting economic pressure - the only means 
that they could use consonant with the terms of the Convention 
of 1827 - the Company kept the Americans out of the disputed 
region between the Columbia and the 49th parallel. In doing 
this, they were upholding the British claim in Oregon because 
after 1843 the Americans were entering Oregon in such numbers 
that before 1846 they had occupied all the best land and 
sought even to develop claims north of the Columbia River.
Had they been in no way checked, these American ’squatters1 
would have established, by right of occupation, their country’s 
title/
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title so comprehensively that a line even north of the 49th 
parallel would justifiably have become the basis of the United 
States* claim, and the Americans would have demanded at least 
that part of Vancouver Island which lies south of 49°; more­
over, they would probably have refused to concede navigation ,of 
the Columbia. By advising the 1 squatters* of the unsuitability 
of the region and by threatening to withhold supplies from them 
if they settled on the north side of the river, the Company's
agents succeeded most effectively in discouraging American
(1)
immigrants. Further, they succeeded,by their policy of
passive resistance, in impressing upon the settlers that the 
Columbia would be the ultimate boundary.
It is well to remember that the presence of the 
Americans in the Willamette Valley was welcomed by the Hudson's 
Bay Company because the settlers were a source of appreciable 
profit to them. If the Company were concerned solely with 
high dividends, as is so often alleged, why did they not en­
courage the Americans to settle north of the Columbia as well 
as south of it? The land north of the river was not so fertile, 
but that alone does not explain why less than a score of Amer­
icans managed to establish themselves in the huge area extend­
ing over three degrees of latitude. The answer would seem to 
be that the Company, by the only means legally at their disposal, 
discouraged the settlement of American citizens north of the 
Columbia because they wished to keep faith with the British 
Government, who had committed themselves throughout the negot- 
eations to securing the Columbia as boundary. The Americans 
were/
1. ”The Company exercises full authority over all, whether
Indians, English or Americans, who are in its service, and 
in a manner always injurious and generally disastrous to all 
others who undertake to trade in that territory. It may be 
said, in fact, that Americans, except associated with Com­
pany, are not permitted to carry on a traffic within several
hundred miles of the Company's posts.*' Hall J. Kelley, 
'Memoir on Oregon,' 31/1/39, printed in appendix to House 
report, No. 101, 25th Cong., 3rd Sess. Cf. Wilkes, op. cit.,
V, 144-45.
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were welcomed so long as they kept within the Willamette
Valley and did not interfere with the Company's trade. The
plan of campaign adopted by the Company in dealing with the
Americans was to establish a trading post adjacent to every
American post and to compete with them even at a loss. That
mere dictates of trading policy alone did not prompt these
methods is obvious from the fact that they were directly opposite
to those employed in dealing with Russian settlements. Since the
latter offered no challenge to British domination in the region
of the Columbia, however, the Company were not required to
(1)
challenge and oppose the Russians' presence.
It is indeed not too much to say that, but for the 
Hudson's Bay Company's interests in Oregon, the Government might 
well have been able and willing - the concrete point of honour 
being absent - to arrange a settlement distinctly less favour­
able than that secured in 1846. That the Government throughout 
the negotiations suffered embarrassment from the existence of 
the Company's holdings is one way of expressing the fact that 
all Oregon might quite easily have been surrendered but for the 
Hudson's Bay Company. Not only the British authorities but 
also Polk and Buchanan realised that fact, and therein lies
the significance of the Company's influence in the final settle-
(2)
ment. That influence was real, potent and continuous,
besides being from a British point of view the outstanding 
characteristic of the whole controversy.
Lord Aberdeen never forgot the Company's vast
stake/
1. This is illustrated in McLoughlin*s (Chief Factor) last 
letter to the Company, quoted by K. Judson in the 'American 
Historical Review,' XI, 104-134.
2. Pakenham told Buchanan that "the British Government would 
be glad to get clear of the question on almost any terms 
•••••• They would yield it [the whole territory) without a
murmur ... [ but} the Hudson's Bay Company had rights in Ore­
gon which must be protected; and I understood him to admit 
that they did interpose an obstacle in the way of settlement 
of the question.” See report of interview with Pakenham on 
27th December, 1845, in Moore, op. cit., VI, 352-353.
stake and inspired policy in the area between the Columbia 
and the 49th parallel; if title by occupation counted for 
anything this region was surely Britain's. His great diffi­
culty was to reconcile his obligation to the Company and his 
duty to his country, which objected to a war over territory 
so remote as Oregon. At one time the two seemed irreconcilable,
but it is greatly to his credit that, assisted by a certain
degree of good fortune, he effected a boundary settlement which
proved acceptable to the Hudson's Bay Company and at the same
time was not unacceptable to the British public.
Upon the twofold point of honour England - Govern-
(i)
ment, Opposition, press, and public - was unanimous, and
was prepared to uphold it at the point of the sword, if necess­
ary. Both British and American Governments were aware that a 
compromise on the 49th parallel would oblige Britain to yield 
far more than the United States, and would give the latter de­
cidedly the best of the bargain. The Americans would be giving 
up nothing not then in their possession while Britain, with a
dozen 'forts* north of the Columbia, would be relinquishing
(2)
several places which she had occupied for many years.
England was willing to cede the title of sovereignty and 
dominion over the greater part of Oregon, but she required, 
as/
1. For the Opposition point of view see Spencer Walpole,
'Life of Lord John Hussell,* London, 1889, p. 421.
2. New York 'Journal of Commerce,' 9th March, 1846. Cf. Moore, 
op. cit., VI, 352-53, and Polk's 'Diary,' I, 191-192. The 
despatches of Louis McLane, who succeeded Edward Everett as 
United States* Ambassador in London in August, 1845, also 
demonstrate that the Americans realised the importance of 
the point of honour to Great Britain. ,fI may repeat my con­
viction, founded upon all the discussion in which I have 
been engaged here, that in making partition of the Oregon 
territory, the protection of those interests which have 
grown up during the joint occupation is regarded as an in­
dispensable obligation on the score of honour and is im­
possible to be neglected.” McLane to Buchanan, 18th May, 
1846. For the press attitude see the leading articles in 
the 'Times' for 4th January, 7th February, 16th March, 1846.
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as a matter of honour,as well as of utility, that the commer­
cial advantages of the country should he continued to her*
The Hudsonfs Bay Company had a very strong case with the Govern­
ment and its interests must not be sacrificed to American am­
bition and aggression*
5. The Company!s Transfer to Fort Victoria.
Probably the most cogent reason why the settlement
of the Oregon controversy came when it did was the change in
the policy of the Hudson's Bay Company. For a number of reasons
Fort Vancouver, the Company's chief post, agricultural and fur
trade centre in the Oregon territory, had become untenable. For
instance, the bar at the mouth of the Columbia was proving a
formidable and irksome obstacle to the Company's shipping; true,
this difficulty was not new (Simpson had been delayed at the
bar for three weeks in 1841) but, with the development of trade,
(1)
it acquired greater significance.
Another circumstance which depreciated the value 
of Fort Vancouver and encouraged the view that a new chief 
depot should be sought was the alarming annual decrease in the 
yield of furs of the area north of the Columbia. No attempt 
had been made to preserve the valuable animals which supplied 
the furs, and the increase in the number of trappers was conse­
quently followed by a decrease in production. This increase
in the number of trappers represented the activities of the
(2)
American Fur Company of John J. Astor.
Simp son/
1. Simpson was an early champion of Fort Victoria which was
easy of access at all seasons. See in particular his letter 
to the Company , March, 1842, in F.O. 5/399. Several ships 
were actually lost in crossing the Mr; Astor*s 'Tonquin' 
sank in 1811; the Company's 'William and Anne' was lost 
in 1829, their 'Isabella in 1830, Wilkes's 'Peacock' in 
1841, Howison's ©hark'in 1846. 
ft. The papers of the comp&ny are in the possession of the New 
York Historical Society. Miss Grace J. Nute reviews them in 
the American Historical Review, XXXII, 524 ff.
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Simpson made frequent reference to this decline 
in the fur trade in his letters to the Governor of the Com­
pany, and the actual profit and loss returns for 1842 and 
1843 corroborate his views. At Fort Vancouver a loss of £1,213 
was recorded in the former year and one of £991 in the following 
year. Settlement did not favour the trade in pelts, and the 
Hudson's Bay Company realised that with the inroads of Americana)
settlers their posts would have to be removed.
If the profits of the fur trade were decreasing, 
it has to be noted, on the other hand, that the general trade 
of the Oregon territory was rapidly improving and developing 
to the financial advantage of the Company. The latter*s main 
object, therefore, was to avoid a war at all costs, because 
war would interfere with their profits. That is why they 
assisted destitute American immigrants; why they bowed before 
American threats and joined the Provisional Government estab­
lished in Oregon; why they removed their chief base from Fort
(2)
Vancouver to Fort Victoria.
The kindly reception extended to American immigrants 
by the British Company may appear unintelligible since the 
Americans were apparent rivals whose presence assisted the 
claim of the United States1 Government and at the same time 
threatened Britain's title by right of occupation. But the 
destitute settlers provided a valuable market for the Company's 
goods; they borrowed tools, ploughs, seed, oxen, and other 
supplies form the Company, and, the journey from the United 
States having exhausted the funds of many of them, they were 
delighted to find the Company ready to lend them money - always 
at/
1. K. Judson, Oregon Historical Quarterly, XVII, 215-239.
See also Wilkes's remarks on the fur trade in his report, 
a copy of which is to be seen in the Oregon Historical 
Quarterly, XII, 269-299.
2. nForced submission or resistance would damage us,” said Dr. 
McLoughlin, chief factor at Fort Vancouver. He had charge
of 500 men and managed most successfully thousands of Indians 
As interpreter of Company policy he is second only to Simpson
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at six per cent interest. What appeared to be a humanitarian 
gesture was in reality prompted by the instinct for profit.
The Company's were almost the only vessels touching at the 
Columbia; moreover, the Company's officials encouraged the 
settlers to run into debt. The Americans were always welcomed, 
therefore, south of the Columbia so long as they did not inter­
fere with the fur trade. If they encroached upon the Company's 
rights they were punished with refusal of clothing and supplies. 
Goods were sold at an advance of fifty per cent on London 
prices and in 1846 it was estimated that fully four thousand
of the settlers were indebted to McLoughlin and the Company
(1)
to the extent of £20,000.
Possession of Fort Vancouver was essential to the 
successful prosecution of trade with the Americans in Oregon, 
and the decision to reduce its status with a view to its ult­
imate abandonment was only made as the result of the envy and 
hostility of the American settlers in the neighbourhood. The 
influx of settlers into the Willamette Valley was increasing 
annually and had by 1843 assumed proportions quite unexpected 
both by the Hudson's Bay Company and the United States* Govern­
ment. The earliest settlers had been for the most part mission­
aries, but a new type of arrival produced in the Company's 
agents justifiable anxiety about their personal wellbeing as 
well as about the safety of their stores. Settlers from Missouri 
who belonged to the thieving and disorderly category of immigrant; 
men who had left home to escape payment of debts or as fugitives 
from justice, began to enter in large numbers in 1843. Usually 
they arrived destitute and starving to find the British Com­
pany in possession of most of the best land. They often came 
with/
1. J . H. Gilbert, 'Trade and Currency in Early Oregon,' p. 45, 
New York, 1897.
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with minds inflamed by demagogues who preached that the Hudson's 
Bay Company was a most sinister organisation which could even 
incite the Indians to plunder and murder the Americans.
The most daring and unscrupulous of the immigrants
squatted upon land directly contiguous to, if not actually upon,
recognised Company territory, trusting for the permanence of
their location to the good nature of the Company's servants and
(1)
to the difficulty of evicting them. If the petition of the
settlers was granted and United States' jurisdiction established 
over Oregon, the American military force which would inevitably 
be sent to the region could be expected, by its intimidating 
presence, to drive the Company out. Fearing this, the Hudson's 
Bay Company were anxious to hasten a boundary settlement which 
would either guarantee the security of their possessions or 
grant them adequate compensation for any loss sustained.
It was President Tyler's Message of December, 1844, 
urging that emigration to Oregon should be facilitated, that 
finally moved Simpson to instruct McLoughlin on 1st January, 
1845, to collect furs at Fort Victoria which was thenceforward 
to replace Fort Vancouver as the main depot for ships to and 
from England. In the spring of that year the 'outfit' (the 
year's supplies kept in case of shipwreck) was deposited at 
Fort Victoria and the produce of Forts Nisqually and Langley 
was stored there for export. The wisdom of the transfer was 
confirmed by the events of 1845. The new American arrivals of 
that year and the next were escorted for a considerable dis­
tance by United States* dragoons who gave them the necessary 
protection en route and allowed them to reach Oregon with money 
and goods intact. No longer were they so dependent upon the 
British/
1. After the boundary settlement in 1846 the best land and
cattle south of 49° were seized by the Americans. This fact 
came out in 1863 when the Report of the British and American 
Joint Commission on Hudson's Bay Company Claims was pub­
lished. Of. F. Merk, 'The Oregon Pioneers and the Boundary,' 
American Historical Review, xXIX, pp. 681-99.
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British company for Initial supplies or funds. That part of the 
Hudson's Bay Company's business ceased to be profitable, and the 
Company were therefore prepared to move northwards in spite of 
the fact that the mainland north of the 49th parallel was looked 
upon with disfavour and had never.been rated very highly.
The choice of the new chief depot at Fort Victoria 
at the southern end of Vancouver Island proved to be a wise 
one inasmuch as it was calculated to accord with the trading
interests of the Company and the strategic interest of the
(1)
Government. United States' diplomacy had been directed
toward securing the control of suitable harbours on the 
Pacific, for great weight had been attached to the report of 
Lieutenant Wilkes who had reported that those on Puget Sound 
were excellent, and he had advised most strongly that their 
possession ought to be made a sine qua non of American demands 
in the Oregon negotiations. Egress from their harbours to the 
Pacific was possible only by way of Queen Charlotte Sound, which 
was understood not to be navigable for ships, and Juan de Fuca 
Strait. Great Britain controlled the former, and if she re­
ceived Vancouver Island entire in the boundary settlement, she 
would be in a position to control shipping through the latter 
also. Fort Victoria, therefore, lay in a highly strategic 
position. Further, since Britain had practically given up 
all/
1. The actual transference of business to Victoria was naturally 
a slow process, and the success of the post was at first 
speculative. The first buildings had been erected in the 
spring of 1843, though the decision to establish some sort 
of post there had been made as early as the previous summer 
by Factor Douglas who. saw in Esquimalt one of the best har­
bours on the whole Pacific coast. The new fort soon just­
ified its choice; it drew trade from all directions, in­
cluding some districts never before touched. It was able 
to accommodate the merchant shipping plying in that region, 
while the surrounding area offered wide scope for farming 
operations. Before the boundary settlement was reached Fort 
Victoria was able to supply a large number of men-of-war 
with vegetables, flour, and other provisions. United States' 
whalers, of which there were many in northern Pacific waters, 
were also supplied by the new depot.
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all hope of securing the integrity of California as a part 
of Mexican territory, and since the United States1 expansion­
ists were casting covetous eyes upon the region whose acquis­
ition, in view of the weakness of the Mexican grasp upon it, 
was considered to be only a matter of time, it behoved the 
British Government to nullify the threatened transfer to the 
United States of the greatest port on the Pacific coast, San 
Francisco, by securing and developing Fort Victoria*
The effect of the establishment of the new chief 
depot was soon evident. among the Oregon negotiators* On 29th 
March, 1845, Sir George Simpson gave the governor of the Com­
pany his notion of a suitable boundary line* After detailing 
essential moves in the eyent of war, he advises that, if the 
line of the Columbia proves unobtainable, the line of the 49th 
parallel ought to be acceptable to the Company provided that 
Britain retained possession of all Vancouver Island and wasa)
guaranteed free navigation of the Columbia River* It is 
a most significant fact that the terms thus outlined and later 
transmitted to the Government as consistent with the interests 
of the Hudson* s Bay Company are identical with those of the 
final settlement of 1846*
4* The Company and the Provisional Government*
In the spring of 1843 the American citizens of
Oregon assembled and voted for a Legislative Committee of six
to act as a Provisional Government; this move had become
(2)
necessary for the protection of existing land claims. Owing
to the early predominance of British subjects (all of them 
sup e rannua ted/
!• Copy in F*0* 5/459*
2* The case of an American settler named Young, who had died 
intestate in 1841 leaving valuable property, inspired the 
idea of the Provisional Government*
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superannuated members of the Hudson*s Bay Company), however, 
the first attempts at setting up a separate government were 
easily frustrated*
The Company were duly invited to join, but Dr* 
McLoughlin at first felt unable to give his consent* Later, 
however, in August, 1845, force of circumstances compelled him
to change his policy* A number of attacks on the Company’s
(1)
property, the difficulty of excluding intruders, the refusal
(2)
of the Company and the Government to send him armed support,
the loss of Company servants by desertion and his inability to
prosecute them, the existence of large outstanding debts owing
to the Hudson*s Bay Company by the settlers of the Willamette
Valley, were McLoughlin's reasons for joining the Provisional
(3)
Government of Oregon*
The conditions of joining laid down by the Company
were broad in principle. They were to pay taxes only on sales
to settlers; the region north of the Columbia was to be called
Vancouver; the Company's trade rights were to be guaranteed;
the majority of the officials in the Vancouver area were to be 
(4)
Englishmen* At the same time, the Provisional Government 
had a definite pro-American tone and character* The Preamble 
to the first Organic Laws, for instance, ran as follows: ”We,
the/
1* For example, an American named Williamson squatted upon
Company property and to oust him McLoughlin had to destroy 
his hut*
2* McLoughlin repeatedly complained of the Company*s and Govern­
ment's failure to support him* He was told in November, 1844, 
that !,no such protection could be obtained in the existing 
state of the boundary question, of which there is little 
prospect of an early settlement •••••• " At length, a man-
of-war, the 'Modiste,* was sent to the Columbia in 1845*
3* McLoughlin*s letter outlining his policy and the reasons for 
it appears in F*0* 5/461* It is dated 20th November, 1845*
4* R* C. Clark, 'The Last Step in the Formation of a Provisional 
Government for Oregon for 1845,* in the Oregon Historical 
Quarterly, XVI, 313-329* In their first report, that of 1st 
November, 1845, Warre and Vavasour approved the Company's 
action, but in their second of 10th ffiuly, 1846, (not in 
Lofcd Aberdeen's hands in May, 1846, when drafting the treaty) 
they condemned it*
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the people of the Oregon Territory, for purposes of mutual pro­
tection, and to secure peace and prosperity among ourselves, 
agree to adopt the following laws and regulations, until such 
time as the United States of America extend their .-jurisdiction
m
over ust”
The Hudsonfs Bay Company has been trenchantly de­
nounced by its critics for associating in the Provisional
Government* It is argued that this act compromised the Govern-
(2)
ment who were concerned with the interests of the Company*
While it is true that the Company’s acceptance of the Provisional 
Government was to a certain extent reprehensible, it must be 
remembered that they accepted it only after much deliberation 
and in the absence of adequate military protection from the 
British Government* The Chief Factor at Fort Vancouver, Dr* 
McLoughlin, had made, as we have seen, repeated unsuccessful 
efforts to induce the Government to send a protective force*
The Company1s lands were invaded and their agents insulted; 
their only means of protection and legal redress was an alliance 
with a body which would respect their rights, and that i3 what 
they effected by joining the Provisional Government* They 
merely entered into an alliance with the American settlers, 
and as an earnest of their good faith the Americans gave them 
control of the area north of the Columbia River* It may be 
argued that the Company placed British subjects under the juris­
diction of a government with foreign sympathies, but we must 
remember that nearly all the British subjects were in the pay 
of the Company which would therefore continue to exercise 
effective control over them* The American settlers wanted a 
constitution/
1* J* Grover, ’Oregon Archives,1 p. 28, quoted in E. S* Meany, 
’History of the State of Washington,1 p* 144, New York, 1924* 
2* See in particular J* White, ’Canada and Its Provinces,’
VIII, 869, Toronto, 1914-17, 23 vols.
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constitution long before they possessed a majority in the
country* Their every effort in this direction was defeated
by the Company’s influence until that majority was obtained*
In the terms of alliance a negative sort of recognition was
given by the American settlers that the Columbia was likely
to be the boundary, a gain of much greater value than any ever
achieved by British diplomacy*
The very fact that the Company were invited to
associate themselves with the Provisional Government is proof
of their power and influence* The Americans saw that it would
be much more politic to placate rather than defy the Hudson’s
Bay Company* They were completely dependent on that body for
supplies; the Company kept them in touch with the outside
world; they acted as clearing-house for their commercial
paper and, most important of all, they controlled the Indians
who were a constant menace to the Americans in the Willamette
(1)
Valley* The memorial of the settlers to the United States’ 
Government in 1846 explains and deprecates thi3 dependence on 
the British Company* Had the latter persisted in holding aloof 
from the Provisional Government, exasperation and anger would 
have induced the Americans to precipitate trouble in Oregon* 
That was precisely what the Company, in accordance with the 
instructions of Lord Aberdeen - who greatly feared that a 
local clash would precipitate a general war - as well as their 
own inclinations, were determined to prevent*
Participation in the Provisional Government was 
conditioned by adherence to the terms, not of a fusion, but 
of an alliance* The oath of allegiance was changed in order 
to allow the settlers to support the Organic Laws of the 
Provisional/
1* See R* C* Clark, ’Last Step in the Formation of the Pro­
visional Government of Oregon,’ in the Oregon Historical 
Quarterly, Xyl, 316-317*
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Provisional Government ffso far as they are consistent with
duties as a citizen of the United States or of a subject of
(1)
Great Britain#n It was a coalition government, and, with 
Englishmen filling the majority of the offices of the region 
in dispute - between the Columbia and the 49th parallel - a 
continuous English bias in the spirit of its government was 
ensured#
This recognition of the Provisional Government of 
Oregon, coupled with the virtual abandonment bf Port Vancouver 
as a trade centre (the two taking place within two months of 
each other), sufficed to convert Peel and other members of the 
Cabinet to Aberdeen’s way of thinking, that is, to being satis­
fied with the 49th parallel as the basis of the boundary settle-
(2)
ment# The Company obviously no longer regarded the river 
as vital to their prosperity, and the concrete point of honour 
would not be sacrificed by accepting the 49th parallel as the 
line of boundary# The trade of the region north of 49° could 
be centred at Port Victoria, while if the Columbia was free to 
both nations use could be made of it as long as it was needed# 
The Government could not be charged with dereliction of British 
interests, and the Opposition and the nation - perhaps even 
Lord Palmerston - would be appeased# After this withdrawal 
from the line of the Columbia, then, there remained only the 
occurrence of a favourable occasion to offer the line of 49° 
to the United States.
1# Clark, idem, p# 323#
2# That Aberdeen attached great importance to the transference 
of the Company’s chief post is evident from his references 
to it in his private correspondence, and Everett, who was 
evidently apprised of its imminence early in 1845, judged 
it to be of sufficient importance to reconcile Britain to 
accepting the line of 49° along with a free Columbia# See 
his letter to Aberdeen, 28th January, 1846, in Aberdeen MSS. 
When the Foreign Secretary received word of the transfer 
he immediately wrote to the Prime Minister privately, ad­
vising him of the development and urging the acceptance of 
the 49th parallel as the line of demarcation in Oregon* S©e 
Aberdeen to Peel, 17th October, 1845, in the Peel MSS.
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5# The ’Mystery’ about Oregon*
There is a school of Canadian historians which 
seeks to discredit the part played by the Hudson’s Bay Com­
pany in the boundary settlement, and to charge them with 
gross selfishness in their devotion to British interests'in 
Oregon* The members of the school contend that the Company 
contrived to wrap Oregon in mystery in order presumably to 
cloak the true nature of their work there.
Thus, the ’father1 of the school, J* E. Fitzgerald, 
an Englishman, writes: "Had that Corporation^ the CompanyJ
asserted the privileges of their charter against American 
claims as vigorously as they have ever opposed them to British 
liberties, the boundary between the United States and British
North America would never have been settled along the forty-
(1)
ninth parallel*" And later: "The Company know very well
that as long as there is a general belief that the interior 
of the continent of America is of no value, so long they may 
feel secure in the possession of their privileges; and there­
fore the idea is circulated that the whole country north of the 
forty-ninth parallel of latitude is a frozen wilderness, where
human life can with difficulty be supported, and where the
(2)
earth will not yield its accustomed fruits ••••••"
But there was no mystery about Oregon* We have 
noted many instances of the very close co-operation that 
existed between the Government and the Hudson’s Bay Company* 
Indeed/
1. J* E* Fitzgerald, ’Examination of the Charter of the 
Hudson’s Bay Company,’ London, 1849, p* 12*
2. Idem, p. 114* The protagonists of this view speak of the 
Company as an ’historical anachronism’ which did every­
thing to perpetuate the mystery ’ about Oregon* See J. 
White, ’Canada and Its Provinces,’ 23 vols*, Toronto, 1914- 
17, Vol. VIII* Cf* Coats and Cosnell, ’Sir James Douglas,’ 
Toronto, 1926, p. 159. Cf. also H. Commager, ’England and 
the Oregon Treaty of 1846,’ in the Oregon Historical Quart­
erly, XXVIII, 18-38*
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Indeed, almost all the knowledge possessed by the Government
of the geography and resources of the Oregon territory was
confined, at least before 1845, to information collected and
freely imparted by the Company* Canning, for instance, felt
constrained to consult the ’Pelly tribe* before formulating
his boundary terms, while H. U* Addington, who was at the
Foreign Office as a permanent official throughout the greater
part of the Oregon controversy, was in regular consultation
with the Governor and the other offL cials of the Hudson’s
(1)
Bay Company*
When the crisis approached in 1844 with the in­
ception of the ’Fifty-Four Forty or Fight’ movement, the 
Government at once appifed to the Company for details of 
conditions in Oregon* The Warre and Vavasour expedition
was a direct sequel to Sir George Simpson’s memorandum of
(2)
29th March, 1845, and his interview with Peel and Aber­
deen of 8th July; Aberdeen sent Simpson as special envoy 
to the north-west coast, having him call on Pakenham with 
private information on his way out; when the time came for 
the Foreign Secretary to draft the terms of the Treaty of 
1846 he actually obtained the assistance of the Governor of 
the Company, Sir J* H* Pelly* It is difficult to see how
co-operation could be closer than this.
(3)
Sir George Simpson was the Hudson’s Bay Com­
pany’s expert on the subject of Oregon. He knew the country 
intimately, and he understood its potentialities better than 
any other man. He spent his life in the Company’s service and 
he had explored the Oregon territory from both the Canadian and 
Pacific/
1* In December, 1825, Addington, on Canning’s instructions, 
prepared for answer by the Company a series of questions 
which, complete with answers, became the basis of the 
Government’s information on Oregon. See above, p. 62.
2* F.O. 5/440.
3* See quotation in footnote 1, p. 63, above*
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Pacific sides. His ’Narrative of a Journey Round the World* 
(1847) describes Oregon and the forces at work there* When 
the Government in 1845 decided to send Warre and Vavasour to 
prepare a military report on the territory, all arrangements 
for their expedition, as well as the drafting of their instruct­
ions, were left in Simpson’s hands. He sent orders to all Com­
pany factors on how to gather information for the envoys, and 
he arranged for their recommendations to be acted upon at once. 
The same courtesy and consideration were extended to Lieutenant 
Peel and ©aptain Gordon when they arrived on the north-west 
coast in 1845, and these two investigators also testified to 
the ready co-operation of the Company’s officials.
Simpson it was who first discerned the possibil­
ities of Fort Victoria and the necessity of establishing a post 
there if Britain’s claim to the southern half of Vancouver 
Inland was to be maintained. Had the Company not been so well 
established there in 1846, it is more than possible that a 
determined American attempt - probably resulting in success -
would have been made to divide the island at the 49th parallel, 
c.
Fort Victoria,^port of great strategic importance, would thus * 
have been surrendered.
In view, then, of all these instances of co-oper­
ation between the Hudson’s Bay Company and the British Govern­
ment throughout the whole period of the Oregon dispute, it is 
difficult to determine just how the Company shrouded the terri­
tory in mystery. No one in Great Britain was interested in 
Oregon for itself because the spirit of the age was decidedly 
inimical to colonial expansion. Settlers for peopling Oregon 
v/ere not forthcoming from England, and occupation by settle­
ment was the only effective positive counter which Britain 
could offer to the United States’ claims. Economic resistance 
was the chief negative means of combating the extension of 
American/
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American immigration and, as we have seen, of this weapon the 
Company made most effective use.
Once the Hudson’s Bay Company knew that an accommod­
ation of the Oregon trouble was imminent, it behoved them to 
remind the Government of their extensive interests south of 
49°; otherwise, how could the Government protect interests 
of whose extent they had been wilfully kept in ignorance by 
the Company? If the latter had argued that the area was totally 
worthless, the Government must have retorted: Wiy do you not
abandon it then and, by doing so, facilitate agreement on the 
boundary controversy?
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CHAPTER X
CONCLUSIONS
It has often been argued by Canadian historians 
that whenever Canadian questions have been entrusted to im­
perial diplomacy Canada!s best interests have invariably been 
ignored and sacrificed to the advantage of purely British con­
cerns • While the Treaty of 1783, and more particularly the 
Ashburton Treaty of 184-2, have been objects of most denun­
ciation, the impression has often been conveyed also that the 
Oregon Treaty was but another example of the mother country1 s 
dereliction of her duty towards Canada.
It is difficult reasonably to contend that Canada 
ought to have been considered as having an interest in Oregon 
in the first half of the 19th century. The fact is that the 
Oregon territory was almost as remote from Canada as it was 
from Britain, and the possibility of the two becoming linked 
politically was no more than a dream, the realisation of which 
was completely thwarted by the report of Warre and Vavasour. 
English diplomatists can surely not be blamed for failing to 
foresee that one day, however near, the area between Upper 
Canada and the Rockies would be extensively occupied by other 
than Red Indians and a few fugitive fur-trappers.
The wisdom or otherwise of the British Governments 
concluding the Treaty of 1846 is hardly debatable in the face 
of the almost unanimous desire in England to have the Oregon 
dispute disposed of once and for all, and the answer, also, to 
Canadian/
Canadian critics, so far as the Government were concerned, 
lies in the trend of public opinion in England. Although the
public did not want Oregon, they were reluctant to relinquish
their claim to it at the expense of their country»s humiliation. 
English public opinion was so strongly anti-colonial that it 
never attempted to comprehend the reality of a Canada extending 
from Atlantic to Pacific. The policy initiated by Pitt when 
he dictated the terms of the Nootka Sound Convention in 1790 - 
and it was also the policy of Pitt’s disciple, Canning - was
to allow settlement of the Oregon territory to take its natural
course, no matter whether by Spaniards, Americans, Britons, or 
Canadians, as it was uhLikely to remain long either an American 
or a British colony. Pitt lived before the day of United 
States’ imperialism, and he could not have foreseen the for-
a)
midable expansionist movement of the next century.
No man could have been more considerate of public
opinion than Lord Aberdeen, and his attempts to satisfy it
and at the same time to direct it constitute a most striking
feature of the negotiations on the British side. When the
Foreign Secretary first broached the matter of Oregon towards
the end of 1843, the public knew only that Great Britain had
a title to the territory and that Canning had made a great
sacrifice in 1827 when he had offered to limit the British
claim to the area north of the Columbia River. It was felt
that no concession beyond that could be madej on the other
hand, Aberdeen felt as early as 1843 that the United States
would not be brought to concede more than the line of the
(2)
49th/parallel.
Lord Aberdeen decided, therefore, that the
minimum/
1. Albert Gallatin seems to have held the same view as Pitt. 
See his letter to Clay of July, 1827, quoted in Scholefield 
and Howay, ’History of British Columbia,’ Montreal, 1914,
I, 440.
2. Aberdeen to Peel, 25th September, 1843, in Peel MSS.
-177-
minimum. British terms should include the line of the 49th 
parallel to the sea, leaving all Vancouver Island to Great 
Britain and, to soften the blow involved in accepting as a 
basis the American line, he demanded the free use to Britain 
of all harbours within Puget Sound to the Columbia along with 
free navigation of that great river. If the Americans refused 
these terms, the controversy would have to be submitted to an 
arbitrator for decision, a view which displays excellently his 
respect for public opinion for in his own words, whether the 
arbitrator awarded "more or less, we [the CabinetJ would be 
released from all responsibility•1 This explains why the 
Cabinet, Peel and Aberdeen in particular, were keen on arbit­
ration as a method of settling Oregon. The territory was in­
trinsically of little value, but public opinion had been 
agitated about it, and Palmerston and the Opposition had so 
successfully convinced the public that the Ashburton Treaty 
was an unqualified concession to American clamour that the 
Government must be extremely wary in their conduct of the 
Oregon negotiations. The press of both countries and public 
outcry had given the subject a fictitious interest which
rendered it difficult for either government to act with mod-
(1)
eration, or even with common sense. The public mind in
England had been so excited, particularly after Polk’s arrival 
on the scene, that the Foreign Secretary’s chief task became 
one of reconciling the public to accepting the line of 49°.
Examination of contemporary newspapers, the best 
reflex of public opinion, proves conclusively that this task 
was performed with success, and in 1846, after the signing 
of the Treaty, but one paper, the ’Morning Chronicle,1 re­
mained faithful to a settlement based on the line of the 
Columbia/
1. Same to same, 21st October, 1844, in Peel MSS.
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Columbia. Even the 'Morning Herald, * which, was violently 
anti-Peelite and which frequently referred to the Squeeza­
bility1 of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, agreed that 
the 49th parallel was quite acceptable as line of demarcation. 
'The Examiner* seemed to speak for the great body of public 
opinion when it said that the only regrettable feature of the 
Treaty of 1846 was that "this was not done long since and that
these concessions were not made to the pacific and courteous
(1)
Mr. Webster instead of to the blustering Mr. Polk.”
If the Treaty satisfied the demands of the Hudson*s
Bay Company then it could not be denounced as sacrificing the
concrete point of honour. Were these demands satisfied? The
most complete answer to this question is the assertion that
the Treaty secured the identical line advised as early as March,
.1845, by Sir George Simpson, the Company's chief adviser on
Oregon; it confirmed the Company in possession of their
territories south of the line finally adopted; it secured
the navigation of the Columbia River and thus protected the
Company's trade interests till the final evacuation of Port
Vancouver was effected. Lord Aberdeen had consulted Sir J • H.
Pelly, Governor of the Company, before dispatching the project
of May. 1846. and Pelly in a subsequent letter had endorsed
(2)
the terms verbally agreed to by the Company on 16th May.
It is clear, therefore, that the Treaty of 1846 was completely 
satisfactory to the Hudson's Bay Company although, naturally, 
had external circumstances been different and had not the nec­
essity of a speedy peace been paramount, the Company would 
have favoured standing out for the line of the Columbia.
The British public could be satisfied that the
abstract/
1. Cf* 'Spectator,' the 'Quarterly Review,' (Vol. 77) and the 
'Edinburgh Review,' (Vol. 83).
2. Pelly*s letter is in P.O. 5/809.
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abstract point of honour was saved because in no way could 
the Treaty be deemed a surrender to American threats* Word 
for word the terms of the Treaty were dictated by the British 
Government so that, in spite of the fact that Lord Aberdeen 
was familiar with President Polk*s minimum demands, the terms 
have the merit of being, at least apparently, British in 
origin* The significant fact is that, though he detested 
the idea of war and the maintenance of peace was imperative, 
Aberdeen1s offer of May was an ultimatum the rejection of 
which presumably meant war. It contained Britain*s maximum 
concessions; it was to be withheld if extraneous circumstances 
warranted; the United States* Government recognised it as an 
ultimatum by neglecting to insist upon limiting the navigation 
of the Columbia to the term of the Company*s charter, a demand 
which Polk had consistently maintained; MeLane had assured 
Aberdeen that his terms would be rejected* Yet they had been 
presented* That Secretary Buchanan was aware of the alter­
native is attested by his unsuccessful attempt to secure 
Pakenham*s assurance that the right of Columbia navigation 
would expire with the Company’s charter; finally, we have
AberdeenTs word that he "made the terms moderate because he
(1)
wished them to be final." It is to be remembered that
the British public knew nothing of Polk*s secret assurance 
of acceptance; so that to them the draft of 18th May was an 
ultimatum that saved the national honour* j
Settlement of the controversy was greeted in Eng- j
land with a universal sigh of relief. Lord Aberdeen had i
.fi
correctly estimated before anyone else in Britain what terms 
the United States would accept* The only difference between 
his scheme of 1844 and the final a rangement was that he aban­
doned his earlier claim to free access to the ports between 
the/
1. Aberdeen to Everett, 1st July, 1846, in Aberdeen MSS.
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the Columbia and the 49th parallel, a claim to a merely nom­
inal right which could be exercised, if necessary, by the 
possession of Vancouver Island. In the face of Cabinet 
opposition he persisted in his scheme in spite of all dis­
couragements, and eventually won over Cabinet and public to 
bis views. In the sense then that the Treaty was in agreement 
with contemporary public wishes it was a success for the 
Foreign Secretary; in that sense, too, the Treaty was cer­
tainly not a British failure.
It has been said that peace was imperative for 
Great Britain in 1846, mainly because of the movement for 
repeal of the Corn Laws, but for quite another reason it was 
essential for Britain to adjust the Oregon dispute. The 
territory was filling up with Americans at an extraordinary 
rate with each year bringing increased numbers of immigrants. 
The 49th parallel would hardly contain them, and it is not 
too much to say that, if the Oregon Treaty had not been con­
cluded when it was, Britain would have almost certainly lost 
the modern province of British Columbia completely.
Insistence by England upon her maximum title to 
what she deemed to be barren land would have been anachronistic 
in the age of arbitration and reciprocal concession which had 
arrived; moreover, such insistence would have meant war. She 
was in no way to undertake a war which would have inevitably 
ruined a great economic experiment and added to the sufferings 
of a famine-stricken population. Had the British Cabinet 
contained an extraordinary soothsayer able to foretell Can­
ada's development westward during the subsequent forty or 
fifty years, had they been prepared to abjure their free trade 
principles, had they been able to look with equanimity upon 
additional suffering in Ireland and the rural areas of England 
and/
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and Scotland, then they might have gone to war in 1846* That 
they sought peace indicates their concern with the immediate 
interests of their people; with one great plunge into the 
future, the economic future, they were resolved to be content. 
The principles of free trade and the belligerent defence of 
their claims in Oregon were, in the Government * s opinion, quite 
incompatible with each other.
Critics in condemning the early British failure 
to settle the Oregon question stand on firmer ground. British 
diplomacy must be condemned for neglecting to achieve a settle­
ment in the early years of the century as well as for more 
than one mistake in negotiation. It must be conceded that 
the British title to Oregon, or at least to the area in dis­
pute between the 49th parallel and the Columbia River west of 
the Rockies, was indubitably better than that of the United 
States. Her claims by discovery and exploration were superior. 
The United States could base a claim either upon the discov­
eries of her subjects or upon her title derived from the 
Florida Treaty; but not upon both because one cancelled the 
other. If the Spaniards were first to discover the area, then 
the Americans had no claims based on discovery. Hezeta, the 
Spaniard, had found the mouth of the Columbia before the 
American, Gray, while it was the Englishman, Broughton, Van­
couver^ lieutenant, Y/ho had explored the river for 100 miles 
more than a dozen years before the advent of Lewis and Clark.
The Nootka Sound Convention had, as we have seen, 
established the principle that occupation and settlement must 
follow discovery to validate a title, and in the disputed area 
there was no question as to which side was first thus to con 
solidate its claim. The North West Company had established a 
chain of trading-posts in Oregon some time before the firs*,, 
and/
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and for a long time the only, American post - Astoria - in 
the disputed area, and the Hudson* s Bay Company had followed 
this up by extending the number of trading-stations and intro­
ducing agricultural pursuits.
The American claim through the Louisiana Purchase 
was quite invalid while we have seen that it is doubtful if 
the terms of the transfer of Astoria had any effect upon the 
title.
The first mistake made by Great Britain was of 
course the retrocession of Fort George (Astoria), the post 
of a private company sold to another company during the war 
of 1812. The Government could not plead ignorance of the 
subject for the North West Company made representations to 
them from time to time, and Simon McGillivray, one of the 
partners, conferred on several occasions with Cabinet Min­
isters. He had interviews with Wellesley, Castlereagh, Bath­
urst and Rose, upon all of whom he attempted to impress that
the United States had no just claim to the possession of 
(1)
Astoria. The second mistake, connected directly with
the first, was in looking upon the fort as a national 
possession.
The Convention of 1818 which established a form 
of condominion for ten years was a mistake because the time 
was favourable for adjustment of the problem, and, in view of 
the large number of British and the paucity of American posts 
in Oregon and of the relative international status of the two 
countries at that time, a large share of the territory must 
have/
X. "No measures were for some time adopted by Government to 
interfere with their [the Americans } new establishment 
at the Columbia River," though they "all expressed their 
opinion that the Country in question belongs of right to
Great Britain...... " See 'Statement Reptive to the
Columbia River,' written in July, 181 . P7 b
in Bagot's despatch to Castlereagh, No. , >
1817, in P.O. 5/123.
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have gone to Britain; as a matter of fact, the United States* 
offer of that year conceded nearly three-quarters of the area 
in dispute. Though Canning was responsible for the first 
recession from the line of the Columbia, had he lived a little 
longer he would probably have effected a satisfactory arrange­
ment at a time when Britain was certain to receive a more ad­
vantageous settlement than that eventually achieved; he would 
certainly never have consented to the indefinite extension of 
the idea of condominion or, as it was termed, joint occupation.
The Convention of 1827, signed after the death of 
Canning, which continued condominion indefinitely was another 
error in the series. Great Britain, possessed of the conviction 
that the Convention secured all that was necessary, was mis­
taken in neglecting the question between 1827 and 1841, and her 
delay in compelling an issue before the American settlers had 
become safely ensconced in Oregon was most unfortunate. It 
had been recognised since Castlereagh*s time that settlement 
of the dispute must anticipate American immigration into
Oregon; yet in the period mentioned nothing was done by the
(1)
British Government to accomplish this.
Palmerston while at the Foreign Office had a 
splendid opportunity to secure one of his diplomatic victories, 
but the Oregon question does not appear to have interested him, 
though after the Peel Government came to power he recognised 
its value as a means of embarrassing that Government by much 
adverse/
1« Castlereagh to Bagot, No. 7, 4th February, 1818, in F.O. 
5/129. "It is always more easy to come to an arrangement 
on such subjects when the Territory in discussion is little 
known or little cultivated than when Enterprise and Industry 
have led to settlements, which cannot be abandoned without 
loss, and cannot be ceded, without the alienation °f 
iects owing: allegiance to one or other state. The history 
of the Oregon question furnished a remarkable confirmation 
of the truth of Castlereagh* s words.
adverse criticism. Yet Palmerston, more than any other 
single statesman almost, was indirectly the author of the 
terms of the Treaty of 1846. Pear of his tongue after his 
bitter denunciation of the Ashburton Treaty of 1842 made the 
Peel Government throughout their tenure of office wary of 
further territorial concessions to the United States, while 
at the same time the precarious nature of the Governments 
tenure of office and the imminence of Palmerston1 s accession 
to the Foreign Office in 1845-46 were more effective than the 
embarrassing Mexican situation in tempering American demands 
and ultimately in hastening American acceptance of Lord Aber­
deen1 s treaty project. Aberdeen was pacific and Palmerston 
was bellicose, but the interaction of their respective in­
fluences produced a peaceful settlement of the Oregon dispute# 
Palmerston prevented Aberdeen1 s surrender, partial or complete, 
in the face of the vigorous American policy based on Polk*s 
election campaign cry; at the same time, concern at the 
imminence of Palmerston's return to office was an important
factor in compelling the President to narrow his demands in 
(1)
Oregon#
Credit for the peaceful settlement of 1846 is in 
very great measure due directly to Lord Aberdeen. To have 
effected a satisfactory adjustment of a thirty years old 
dispute in the face of the difficulties he had to contend 
with was a great achievement. The Prime Minister, Sir Hebert 
Peel, himself only less peace-loving than the Foreign Secretary, 
had in the Cabinet to hold the balance between the M t e  of ^
Wellington, always suspicious of France and quick to see that j
country's share in all manifestations of anti-British filing 
in/
i^ rnmatid his Government w# should
1. "Mr. McLane told me he had inform ^ a t ........ was
not be in office on the 1st J»±7, Aea&gsor and QSXpO'C'&'OCi
to be lost. The conduct of' ®|g?-OTrtc,n ^ a t y  had filled Kr.
successor with regard to ,r . ioh x presume, was snare* j
McLane with the greatest a-tais, , Aberdeen to ?aken-» J
by the Government of the I
ham. h-th .Tune. 1846, in 7.0. 6/*»" J
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in any part of the^world, and Aberdeen, always anxious to 
preserve peace* in the Oregon negotiations the Foreign
Secretary was given a completely free hand, and Peelfs 
correspondence with him reveals the confidence reposed in 
Aberdeen by the Prime Minister.
Aberdeen wanted to wean the United States away 
from France. He desired an accumulation of British acts and 
expressions of friendship for the United States in order to 
prepare the Government and public in America to discard their 
suspicion of British diplomacy. His appointing the energetic 
and pacific Pakenham was the first move in this direction; his 
decision not to intervene in Texas was another; likewise his 
declaration on California; his early notice to Delane of the 
Cabinet* s decision on repeal of the Corn Laws in order that the 
* Times* might catch the United States* mail was also in accord 
with this side of Aberdeen*s policy. Yet he knew that by 
surrendering the area between the 49th parallel and the Col­
umbia he was making a great sacrifice, and he was fully aware, 
not only that Britain*s claim to it was more sound, but also 
that this part of Oregon with its population overwhelmingly 
British was the most important part of the entire Oregon 
territory.
On the whole, British diplomacy in conducting the 
Oregon controversy lacked enterprise and vigour. With the 
possible exception of Canning, Great Britain in the negotiations 
over Oregon produced no diplomatist possessing the fervour or 
fanatical/
1* In his correspondence with Aberdeen the Prime Minister 
uses Wellington* s arguments, giving'them as his 0
convince Aberdeen of French duplicity; in . 
correspondence with Wellington Peel uses e Foreien
arguments to cool Wellington. So completely r®£6
Secretary appear out of sympathy with th -nr>qqIhi «
the Cabinet upon the question of Separations ^ p o s s i b l e
war with France that ln ^ ^ e r , J -  * Poreign Minister,
to resign and make way for a less pacm. &■
See Peel MSS.
-186-
fanatical nationalism of John Quincy Adams or James Knox Polk.
The most representative British negotiators in the controversy 
were Castlereagh, Canning and Aberdeen, while the ablest and 
most representative American negotiators were Adams and Polk.
Never did the British representatives become extreme in their 
demands; always were they on the side of compromise; invariably, 
as Buchanan remarked, the British Government played the part 
of the lion, though generally a quiescent one, and never that 
of the fox.
Neither side had a clear title to the Oregon terri­
tory. Britain was first to recognise this and once she had 
done so she remained firm in her determination to settle by 
compromise a dispute which obviously demanded such a mode of 
adjustment. On the other hand, whereas in 1818 Rush and Gall­
atin claimed for the United States only a title as valid as 
Britain1s, Polk and Buchanan in 1845 put forth a claim to 
exclusive sovereignty over all Oregon. This erratic diplomacy 
illustrates the obstacles with which British negotiators were 
confronted.
All the abler diplomatic strokes were American - 
the insistence that Fort Astoria was a national possession, the 
encouragement of immigration into Oregon, the alliterative cam­
paign cry of 1844. Throughout the negotiations of thirty years 
Great Britain gained but one victory, namely, the recognition 
that navigation of the Columbia was not restricted to a period 
of years, and this she secured by playing the lion - not the
CD
fox.
1. The British press consistently derided the Governmentfs
handling of the controversy. 1 Our diplomatists,” said the 
Spectator,1 ”could not penetrate below the technicalities 
and sophistries of the American argument, to the fundamental 
principles that should have governed the question.” (Edition 
of 1845, 326). 1 Fraser*s Magazine* denounced the ”extreme
easiness of British ministers - the neglect, the ignorance 
and incapacity of certain of the individuals they employed 
as diplomatists in the course of the negotiations.” (April 
1843, p. 484). Cf. ’Morning Chronicle*, passim. *
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fox.
There was one aspect in which British diplomacy 
was consistent throughout the dispute - in emphasis upon the 
commercial issues involved. Great Britain*s first interest 
in the Pacific coast was essentially commercial, and after the 
amalgamation of the North West and Hudson*s Bay Companies in 
1821 it' so happened that the interests of Government and Com­
pany coincided. That is the chief reason for the consistent 
co-operation between the two during the ensuing twenty years, 
and it also explains the Government’s anxiety to exalt the 
concrete point of honour. From the day that Canning consulted 
what he called the ’furry and the finny tribes* - the Hudson*s 
Bay Company and the whalers - the Government took no important 
step in Oregon without consulting the commercial issues involved.
One other aspect of the Oregon negotiations deserves 
notice. In diplomacy chance must always be an important factor. 
Good fortune in the choice of negotiators and, particularly, 
ability to take advantage of fortuitous circumstances exert a 
definite influence. It is a characteristic of the Oregon 
negotiations that this factor of luck seldom favoured the 
British. It was, for instance, purely a matter of American 
good fortune that Vancouver sailed past the mouth of the Col­
umbia River, while very shortly afterwards the American, Gray, 
discovered it and established the basis of an American claim.
In 1803, when British and American negotiators had agreed upon 
an amicable adjustment of the boundary line, the acquisition of 
Louisiana intervened to complicate the settlement by apparently 
strengthening the United States* claims. Jefferson perceived 
the importance of the acquisition and was quick to dispatch 
Lev/is and Clark on their search of the source of the Columbia.
The wording of Article 1 of the Treaty of Ghent
which/
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which sanctioned the restoration of conquests was -unfortunate.
The United States* Government were alive to its significance 
and possibilities, and once again the British Government were 
outwitted. The retrocession of Astoria as a national possession 
was insisted upon and, unluckily again, Castlereagh*s general 
policy produced in him a yielding mood. It was unfortunate, too, 
that the Americans managed to establish themselves at Astoria 
a very short time before the British North West Company arrived 
there. When eventually a positive policy was adopted in the 
Oregon controversy, its champion, Canning, passed away before 
he could settle the. dispute, his early death paving the way 
for the unfortunate policy of procrastination adopted by the 
Foreign Office.
Palmerston might have effected a very favourable 
settlement had it not been that he was not interested in the 
dispute and that his relinquishment of office synchronised 
with the extended American immigration into Oregon and the 
increased importance which that territory consequently acquired. 
It was unfortunate for Britain that, owing to the growth of 
the American settlements in Oregon, resort to the extremity 
of war became the only possible method of securing her entire 
claim. It was therefore still more unfortunate, if it be 
granted that Oregon was worth a war, that her foreign policy 
was in the hands of her most pacific Foreign Secretary acting 
under an equally peace-loving Prime Minister.
Pakenham*s summary rejection of Polk*s offer of 
July, 1845, when the controversy was approaching an amicable 
solution, was decidedly inppportune inasmuch as it gave Polk 
an excuse for adhering publicly to the terms of his election 
campaign cry so that Britain was made to appear a humble 
supplicant for peace. Great Britain*s ill fortune reached a 
climax/
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climax in 18469 The prevalent agricultural distress and the 
necessity for repeal of the Corn Laws, with its attendant 
foreign policy of peace, rendered war impossible and under­
mined the whole British position.
Considering, therefore, the ■unfavourable effect 
of this series of misfortunes, the limitations imposed by the 
negotiations of his predecessors, the urgency of peace, and 
the views of the British public in 1846, one concludes that 
the terms sectored by Lord Aberdeen were hardly deserving of 
harsh censure. It is true that he realised he was surrender­
ing a large area of land to which Great Britain had the 
superior title and which was inhabited by a mere handful of 
Americans, but it should be remembered that, had no settle­
ment been effected before the Fraser River Gold Rush of 
1857-58, when so many prospectors from the south entered 
British Columbia that the population became overwhelmingly 
American, not only the area south of the 49th parallel but 
also that west of the Rockies up to 54° 401 would almost 
certainly have been lost to Britain; and it should also be 
remembered that, though the British Government were fully 
aware that they were giving up territory wherein lay extremely 
valuable harbours and a host of places like Admiralty Inlet, 
Whidbey Island and Puget Sound, all with unmistakably English 
names and associations, they had in 1842 gained a diplomatic 
victory over the United States when the northeastern boundary 
had been adjusted at Washington. They could afford, therefore, 
to redress the balance by allowing the Americans to gain a 
northwestern boundary success in 1846. This redress was im­
perative to maintain the phenomenon of a 3,000 miles long 
totally undefended boundary.
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NOOTKA SOUND CONVENTION
NOOTKA SOUND CONVENTION
ARTICLE I.
His Catholic Majesty, besides having restored the ship ’Argonaut,* 
the restoration of which took place in the port of San Bias in 
the year 1791 [l79o], agrees to pay as indemnity to the parties 
interested in it the amount of two hundred and ten thousand hard 
dollars in specie, it being understood that this sum is to serve 
as compensation and complete indemnification for all their 
losses, whatever they may be, without any exception, and without 
leaving the possibility of a future remonstrance on any pretext 
or motive.
ARTICLE II.
Said payment shall be made on the day on which the present 
convention shall be signed by the commissioner of His Catholic 
Majesty in the presence of the commissioner of His Britannic 
Majesty, which latter shall give at the same time an acknowledg­
ment of payment consistent with the terms enunciated in the 
former article and signed by the said commissioner for himself 
and in the name and by the order of His Britannic Majesty and of 
the said interested parties* And there shall be attached to the 
present convention a copy of the said acknowledgment of payment, 
executed in the proper form, and likewise of the respective full 
powers and of the authorization of the said interested parties.
ARTICLE III.
The ratifications of the present convention shall be exchanged in 
this city of London within a period of six weeks from the date 
of its signature, or before if possible.
APPENDIX II
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TERMS OF CESSION OF ASTORIA IN 1818
”In obedience to the command of H. R. H. the prince
regent, signified in a despatch from the right honourable the
Earl Bathurst, addressed to the partners or agents of the
North-West Company, bearing date of the 27th of January, 1818,
and in obedience to a subsequent order, dated the 26th July,
from W. H. Sheriff, Esq., captain of H. M. ship, Andromache, We,
the undersigned, do, in conformity to the first article of the
treaty of Ghent, restore to the government of the United States,
through its agent, J. P. Prevost, Esq., the settlement of Fort
(1)
George, on the Columbia River.”
6th Oct., 1818.
(signed)
F. Hickey, Capt. H. M. Blossom. 
J. Keith, of N. W. Co.
1. Greenhow, op. cit., Appendix, p. 453.
a /-/-/-/-/-/
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CONVENTION OP 1818
CONVENTION OF 1818 (20th October)
ARTICLE II.
It is agreed that a line drawn from the most north-western point 
of the Lake of the Woods, along the 49th parallel of north 
latitude, or, if the said point shall not be in the 49th parallel 
of north latitude, then that a line drawn from the said point 
due north or south, as the case may be, until the said line 
shall intersect the said parallel of north latitude, and from 
the point of such intersection due west along and with the said 
parallel, shall be the line of demarkation between the territories 
of the United States and those of his Britannic majesty; and 
that the said line shall form the boundary of the said terri­
tories of the United States, and the southern boundary of the 
territories of his Britannic majesty, from the Lake of the Woods 
to the Stony Mountains.
ARTICLE III.
It is agreed that any country that may be claimed by either party 
on the north-west coast of America, westward of the Stony 
Mountains, shall, together with its harbours, bays and creeks, 
and the navigation of all rivers within the same, be free and 
open for the term of ten years from the date of the signature 
of the present convention, to the vessels, citizens and subjects, 
of the two powers; it being well understood that this agreement 
is not to be construed to the prejudice of any claim which 
either of the two high contracting parties may have to any part 
of the said country, nor shall it be taken to affect the claims 
of any other power or state to any part of the said country; 
the only object of the high contracting parties, in that respect, 
being to prevent disputes and differences among themselves.
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CONVENTION OF 1827 (6th August)
ARTICLE I.
Provides for the continuance of the agreement to joint 
occupation of 1818.
ARTICLE II.
It shall he competent, however, to either of the contracting 
parties, in case either should think fit, at any time after 
the 20th of October, 1828, on giving due notice of twelve 
months to the other contracting party, to annul and abrogate 
this convention; and it shall, in such case, be accordingly 
entirely annulled and abrogated, after the expiration of the 
said term of notice.
ARTICLE III.
Nothing contained in this convention, or in the third article 
of the convention of 20th October, 1818, hereby continued in 
force, shall be construed to impair, or in any manner affect, 
the claims which either of the contracting parties may have 
to any part of the country westward of the Stony or Rocky 
Mountains.
APPENDIX V
TREATY OP 1846
TREATY OF 1846 (15th June)
PREAMBLE...........
ARTICLE I.
From the point on the forty-ninth parallel of north latitude, 
where the boundary laid down in existing Treaties and Convention* 
between Great Britain and the United States terminates the line 
of boundary between the territories of Her Britannic Majesty and 
those of the United States shall be continued westward along the 
said forty-ninth parallel of north latitude, to the middle of the 
channel which separates the continent from Vancouver1 s Island; 
and thence southerly, through the middle of the said channel, 
and of Fuca's Straits, to the Pacific Ocean; provided however, 
that the navigation of the whole of the said channel and straits, 
south of the forty-ninth parallel of north latitude, remain free 
and open to both Parties*
ARTICLE II*
From the point at which the forty-ninth parallel of north latitude 
shall be found to intersect the great northern branch of the 
Columbia River, the navigation of the said branch shall be free 
and open to the Hudson's Bay Company, and to all British subjeete 
trading with the same, to the point where the said branch meets 
the main stream of the Columbia, and thence down the said main 
stream to the ocean; with free access into and through the said 
river or rivers; it being understood, that all the usual portage* 
along the line thus described, shall in lilce manner be free end 
open*
In navigating the said river or rivers, British 
subjects, with their goods and produce, shall be treated on the 
same footing as citizens of the United States, it being, however, 
always/
always understood, that nothing in this Article shall be 
construed as preventing, or intended to prevent, the Government 
of the United States from making any regulations respecting the 
navigation of the said river or rivers, not inconsistent with 
the present Treaty.
ARTICLE III.
In the future appropriation of the territory south of the forty- 
ninth parallel of north latitude, as provided in the First Article 
of this Treaty, the possessory rights of the Hudson’s Bay 
Company, and of all British subjects who may be already in the 
occupation of land or other property lawfully acquired within 
the said territory, shall be respected.
*
ARTICLE IV.
The farms, lands and other property of every description, 
belonging to the Puget Sound Agricultural Company on the north 
side of the Columbia River, shall be confirmed to the said 
Company. In case, however, the situation of those farms and 
lands should be considered by the United States to be of public 
and political importance, and the United States Government should 
signify a desire to obtain possession of the whole or any part 
thereof, the property so required shall be transferred to the 
said Government at a proper valuation, to be agreed upon between 
the parties.
ARTICLE V.
Terms of ratification.
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INTRODUCTION
The anxiety of both countries in the later stages of the 
Oregon Treaty negotiations to secure a speedy settlement - 
the Peel Government because of the Imminence of their 
giving up office, and the Polk Government because of the 
outbreak of war between the United States and Mexico - 
meant that the Oregon Question was not finally or completely 
cleared up in 1846* The draft of the Oregon Treaty pre­
pared by Lord Aberdeen neglected to make a precise demar­
cation of the boundary line between the mainland of British 
Columbia and Vancouver Island. Each side interpreted the 
Treaty in its own way and decided that the channel most 
suitable to its territorial advantage was that meant by 
the Treaty. When it is pointed out that this involved right to 
possession of the strategically important Island of San 
Juan which, by controlling the entrance to Puget Sound, 
was deemed of vital importance by the American Government, 
and which, by controlling communication between British 
Columbia and Vancouver Island, was awarded equal importance 
by the British Government, it will be seen how the Treaty 
laid the foundation of a new territorial dispute.
Within the quarter-century immediately subsequent to 
the signing of the Oregon Treaty many attempts were made, 
and a variety of methods used, to settle the new dispute.
These methods, which included the appointment of a joint 
commission in 1856-57, were unfortunately all unsuccessful.
More than once conflicts in the disputed area threatened 
to involve the two countries in war, and only the good sense 
of certain military and naval officers prevented an outbreak.
Ultimately, the negotiators of the Treaty of Washington 
in 1871 agreed to refer the dispute to the arbitration of 
the German Emperor, who in October, 1872, decided in favour 
of the United States* position.
CHAPTER I
THE NEW DISPUTE
1. Origin and Earliest Stages.
The authors of the Oregon Treaty of 1846 could 
never have suspected that the obscure phraseology of their 
work would produce a new boundary quarrel which would more 
than once during the following generation threaten to pre­
cipitate a war between Great Britain and the United States. 
The complacence with which Lord Aberdeen and Sir Robert Peel 
accepted their removal from office would not have been so 
easy had they foroseen that the Treaty - one of their few 
crumbs of comfort in surrendering power - was to produce a 
quarrel almost as acrimonious as that over Oregon.
The first article of the Treaty had decided that 
the boundary line along the forty-ninth parallel should run 
”to the middle of the channel which separates the continent 
from Vancouver’s Island and thence southerly, through the 
middle of the said channel and of Fuca’s Straits, to the 
Pacific Ocean.” The negotiators had apparently neglected 
the fact that there was more than one channel west of 49°, 
but the ink on the Treaty was barely dry when the Hudson’s 
Bay Company hastened to advise the Government of this and 
to warn them of a possible conflict over claims. -Accordingly 
Sir J. H. Pelly interviewed Lord Palmerston, the new Foreign 
Secretary, on 29th July, 1846, and gave him his opinion of 
the questions likely to arise from the treaty of the previous 
month. He explained that the space between 49° and 48° 20’ 
(where the Strait of Juan de Fuca opens) contains numerous 
islands with passages between them, but he opined that there 
could/
2bould be not a doubt that the largest1 passage - "that used
by Vancouver" - was meant as the boundary. At Palmerston *s
behest, Pelly put his views in writing and sent them to the
(1)
Foreign Office.
The Government took no action, however, until 
a despatch from Mr. Pakenham, Ambassador at Washington, dated 
17th March, 1847, served to remind them that the line of 
demarcation ought to be more accurately defined. Continuing 
the co-operative policy pursued throughout the Oregon negot­
iations, the Foreign office at once got in touch with Sir 
George Simpson of the Hudson*s Bay Company and desired him 
to prepare a memorandum on the Treaty of 1846. The result 
was a document that does little more than advise that, since 
more than one channel exists west of the mainland, a commission 
should be appointed to determine which one was meant by the 
Treaty.
The cumbersome and slow Foreign Office machinery 
had thus been set in motion with the result that the Permanent 
Under-Secretary, H. U. Addington, who had been at the Foreign 
Office since 1842, that is, during the most contentious years 
of the Oregon Question, prepared for Lord Palmerston a memo­
randum on the new subj ect of the Pacific Water-Boundary. He 
presages trouble over the islands west of British Columbia 
unless the two countries agree that * channel* means navigable 
channel, in which case two naval officers - one British and 
one American - could effect an agreement. If, however, the 
1 channel* be taken to mean the whole water area between the 
continent and Vancouver Island he subscribes to Simpson*s 
view that a commission will be necessary to trace a line 
down/
1. Pelly*s letter giving the gist of his conversation with 
the Foreign Secretary appears in P.O. 5/809.
3down the middle of the channel on the same principle "as
(1)
the islands in the St. Lawrence.” Palmerston*s note 
attached to the memorandum says, ”Suspend negotiations till 
Admiralty reports received,” and Pakenham was told a fort­
night later that the Admiralty survey of the disputed area
being still unfinished, and the greater part of the terri-
(2)
tory still unexplored, he was to do nothing meantime.
In December of that year Mr. John F. Crampton, 
who succeeded Pakenham in Washington, was instructed to 
obviate future disputes by securing a speedy arrangement 
of the Pacific coast boundary. It was believed that only 
one channel had been hitherto surveyed and used, namely, 
that laid down by Vancouver in his chart, and it seemed 
reasonable to assume that in employing the word •channel* 
the negotiators of the Oregon Treaty had in view this par­
ticular channel. Palmerston expressed the hope, therefore, 
that this channel would be mutually agreed upon, though he 
instructed Crampton to remind the American Secretary of State 
that its adoption would mean more islands falling to Great 
Britain than to the United States. Enclosed with Palmerston*s 
despatch was a copy of instructions to commissioners which
advised the use of Vancouver*s chart as the basis of any 
(3)
delibera tions•
Crampton duly carried out his instructions and 
Secretary Buchanan in reply asked for an offer in writing, 
intimating at the same time that there was little likelihood 
of inconvenience arising. He had never seen Vancouver*s 
chart and hesitated therefore to adopt its line as the 
geographical/
1. Dated 30th March, 1847, in F.O. 5/809.
2. Palmerston to Pakenham, No. 25, 19th April, 1847, in same.
3. Details of these instructions are given below, pp.19-20.
(4)
geographical channel; while negotiating in 1846, however,
he had taken the channel mentioned in the Treaty to mean
(1)
*main navigable channel.1
If Great Britain was slow to act, the United
States* Government were not less so. Crampton*s note to
Buchanan suggesting the appointment of commissioners was dated
13th January, 1848, but no mention of the matter was made
by the Americans until the autumn of the following year when
Crampton sought an answer to his earlier note. Secretary
Clayton, in reply, informed him that Congress was to be
asked to make the necessary appropriation if it acceded to
(2)
the choice of commissioners. Unfortunately, nothing
was done yet.
The Governments having failed to act, their 
respective subjects who were directly concerned in the 
allocation of the disputed islands proceeded to play their 
part in the controversy. In the winter of 1852-53, therefore, 
United States* settlers on the islands in the area between 
the mainland and Vancouver Island asserted claims on behalf
of their country to possession of the islands in question.
This presented a problem for Governor Douglas of Vancouver
Island, and, thoroughly alarmed, the Governor hastened to
(3)
write to the Colonial Office for instructions.
The Colonial Office seems to have been unfamiliar 
with the subject and so assistance was sought from the 
Foreign Office. Lord Clarendon, the Foreign Secretary, 
simply/
1. Crampton to Palme ston, No. 2 13th January, 1848, in 
F.O. 5/809.
2. Crampton to Palmerston, No. 91, 29th October, 1849, in 
F.O. 5/809.
3. Douglas to Sir John Pakington, 9th December, 1852, in same. 
Mr. (afterwards Sir) James Douglas was both Hudson*s Bay 
Company employee and Government servant from 1851 to 1858. 
From September, 1858, to March, 1864, he was Governor of 
both Vancouver Island end British Columbia. For accounts 
of his life see Coats and Gosnell,' *Sir James Douglas*, 
Toronto, 1926, and W. N. Sage, *Sir James Douglas and 
Br'tish Columbia,* Toronto, 1930.
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simply instructed Crampton that he was not to mention the 
affair to the United States1 Secretary unless it was deemed 
important enough to demand urgent settlement; otherwise, 
it was to be allowed to remain in the background at a time 
when several urgent and likely to be protracted questions - 
notably the Fisheries dispute, British maritime claims, the 
rival positions in Central America, - were pending between 
Great Britain and the United States.
This did nothing to lighten the burden of Governor 
Douglas whose position was becoming increasingly difficult 
as Americans persisted in their attempts to settle on the 
disputed islands. He continued to resist all these endeavours 
because he realised that the three main islands in the Haro 
Archipelago, San Juan, Lopez and Orcas, were all very val­
uable, not only on account of their strategic situation with 
respect to Vancouver Island, but also on account of their 
productive salmon fisheries, forests of timber, and great 
extent of arable land. Furthermore, in 1853 Washington 
Territory was separated from Oregon, and Island County 
which included the islands adjacent to the Haro Channel, 
became part of Washington Territory. To keep possession of 
these valuable territories and maintain them os de facto 
dependencies of Vancouver Island by means of hired labourers 
was a task of great magnitude. San Juan was the most im­
portant of the three islands; fourteen miles long and 
approximately 4-g- broad, it has a surface area of 54 square 
miles. Less than seven miles from Vancouver Island this 
important island lies only eighteen miles from Victoria.
While the Government hesitated to move, the 
situation in the disputed area continued to assume a more 
grave aspect. Douglas!s despatches became more and more 
alarming, and the sequel was the despatch of instructions 
to/
-6
to him by the Hudson’s Bay Company to secure possession 
of the islands of Lopez and San Juan, both of which were to 
be occupied and turned to some use by the Company’s servants# 
The plan obviously aimed at anticipating official United
a)
States’ action*
Eventually, a letter from Douglas to the Colonial
Office dated 24th December, 1853, allied with representations
from the Company, and the fear that the Governor might take
a false step in resisting the squatters, convinced the
British Government of the gravity of the situation* The
Queen’s Advocate was instructed to examine the legal position,
while the Foreign Office was asked for its views* Addington
seized the opportunity to compose a new memorandum, much
more interesting and comprehensive than the last*
Starting off with the astounding statement that,
in the negotiations of 1846, the present trouble was foreseen,
nbut this consideration being of less importance than the
conclusion of the Treaty, the Treaty was concluded and
signed,” the memorandum goes on to reiterate the statement
that Rosario Strait is the navigable channel meant by the
Treaty* Douglas has acted quite correctly in dispossessing
the American squatters, and it would be politic for him to
(2)
continue to do so without ’ostentation’ or force.
1* Hudson’s Bay Company to Douglas, September, 1853; copy
as Enclosure 2 in Appendix A of Colonial Office memorandum 
of November, 1872, in F.O* 5/1473. Douglas at once sent 
Captain Stuart to take possession of Lopez Island with 
authority to give grants of land; it was apparently 
realised that haste was necessary. After the Ebey in­
cident (infra) no attempts were made to allot grants of 
land; evidently the Company understood that, the Amer­
icans having demonstrated the vigour with which they 
maintained their claim, they had no right to do this*
2# 27th February, 1854, in F.O. 5/809.
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2. The Ebey Incident,
Now follows one of those peculiar incidents 
with which the history of the western part of the United 
States abounds. An American Collector of Customs, J. M.
Ebey, was appointed in the spring of 1853 by the Executive 
of Washington Territory to the charge of Puget Sound District. 
Zeal of office moved the new appointee, who arrived on 3rd 
May, to threaten to seize property of the Hudsonrs Bay Com­
pany on San Juan Island. Governor Douglas countered this 
action by sending Charles Griffin, a Company employee, in 
December, 1853, to form a settlement at the expense of the 
Company. Free grants of land were unsuccessfully offered 
to British subjects after attempts to sell land had ended 
in failure. Griffin was made a Justice of the Peace with 
instructions to apprehend any person breaking the peace in
order that he might be able to treat the United States*
(1)
Collector as a common offender. Ebey, not to be intim­
idated, answered the British attempt to establish jurisdiction 
on the island by placing on it a United States* Customs 
Inspector.
The potential danger of the situation is obvious, 
and the Government seem at last to have become infected with 
some of Douglas*s anxiety. Accordingly, Crampton was instructed 
to obtain an adjustment without further delay, copies of the 
despatches of Douglas being enclosed with the instructions.
He was to learn if the United States v^ ere inclined to con­
clude a settlement, and, if they were, he was to express 
Great Britain*s readiness to appoint a commissioner to act 
upon/
1. Douglas to Company, 30th January, 1854, copy in F.O. 
5/809, and Douglas to Colonial Office, 27th February, 
1854. San Juan had been occupied by the Hudson*s Bay 
Company for the first time in July, 1845, and settled 
by their servants for the first time in 1850. By the 
terms of a royal grant of the previous year the Company 
Lad undertaken to defray the expenses of all civil and 
military establishments on Vancouver Island.
■8-
upon the instructions prepared by Palmerston in December,
1847. ^rampton duly communicated to Secretary Marcy an
outline of the instructions he had received, but once again
the United States failed to pass an appropriation bill.
While attempts at a diplomatic adjustment were
thus frustrated, the situation on San Juan was rapidly
heading towards a crisis. When Griffin warned Ebey off the
island, the American disappeared but sent an Indian with a
message suggesting an interview with Griffin. The latter
welcomed the request, but he reminded Ebey that his instructions
were imperative and to be strictly observed.
The Inspector of Customs appointed by Ebey reached
the island on 5th May and encamped behind the establishment
of the Hudson1s Bay Company. He refused to be dislodged,
and when a constable with half a dozen men tried to arrest
(1)
him, he produced a revolver and defied them. Griffin
thereupon wrote to Douglas for authority to arm and to arrest
(2)
the Inspector. The Governor replied that, while the
Inspector!s presence was not desirable, to arrest him would 
be a mistake unless he actually broke the lav/.
The truth is that Douglas^ zeal had been some­
what tempered by his recently securing a copy of Crampton1s 
letter to Secretary Buchanan of 13th January, 1848, in which 
it was admitted that some difficulty might arise in deciding 
which of the channels leading from the Gulf of Georgia ought 
to be adopted for the boundary, an unfortunate admission, 
according to the Governor, showing a ’lamentable want of 
information on the question at issue.” Yet it was a fact 
which/
1. Griffin to Douglas, 7th May, 1854, enclosure 4 in 
D o u g l a s  to Newcastle at Colonial Office, 17th May, 1854, 
in P.O. 5/809.
2. Idem, enclosure 5.
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which might greatly embarrass the British Government, H© 
became cautious, therefore, and was not disposed to push 
matters,
Douglas had been disappointed in the terms of the 
Oregon Treaty which he had deemed a concession to the Amer­
icans, and now it seemed that fresh and equally humiliating 
concessions were to be made. It had never before occurred 
to him to doubt the legality of the British position that 
Rosario Channel formed the boundary line west of the main­
land, but he was alert enough to recognise the implications 
of Crampton*s letter. His natural inclination was to seize 
the property and defy the Americans, but he realised how 
difficult it would be to obtain his Governments sanction 
for any hasty, ill-considered move. These sudden clashes 
of conflicting interests, which usually appear to those on 
the spot to be remediable only by resort to force, very often 
assume a calmer and mueh less frightful appearance when con­
sidered and pronounced upon by Government officials far 
removed from the scene.
That is precisely what happened in the case
under review, Crampton complained to Secretary Marcy of
Ebey*s aggression, Marcy replied in incredulous tone that
he would institute inquiries and promised that, if Ebey had
exceededhis authority, he would be officially censured. This
was followed by an official denial from Governor Stevens of
Washington Territory that there was any danger of seizure
(1)
of property. It was possible, admitted Stevens, that
a Customs Inspector had been stationed on San Juan because 
the Americans considered the island to be United States* 
territory/
1, A copy of Marcy*s reply to Crampton is enclosed in the
latter*s No, 192, 24th July, 1854, in F.O. 5/809, Copies 
of both letters are printed in Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 172,
36th Cong., 2nd Sess,
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territory, but he was emphatic in asserting that there was 
not the least likelihood that the possessory rights of the 
Hudsonfs Bay Company would be interfered with#
The Ebey incident, while of little moment intrin­
sically, proved to be the spur necessary to rouse the two 
Governments# Its direct sequel was the despatch of instructions 
to Crampton to bring the affair to the notice of Marcy as a 
proof that the settlement of the boundary between the possessions
of Great Britain and the United States in thos e parts was of
(1)
"urgent importance#” The incident also served to hasten
the appropriation bill through the House of Representatives; 
unfortunately, however, the Senate rejected it. This was a 
source of disappointment for Britain at a time when, engaged 
in the Crimean War, she was particularly anxious to maintain 
peaceful relations with the Americans. She feared that the 
recurrence of trouble on the Pacific coast might precipitate 
war, but after the failure of the United States to appoint 
a commissioner to define the boundary line she had to be 
content with taking steps towards obviating another clash 
of interests in those parts# Fortunately she found Marcy 
sympathetic, and it was agreed that both Governments should 
instruct their chief agents on the Pacific north-west coast
(2)
to warn their subordinates to act with extreme forbearance.
Thus, in a despatch to the terms of which appeal 
was subsequently made quite frequently in the course of the 
next/
1# Clarendon to Crampton, No. 179, 9th August, in F#0# 5/809# 
2# In spite of the action of the two Governments the next year 
produced another dangerous situation. A party of Americans 
under Sheriff Barnes of Whatcom County, of which San Juan 
constituted a part, arrived on the island on 30th March 
and demanded payment of taxes - eighty dollars in all. 
Satisfaction being refused, they seized a number of rams, 
and, numerically stronger and in possession of revolvers, 
they had no difficulty in enforcing their wishes. They 
were able successfully to resist a3.1 Griffin* s attempts 
to wrest the sheep from them. Griffin complained to 
Governor Douglas, who in turn complained to Governor 
Stevens. See Douglas to Colonial Office, 18th May, in 
F.O# 5/809. Stevens’s answer is printed in Sen. Ex. Doc# 
No. 172, 36th Cong., 2nd. Sess., pp. 116-117.
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next few years, the United States1 Secretary of State
informed Governor Stevens of Washington Territory that
"the title ought to be settled before either party should
attempt to exclude the other by force, or exercise complete
and exclusive Sovereign Rights within the fairly disputed
limits." Mr. crampton, acting under instructions from home,
wrote in similar strain to Sir Edmund Head, Governor-General 
(1)
of Canada.
So far, then, the Water-Boundary dispute had been 
treated more or less casually by both interested Governments, 
but this is explained by the remoteness of the object in 
dispute, the procrastinating policy traditionally followed 
by the United States in controversies with Britain, the 
latter*s apathy in colonial matters, and the country*s pre­
occupation with much more pressing problems. San Juan could 
not be expected to have the same significance in the eyes of 
the Colonial Office as it had in those of Sir James Douglas.
It was apparent that only when, if ever, a local clash of 
interests threatened to expand and involve greater issues 
would either Government seek a final settlement.
1. A copy of Marcy’s letter to Stevens is Enclosure 1,
Crampton’s to Head is Enclosure 4, and Head’s reply is 
Enclosure 5 in Crampton’s despatch to Lord Clarendon,
No. 156, 30th July, 1855, in F.O. 5/809. A copy of Marcyfs 
letter also appears as Letter No. 1, House Ex. Doc. No.
65, 36th Cong., 1st Se3S. and also as Letter No. 1 in 
Sen. ®x. Doc. No. 10, 36th Cong., 1st Sess.
CHAPTER II
EXTERNAL INFLUENCES
Throughout the latter part of the Oregon dispute 
and the whole of the San Juan controversy three concurrent 
movements - that for the annexation of Canada to the United 
States, that of anti-imperialism in England, and that of 
•Manifest Destiny1 in the United States - were most prominent* 
Each had a direct effect upon the official attitude to the 
San Juan dispute, and appreciation of the weight of their 
combined influence makes it a matter of extreme wonder that 
Canada remained a part of the British Empire*
In Anglo-American relations Canada was Britain’s 
weak spot. On the one hand, the protagonists of the ’Manifest 
Destiny’ Idea strongly resented Britain’s control of the vast 
area to the north; on the other, British Liberals strongly 
resented the claims of Canada upon the mother country, and 
they looked forward to the time when Canada should be free 
of British control. Liberal Governments were, to say the 
least, apathetic In their attitude to Canadian affairs and 
many Americans mistakenly accepted this as evidence of 
general weakness in British foreign policy. Only very 
strong provocation would justify a British Government - 
Liberal or Conservative - fighting a war which would 
jeopardise Lancashire’s great cotton trade to retain defence­
less Canada. The Americans early perceived this and they were 
accordingly inclined to be arrogant in their attitude to 
Great Britain* They believed, and many Englishmen shared 
their belief, that it had become a maxim of policy with 
England/
13-
England that all controversies with the United States must
(1)
be in some way amicably settled.
Of comparable, though not so persistent^ influence 
and importance was the annexationist movement in Canada.
After the Rebellion of 1837, for instance, the leaders who 
escaped to the United States received enthusiastic support 
in their attempts at recruiting forces to invade Canada. In 
1849 the annexationist movement reached its zenith, and was 
very surprisingly supported by the Canadian Tories. Chagrin 
at loss of office, the passage of the Rebellion Losses B i n # 
dislike of the French-Canadians, were all factors in encour­
aging this attitude.
Moreover, the effect of the introduction of Free 
Trade in Great Britain had a disastrous influence on Canadian 
commerce and induced Canadian business men to look southward 
for redress. The Repeal of the Corn Lav/s in 1846 had driven 
Canadian produce down the New York channels of communication, 
destroying the revenue which Canada expected to derive from 
canal dues, and ruining at onee mill-owners, forwarders, and 
Merchants. The consequence was that private property became 
unsaleable in Canada, while the United States1 tariff wall
t o )
meant that Canadian produce could find no market to the south# 7 
To aggravate matters, British money and labour went to the 
United States to make railways and develop industries while 
Canada was ignored.
Fortunately, with the return of prosperity in the 
’fifties after the failure of the diverse an .exationist groups 
to/
1. "The idea that, happen what may, England will never really 
declare war with this country has become so deeply rooted 
that I am afraid nothing short of actual hostilities would 
eradicate it." Lord Lyons, British Ambassador at Washington, 
to Lord John Russell, 21st September, 1859, quoted in Lord 
Newton, ’Lord Lyons,1 I, 20, London, 1913. Cf. Lord Sel- 
borne, ’Memoirs,’ I, 203, London, 1898.
2. ^ a l r o n d ,  ’Letters and Journals of James, Eighth Earl of
Elgin,’ p. 60, London, 1872, quoted in H, l . Keenleyside,
’Canada and the United States,’ p# 122, New York, 1929#
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to unite on a common policy, the movement suffered temporary 
extinction and was never again revived, at least in Eastern 
Canada, with so much hope of success. Still it could be used, 
and was used, to unsettle Canadians and make them dissatisfied 
with the imperial connection. Annexation became chiefly the 
cause of a minority of malcontents whose influence waned with 
the winning in 1854 of reciprocity, which "gave to Canada most 
of the advantages of annexation without its defects.”
Running parallel to the ’Manifest Destiny’ move­
ment in the United States was the anti-colonial agitation in 
England. Early in the century the Philosophical Radicals 
applied their principles to the theory of colonial government 
and found that to protect the colonies, keep them in dependence 
and prevent them from smuggling, fleets and armies were necessary,
and for these Great Britain had to pay because the colonies
(1)
yielded no revenue. The ’Westminster Review* in 1830 called
colonies ”impediments to commerce, drawbacks on prosperity, 
pumps for extracting the property of the many for the benefit 
of the few, the strongholds and asylums of despotism and 
misrule."
It was the belief of free traders that the 
application of their ideals would lead to the loss of the 
colonies. Moreover, it was inevitable that the larger 
colonies at least should become independent in the course 
of timej American, Spanish, and Portuguese example all pointed 
that way. As the colonies grew, they would naturally seek 
independence to develop their ideals and enhance their power.
The general public was of course little exercised 
over the question and, as we have seen, knew next to nothing 
of/
1. R. L. Schuyler, ’The Rise of Anti-Imperialism in England,’ 
in the Political Science Quarterly, 37, 467.
of the geography and importance of Englandfs colonial 
possessions. Parliament was often •counted out1 when colonial 
affairs were under discussion. Colonial policy before 1867 
was in the hands of professional politicians and permanent 
officials. "Whatever public interest did arise was confined 
to humanitarian societies.
Statesmen in the middle of the century, if they 
did not actually favour the grant of independence to the 
colonies, were almost unanirrmisly convinced that ultimate 
separation was inevitable and that diplomacy should aim at 
making the parting as amicable as possible. Thus the private 
papers of Sir Robert Peel and Lord Aberdeen confirm the con­
clusion of a recent writer that Peel, beyond affirming a 
desire to remedy specific grievances, was unprepared to 
make any radical change of Imperial policy. He regarded 
the Empire "primarily as a liability, an addition to the
burdens, heavy enough without it, of government and of
(1)
defence." Even Disraeli, later staunch Imperialist, 
exasperated at Canadafs refusal in 1862 to organise a local 
militia, was moved to ask, "What is the use of these colonial 
deadweights which we do not govern?"
Most conclusive evidence of the consistent 
attitude of successive governments to colonial develop­
ment is to be found in the views of the Permanent Under­
secretaries at the Colonial Office. During the period 1836 
to 1871 there were but three such officials there: Sir
James Stephen (1836-1847), Herman Merivale (1847-1859), and 
P. C. Rogers (later Lord Blachford) (1859-1871).
In Stephen’s eyes, for instance, the colonies
(
were useful for absorbing the mother country’s surplus pop­
ulation/
1* W. P. Morrell, *British Colonial Policy in the Age tifi 
Peel and Russell,* pp. 29-31, Oxford, 1930.
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population, but he considered some of them to be a ’wretched
burden,’ and favoured the development of colonial self-
(1)
government as a step towards independence. The object of
the Colonial Office was to encourage the colonies to prepare 
for independence for their own sake, at the same time to re­
lieve the mother country of her large share - usually ninety 
per cent - of the cost of colonial administration and defence* 
the connection should last just as long as the connection
was profitable to both countries; separation which was in-
(2)
evitable should come amicably.
The colonies, according to this commonly held 
view, were a damnosa heredl^tas which constituted a grave 
danger to the equanimity of the mother country because their 
contiguity to foreign countries introduced persistent and 
unnecessary causes of war. Canada in particular, as the 
neighbour of the United States, was a constant source of 
diplomatic trouble, and the frequent incidents that arose 
between Great Britain and the United States produced a feel­
ing of exasperation and annoyance in the mother country. 
Nothing could be more provoking than the threat of war with 
the Americans in the place and manner most disadvantageous 
to Great Britain, on behalf of a colony which was of little 
intrinsic value and whose people at one time or another 
spoke glibly of annexation to the United States.
We can well understand, therefore, the irritation 
of the British Government when incidents on San Juan began 
to disturb their composure. The island was a powder barrel 
which caused them grave anxiety and, especially after it 
was occupied by United States* troops in 1859, there was 
acute/
1. W.P. Morrell, op. cit. p. 45.
2. G.E. Marindin, ’Letters of Lord Blachfor$,’ pp. 299-300, 
London, 1896. Cf. H.E. Egerton, ’Short History of British 
Colonial Policy,’ p. 317, London, 1932, and H. Merivale
in the ’Fortnightly Review,’ February, 1870#
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acute danger of an explosion* The continuous and oft-expressed
concern, therefore, of diplomatists like Lord Lyons, British
representative in Washington during the extremely thorny
period from 1858 to 1865, about the situation on the Island
(1)
is hardly surprising*
On the United States side there was the expansion­
ist movement inspired by the phrase ’Manifest Destiny’, a 
phrase which had originated in 1845 in the height of the 
Oregon controversy* It had appeared in the "Democratic 
Review,1 whence it was transferred to the House of Represent­
atives debate on Oregon. It was asserted that the best and 
strongest title to Oregon was by the right of the United 
States’ ’manifest destiny* to "overspread and to possess the 
whole of the continent which Providence had given them for
the development of the great experiment of liberty and feder-
(2)
ated self-government entrusted to them." The phrase took 
an important place in the national vocabulary, and it became 
the battle-cry of expansionists from Polk to Seward and Sumner* 
It is obvious that the three movements mentioned 
would have their effect upon the solution of the San Juan 
problem. ’Manifest Destiny’ made the possession of the Island 
an essential of a vigorous policy which exalted territorial 
expansion, and it was not until the expansionist movement was 
on the wane that, as will be seen later, the United States* 
Government displayed the real desire for settlement that was 
so necessary for agreement. The comparative equanimity with 
which territorial cession on the American continent would 
have been viewed by Britain in the middle of the 19th century 
concurred with the spasmodic evidences of an annexationist 
movement in Canada to encourage, generally, official inaction 
and apathy.
1. See Lord Newton, ’Lord Lyons,* passim.
2. Quoted by J. W. Pratt, ’The Origin of Manifest Destiny,1 
in American Historical Review, XXXII, pp. 795-798#
CHAPTER III
THE WATER-B OUUDARY COMMISSION
In 1856 at a time eminently suitable for adjust­
ment of the boundary controversy the United States made a 
move towards settlement# The Fisheries dispute, which had 
been a recurring source of irritation since 1783, was tem­
porarily dormant owing to the operation of reciprocity, while 
that other source of periodic trouble, the Right of Search, 
ceased almost for the first time to be an issue when the 
Crimean War ended* The annexation of Canada, which had 
seemed certain in the winter of 1855-56 as the result of 
Republican agitation, of the withdrawal of regular forces 
from Canada and of the irritation caused by the efforts of 
Canadians to recruit men in the United States for service 
in the Crimea, was no longer imminent, particularly when 
strong forces were dispatched to Canada after the war* In 
addition, a satisfactory solution of the Central American 
quarrel betY/een the United States and Britain was pending*
On 11th August Congress passed an Act empowering 
the President to appoint commissioners and to take other 
necessary steps to define the Water-Boundary• Intimation of 
this action was conveyed to the Foreign Secretary, Lord
Clarendon, by Mr* Gr*M* Dallas, United Statesf Minister in
(1)
London, and Clarendon v/elcomed the news*
Captain Prevost and Captain Richards, the latter 
as Chief Surveyor and Astronomer under the instructions 
of Prevost and as second-in-command, were to be the British 
commissioners, their appointment dating from 20th December, 
1856. Clarendon drew up their instructions, and in them
a/
«* r?1iaS/,t° £la£endon, 28th August, in F.O. 5/812.
ras to cond i r « V°St’ N<V »  in P ‘°* 5/810* S h a r d s  t0 conduct a survey of the Haro Archipelago.
a brief review of the attempts to settle the controversy 
is followed by directions to Prevost on the manner of pro­
cedure, this part of the instructions being identical with 
those prepared by Palmerston in 1847* ^irst of all, the 
commissioners are to determine where the forty-ninth parallel 
strikes the sea; then to trace the line westward to the 
middle of the channel between the mainland and Vancouver 
Island, seeking to obtain Point Roberts for Great Britain; 
the line thus reaches the Gulf of Georgia, through the 
middle of which it runs, until it ceases to be the only 
channel*
flSo long as there is only one channel separating
the continent and Vancouver*s Island, no doubt can be enter­
tained; and therefore the centre of the Gulf of Georgia, 
as far as the latitude where it ceases to be the only channel, 
and the centre of the Strait of Fuca till it ceases also to 
be the only channel between the continent and Vancouver*s 
Island appear to Her Majesty*s Government to be fixed points 
in the line of boundary - and it is only as regards the space
between these two points that any difference of opinion as
(1)
to the proper channel can exist*"
Great Britain has always considered these islands
of the Haro Archipelago to be appendages of Vancouver Island
and, whatever may be their intrinsic importance, it cannot 
be questioned that their possession by Great Britain must 
contribute appreciably to the quiet possession of Vancouver 
Island*
If agreement is not reached upon the Rosari© 
Channel as the line of boundary, the commissioners ar© t© 
attempt to settle upon another channel among th© gf©up ©£ 
islands/
1* See map in Appendix*
islands between Vancouver Island and the Haro Channel 
because the controversy must be settled* If they think 
Rosario Channel is not substantiated by the Treaty of 1846, 
they are free to adopt any other 1 intermediate1 channel 
which they may discover. Richards is to make an accurate 
survey of the area to ascertain if there exists another 
navigable channel among the islands between the mainland 
and Vancouver Island* If they cannot come to an understanding 
with Mr* Campbell, the American commissioner, and if they 
are satisfied of the soundness of the British case, they are 
to propose that both countries* commissioners should draw 
up a statement of their position and present these to their 
respective governments.
Prevost sailed from England on 23rd December,
1856, and arrived at Esquimalt, Vancouver Island, on 14th
June, 1857, while Campbell arrived on 20th June. The two
exchanged copies of their instructions before beginning
(1)
their discussions on 27th June. Several formal talks
followed at which It was mutually admitted that through the
Gulf of Georgia and through the Straits of Fuca there would
be no difficulty in tracing the boundary line, but as to the
direction in which it should proceed through the space
situated between these waters the opinions of the respective
commissioners were diametrically opppsed. In short, Campbell
stood out for the Haro Channel; Prevost demanded Rosario as
(2)
the line of boundary.
Prevost rested his claim more particularly upon 
the wording of the Treaty, while Campbell tended rather to 
argue upon contemporaneous evidence which sought to explain 
the/
1* Prevost to Clarendon, No. 2, 30th June, 1857, in F*0* 
5/810. A printed copy appears in Sen. Ex. Doc* No. 29, 
Serial No. 1316, p. 5.
2* Prevost to foreign Office, No* 7, 7th December, 1857*
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the intentions and views of the negotiators and others
directly concerned in the signing and ratification of the
Oregon Treaty. Campbell produced copies of Mr. McLane!s
despatches of May, 1846, along with reports of Senator
Benton*s speeches, to prove that the United States had in
(1)
mind the Haro Channel when concluding the Treaty.
Campbell argued that the boundary line defined 
by Lord Aberdeen in his despatch of 18th May, 1846, could 
not possibly be "tortured into" a line running through the 
middle of Rosario Strait. It follows that, since Aberdeenfs 
line was not clearly marked, one must fall back upon the 
motive which induced deflection from the 49th parallel. This 
motive was simply to give Vancouver Island to Great Britain; 
indeed, the Foreign Secretary1s actual words are: "thus
giving to Great Britain the whole of Vancouver*s Island and 
its harbours." Finally, contend the Americans, if there was 
any possibility of doubt concerning the interpretation of 
the Treaty of 1846 the British Government which framed it 
ought/
1. McLane, in his despatch of 18th May, 1846, recounts the
substance of an interview with Lord Aberdeen in the course 
of which the Foreign Secretary had explained the "probable" 
terms of his proposition for the conclusion of the dispute 
over Oregon. In his despatch McLane definitely mentions 
the Haro Channel as that to be offered as boundary. A 
copy of the despatch is to be found in F.O. 5/1472.
Senator Benton says the line established by the first 
article of the Treaty "follows the parallel of 49 degrees 
to the sea, proceeds to the middle of the
channel, and thence, turning south, through the channel 
de Haro (wrongly written Arro on the maps) to the Straits 
of Fuca; and thence west through the middle of that Strait 
to the sea. This is a fair partition of these waters, and 
gives us everything we want, namely, all the waters of 
Puget Sound, Hood*s Canal, Admiralty Inlet, Bellingham Bay, 
Birch Bay and with them the cluster of islands, probably 
of no value, between de Haro*s channel and the continent." 
From report of a speech by Benton delivered in the Senate 
on 15th June, 1846, during the debate on the Oregon Treaty, 
quoted by Prevost to Clarendon, No. 7, 7th December, 1857, 
in F.O. 5/810. A copy appears in the Appendix to the Con­
gressional Globe, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 867, quoted in 
*Papers Relating to the Treaty of Washington, Vol. V, 
Washington, 1872.
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ought to have taken all possible steps to preclude a state 
of doubt and uncertainty. Campbell maintained also that 
not only American but even English contemporaneous evidence 
is clearly on the side of the United States, and the letters 
of Palmerston, Aberdeen and Pakenham do not sustain the 
British argument*
Prevost, on the other hand, rested the British 
position almost entirely upon the words of the Treaty, and 
concluded that Rosario Channel was the only line which could 
be justified after a study of the wording. His reasons were:
1. Rosario is the navigable channel of direct communication 
from the Gulf of Georgia to the Straits of Fuca situated 
most adjacent to the continent and is consequently the 
channel ”v/hich separates the continent from Vancouverfs 
Island.”
2.. Rosario Channel is a direct continuation of the channel 
of the Gulf of Georgia and answers the words, ”thence 
southerly through the middle of the said channel.”
3. It admits of the channel being carried through it with 
less departure from Southerly* than any other channel. 
In rebuttal of the United States* arguments the 
British commissioner continues:
1. Campbell claims that the islands between the continent 
and the Haro Channel are natural appendages of the con­
tinent. ”l reply that in the Treaty I find two fixed 
points named, the Continent on one hand, and Vancouver*s 
Island on the other, and that I conceive the Continent 
must be de facto the Continent, as much as Vancouver*s 
Island is de facto Vancouver*s Island.”
2. Campbell refuses to admit that Rosario Strait is 
peculiarly a direct continuation of the channel of the 
Gulf/
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Gulf of Georgia but maintains it to be a continuation 
only in common with other channels. Local experience, 
argues Prevost, is on the British side for the unin­
terrupted body of water flowing from the Gulf of Georgia 
through the Rosario Strait causes a regularity of current 
not experienced in the other channels.
3. If 1 southerly1 were taken in the strict sense, the 
Treaty would become a nullity is the claim of the 
Americans, for the term related equally to the Strait 
of E\ica, where it was impossible the boundary line 
could be run in a southerly direction, and they argued 
that the term must therefore only be used generally 
and in opposition to ’northerly.* Prevost answers that 
where the wording of a treaty can be strictly adhered 
to, this piust be done; where it cannot, the evident 
intention of the treaty should be sought. He quotes 
from Vattel to illustrate and drive home his contention.
4. Benton’s and McLane*s testimony, admits Prevost, is 
entitled to some weight, but their evidence is merely 
secondary* The terms of the Treaty were drafted by 
Great Britain, but no mention is made of the Haro 
Channel to explain the nature of Benton’s and McLane’s 
testimony* Prevost educes two possible explanations; 
Benton may have used Wilkes’s map of 1845 and.was misled 
by it because in carrying the eye along from the termin­
ation of the boundary line on the eastern side of the
. Rockies it rests naturally upon Birch Bay, and Haro
Strait is so conspicuously marked that it appears to
be the only direct channel between the mainland and
(1)
Vancouver Island that turns Into Fuca Straits. Alter­
natively, Benton may have relied upon the terms of 
McLane’s despatch of 18th May, 1846.
Campbe 11/
1. C. Wilkes,’Narrative of United States Exploring Expedition,’
5 vols., Philadelphia, 1845.
Campbell proved adamant and so, in consonance 
with his instructions to suggest an intermediate strait as 
the boundary channel, Prevost suggested - merely as a com­
promise, he was careful to point out - that the channel sit­
uated nearly midway between the Rosario Strait and Haro
Channel should be taken as the channel through which to run
(1)
the line of demarcation. Campbell refused to entertain 
this suggestion, however, and Prevost had accordingly to
(2)
postpone discussion pending fresh instructions from home.
Unfortunately, the home Government were in no hurry to issue
fresh instructions and, beyond formal approval of his efforts
and a promise of further instructions, Prevost heard nothing
(3)
more until 1859.
1* Prevost to Clarendon, Ho. 7, 7th December, 1857, in
F.O. 5/810. This channel was not yet known to be navigable.
2* Copies of the correspondence between the two commissioners
are enclosed in Prevost1s despatch just mentioned. The 
enclosures are:
1. Prevost to Campbell, Ho. 1, 28th October.
2. Campbell to Prevost, 2nd November.
3. Prevost to Campbell, Ho. 2, 9th Hovember.
4. Campbell to Prevost, 18th November.
5. Prevost to Campbell, Ho. 3, 24th November.
6. Arrowsmith to Hudson1s Bay Company, 29th September.
7. Campbell to Prevost, 28th November.
8. Crampton to Buchanan, 13th January, 1848.
9. Prevost to Campbell, Ho. 4, 1st December, 1857.
10. Campbell to Prevost, 2nd December, 1857.
11. A map showing all claims. A photostat copy of this 
map may be found in the Appendix to this monograph.
Campbell’s letter to Prevost of 4th December denouncing 
alleged restrictions in the instructions to Prevost is 
Enclosure 1 in Prevost*s despatch to Clarendon of 16th 
December, 1857. Campbell’s final letter and Prevost’s 
answer are Enclosures 1 and 2 in Prevost’s despatch to 
Clarendon of 2nd January, 1858.
Copies of all the above are also to be found in Sen. Ex. 
Doc. No. 29, Serial No. 1316, pp. 5 - 47.
3. Malmesbury to Prevost, 14th May, 1858, in F.O. 5/810.
CHAPTER IV
BRITAIN REVIEWS THE POSITION AND MAKES AW OFFER
1. Departmental and Other Opinions.
The failure of the commissioners to effect a 
settlement was most disappointing, particularly since a new 
factor had made itself known while the Boundary question lay 
in abeyance between the Governments and their representatives. 
The year 1853 produced the Fraser River gold rush and gave 
British Columbia and the adjoining islands an importance 
they had never before enjoyed. The discovery of gold along 
the banks of the Fraser River attracted throngs of gold­
miners from the corners of the earth to British Columbia 
and the adjacent islands. The great majority of the nev/comers, 
however, were Americans and the population of the United 
States* towns on the Pacific Coast was severely depleted.
Since all prospective gold-miners had to procure a licence 
at Victoria, that settlement increased almost overnight to 
the status of a city. It became obvious that British Col­
umbia, Vancouver Island and the adjacent islands would thence­
forward assume a prominent place in North America and, what 
was more important, many squatters, the great majority of 
them Americans, settled, ’staked their claims* on the islands 
of/
of the Haro Archipelago, openly declared the territory to
(1)
belong to the United States, and refused to budge. The
stage was set, therefore, for another act in the disturbing 
drama enacted by the two Governments.
Fortunately, the British Government perceived 
the danger and took immediate and comprehensive steps to effect 
a solution, ^he whole problem was stich a perplexing one for 
them that strict unanimity of departmental opinion could not 
be secured. Copies of Prevost*s despatches were sent to the 
Admiralty and to the Colonial Office in an attempt to amass 
all available evidence and arrive at the best possible course 
to be pursued. Throughout 1858, therefore, there was con­
siderable inter-departmental correspondence.
The Colonial Office advised arbitration as the
(2 )
best means of settling the controversy, while the
Admiralty attempted to shelve the question by reminding Lord 
Clarendon that no purely naval question was at i33ue. The 
Lords of the Admiralty went so far, however, as to opine that 
the line meant by the framers of the Oregon Treaty was to 
follow the middle of the whole area between the continent 
and Vancouver Island. It seemed obvious to them, therefore, 
that the object of the commissioners should be to trace the 
most convenient line by which the whole Strait could be 
divided between the two countries, and could be continued as 
nearly/
1. Urging a speedy solution the Colonial Secretary pointed
out to the Foreign Office the danger that the Americans
would flincrease their demands in proportion to the delay 
which allows the popular feeling in America to be fed and 
swollen by accounts that must stimulate cupidity.” Colonial 
Office to Foreign Office, 24th August, 1858, in F.O. 5/813.
2. Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 6th March, 1858, in same.
Arbitration was tantamount to shirking or, at least, shel­
ving the issue. ?/hen in August, 1858, Lord Stanley v/as 
succeeded at the Colonial Office by Bulwer Lytton, a more 
positive policy was adopted, and the new Secretary con­
curred with the increasingly prominent view that San Juan 
v/as indispensable to the safety of Vancouver Island; that 
is, the risk of a possible adverse decision by an arbiter 
could not be taken.
nearly as possible along the middle of the whole strait 
dividing the continent from Vancouver Island.
Haro Channel does not satisfy the Treaty proviso 
that the ’’navigation of the whole of the said channel and 
straits south of the forty-ninth parallel of north latitude 
remain free and open to both Parties.1 Clearly, argue the 
Lords of the Admiralty, the channel meant is the whole area 
between the mainland and Vancouver Island. This channel 
begins above, and is greater than, Haro. If the latter had 
been meant, words of restriction would have been inserted 
excluding the free navigation of that part of the channel 
given to the United States. For similar reasons Rosario 
Strait does not completely satisfy. Therefore the Lords 
of the Admiralty feel that it would be an advantageous settle­
ment of the question if the boundary line were laid down so
as to give to Great Britain the Island of San Juan  ....  and
they think that this line might be fairly accepted as a com­
promise line by the United States. Should that not be con­
ceded, they would advise that the question be settled even 
by accepting the Haro Channel as the line of boundary. The 
important consideration is that the United States are the 
gainers by the questionfs being left open, every day adding to 
the number of American settlers in the disputed territory.
The precise line of boundary is of little importance, but
the Admiralty insist that free navigation of the whole water
(1)
area must be secured to Great Britain.
The opinion of Sir Richard Pakenham, who had 
been British Ambassador at Washington in 1846, was also 
secured./
1. Admiralty to Foreign uffice, 8th April, 1858, in F.O.
5/813. This Admiralty attitude remained the same through­
out the dispute. See their letter to the Foreign Office 
after Richards’s survey report had arrived in London:
9th April, 1859, in same. Of course their preponderating 
naval influence in the Pacific made them ready to ridicule 
any fears for the safety of Vancouver Island.
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secured. Copies of the instructions to Prevost, the latter1 s 
report on them, the despatches of Lord Napier, Ambassador at 
Washington, the Colonial Office letter of 20th March, 1858, 
and the Admiralty letter of 8th April, all were sent to him 
for his observations. Pakenham’s conclusion, a very valuable 
and important one, was that neither Haro nor Rosario would 
exactly fulfil the conditions of the Treaty, which according 
to their literal tenor would require the line to be traced 
along the middle of the channel, "meaning, I presume, the 
whole intervening space •••••• ,f He was certain that no
mention had ever been made of Haro Channel in the course of 
the negotiations.
Sir Richard goes on to assert his belief that 
neither Lord Aberdeen nor Mr. Buchanan nor Mr. McLane 
possessed at that time a sufficiently accurate knowledge 
of the geography or hydrography of the region in question 
to enable them to define more accurately what was intended 
to be the line of boundary than is expressed in the words 
of the Treaty. Besides, states Pakenham, it is certain that 
Buchanan signed the Treaty with McLane*s despatch before him 
and that he made no mention whatever of Haro Strait as that 
through which the line of boundary should run as understood 
by the United States’ Government. He advises that, since 
a direct line, as obviously desired by the Treaty, cannot 
be conveniently adopted because it would run partly overland, 
the next best course to pursue would be to trace the line in
(1)
the direction coming nearest to that required by the Treaty.
Preparations/
1. Pakenham to Foreign Office, 19th April, 1858, in F.O. 5/813. j 
Lord Aberdeen, Foreign Secretary in 1846, to whom the Gov- j 
ernment wrote in 1858 for corroboration of Pakenham*s views j 
declared that he was certain that it was the intention of ,
the Treaty to adopt as line of demarcation the mid-channel j 
of the Straits without any reference to islands, the position i 
and indeed the very existence of which had hardly at that j
time been accurately ascertained. He had "no recollection j 
of any mention having been made during the discussion of the ? 
Canal de Haro or indeed any other channel than those describedj 
in the Treaty itself." See Sir Arthur Gordon (Aberdeen’s 
son) to Lord John Russell, 21st August, 1859, in P.O. 5/814.
Preparations were made to go over the whole issue 
at the Foreign Office, arrangements being made for Viscount 
Palmerston, not at this time a member of the Government, and 
Lord Stanley, Colonial Secretary and son of the Prime Minister, 
to discuss the position with Lord Malmesbury, the Foreign 
Secretary, on 20th April. Copies of the correspondence sent 
to Pakenham, the latter*s reply thereto, and a memorandum by 
Mr. Hammond, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, 
were all set before the three statesmen..
Hammond’s memorandum is important because, being 
the work of a permanent official who had been in personal 
contact with the controversy for many years, it carried great 
weight with the members of the Cabinet. The dominant note 
of the memorandum, namely, its insistence upon the importance 
of retaining the Island of San Juan, became the basis of the 
Government's policy in the dispute. Hammond saw San Juan 
as the really important island, and Britain ought to stand 
out for it. He advised that the middle channel, as coming 
most nearly within the strict definition of the Treaty of 
1846, might first be suggested and, if refused, arbitration 
could be pressed for. If both these proposals were refused, 
Hammond would go the length of intimating that England would 
act upon her interpretation of what was right, and she would
continue to hold the Island of San Juan as a solely British
(1)
possession.
After discussion, it was finally decided to make 
no proposal till the conclusion of Captain Richards's survey, 
since whatever was done would be better done with full know­
ledge/
1. Hammond*s memorandum is in F.O. 5/813. He also makes the 
significant statement that "we ought to come to an early 
decision and require an early decision on the part of the 
United States and not allow them to play their usual game 
of procrastination at which they always win."
knowledge, particularly since it could be safely assumed that 
the Americans would not voluntarily forego any portion of their 
pretensions. Moreover, if resort were to he had to arbitration 
it would be wise to have a clear knowledge of the chances 
resulting from a survey before deciding on the course to be 
taken•
2, Richardsfs Survey Report,
Both the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office, 
therefore, awaited the report of Captain Richards with con­
siderable impatience. The Colonial Office saw the danger to 
British Columbia and Vancouver Island if there was an adverse 
report upon the usefulness of Rosario Strait, while the Foreign 
Office perceived the danger of having to recede from their 
strong position or, alternatively, of having to submit to an 
arbitrator a question which they feared might be decided 
against them.
The chart and report of the survey party were 
finally dispatched on 30th November, 1858, and reached the 
Foreign Office in the following January, The report came 
as a bombshell, for in the Foreign Secretary*s own words
they went !,to establish the American claim that the Canal
(1)
de Haro was the best navigable channel,”
The report commences with a comparison of the
three main channels, Haro, Rosario, and the Middle Channel,
(2)
sometimes called Douglas Strait, Rosario Strait, the
report points out, varies in width from one and one-third 
to six miles, with an average width of two miles. It has 
strong tides; it contains two great dangers to navigation 
in/
1* Memorandum of 3rd February, 1859, in F,0. 5/813.
2, Strictly speaking, one can apply the name *Douglas Strait1 
only to a passage which forms a part of the Middle Channel,
in the shape of two giant rocks. Its depth varies from 
twenty-five to thirty-five fathoms. Haro Strait, on the 
other hand, is two and a half miles at its northern en­
trance, and it is on the whole wider and deeper than the 
other two. The middle channel is much inferior in capacity, 
yet is safe enough for steamships. Its tides are strong 
at the southern entrance, and there is a narrow inlet. All 
three channels present considerable difficulties to sailing 
vessels - chiefly, danger and great delay. As regards 
steamships, however, the passages are quite safe during 
the day and could be lighted at night.
But three points are particularly stressed:
1. Vessels passing through the Strait of Juan de Fuca
and bound for the Fraser River or Nanaimo would unquestion­
ably take the Haro Strait as, by doing so, they would save 
a distance of from twelve to fifteen miles.
2. Haro Strait from its position with reference to British 
ports must be almost entirely used by British vessels.
3. nTo the commerce of British Columbia, to the rising 
port of Nanaimo, which probably for many years will be the 
great coal depot to the coasting trade, which will rapidly 
rise into importance so soon as Vancouver fs Island Is open 
to the enterprise of the Agriculturist and the Settler, 
this Strait is of equal interest•”
It will be seen, therefore, that Richards’s 
report is of very great importance in the controversy 
because, by proving the middle channel to be navigable,
It gave the British Government a valuable, if dangerous, 
alternative to Rosario Strait in the negotiations. At 
the/
1* Richards1s report appears in F.O. 5/813$ a complete 
copy may be found in the Appendix to this essay.
the same time, by demonstrating the essential superiority 
of Haro Strait, it weakened the confidence of the Govern­
ment in the British position and made possible, if it did 
not actually encourage, the ultimate mismanagement of the 
British case.
5. The Strategic Importance of San Juan.
The disappointing nature of the survey report 
compelled the Government to reconsider their attitude. They 
could not publicly admit, without serious loss of prestige, 
that from the point of view of navigability and accessibility 
their claim to Rosario Channel as the line of boundary was 
difficult to substantiate. They examined the utilitarian 
aspect of the problem, therefore, and arrived at the con­
clusion that, if they could secure rightful possession 6f 
the Island of San Juan, they might save their faces and 
at the same time strike a decisive blow for the safety of 
Vancouver Island about which the Colonial Office, in par­
ticular, was so much exercised. After the receipt of the 
report of Captain Richards in January, 1859, therefore, 
the ’Water-Boundary Question1 became for Great Britain the 
*San Juan Question.1
Mere considerations of the phraseology of 
treaties and the weighing of the pronouncements of states­
men became of minor significance when the naval and mil­
itary importance of the Island of San Juan fell into the 
balance. Both Governments were aware of the strategic 
position of the island and both attached to it an almost ex­
aggerated military value. It was becoming increasingly 
evident, as Canning had said, that nthe trade of the East 
was that most susceptible of advancement.tf Vancouver 
Island/
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Island, with its excellent harbours, and also the mainland 
in the region of the modern city of Vancouver, which even 
then promised to he the commercial centre of the North 
Pacific, were several hundred miles nearer the East than 
San Francisco.
The value of Vancouver Island was also well 
known. It has on all sides safe and commodious harbours; 
it is well surjplied with fresh water; it is covered with 
excellent timber; its splendid climate, with a warm, dry 
summer, short winter, and heavy dews to take the place of 
rain, make it an enviable possession. There is an abund­
ance of coal of first class quality, while salmon, cod, 
and herring abound in its waters. Gold had been found, 
and after the ’strike1 in the adjacent Fraser River area, 
the Island was likely to be rich in this respect too.
The key to the possession of this valuable 
island was the ’Kronstadt of the Pacific’ - San Juan - 
and therefore every effort must be made to retain it. It 
is not too much to state that it was this evaluation on the 
part of officials that gave the whole question of the bound­
ary west of the mainland the importance it ultimately 
achieved, and delayed settlement of a problem that might 
otherwise have been quite unobtrusively adjusted. The 
Joint Commission of Captain Prevost and Mr. Campbell had 
been foredoomed to failure because the principals on both 
sides had allowed their views to become coloured by their 
conception of the Island of San Juan as a military and 
naval stronghold.
Campbell in his researches had come upon the 
report of General Persifer F. Smith who had visited the 
region in 1849-50 and on his return had represented to 
the President the immense importance of the islands in the 
Haro Archipelago. He asserts that ’’these islands ^San Juan, 
Orcas/
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Orcas and Lopez J form a naval harbour that may be defended 
against any force if they are fortified as they may be, and 
the nation that disposes of them thus will absolutely command 
not only ^ueen Charlotte’s Sound but all those splendid har­
bours in our territory on the waters of Admiralty Inlet 
and Puget’s Sound, as well as those on the Straits of Juan 
de Fuca and the navigation of that inlet. These harbours 
are the best on the Pacific coast, for, with the timber 
that covers the hills bordering on them, and the coal in 
the adjacent territory as far south as Grey's Harbour, 
they possess the great advantage of a rise and fall of
tide of twenty-one feet, rendering the construction and
(1)
use of docks easy and cheap.”
In 1859 General Totten, Chief Engineer of the
United States' Army, was sent to the San Juan region to
report upon suitable naval and military sites there. In
his report to the War Department he confirmed the views of
the earlier experts, and expressed the opinion that possession
of San Juan was absolutely essential to the United States
to compensate for the loss of Vancouver Island. His expert
opinion became the adopted view of the American Government
which realised conclusively that without the San Juan group
of islands there could be no escape from the paralysis that
adverse naval predominance - predominance that Great Britain
consistently maintained in that area - would impose on all
(2 )
coasts and waters inside Cape Flattery. In short, only
by adopting the Haro Strait as line of boundary would the 
United States secure compensation for Britain's advantageous 
position./
1. Quoted by Campbell in a letter to General Cass, 25th 
September, 1858, in Sen. Ex. Doc. Ho. 29,_40th Cong.,
2nd Sess., I, 52. As early as 1855 Captain George 
Stoneman of the Dragoons and Lieutenant W.H.C. Whiting 
of the Engineers had reported in very similar terms to 
the United States’ Government.
2. Idem, p. 134.
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(1)
position*
The vehemence with which these views were ex­
pressed and the universality with which they were held by 
American experts justify the importance attached by the 
United States* Government to possession of San Juan* They 
of course had faith in the justice of their abstract claim 
to the Island, but realisation of its strategic value 
fortified them and made them unwilling to hear of compromise* 
Captain Prevost, on his part, had been deeply 
impressed by the Island's strategic position* He saw a 
menace to the safety of the whole region in the-rapidity 
with which Washington Territory was being settled and in 
the fast increasing interests of the United States in the 
Pacific* England must control Vancouver Island as a counter­
poise, and Prevost, as a naval expert, realised that 
possession of San Juan as a wall of defence lying in the 
line of direct communication between Vancouver Island and
British Columbia was essential to the peaceful occupation
(2)
of the naval base on Vancouver Island* The British
Government/
1* Sen* Ex* Doc. No. 8, 41st Cong*, 1st Sess., Vol* 1, 2.
The views of General Totten were subsequently adopted in 
toto by the United States' Board of Engineers who con­
cluded that "our sole and exclusive possession of Rosario 
Straits will be of no appreciable military value to us 
if Great Britain be allowed to possess the island of San 
Juan .*•••• The possessor of the south extremity of the 
island of San Juan can easily close the entrance to the 
President's Passage at will. By establishing a military 
and naval station at Griffin Bay, on the southeastern 
shore of San Juan Island, we shall be able to overlook 
those inner waters equally with Great Britain from 
Esquimalt harbour, and thus counterbalance the prepon­
derance she is seeking to establish* Excluded from this 
harbour we shall find no substitute for it, for no har­
bour of sufficient capacity for vessels of war is to be 
found east of this point short of Rosario Straits. A 
harbour in Rosario Strait will not enable us to overlook 
these inner waters equally with Great Britain." - Idem.
2* Prevost to Hammond, 13th April, 1858, in P.O. 5/810.
Prevost in turn had been influenced by Hudson's Bay Com­
pany reports placed before him by the Governor stressing 
the Island's strategic value. See Colonial Office to 
Foreign Office, 26th September, 1856f - P.O. 5/812.
Government at once adopted Prevost's opinion. It is to be
remembered that, in the middle of the 19th century at least,
Vancouver Island was potentially more valuable than the
mainland of British Columbia. To lose the islands lying
between Vancouver Island and the mainland meant for Great
Britain the loss of the only navigable channel for sailing
vessels, inasmuch as the navigation of this channel was
(1)
commanded by San Juan.
It was impressed upon the Government, therefore, 
that they would realise the aims of the different Government 
departments if they gained the middle channel as boundary 
and thus secured absolute possession of San Juan. They 
could justify their tacit surrender of the claim to Rosario 
Strait as line of boundary by officially endorsing the views 
of Lord Aberdeen and Mr. Pakenham and insisting, accordingly, 
that the negotiators of 1846 had meant the line of demarcation 
to divide equally between the two countries the whole area 
lying between the mainland and Vancouver Island. Richards's 
report had proved the existence of a navigable middle channel 
which, if it was not ideal from the mariner's point of view, 
was nevertheless a fair compromise line which by dividing 
the whole area into two approximately equal parts would 
surely be acceptable to the United States. What the Govern­
ment neglected to notice, however, was that the United States 
al^o were aware of San Juan's importance, and the Americans 
were not prepared to accept the islands east of the middle 
channel as adequate compensation for surrendering San Juan.
4. The British Offer of 1859-.
Lord Malmesbury was succeeded at the Foreign 
Office in June, 1859, by Lord John Russell, and the new 
Secretary/
1- Of the total population of British Columbia - 14,000 - 
fully two-thirds lived on Vancouver Island.
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Secretary soon got to grips with the Water-Boundary problem. 
He adopted the views of his predecessors as to the necessity 
for "honourable compromise" and, forgetting the tactical 
blunder inherent in the offer of a proposition which surrend­
ered, perhaps not positively, the line of the Rosario Strait, 
he suggested, after adumbrating the British arguments for 
Rosario, the middle channel as the boundary. At the same 
time he took the risk of completely alienating the United 
States by asserting that, no matter what the circumstances, 
Great Britain was determined to maintain her right to the 
Island of San Juan; whatever adjustment of the line of 
boundary might be effected, the United States must relinquish 
their claim to that island, Britain was prepared to give up 
Orcas and Lopez Islands, but she Insisted that all three 
channels in the region between Vancouver Island and the main­
land should remain free and open to both countries.
Apparently quite unaware that the United States 
also placed a high value upon San Juan, Lord John expressed 
himself as unable to believe that the Americans could refuse 
this attractive compromise offer. Before formulating it he 
was at some pains to have his proposition reviewed by Lord 
Palmerston, the Prime Minister, and the Duke of Newcastle, 
the Colonial Secretary, All agreed that, if the proposition 
were rejected, the only possible solution was arbitration, 
in which case Great Britain would fall back upon her claim
Cl)
to the line of the Rosario Strait,
It will be noted that Britain is continuing her 
former policy of being first to suggest a proposition in 
detail, though this offer of Lord John Russell simply re­
iterated the compromise plan presented by Captain Prevost^ 
nearly/
1, The despatch to Lord Iyons at Washington of 24th August, 
1859, containing the proposition appears in F.O* 5/813, 
For the line see the map in Appendix,
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nearly two years previously# Unfortunately, the offer was still 
not acceptable to the United States, and more unfortunately 
from a British point of view, the British Government could 
be sure that in future negotiations with that country the 
reserved British claim to the line of Rosario Strait would 
be ignored and the line of the middle channel would be 
adopted as a proposition to be whittled down# The Americans, 
in negotiating with England, always seemed to consider the 
offer of compromise as a sign of weakness, and the confidence 
with which they asserted and held their views increased in
(1)
direct proportion to the extent of the British concessions#
On the day that Lord John Russell sent off his
despatch to Lord Lyons another •Confidential1 despatch, *seen
by Lord Palmerston and the Queen, > was forwarded to Captain
Prevost, advising him of the new proposition, and declaring
his position as commissioner to be in abeyance pending the
(2)
development of the negotiations in Washington#
1, The Prevost plan was suggested before the Richards survey 
report was received because it was then officially believed, 
or at least hoped, that a middle channel would be found#
An incident illustrates this# Mr# Campbell, while at 
Washington in January, 1858, for the purpose of impressing 
upon his government the strategic importance of San Juan, 
had several discussions upon the Water-Boundary with Lord 
Napier, the British Ambassador# The latter suggested that, 
provided a middle channel were found, it might be accepted 
as an "amicable compromise," though the suggestion was 
made by Napier "without committing either my Government 
or myself , or any other person, to a renewal of it at 
any subsequent period should it not now be accepted#" See 
Campbell to Cass, 20th January, 1859. printed in Sen# Ex# 
Doc# No# 29, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess#, Vol. 1, p# 75#
2# 24th August, 1359, in F#0# 5/813#
CHAPTER V
THE CELEBRATED HARNEY INCIDENT
1# Trouble on San Juan#
We have seen how Britain was once more embarked 
upon a diplomatic method of settling the San Juan dispute, 
but before discovering the fate of Lord John Russell*s offer 
it is necessary to notice developments on the disputed Island, 
because shortly before the despatch of the offer a crisis 
had been precipitated on San Juan itself, and word of this 
was on its way to England while the new British proposition 
was being conveyed to the United States# Serious complications 
were produced by an episode of the type referred to by Lord 
Clarendon when he wrote: "The over-zeal and the over-desire
to make political capital without reflecting on the conse­
quences, of employees, have caused difficulties which put
the firmness and good faith of both governments to the test 
*(1)
• ••••• The attention of the world was for the first time
attracted to the Haro Archipelago by this incident which 
almost produced war between the United States and Great 
Britain# The incident, which revolved round the intervention 
of the American General Harney, has never satisfactorily been 
explained and has been variously interpreted#
The disputed Island had been occupied by the
Hud8on*s/
1# Clarendon to Buchanan, 13th October, 1869, *Works of 
James Buchanan,9 ?I, 333, London, I806-0Q#
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Hudson's Bay Company sine© December, 1853, while a number
of Americans had also found their way there • The Company
used the Island as a sheep-rearing centre and fishing
station* In 1854 along with other adjacent islands it was
organised as Whatcom County and treated by the Americans as
United States1 territory. Taxes were assessed regularly and
it was estimated in May, 1859, that the Company owed 935 dollars
as arrears of taxation. The Hudson1s Bay Company refused,
of course, to recognise any right in the American authorities
(1)
to tax their land*
An American citizen named Lyman Cutler landed
on San Juan in April. 1859. and proceeded to establish a 
(2)
fana there* Cta 15th June Cutler was unwise enough to
shoot a pig belonging to the Hudson's Bay Company because, 
so he alleged, it was destroying his crops* That same day 
Mr* A* G. Dallas, Director and President of the Council of 
the Company in America, landed from the Company's ship, 'Beaver,1 
accompanied by two other officials named Fraser and Tolmie*
On the following day Charles Griffin, resident Company repres­
entative on the Island since 1853, called upon Cutler* The 
latter was under the impression that the three colleagues of 
Griffin had come from Vancouver Island specifically to demand 
retribution from him; actually, according to Dallas, he and 
bis friends, who were visiting the Island of San Juan solely
I
for reasons of trade, owed their presence there on that par­
ticular day entirely to coincidence*
The/
1* See letter of H* R* Crosbie, temporary United States' 
magistrate on San Juan, to General Cass, July, 1859, in 
House Ex* Doc* Ho. 77, 36th Cong., 1st Sess*
He later swore that he owned 160 acres; but Mr* Dallas, 
ridiculing such a statement, said that Cutler merely had 
a small potato patch* See copy of Cutler's affidavit 
enclosed with Harney to Scott, 16th September, in F*0* 
5/816, and Dallas to Harney, 10th May, 1860, in same*
It is printed as enclosure to Ho* 27, Lyons to Cass, in 
Sen* Ex* Doc* Ho. 10, 36th Cong*, 1st Sess*, pp* 49-50*
The position of the Hudson's Bay Company on the 
north-west coast and, in particular, on San Juan and the other 
islands of the Archipelago was becoming delicate, and there is 
some justification, therefore, for the exasperation their 
agents must have felt* American squatters who sat down in 
the midst of sheep runs were overrunning territory which the 
Company had controlled for years, and while the boundary con­
troversy existed they were unable to do more than register 
mere formal protest* The Company had thousands of head of 
cattle and sheep on the Island of San Juan, and squatters 
were threatening their hard-won security* It is more than 
likely, then, that Dallasls attitude towards Cutler was the 
reverse of friendly* At any rate, Cutler resented his manner, 
and swore in an affidavit that Dallas had demanded a hundred 
dollars from him under penalty of arrest and trial in Vic­
toria* Dallas, on the other hand, denied all mention of 
money and threat of arrest. Cutler produced a revolver 
and threatened to shoot if an attempt were made to arrest 
him* The English thereupon left the Island*
In accordance with instructions from the Colonial 
Office, Major John de Courcy was taken to the Island on 27th
July and installed as resident British magistrate there. The
(I)
uext day he read his commission to the British settlers. 
Obviously, the position was dangerous and liable to develop 
rapidly*/
1* See Captain Michael de Courcy (spelled *Courcey1 in a 
number of despatches), senior naval officer at Vancouver 
Island, to Rear Admiral Baynes, Commander-in-Chief of 
the British forces in the Pacific, dated 5th August, 
copy enclosed in Baynes*s despatch to the Admiralty, 8th 
August, 1859, in P.O. 5/813. Harney states that there 
were 25 American families on San Juan, that is, about 
100 persons. Prevost speaks of 7 British inhabitants, 
and de Courcy corroborates. Harney's statement seems 
an undoubted exaggeration; there is certainly no in­
dication in the Foreign Office records of this adverse 
disproportion. H. R. Crosbie, who arrived on 29th July, 
found 29 actual settlers, while Pickett (infra) speaks 
of seeing less than 30 settlers. Douglas, who was well 
qualified to know, claimed that up to 1859 the® was only 
on© American on San Juan; in that year lfa few more1* came*
2* The Advent of General Harney*
Cutler had communicated his version of the
incident to American officials in Washington Territory,
with the result that General Harney, Commander-in-Chief
of the Pacific Division of the tfoited State®* Army, on
18th July ordered Captain G* E* Pickett to proceed from
Port Bellingham to San Juan Island with a force of soldiers*
He was instructed to protect the American citizens from
Indians and to stop "British interferenoe •w His small
initial force was to be increased until it eventually num-
(I)
bered from four to six companies* General Harney had 
consulted with Governor I* J. Stevens of Washington Terri­
tory upon the substance of a petition presented to Harney 
by American citizens on San Juan* The petition complained 
of attacks on their property by Indians and demanded mili­
tary protection* Stevens seems to have given his blessing 
to Harney's initial steps; indeed, his biographer conveys
the impression that Harney was acting upon the advice of
(2)
the Governor*
John de Courcy, the British magistrate, demanded 
to know by what right Pickett, who appeared on 27th July, 
had presumed to land* The American replied that the question 
*us not within his (de Courcy*s) rights but, since his 
reason was generally known, he had no objection to informing 
him that he was acting in accordance with Government orders* 
De Courcy replied that he was trespassing on British property, 
and/
1* Harney to Pickett, 18th July, 1859, letter No* 4, Sen* 
Ex* Doc* No. 10, 36th Cong*, 1st Sess., pp* 6-7* There 
were four military camps in the Pacific north-west* at 
Fort Vancouver, Fort Bellingham, Fort Steilacoom and 
Fort Townsend*
2* H* Stevens, 'Life of General Isaac I* Stevens,1 2 vols* 
particularly II, 292-3, New York, 1900*
and warned him off. Pickett's retort was to introduce 
Mr. H. R. Crosbie, the United States' stipendiary magistrate 
on the Island, who in his turn warned Major de Courcy
Cl)
against acting upon his instructions.
Governor Douglas was placed in a quandary 
because this occupation by Pickett on the advice of General 
Harney appeared to have Government sanction. He had directed 
his actions during the previous five years by the terms of 
the Colonial Office despatch of 21st September, 1854, ad­
vising him to treat the islands in the Haro Archipelago as 
British property, and later by the Marcy-Crampton arrange­
ment of 1855, which sanctioned joint occupation, but these 
did not comprehend the contingency that had just arisen. 
"Trusting that the exhibition of an overwhelming force 
might prevent resistance and probable effusion of blood," 
he asked Captain Michael de Courcy, senior naval officer 
in the region, for a powerful vessel to stop the American 
landing. Captain Hornby of the British ship, 'Tribune,' 
was sent immediately. He was instructed by Douglas to 
sail at once for San Juan with a body of marines to prevent 
the further landing of United States' troops, to erect 
military works, and to assist the civil power. He was to 
call upon Pickett and outline to him his instructions.
When Hornby called at the American camp, however, he was
unable to find Pickett, and he decided to take no steps to
(2)
prevent the landing before interviev/ing him.
On the 31st Douglas held a conference with
Captain/
1* De Courcy £o Douglas, 29th July, enclosed in Douglas 
to Colonial Office, 5th August, in F.O. 5/730.
2. Hornby to his wife, 31st July, 1859, in Mrs. Fred Eger ton, 
'Admiral Sir Geoffrey Phipps Hornby, p. 64, Edinburgh, 
1896.
Captain Richards of the Boundary Commission and Captain 
Michael de Courcy. The two naval officers were strongly 
against the employment of force against the American troops 
and advised milder measures. Douglas, while still of 
opinion that a display of force would best suit the cir­
cumstances, realised that it would be difficult for him to 
take any action without the cordial support of his naval 
allies* Accordingly, he agreed to modify his instructions 
to Hornby, revoking that part which commanded him to prevent 
the United States' forces from landing and to erect military 
works on San Juan* The British magistrate on the Island
was also instructed not to issue any process against the
(1)
troops on San Juan*
The Legislative Council of British Columbia 
was asked to approve the newly made decision and, with a 
single dissentient, did so on 1st August. The Council 
was prompted by different motives from those of the British 
naval officers. To the Council the evidence that the United 
States' occupation of San Juan was a federal move appeared 
overwhelming, but there were no reliable forces at hand to 
repel a federal action, for the great majority of the in­
habitants of British Columbia and Vancouver Island were 
Americans, and in the event of an outbreak there would be 
"insurrectionary and filibustering movements*ff The local 
militia could not be depended upon, and the British author­
ities could not hope to maintain sovereignty for more than
(2)
a short time.
On the same day the Governor issued a proclamation 
to the effect that "the sovereignty of the Island of San 
Juan/
1* Douglas to Colonial Office, 1st August, in F*0* 5/730* 
Captain de Courcy left for San Francisco on 5th August 
so that Hornby became senior naval officer in the region* 
2* Address of Legislative Cornell, 1st August, 1859, en­
closure in Douglas's despatch of same date to the Col­
onial Office in C.O. 305/11*
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Juan, and of the whole of the Haro Archipelago, has always 
been mdeviatingly claimed to he in the crown of Great
Juan
Britain ••••••
On 2nd August Governor Douglas instructed
Hornby to land troops on San Juan in order to sustain the 
British claim to the Island, for the purpose of maintaining 
the national honour, and for the protection of British
and frank communication” with Pickett. The delicacy of
Hornby*s position is obvious. The following day, accompanied
by Commissioners Prevost and Richards, he called upon Captain
Pickett. The deputation demanded to know if General Harney
was acting upon authority from Washington when he commanded
Pickett to occupy San Juan; they protested at the United
States* claim; they suggested joint military occupation
of the Island by British and American troops. Pickett1 s
answer was that, so far as he knew, Harney had acted upon
orders from superiors, and he refused to consent to a joint
occupation because his instructions did not provide for
(2)
that.
5. The Crisis Passes.
The interview between the two groups of officers 
seems to have been most friendly, and Homby had no hesi-
subjects• At the same time, Hornby was to enter into full
tation/
Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 16-17. No. 10, 36th
interview
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hesitation in deciding to disobey Douglas’® orders of the 
day before. He apparently felt that the honour of the flag 
was not at stake and that to have precipitated a war by 
landing marines would have been, in view of the overwhelming 
superiority of the British naval forces in that region, to 
give a distinct moral advantage to the United States. The 
British would have appeared as aggressors, ready to take 
■unfair advantage of temporary weakness, and would therefore 
have been successful only in m i  ting American public opinion 
against their cause. In view of the Foreign Secretary’s 
statement of the same month that Great Britain was not 
prepared to negotiate unless possession of San Juan was 
guaranteed to her, there could be no complaint if this 
arrogant proviso, following so soon a naval or military 
attack upon the Island Itself, were misconstrued.
It would be unfair to say that Governor Douglas
was actuated by other than patriotic motives, but it IS
right to note that he was exasperated at the Americans. He
had been a servant of the Hudsonfs Bay Company slnos boyhood
until he became Governor of Vancouver Island. The Company
had engaged in stem economic battle with the Americans on
the Pacific coast and had not, in Douglas’s ©pinion, been
satisfactorily compensated for losses sustained by virtue
of the terms of the Oregon Treaty of 1§4#. the type of 
American with whom he came in contact was not of the most
respectable, and he could be excused for looking upon the
American squatters with some thing very much like contempts
He understood how quickly that type would seise upon any 
concession or lack of vigour as evidence of weakness* Med 
he stopped to consider the situation calmly and in Iti
widest aspects, he must have seen the wisdom of Mornbyfg
deliberate failure to implement M s  instructions.* Mad these 
been/
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been acted upon, war would almost have been inevitable. 
Douglas did not desire war, though had hostilities been 
necessary to overawe the American force on the Island he 
would not have hesitated to commence them* Pickett’s words 
go to show that with the presence in the region of the pre­
dominant British naval force, he would have contented him­
self with a “most solemn protest" if a British army of
occupation had been dispatched; but, in his opinion, the
(1)
Island was "large enough for both of us*" Douglas
remained firmly of the opinion that the United States’
force would make no attempt to resist a British landing
(2)
on San Juan*
By refusing to imitate Harney’s warlike measures 
Bomby was acting in consonance with the pre-Harney agree­
ment that neither country was to exercise exclusive sover­
eignty in the disputed Archipelago* Harney’s action, whether 
or not inspired from Washington, was in itself indefensible, 
and to imitate it would have been to stoop to the level of 
a firebrand who did not pause to weigh the consequences of
his actions* Verbal protest, supported by an overwhelmingly
(3)
superior force, was a much more dignified manner of 
meeting/
1* Prevost to de Courcy, 5th August, enclosed in Admiralty 
to Foreign Office, 3rd October, in F*0* 5/730*
2* Douglas to the Colonial Office, No* 4, 22nd August, 1859, 
in C*0* 305/11* "•••••• vigorous measures on our part
would soon dispose of the question in our favour; a 
policy of national concession is always mischievous and 
in the case of these colonies dangerous*" Sir George 
Simpson, a keen judge of character, said of Douglas that 
he was "well qualified for any service requiring bodily 
exertion, firmness of mind and the exercise of sound 
judgment, but furiously violent when roused*" See D.
Mac Kay, "The Honourable Company,’ p* 219, London, 1937*
3* There were four British men-of-war in the vicinity of San 
Juan and Vancouver Island, and Admiral Baynes arrived on 
5th August on the ’Ganges’ to make the number five* See 
his despatch, Ho* .107, to the Admiralty, copy in F*0*
5/730* ^eps were taken at once to Increase this force, 
a first-class frigate and a vessel of the size of the ’Clio1 
being sent to the troubled area* See Foreign Office to 
Admiralty, 2nd October, 1859, in same*
meeting the situation, much more in keeping with the de­
tached deliberation expected of a responsible Government
(1)
official*
It must be remembered that the temper of the 
English inhabitants of British Columbia and Vancouver 
Island was inclined to be short* Among them the clamant 
cry was, "Why were not troops landed?" This also was the 
tenor of the debate and address of the Legislative Assembler, 
and the colony’s newspaper, ’The British Colonist,’ pub­
lished an editorial under this heading in its issue of 17th 
August*
Captain Hornby knew enough of western Americans 
to comprehend the possibility that the whole Harney demon­
stration was initiated without the cognisance of the United 
States’ Government; in other words, Americans sometimes 
acted like this to "get their names up*" Yet Pickett, 
evidently under genuine misapprehension, seems to have been 
at pains to assure Hornby that he was acting on instructions 
from Washington; "I have endeavoured to impress them with 
the idea that my authority comes directly through you from 
Washington," he informed Captain Pleasanton, the United 
States’ Adjutant-General in Oregon*
While Hornby debated the issues, General Harney 
was not inactive* To the Douglas protest he replied that 
he had sent Pickett to protect American citizens residing
1* Hornby to his wife, 5 th August, 1859, in Eger ton, op* 
eit*, p* 65* Hornby’s tactful policy was subsequently 
ratified by the Government, Douglas being told that he 
had acted wisely in refraining from sending a force to 
San Juan* See Colonial Office to Douglas, 30th September* 
According to Hornby peace was preserved owing "to my 
good judgment in not following the Governor’s instruct­
ions • ••••• " See Hornby to his wife, 1st November, in 
Egerton, p*65* This is corroborated by two other actual 
witnesses, viz*, D* G* B* Macdonald, attached to the 
Government survey staff of British Columbia, in his 
’Sritish Columbia and Vancouver Island,' London, 1862, 
and Matthew Macfie, ’Vancouver Island and British Col­
umbia,’ p* 31, London, 1865*
on the Island from the insults and indignities which the 
British authorities and the Hudson*s Bay Company1 s officials 
had recently offered them by sending a British warship from 
Vancouver Island to convey the "chief factor" of the Com­
pany to San Juan for the purpose of seizing an American
and transporting him by force to Vancouver Island to be
(1)
tried by British laws.
^his explanation furnished to the British
authorities was followed next day (7th August) by one to
the United States* Adjutant-General. An account of the
origin of the dispute is given, this time stress being
laid upon the fictitious threat of the Company to turn the
Indians upon the innocent American settlers, an old canard
that could always be relied upon to rouse the Americans.
Mention is also made of the "overbearing, insulting, and
aggressive conduct" of the British executive officers. In
conclusion, the Adjutant-General is reminded that it would
be well for the British Government to know that the American
people of the Pacific coast will never sanction any claim
the British may assert to any other island on Puget Sound
(2)
than Vancouver Island.
Although the affair had not progressed exactly 
as Harney had intended, the tactful, dilatory policy of 
Captain Hornby being calculated to offset and nullify the 
General*s plans, he nevertheless remained ■undaunted. Con­
sequently, he decided to increase his numbers on San Juan, 
and he followed up his explanatory letter to the British 
authorities and his apologia to his superiors in Washington 
by ordering Colonel Silas Casty to proceed from Port Steil- 
acoom/
1. Harney to Douglas, Enclosure 5 in Baynes to Admiralty, 
Mo. 110, 12th August, in Bgerton.
2# Copy enclosed in Lyons to Foreign Office, Mo. 74, 28th 
February, 1860, in F#0. 6/815.
Steilacoom to San Juan with reinforcements, Casey duly
arrived with nearly 200 men, and at once sent for Hornby*
Not satisfied with that, he determined to go straight to
the chief authority and on the following day made the twenty-
five miles journey to Esquimalt for the purpose of discussing
matters with Rear Admiral Baynes who commanded the British
Fleet in the Pacific Ocean* Baynes, however, recognising
the fact that Casey was a subordinate officer, declined
(1)
the invitation to visit the American*
Douglas*s answer to Barney *s new moves, and 
more directly to Barney^ explanatory letter to him was 
his very clever and temperate letter of 13th August* The 
letter begins with a courteous, if slightly sarcastic, ex­
pression of thanks for Harneyfs wfrank and straightforward 
manner11 of explaining why his troops had occupied San Juan*
An unhesitating and unqualified denial of the facts outlined 
by Harney is given, for no British ship had ever been sent 
to convey the chief factor or any officer of the Hudson^
Bay Company to San Juan for the purpose of seizing an Amer­
ican citizen* If he has acted illegally, the Governor 
reminds Harney that all his actions have been in accord
with Secretary Marcy's letter to Governor Stevens of July,
(2)
1855* If Jie has overstepped the bounds laid down in 
that letter, surely, insists Douglas, the most sensible 
step for Harney to take would have been to communicate 
with M w  and to seek redress before making the precipitate 
and extreme move of military occupation* Harney had very 
recently - on 18th July - seen him personally in Victoria, 
when/
1* Baynes to Admiralty, 12th August, 1859, No. 110, in 
F.0* 5/730. A copy of Casey* s note to Baynes is en­
closed; a copy also appears as enclosure to Sen* Ex* 
Doc. No* 10, 36th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 16-17*
2. Supra, p. 11.
when he did not even mention the Cutler incident* Con­
cluding, the Governor feels that the first essential to 
resumption of the status quo is the withdrawal of the 
American force from San Juan*
Harney took no notice of the letter, and the 
Americans continued with the erection of military works 
on the Island with the result that by the middle of August 
they had a formidable fort manned by over 400 men together 
with a considerable number of artificers and labourers*
In Douglas these preparations excited an overpowering impulse
to retaliate, and he can be forgiven for his attitude ex-
(1)
pressed by the words, I told you so* The manner in 
which the Ohited States were strengthening their position 
daily must have created doubts and, misgivings in British 
official circles, for it would obviously be a difficult 
matter to dislodge them from the Island once they were 
firmly established there* On the other hand, the occupation 
of San Juan was in British eyes quite an illegal act, 
and their confident hope that justice and common sense 
would prevail convinced the Colonial Office that there was 
no need for alarm* The Government*s course was clear; they 
must approve, and share the responsibility for, the policy 
adopted/
1* He seems never to have changed his original opinion 
and wrote home on 22nd August, WI confess with regret 
that my views differ essentially from those expressed 
by hear Admiral Baynes •••«•• I feel assured that a 
bold and resolute stand, as I proposed in the first 
instance, would have nipped in the bud the project, 
increased the influence and dignity of this Government, 
and prevented collisions which a policy of concession 
may precipitate*n See Douglas to Colonial Office, 22nd 
August, in F*0* 5/815*
2* British subjects had been warned that if they settled 
on San Juan they did so at their own risk* The Company 
had been given, by their charter in 1849, the exclusive 
right to sell land "at a reasonable figure" in Vancouver 
Island and the adjacent islands* Ho British subjects 
other than Company servants ever settled in this area; 
a despatch to Douglas by the Colonial Secretary, Sir*
V* Molesworth, dated 13th August, 1855, distinctly dis­
avowed on the part of Great Britain any intention to 
sanction the colonisation of the area*
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adopted by Baynes and Hornby, regardless of Its wisdom.
If the British forces had been inferior, Douglas*s advice 
mast have been followed to save the national honour; the 
British force being greatly superior, the British line of 
action was what the Colonial Secretary termed "one 0£ for­
bearance, not timidity#" It is to be remembered that the 
disproportion of forces in the region of San Juan was still 
very considerable# There were 5 British men-of-war with
1.940 men and 167 cannon, as against 5 American companies
(1)
with 461 men and 17 cannon#
4# Government Intervention#
Douglas, in an attempt to enlist the aid of 
an additional powerful agency, wrote to Lord Lyons, British 
Ambassador in Washington, tracing the origin and development 
of the whole Harney incident# Lyons, receiving the letter 
on 3rd September, acted with alacrity# He telegraphed the 
details home, and personally broached the matter that day 
to General Cass, the United States1 Secretary of State# Cass 
assured the Ambassador that he had heard nothing of Harney1 s 
attack on San Juan# To Lyons*s subsequent suggestion that 
Cass should send a positive injunction to the American 
troops to cause no trouble on the Island the Secretary 
retorted that Harney?s seizure did not affect in any way 
the diplomatic progress of the settlement of the dispute, 
inasmuch as he was prepared to guarantee the immediate 
evacuation of the United States* troops if the Island were 
awarded to Great Britain# Lyons was particularly careful 
to avoid raising any collateral point of debate which might 
have/
1# Sen# Ex# Doc# Eo# 10, 36th Cong#, 1st Sess#, p# 29#
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have added to the difficulty of inducing the United States* 
Government to replace matters at the Island of San Juan on
(1
the footing which had been so disturbed by General Harney.
Hifhile Cass*s reply, to Lord Lyons does not appear 
too reassuring, it is to be noted that the Secretary acted 
with despatch in silencing Harney. On the very day of 
Lyons*s protest Cass wrote to the General intimating that 
"the President was not prepared to learn that you had ordered 
military possession to be taken of the Island of San Juan 
or Bellevue. Although he believes the Strait of Haro to 
be the true boundary he had not anticipated that
so decided a step would have been resorted to without in­
structions." In addition, Harney was instructed to inform
the British officials on San Juan that he had not been
(2)
attempting to prejudge the question.
A fortnight later the United States' Government 
showed how seriously they viewed the situation by sending 
orders through the War Department to General Winfield Scott, 
Commander-in-Chief of the United States* Army, to take per­
sonal command of the situation on San Juan. The letter of 
instructions to Scott reviews the whole controversy and at 
the outset advises him that much will be left to his own 
discretion. He is reminded that the President s main object 
is to preserve the peace and prevent collision until the 
question of title can be adjusted by the two Governments.
The President abhors the possibility of the two nations 
being thrown into war over the possession of a small island. 
Only in the remotely possible event of Great Britain's 
seizing/
1. Lyons to Lord John Russtll, Ho. 189, 13th September, 
and 3rd October, 1859, in P.O. 5/814.
2. Secretary of War to Harney, 3rd September, printed as 
Letter 15, Sen. Ex. Doc. Ho. 10, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 
This despatch was shown to Lord Lyons before being for­
warded* see P.O. 5/715.
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seizing and occupying the Island would it be necessary to
(1)
defend the national honour by an appeal to arms.
General Scott arrived at Port Vancouver on 
20th October, 1859, and soon got into communication with 
Governor Douglas, on the 25th he suggested the establish­
ment of a joint military occupation of San Juan, but Douglas 
in a friendly note declined, suggesting in turn that there 
be a joint civil occupation, the existing resident magistrates 
to be furnished with assistants. Scott soon found himself 
unable to subscribe to Douglas's plan and, insisting upon 
his own proposal, he enclosed a project of settlement 
whereby the two countries should agree to joint military 
occupation with 100 men each. Douglas found such an arrange­
ment incompatible with his instructions, and informed Scott
that- pending further advice from home, he would be unable
(2)
to proceed with the negotiations.
Both Douglas and Scott had perfectly sound 
reasons for their respective positions. If joint civil 
occupation were established, the status quo would thus be 
resumed and the incident would be closing with complete 
American surrender; the evacuation of their troops would 
be tantamount to public repudiation by the United States 
of Harney's actions and would be most humiliating. Scott 
realised, too, that San Juan came within the jurisdiction
1. Tfer' Department to Scott, 16th September, 1859, printed 
in Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 10, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. pp. 161-2. 
The basis of the ins truetions to Scott was, so Cass 
assured Lyons, Marcy's letter of 14th July, 1855, (supra, 
p. 11). See Lyons's cipher despatch of 15th September, 
1859, in P.O. 5/813.
2. Copies of the Douglas-Scott correspondence appear as 
enclosures in Douglas's despatch to the Colonial Office 
of 19th November, 1859, in P.O. 5/915. They are:
Scott to Douglas, 25th October;
Douglas to Scott, 29th October;
Scott to Douglas, 2nd November;
Douglas to Scott, 3rd November.
See also enclosures to Letter &<>. 23, Sen.Ex. Doc., 
idem, pp. 59-75.
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of Washington Territory, not yet constituted a state but 
possessing considerable independence of the federal Govern­
ment, and to withdraw the federal forces would be to risk 
leaving the future in the hands of irresponsible demagogues 
and notoriety-seeking military officers. Vancouver Island 
stood in somewhat the same position with respect to Great 
Britain. The colonial Government, answering in parallel 
to a territorial body in the United States, had not acted 
imprudently in the recent controversy, but this was because 
the Governor acted upon the advice of the Legislative Council 
and ignored that of the Legislative Assembly who shouted 
"Why were troops not landed?" Nor was there any guarantee 
that in the absence of pacific men cognisant of the larger 
issues threatened - men like Hornby and Baynes, whose presence 
during the progress of the Harney affair had been more or 
less accidental - the flrebsands of British Columbia and the 
men with private axes to grind would remain in the back­
ground.
The best arrahgement would perhaps have been to 
set aside both military and civil occupation and to leave 
the Island unoccupied by both countries until the question 
of title was settled. Scott's mission was, by his very 
appointment, sufficient repudiation of Harney, who was, after 
all, an accredited Tfolted States' official. T0 the American 
public, too, withdrawal of all troops from the disputed 
area might have seemed absolute submission to British 
dictation.
Britain could be completely satisfied with 
joint military occupation because the Americans, by peace­
fully accepting the arrival of British troops, would be 
admitting their denial of any claim to exclusive juris­
diction/
diction. Furthermore, since Scott was instructed to act 
upon the terms of the Marcy letter of July, 1855, there 
was adequate guarantee that the United States' Government 
were not claiming exclusive sovereignty. The British Gov­
ernment, therefore, as soon as they learned from Lyons of 
the impasse on San Juan, decided to advise Governor Douglas 
to concert with General Scott, and to act upon any proposition 
he might make for joint occupation of the Island, each to 
place the same number of troops there. A despatch with
(1)
these instructions was forwarded by the Colonial Office.
Meantime General Scott had sought to remove
from the scene a more concrete cause of British annoyance.
On 15th November he intimated to General Hawney that "it
might be a great relief to the President to find you, by
(2)
your own act, no longer in that command." Harney, however, 
refused to accept the proffered command of the Department 
of the West, professing his belief that Scott was acting 
wholly on his own responsibility, and not under Government 
instructions •
(3)
Ultimately, on 21st March, 1860, 100 British
troops under Captain Bazalgette were landed on San Juan, 
talcing possession of the southern end of the Island opposite 
to that occupied by 100 United States* troops under Captain 
Hunt, an officer "remarkable for firmness, discretion and 
courtesy."/
1. Dated 16th November, 1859; copy enclosed in a Colonial 
Office letter to the Foreign Office dated 24th November; 
Douglas recWLved the despatch on 26th January, 1860. He 
and Baynes decided not to carry out the instructions 
until they had heard something of the progress of the San 
Juan negotiations in Washington. Besides, the absence
of Scott retarded their progress.
2. Sen. 3x. Doc. N0. 10, Letter No. 230, 36th Cong., 1st 
Bess.
3. Admiral Baynes says the 21st. See his despatch to the 
Admiralty of 28th March, 1860, in P.O. 5/815. Scott, 
on the other hand, in his letter of 16th May to the 
Secretary of War says 20th March.
court© sy." Bazelgette's instructions forbade him to inter­
fere in any way with American citizens on San Juan; he was 
to recognise American and British subjects as possessing
equal rights; he was to keep in frank and open communication
(1)
with Captain Hunt#
5# The Re-appearance of Harney#
General Harney, though thus unceremoniously 
thrust into the background, did not remain there long#
The limelight exerted a too powerful influence over him 
and this time his love of notoriety proved fatal to the 
success of his career# His action in 1859 had very nearly 
precipitated war, but his success as a chauvinist was de­
pendent upon British ignorance of his true character and 
an erroneous tendency to give undue importance to his 
status# His efforts in 1860, therefore, did not prove 
so formidable#
On 10th April, 1860, Harney instructed CaptAin 
Pickett to return to San Juan in place of Captain Hunt, 
and to resist any British attempt to deny the authority 
of Washington Territory over the Island# Pickett duly 
landed on San Juan on the last day of the month, Hunt 
returning to Washington Territory# Pickett's first act 
to send a copy of his instructions to Captain Bazelgette#
The advice to treat San Juan as part of Washington Territory 
was wholly inconsistent with Scott's arrangements for joint 
occupation/
1« Baynes to Admiralty, 28th March, 1860, in F#0# 5/815. 
Approval of these instructions by the Foreign Secretary 
was intimated on 17th May, 1860.
2. Copy enclosed in Lyons to Russell, No. 204, 7th June, 
in F.0. 5/815. The gist of Harney's advice is that 
Scott, who had gone to Washington on 11th November, had 
left no orders to grant a joint military occup&tion. 
Scott had made the offer, but Great Britain declining 
it (which was untrue), the transaction was concluded.
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occupation, and Bazelgette, as soon as he saw its significance,
hastened to report the facts to Admiral Baynes. The latter
deemed it speedier to achieve something by acting through
Washington, and he accordingly communicated the details to
Lord Lyons there. The Ambassador demanded that General Cass,
the United States Secretary of State, should take immediate
measures to avoid a clash. Cass, seriously perturhed and
furiously angry, undertook to give a written answer completely
satisfactory to Her Majesty’s Government. He assured Lyons
that his Government absolutely rejected and disavowed
(1 )
General Harney.
When Governor Douglas heard of the extraordinary
nature of Harney's latest instructions, he concluded, and
wrote home to the effect that, till the question of title
was settled, 'the best move would be to draw up a convention
and to withdraw the civil magistrates of both sides, as no
civil jurisdiction could properly exist within the region
(2)
so long as its possession remained in dispute. This
advice had not reached London when the Foreign Secretary, 
acting immediately upon receiving news of the new contre­
temps, instructed Lord Lyons to make a convention with 
General Cass in the sense of General Scott's proposition, 
that is, a temporary and provisional arrangement with
magistrates withdrawn or with defined limits of juris­
ts)
diction. Douglas was duly informed of this development,
and he and Scott proceeded to provide for joint military 
occupation of San Juan.
The United States' Government were obviously
alarmed/
— — ■! I — — — — . -V
1* Lyons to Russell, No. 204, in F.O. 5/815.
2. Douglas to Newcastle, No. 24, 7th May, 1860, in same.
3. Russell to Lyons, 20th July, 1860, 'Seen by Lord Palm­
erston and the Q,ueen,' in same.
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alarmed at Barney1s latest outbreak and on 8th June, 1860, 
he was summarily recalled and ordered to report in Wash­
ington. *nd so faded from the scene, in not very graceful 
fashion, the individual who had almost succeeded in making 
possession of the apparently unimportant little Island of 
San Juan the cause of a war between two great nations.
6. Review and Significance of the Harney Incident.
Harneyfs actions and motives throughout had
been most questionable. He had not hesitated to lie in
order to strengthen his case, and his letters to subordin-
ates and to Douglas had bfeen full of discrepancies and
misstatements. He had sought to strengthen his hand by
inducing others to believe that his instructions originated
(1)
with his superiors in Washington. It was quite untrue 
that A. G. Dallas had been taken to San Juan on a British 
man-of-wir for, as Harney well knew, Dallas was not a 
Government official and therefore had no right to use a 
Government vessel. In order to Improve his position,
Harney made it appear that Dallas was C^ief Factor of the 
hated Hudson's Bay Company; this again was false. His 
attempt to excite American indignation by alleging that 
the Company had united and incited the Indians to attack 
the Americans on the Island, resuscitation of an old canard 
which had been thoroughly exposed, is another example of 
his lack of scruple. It was ridiculous, surely, to expect 
anyone to credit the necessity of sending several hundred 
soldiers/
1. Hornby to Douglas, 4th August, 1859, in P.O. 5/730.
Campbell, the United States' boundary Commissioner, for 
instance, was convinced until 14th August that Harney was 
acting on instructions from Washington. See his letter to 
Harney of that date in Sen. Ex. Docs. 1316, 29.
soldiers to protect a few Americans on a small island.
It has been suggested that the incident of 
1859-60 was used by Harney, Governor Stevens, and Pickett 
with a view to precipitating a war between the United 
States and Great Britain in the hope that such a war would 
rally to the American flag, and unite in battle, the sections 
that could not agree on the issue of slavery. It was be­
lieved that "the first British gun that should launch its 
thunder against the Pacific Coast would echo and re-echo
across the continent and send its reverberations to the
(1)
remotest limits, North, South, East and West.” There 
seems to be more than a grain of truth in the suggestion 
that Harney's southern sympathies made him a war-monger, 
and it is significant that he initiated the whole affair 
shortly after word came to the Pacific of the war in Italy.
The chaos of the Crimean War and the recrimination that 
followed it had lowered British prestige which was un­
fortunately not improved later by the Indian Mutiny. The 
year 1858 seemed certain to find England Involved in a 
continental war, and many outsiders, Harney among them, 
thought she would find it impossible to keep out of the 
war in Italy. Harney wrote to his superiors on 19th July, 
1859, describing San Juan, pointing out its extreme mili­
tary importance - "it is as important to the Pacific States 
as Cuba is to those on the Atlantic” - and mentioning the 
citizens' petition.
The Harney incident, though signally failing 
in its purpose, left bitterness and suspicion in its wake 
and, as long as the condition of United States' politics 
allowed men like General Harney to act on their own initiative 
in/
1. L. 0. Pickett, 'Pickett and His Men,' pp. 125-24.
Atlanta, 1899.
in matters of international concern, there was real danger 
to San Juan and Vancouver Island and British Columbia. The 
views of the British inhabitants of the region were coloured 
by their attachment, present or past, to the Hudson's Bay 
Company, which had for some time been at loggerheads with 
the United States' authorities in the West* The Company's 
agents could never forget that the whole area had once been 
their free locus operand! and to many of them, notably those 
of the older generation, the Americans were no more thah 
interlopers* The temper of such individuals was as short 
as their memory was long. These British inhabitants of 
British Columbia had urged Governor Douglas to meet force 
with force, and it was a great disappointment to them that 
troops were not used to resist the American occupation of 
San Juan.
There was a large American population in British 
Columbia, in some of the adjacent islands, and more partic­
ularly in the neighbouring part of the United States. This 
population was very mixed and included a large number of 
fugitives from justice who were ready for any opportunity 
to attack the civil power. The militia of British Columbia 
was insufficient to cope with this large body of Americans 
and, ultimately, to offset the influence of these people 
and in order to be prepared for the possible arrival on the 
scene of another Harney, the War Office, at the instigation 
of Lord John Russell, released a battalion of troops from 
China early in 1861 for service in British Columbia.
The Hudson's Bay Company's connection with the 
Harney incident was an indirect one. The Company had no 
right to give grants of land on San Juan, and their attempts 
first to sell the land and later to give it away were 
illegal/
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illegql and contrary to the British Government's specific
instructions* Their agents had done everything possible
to discourage American squatters and, by doing so, they
were, perhaps negatively, exercising exclusive sovereignty,
which they had no right to do while the title to the Archipelago
was in dispute* At the same time it must be remembered that
the Company suffered from the erratic nature of Government
policy* They were instructed to send settlers to San Juan
in 1853 and to treat the Island as a British possession, and
less than two years later they were informed that the title
to the Island was in dispute, and they must thei^ore make no
(1)
grants of land there. The Company's direct connection
with the Harney episode was an innocent one. Their very 
presence in Oregon and British Columbia was obnoxious to 
super-patriots like General Harney, and the latter's attempt 
to identify the Company with Indian attacks was an astute, 
though totally unworthy, move to secure support for his 
action in sending troops to the Island.
1. This was made abundantly clear later, in 1862, when
certain British, settlers wanted to buy land on San Juan 
from the British Government. The Government informed 
them that they could not sell the land, nor would they 
permit them to settle there even at their own risk.
CHAPTER VI
DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS 1859-61
1. The United States Reject the Offer of August. 1859#
%
The terms of Lord John Russell's San Juan
boundary compromise proposal of August, 1859, have already
(1)
been noted# On 12th November the answer of the United 
States' Government was communicated by the American Ambass­
ador, Mr# Dallas, to Lord John# The Americans, therefore, 
had had plenty of time to consider the terms of their 
answer; moreover, they were able to have before them the 
correspondence incidental to the Harney affair as well as 
the terms of the Scott-Douglas agreement#
Secretary Cass commences his reply with an 
assurance of the President's keen desire for settlement 
of the problem, but follows up with what seems to be a 
justifiable objection to the Foreign Secretary's declaration 
that the British Government are already determined, under 
any circumstances whatsoever, to maintain their right to 
the Island of San Juan; on that they are determined to 
accept no compromise# "if this declaration is to be 
Insisted on, it must terminate the negotiation at its 
very threshold, because this Government can permit itself 
to enter into no discussion with that of Great Britain, or 
any other power, except upon terms of perfect equality ••• 
... * Cass feels sure that Great Britain will withdraw or 
explain/
1* Lyons communicated the proposal of 24th August to Cass 
on 12th September# Supra, p# 30.
explain the offensive statement* After recapitulating
old arguments, Cass goes on to argue that even Sir Richard
Pakonham, one of the negotiators of the Oregon Treaty, says
that neither Rosario nor Haro Channel was intended in 1846.
How, then, can Britain maintain that Rosario Channel alone
was intended? She is prepared to accept the middle channel
which Lord John admits to be inferior, but this is because
the British Government need San Juan which they deem to be
of no value to the United States. Cass denies the latter
contention, and, while admitting that both Great Britain
and the United States made concessions in 1842 and again
in 1846, he cannot agree that there is in the present case
(i)
any need for a policy of mutual convenience*
This note of General Gass became the subject
of "serious consideration" by Her Majesty's Government and,
pending preparation of a complete answer, Lyons was Instructed
to remove from the President % mind the unfavourable impression
created by the Russell despatch. When the meaning of a
treaty is clearly in favour of a certain interpretation,
argues the Foreign Secretary not very convincingly, but the
interests at stake are unimportant,, a point may willingly
be yielded for the sake of peace. When the Interests are
high and the meaning is clear, however, concession cannot
(2)
be expected.
The complete British answer was finally composed 
and sent to the American Secretary. It starts off by 
hastening to assure the United States' Government that 
the proposition of the previous August had been forwarded 
many days before the Foreign Office received news of the 
Harney/
1. F.O. 5/814; also printed in Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 10,
56th Gong., 1st Sess., pp. 231-240.
2. Foreign Office to Lyons, 29th November, 1859, in 
F.O. 5/814.
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Harney intervention* Had the Government been aware of the
proceedings at San Juan, they could not have acted upon
their intention to propose a friendly compromise of the
question until an assurance had been given that the actions
of General Harney were not approved* The nature of the
instructions to General Scott, however, makes it possible
for Great Britain to continue negotiations*
Qnee again the old contentions are set forth
and expounded, though the Foreign Secretary also manages
to introduce one or two new arguments* Briefly, the burden
of the British argument is that the expressed intention of
contemporary negotiators is as strong for the British as
for the American position* But, once again, Great Britain
appeals more particularly to the actual words of the Treaty
of 1846 which stipulate that the boundary line is to run
along the "middle of the said channel;11 and "when you say
along the middle of the road you do not mean one side of
the road*" The object of the Treaty was not to enable
vessels to reach the Pacific Ocean by the shortest routs;
that object is provided for by the other part of the Article
which provides that the navigation of the "whole of the
said channel and straits south of the 49th parallel shall
remain free and open to both parties*"
If the United States are awarded San Juan they
will control both Rosario and Haro Channels* San Juan is,
therefore, a defensive position if in the hands of Great
Britain; but it is an aggressive position if in the hands
of the United States* The latter may fairly be called upon
to renounce aggression; but Great Britain can hardly be
(1)
expected to abandon defence*
Cass/
1* H*0* 5/814; "Confidential*"
Cass found this reply unsatisfactory, and in
his answer of 4th February, 1860, forwarded to Mr* Dallas
for transmission to the British Government, he protested
that Lord John had not withdrawn his demand that Great
Britain must have the Island of San Juan* Since he has
abandoned the claim to Rosario Channel for that of the
middle channel, the issue is narrowed to possession of
the island, and to declare that it will not be ceded is
to end discussion peremptorily* In any case, thinks the
American Secretary of State, England has attached too great
importance to this Island. She has overrated its military
value; it does not command Haro Strait; no fortifications
erected upon the coast of the channel can ever control its
navigation* (Here Cass^ arguments are directly counter to
the views of the experts, American and British)* To conclude,
since Great Britain insists upon retaining San Juan, there
is no need for further discussion and the President can
(1)
only decline to continue negotiations*
The Foreign Secretary, on receipt of this snub,
hastened to assure the United States• Government that they
had entirely misconceived the purport of his declaration
about San Juan* Britain had proposed compromise without
prejudice to her claim to Rosario Channel as boundary* In
effect, she maintained that either Rosario Channel or the
middle channel answers the terms of the Treaty, but never
(2)
Haro Channel* This apology proved acceptable to the
United States, and they now declared their willingness to
(3)
proceed with negotiations*
Accordingly,/
1* F*0* 5/815; also printed as Letter No* 20 in Sen*Ex*
Doc. Ho. 10, 36th Cong*, 1st Sess*
2* Russell to Lyons, No* 63, "Seen by Lord Palmerston,"
9th March, I860, in same*
3* Lyons to foreign Office, No* 126, 2nd April, 1860, in
F*0* 5/815*
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Accordingly, General Cass forwarded to London, 
still another despatch on the San Juan controversy# Hq 
saw, and reminded Dallas, how the British position was 
weakened by their proposing the middle channel as the line 
of demarcation# In August Lord John Russell had demanded 
Bosario Channel as the line, but in substantiation of his 
claim he had quoted Lord Aberdeen and Sir Richard Pakenham, 
both of whom were firm in their conviction that they had 
meant in 1846 to establish a line midway along the whole 
space intervening between the mainland and Vancouver Island# 
Yet in December Lord John had plumped for the middle channel, 
that is, for the channel of Aberdeen and Pakenham# To 
increase the confusion, the Foreign Secretary had in March, 
1860, declared his readiness to accept either Rosario or 
the middle channel# In other words, said Cass, he had 
proposed three different lines, omitting one only - Haro 
Channel - which Benton, McLane and Buchanan had mentioned 
so specifically# ”©16 whole subject in question,” concludes 
the Secretary of State, ”is the Island of San Juan •••#•• and 
a proposal which gives the Island to Great Britain is a pro­
posal to surrender the whole American claim, and not^ in any 
sense of the term, a proposition for compromise•“
2# A Threatened Impasse#
Cass's letter left little to say on either side 
yet the summer of 1860 seemed most propitious for a settle­
ment of the San Juan controversy for, after Villafranca, 
Great/
1* Cass to Dallas, No# 252, 23rd April, 1860, communicated 
to Lord John Russell by Mr# Dallas on May 10, copy in 
F#0. 5/815; also printed in Sen# Ex. Doc. cit# pp# 57-w#
Great Britain had her hands free, and there was nothing, in 
foreign or domestic politics to suggest that she might he 
involved in war. Conditions in the United States also 
were propitious for a settlement. The Presidential election 
campaign was under way and, almost for the first time in 
history, no party sought to make political capital by 
stirring up Anglo-American hatreds. The peaceful settle­
ment of the Central American controversy, a quiet Canadian 
border after reciprocity, and the surrender of British 
maritime claims had all helped to smooth ruffled feelings 
sind to produce the calm necessary for successful negotiations. 
The failure, of General Harney to precipitate a rupture was 
an excellent augury, while the approaching visit of the 
Prince of Wales to Washington at the invitation of the
President was bound to foster amity between the two
(1 )
peoples.
The British Government felt that their San Juan 
offer of 1859 had been modest and reasonable, and they 
seemed to be surprised at the United States1 rejection of 
their line of compromise. They realised too late that by 
suggesting this line they had weakened their case, for 
the Americans could be expected to use the compromise 
offer as the basis of all subsequent negotiations. The 
rejection of the British offer made it very difficult 
to know what new proposition ought to be put forward.
Neither country favoured the principle of arbitration 
in/
1. 'The Cambridge History of Foreign Policy,1 p. 282,
London, 1923. For an account of the diplomacy of the 
Central American dispute see S. F. Bemis (editor),
'The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy,* 
VI, New York, 1927. For a discussion of Canadian - 
American relations at this time see L.B. Shippee,
1 Canadian-American Relations,' Toronto, 1939.
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in the present case, and even if a third power were 
appealed to, upon what was it to arbitrate? The two 
countries could hardly ask an outsider to decide the 
meaning of words their representatives had jointly com­
posed# It would surely be ironic if Great Britain and 
the United States had to call upon a third power to tell 
them what they had meant in 1846# Yet the attempt to 
settle the question by commissioners had failed completely 
and absolutely. The Foreign Office was fully aware that 
the words of the Treaty of 1846 were the British vantage- 
ground, while the American argument rested mainly upon 
contemporaneous evidence# To lose sight of the Treaty 
was to lose San Juan# The deliberations of the British 
Government reduced themselves, therefore, to the single 
question as to whether it would be wise for Great Britain, 
as a last resort,to be rid of a troublesome dispute and to 
end their "nervousness” about their troops on the Island 
of San Juan, to suggest arbitration#
Arguments had been pretty well exhausted on 
both sides and, while it was true that the Americans had 
written last and an answer to them was necessary, the United 
States had made no new proposition counter to the British 
offer of December, 1859, an offer which the Foreign Secretary 
considered the last word in compromise# Undoubtedly, there­
fore, it rested with the Americans to make an offer# Great 
Britain was not disposed to propose arbitration, but the 
rather hoped the United States would suggest it#
5# Britain Again Initiates Negotiations#
Ultimately, when it had become obvious that 
the United States were determined to make no suggestions 
to end the dispute, the British Government on 22nd November, 
1860,/
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1860, decided to instruct Lord Lyons to propose arbitration
to the United States' Government* The subject matter of
the arbitration was to be the true meaning of the words
of the Treaty of 1846, or, "if the precise line intended
cannot be ascertained, is there any line which will furnish
an equitable solution of the difficulty, and is the nearest
approximation that can be made to an accurate construction
of the words of the Treaty?" For arbitrator the United
States might choose the King of Norway and Sweden or the
(1)
President of Switzerland*
This instruction was followed by a copy of a 
convention from the Foreign Office to Lord Lyons covering 
the reference of the dispute to arbitration* Article 1 
recapitulates the terms of the Treaty of 1846 and meriions 
the failure of the commissioners in 1857-59 to reach an 
agreement* It calls for reference of the controversy to 
an arbitrator within three months of ratification of the 
convention* Article 2 empowers the arbitrator, if he 
rejects both Rosario and Haro Channels as Boundary, to 
choose the channel most nearly approximating to that meant 
by the words of the Treaty* Article 5 calls for the pay­
ment of 500.000 dollars to the Hudson's Bay Company as
(2)
compensation for the surrender of the letter's rights*
Gircumstances were opposed to immediate accept­
ance of the convention by the United States because a new 
government were due to assume office in March, 1861, and the 
Senate/
1. Russell to Lyons, 22nd November, 1860, in F#0* 5/815.
There is no subtlety about the phraseology; the hint 
that a middle channel will satisfy Great Britain is un­
mistakable •
2* Russell to Lvons, No* 18, 25th January, 1861, in F*0.
5/816A* In Article 3 of the Oregon Treaty the United 
State8 pledged themselves to respect the possessory rights 
of the Company in Oregon* If they were to be sold, it 
was to be "at a proper valuation to be agreed upon between 
the parties*" For the history of the negotiations over 
the claims see R* R* Mar tig, 'Hudson's Bay Company Claims,' 
in Oregon Historical Review, XXXVI, pp* 60-69*
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Senate were unlikely, with such a short time remaining, to 
vote the necessary lafge sum of money. Judge Black, who 
had succeeded Cass as Secretary of State, promised, however, 
to ask the Senate if they considered arbitration desirable, 
and if they would empower the arbitrator to draw his own 
line. This meant that the claims of the Hudson*s Bay Com­
pany were not to be put to the Senate, though Judge Black 
ought to have secured Lyons *s consent to this omission.
The Senate duly considered the matter, but nothing was done. 
Black expressed himself as sanguine, however, that the in­
coming administration could secure, if they chose, a positive 
and favourable answer to the questions asked, and he added 
that he would, in giving up the charge of his Department 
to his successor, say to him that he had never seen a case, 
during his whole experience of public affairs, in which 
arbitration was so properly applicable or so imperatively
CD
called for.
The new Lincoln administration, which took up 
office on 4th March, 1861, had William H. Seward as Secretary 
©f State. Seward’s record, to say the least, did not in­
dicate that he would be very anxious to settle any outstand­
ing difficulties with England. He belonged to that class 
©f American politicians which sought to make political 
capital from Anglo-American relations. Lyons, who was 
distrustful of him, while he did not think that Seward 
would go to war, considered that he would take every oppor­
tunity nto play the old game of seeking popularity by dis-
(2)
playing violence towards us ...••• n At the same time, 
Seward/
1. Lyons to Russell, No. 88, 3rd March, in P.O. 5/816A.
2. Iyons to Russell, Private, 7th January, 1861, in Lord 
Newton, ’Lord Lyons,’ I, 30, London, 1913. Even during 
the minor Central American dispute Seward had spoken 
threateningly of "war and favoured making positive 
demands upon Great Britain.11 See P. Bancroft, ’The Life 
of W. H. Seward,’ I, 485, 2 vols., London, 1900. Seward 
had more than once advocated the acquisition of Canada.
Seward possessed some knowledge of Europe and European
polities. He had travelled there, and had met some of the
leading statesmen. Moreover, he had served on the important
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and knew a good deal,
therefore, of the diplomatic relations between the United
(1)
States and the great powers of Europe.
Lyons was in something of a dilemma because he
was anxious to settle the San Juan controversy before
another Harney should appear; but his instructions made
settlement contingent upon a satisfactory agreement upon
the Hudson’s Gay Company’s claims. The Company could be
exacting and clamant, and the directors of the Company
might feel that, if their claims were separated from the
San Juan discussion, their cause was being wantonly abandoned
(2)
by the Government.
Contrary to expectation, Seward appeared willing 
enough to settle the Water-Boundary dispute, but he was 
not so willing to discuss the claims of the Hudson’s Bay 
Company. He laid the matter before the Senate, but that 
body adjourned on 1st April without having answered his 
questions. The obstacle to acceptance of the convention 
was the proposal to allow the arbitrator to draw a line of 
his own, and the Committee on Foreign Relations absolutely 
declined to recommend the adoption of this proposal. Yet 
this clause was so vitally Important to Great Britain’s 
Interests that to abandon it would almost constitute surrender 
of the whole British claim.
There was still a feeling in the United States
that/
1. T. H. Lothrop, ’William H. Seward,’ p. 297, New York, 1896.
2. Lyons to Russell, ’Private,* 4th March, 1861, in 
P.O. 5/816A.
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that the bargain made by them in 1846 was not a good one, 
and the new generation of Senators, remembering the 1 Fifty- 
Four Forty or Fight* campaign and the subsequent withdrawal 
to the 49th parallel, however obvious might bo the advantage 
of the settlement arrived at in 1846, could only reach one 
conclusion, namely, that Great Britain had scored a diplo­
matic victory in 1846* There was, therefore, slight hope 
of ratification by the Senate, while so disposed, of any 
convention which would allow an arbitrator to draw a new 
line of compromise*
Should the arbitrator be unable to determine 
the line, Britain would be thrown back upon her claims as 
they existed prior to 1846, which would allow the United 
States to make effective use of their argument that the 
Oregon Treaty prescribed a line which deviated from the 
49th parallel no more than enough to give Vancouver Island 
to Great Britain* The latter had to choose, therefore, 
between submitting the question to arbitration at the risk 
of losing San Juan and, on the other hand, allowing the 
continuance of the joint occupation of the Island with all 
its attendant risks and inconveniences*
Finally, as had been anticipated, the Senate's 
decision was in favour of arbitration, wbut without power
(3
to establish any line but that provided for in the Treaty*" 
The Foreign Office thereupon prepared the draft of yet 
another convention which asked the President of the Swiss 
Confederation to decide the line of the Treaty and which 
sought also to settle the Company's claims*
!• Iyons to Russell, Ho* 124, 1st April, 1861, in F.O# 
5/816A.
4* The Civil War Intervenes*
Unfortunately, the American Civil War intervened 
to prevent any further progress* The Senate, due to convene 
on 4th July, were then expected to vote upon the questions 
submitted for their consideration; but when both houses met 
they decided to postpone discussion of all business un­
connected with the Civil War* British hopes were thus once 
more dashed, and Lord Lyons had to be content to remain in 
the background with his scheme till a favourable opportunity 
for its presentation should arise* The Civil War did in­
directly, however, solve one difficulty* Britain had always 
been afraid that the joint occupation of San Juan might 
produce an eruption - Lyons had spoken more than once of
being "a little nervous about our company of marines on 
. (1)San Juan - but soon after the outbreak of hostilities
in the United States Captain Pickett was ordered to reduce
(2)
by half his force on the Island* There was little fear
that such an inferior force would precipitate trouble*
In December, 1861, advice was sent to Lord 
Lyons to take no steps to hasten the negotiations about 
San Juan because Great Britain was by then too deeply 
involved in incidents arising from the Civil War, and it 
was realised that the safe course was to prevent questions 
arising if possible* It was realised, too, that the arbiter 
might find no line that fitted the words of the Treaty, and 
that, consequently, the principal point in dispute might 
after all not be brought to a settlement* It was compre­
hended, moreover, that in the subsisting state of the 
United./
1# Newton, op* cit* I, 43, London, 1913*
2* At first he was instructed to withdraw all his troops 
from San Juan but before completing arrangements for 
evacuation his orders, owing to threats from the Indians, 
were countermanded, and he was told to halve his force* 
Pickett to Bazelgette^ 25th June, enclosed in Admiral Mait­
land's despatch to Admiralty, 9th.July, 1861, in F*0« 5/816«
United States, the San Juan dispute was hardly important
enough or exciting enough in the eyes of the Americans to
be made the grounds of a quarrel with Great Britain* As
a matter of fact, United States* opinion was totally opposed
to war, and even the anti-British Seward was on the side of
peace after the 'Trent* incident and did not like "the look
of the spirit he had called up* Ten months of office had
M (1)
dispelled many of his illusions*
There was little fear that a war over San Juan 
would be precipitated from the British side for Great Britain 
was confirmed in a policy of neutrality, the maintenance of 
which produced more than one 'incident*' She had no economic 
motive for intervention because, though the cotton operatives 
of Lancashire suffered greatly, adjustment and compensation 
were obtained from war profits. Her governing classes 
favoured Southern aspirations but sympathy was not profound 
enough to justify war; indeed, it was thought to the end 
that the South would achieve independence without outside 
aid and England would have welcomed a divided North and 
South* Moreover, of paramount importance to Britain were 
fear and suspicion of Napoleon III whose star reached its 
zenith between 1860 and 1866*
The importance of San Juan during the Civil 
War lay in the danger of trouble arising there and spreading, 
to complicate settlement of one of the several provoking 
'incidents' produced by the war* Fortunately, the 'Trent* 
incident "cleared the air; Seward now appeared in the new 
role of conciliator; an An&lo-American war had been faced 
and found disagreeable to both Governments; and the British 
Cabinet was stiffened in its policy of neutrality*"
1* Lyons to Russell, Private, 23rd December, 1861, in Newton, 
op* clt*, I, 69*
2* S. E* Morison, 'History of the United States,* II, 203*
Cf* Lord John Russell, *Recollections and Suggestions,* 
p* 276, London, 1875*
CHAPTER YII
PROGRESS IN THE POST-CIVIL WAR PERIOD
1, Lord Lyons’s Last Attempt at Settlement*
Though San Juan was of too minor importance 
to receive much consideration during the early part of 
the Civil War it was not allowed to fall completely out 
of sight. In March, 1863, for instance, a member of Parl­
iament named Longfield wanted to know what progress had 
been made towards a settlement of the dispute. He was 
rewarded with a brief review of the controversy, but it 
was explained to him that, since the dispute was not 
settled, the relative correspondence could not be made 
public* With respect to the Island itself the attitude 
of the British Government was that, pending agreement on 
its possession, they must decline to sell any land on it
and must continue to dissuade their subjects from settling
(1 )
there.
Lord Lyons began to feel that the difficulty 
might be cleared up in spite of the interference of the 
Civil War and, writing optimistically on the subject in the 
same month that Longfield posed his question in Parliament, 
he wrote home for instructions. Though there had been 
no great change in the feeling of the Senate, they might 
be induced to consider the second convention sent by Lord 
John/
1. Colonial Office Memorandum dated November, 1872, in 
P.O. 5/1473.
John Russell, which they had not seen and wherein it was
stipulated tha£ an arbitrator should determine the line
meant by the Treaty*
The home Government not very enthusiastic
about originating a proposition on the San Juan issue,
though they were prepared, if Secretary Seward mentioned
the subject, to stand out for the demarcation of what they
(1)
termed an *equitable1 line. Thus matters stood through­
out 1863, until the friendly nature of the Presidential 
Message of December, 1863, prompted them to Instruct the 
Ambassador once again to ask Seward if he thought the time
propitious to settle the controversy by means of arbit-
(2)
ration* The Secretary when approached welcomed the 
mention of arbitration and expressed his hope that the 
Senate would agree to this method of adjustment. He under­
took to moot it as soon as the Hudson’s Bay Company’s claims
(3)
were settled*
Following this development Lord Lyons was 
instructed to insist ”as much as possible” that the 
arbitrator should have power to fix a line as nearly as 
possible in accordance with the description in the Treaty, 
if he found himself unable to find a line strictly meeting 
its terms. Lyons was not to sign any convention which did 
not give this discretionary power to the arbitrator* As 
. arbitrator lord John suggested the Swiss President, or the 
King/
1* Russell to Lyons, No. 191, 9th April, 1863, ’Seen by 
Lord Palmerston and the Queen,’ in F*0. 5/816A.
2* Russell to Iyons , No. 637, 24th December, in same*
3* Russell to Lyons, 4th February, 1864, in same. A joint 
commission had been arranged for in July, 1863, to settle 
the Claims controversy. The commission did not meet 
until January, 1865, but the Company’s case was not con­
cluded until August, 1868* The final award was promul­
gated in September, 1869*
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King of Holland, or the King of Sweden, or the King of
(1)Italyi in short, almost any ruler hut the Czar of Russia.
To explain the term ‘equitable boundary,* Lyons 
furnished Seward with a copy of Lord Russellfs despatch of 
January, 1861, to the effect that the arbitrator should not 
depart from the true meaning of the Article as It stands, if 
he is able to deduce that meaning from the words of the 
Article, those words having been agreed to by both parties 
and having been inserted in a Treaty ratified by both Govern­
ments. No matter whether the referee gives a positive 
decision for one of the lines or chooses a line as the 
nearest approximation to an accurate construction of the
Treaty, his decision is to be accepted as final and con-
(2)
elusive.
Seward seems to have consulted influential 
Senators before making any attempt At formal presentation 
of a convention to the Senate. At any rate, he entered into 
no negotiations with Lyons, either because the views of the 
Senators consulted were adverse, or because there was at 
that time, as the outcome of England‘s attitude during the 
Civil War, a revival of the feeling of irritation in the 
United States against Great Britain. Whereas at the be­
ginning of the Civil War, with all boundary disputes except 
that of San Juan removed, relations between the two countries 
had been more cordial than for some time, by the end of the 
War a strong anti-English sentiment had developed in both 
North and South. The former could not forgive Great Britain 
for recognising the South, for allowing the ‘Alabama* to 
escape/
1. Russell to Lyons, 4th February, 1864, in F.O. 5/816A. 
2« Lyons to Russell, No. 184, 11th March, 1864, in same.
escape, for the frequently manifested Southern sympathies
of her upper classes, for the humiliation suffered in the
•Trent1 affair. The South, on the other hand, resented
Britain* s refusal to recognise Southern independence, though
(1)
nearly gained, and her refusal to interfere in the war.
Events in the immediate post-war years did
nothing to improve relations. To the Americans British
prestige in Europe seemed at a low level, and after her
conduct in the Danish quarrel United States’newspapers
reiterated in strong terms their old conviction that Britain
would never fight again. After the Civil War the United
States* merchant marine failed to rise up, and Britain was
blamed for this, although the truth was that, because of
the United States* protective tariff, Britain could build
ironclads much more cheaply than the Americans.
Once again, therefore, attempts to settle the
San Juan dispute ended in failure, and the controversy
lancpalshed for a considerable time thereafter. Fortunately,
the relations between the British and American occupation
forces on the disputed Island were of the friendliest, though
the danger of local trouble precipitating an international
struggle remained real. One or two minor incidents which
seriously tried the patience of the officers in charge did
arise, but on the whole remarkable forbearance was displayed
(2)
by both sides when trouble seemed imminent.
1. Keenleyside, op. cit., pp. 137 ff• ”lt is equally mani­
fest that the sympathy of the whole American people goes 
with such movements [sedition in Ireland] for the reason 
that there is a habitual jealousy of British proximity 
across our northern border, and especially for the reason 
that this nation indulges a profound sense that It sus­
tained great injury from the sympathy extended in Great 
Britain to the rebels during the civil war.” Seward to 
Adams, Confidential, No. 1952, 28th March, 1867, printed 
in *Foreign Relations,* 1866-67, Pt. I, p. 75.
2. There was, for example, the Hughes incident of 1867. For 
details see the relative correspondence, viz., Seymour to 
Okfield, 3rd January, 1867, Enclosure 3 in Seymour to Car­
narvon, 4th January, in F.O. 5/816B. See also Halleck to 
Oldfield, 218t January, 1867, in same.
2. San Juan Linked with the Naturalization Question.
Unfortunately, the prospect of settlement did 
not improve with the passage of time because the delay in 
settling the dispute had served to introduce a number of 
additional thorny problems, some of which were deemed more 
pressing and dangerous. The celebrated Alabama Claims 
question, for instance, was considered the most clamant, 
while the rights and position of naturalized citizens 
and the long-standing Fisheries Question were officially 
given equal prominence with the San Juan controversy.
The Naturalization Question, which the United 
States now decided to link diplomatically with San Juan by 
insisting that it was to be satisfactorily settled before 
the Water-Boundary dispute was tackled, was particularly
(1)
difficult because it was directly concerned with Ireland. 
After the Civil War many Fenians who had taken part in the 
fighting returned to Ireland. Some became involved In the 
Fenian Brotherhood campaign of 1866 and 1867, and among 
the number arrested for seditious activities were several 
naturalized Americans. The activities of the Fenians, their 
drilling in the United States, their periodic attempts to 
invade Canada, and the apathy of the United States in 
suppressing this organisation concurred in endangering the 
peace which nominally existed between the countries.
Briefly the position of the United States1 
Government on the question was that they asserted their 
belief/
1. "It happens that every considerable surge of popular 
discontent that disturbs the peace of Great Britain 
affects that portion of our people who have derived 
their descent from Ireland, and this emotion, in no 
inconsiderable degree, affects by sympathy the whole 
population of the United States." Seward to Johnson, 
No. 2, 20th July, 1868, Foreign Relations, Pt. 1, Vol. 
I, p. 329.
belief in the absolute right of expatriation and maintained 
that, with the exception of eligibility for the Presidency, 
their naturalized citizens were on terms of equality with 
native-born Americans. Great Britain, on the other hand, 
based her actions on the dictum *once an Englishman, always 
an Englishman,1 and refused to recognise as American cit­
izens those Irishmen who had become naturalized subjects 
of the United States.
The problem became a subject of discussion in
English newspapers and the Government were speeded to action
by the introduction in the House of Representatives of the
Banks Retaliation Bill at the end of 1867. This drastic
measure provided that Wwhen a naturalized American was
arrested by a foreign government upon the allegation that
naturalization in the United States did not operate to
dissolve his allegiance to his native sovereign •••••• the
President should be empowered to order the arrest and to
detain in custody any subject or citizen of such foreign
government who might be found within the jurisdiction of
(1)
the United States.11 It is obvious that, had this Bill 
become law, the prospect of amicable adjustment of the 
outstanding disputes between the two countries would have 
been negligible for a considerable time.
The promising part of the position was that 
Secretary Seward really desired to settle the outstanding 
matters of difference between England and the United States 
because he realised that any one of them - the naturalization 
and the San Juan Questions in particular - might at any 
moment/
1* Quoted in R. L. Morrow, *The Negotiation of the Anglo- 
American Treaty of 1870,* American Historical Review, 
XXXIX, pp. 663-681.
moment become a subject of ”exciting controversy.”
H© was prepared to conclude a treaty with Great Britain 
on the lines of a naturalization arrangement concluded 
with Prussia in March, 1868, but when the terms were sub­
mitted to the law officers of the crown for their opinion 
many objections arose; when they were instructed to draft
a treaty they asked for an extended period to study the
(2)
problem. Fortunately again, the question became less
urgent with the gradual release of Irish-American Fenians
and with the alteration of the Banks Bill in the Senate
(3)
so as to make the retaliatory clause quite innocuous.
The delay for which the law officers were responsible was 
no longer dangerous.
5» An Agreement Concluded at Last.
In spite of the disappointing developments 
in the situation after the Civil War, a solution was at 
last in sight. Reverdy Johnson who replaced Charles Francis 
Adams at the Court of St. James in June, 1868, was soon on 
good terms with Lord Stanley, and a protocol adjusting the 
Naturalization Question was signed on 9th October, 1868. 
Within a few days a protocol on the San Juan dispute was 
also concluded, though, in harmony with Seward’s instructions 
that the Haturalibation Question was to have precedence 
over the Alabama Claims and San Juan disputes, the San Juan 
arrangement/
1. Seward to Adams, 13th January, 1868, Foreign Relations, 
1867-68, Pt. 1, Vol. I, p. 141.
2. F.O. 83/2225, quoted in Morrow, op. clt., p. 669.
3. Morrow, op. clt., p. 674.
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arrangement was made contingent upon the
Question toeing finally settled to the satisfactions, of tias 
(1)
United States*
Article 1 of this San Juan protocol agrees to
refer the dispute to some friendly sovereign to toe ctoosesa
within three months, while Article 2 contains the very
valuable stipulation that Great Britain so strennonsly
insisted upon: 11 If such Sovereign or State should toe wnetolle
to ascertain and determine the precise line intended toy ttto®
words of the Treaty, it is agreed that it shall toe left; to
such Sovereign or State to determine upon souse line
in the opinion of such Sovereign or State, will franmlslt
an equitable solution of the difficulty and will toe tine
nearest approximation that can toe made to an accmaito r a *
struction of the words of the Treaty*11
Article 3 stipulates:”But the Referee &to#JUL
depart from the true meaning of the Article as it stomata*
if he can deduce that meaning from the words of theit
Article •••••« ” and Article 5 makes agreement inoperative)
until the Naturalization Question is satisfactorily settled
(S)
between the two Governments*
When on 14th January, 1S69, the protocol m %  
converted into a convention to toe ratified within a year* 
there remained only ratification toy the Senate to allow 
the arbitrator to begin his task*
Feeling in the Waited States, however, wee mm 
opposed to submission of the San Jrnn controversy to erfelt*. 
ration*/
1* Idem, 677* °f« Seward to Johnson, M%
1868, in Foreign Relations, li§7*i§, it* i, fel* i% 
p* 354*
2* A copy of the protocol appears in ?*§* tetiele
5 was omitted from the subsequent convention*
arbitration* The opinion that Great Britain had out­
witted the Americans in 1846 was widely held, and it was 
argued that Article 5 of the agreement of 1868 was merely 
a device to surrender United States* claims to the Island 
of San Juan in return for a satisfactory adjustment of the 
Naturalization Question* The citizens of Washington Terri­
tory, who reminded the Senate that the United States had 
in 1846 conceded the area between 49° and 54° 40* for the 
sake of peace, presented a memorial to that body urging 
that nothing be done in the direction of ratification* The 
Facific coast Senators and their allies, led by Senator 
Howard of Michigan, who in April, 1869, made a violent 
anti-English speech, were very determined in their opposition 
with the result that, in spite of the efforts of Senators 
favourably disposed towards England, decision upon the con­
vention was from time to time deferred until eventually 
the time for ratification - a year - had expired without 
the subject having been considered by the Senate* This 
development was, to put it mildly, extremely disappointing 
to the British Government*
They seemed to feel that they had been shabbily 
treated and a very stiffly worded despatch, *seen by the 
Cabinet,* was prepared for Sir Edward Thornton, British 
Ambassador at Washington, who was to show it to the American 
Secretary* At the same time, J • L* Motley, the United States* 
Minister in London, was told that the British Government 
regarded the Senate*s neglect to consider for ratification 
the San Juan convention before 14th January a frank dis­
courtesy* The Secretary of State in the Grant Administration, 
Mr. Hamilton Pish, seriously perturbed at the development,
(1)
immediately issued instructions to Motley on the subject*
His/
1* Thornton to Clarendon, No* 52, in F.O. 5/1469
His explanation for the failure to consider the San Juan 
convention was that it was linked with the Naturalization 
Question, and though Article 5 of the protocol had been 
omitted from the subsequently signed convention, his Govern­
ment expected Great Britain to keep a promise which was a 
"solemn agreement not to be waived by implication or by 
inference*" When Reverdy Johnson had been sent to England 
it had been made clear that the Naturalization Question 
came first, and he had been told frankly to state to Lord 
Stanley, with whom he negotiated, that until that difficulty 
was removed, any attempt to settle any of the existing con­
troversies between the two countries would be unavailing* 
Great Britain, he pointed out, had agreed in the Natural­
ization protocol of 9th October, 1868, to introduce measures 
in Parliament for a speedy settlement* This had not been 
done in spite of the fact that Parliament had sat from 16th 
February to 11th August, 1869. The United States had not
pressed the matter because of Britain's preoccupation with
(1)
the Irish Disestablishment question*
This, in turn, demanded an explanation from 
the British Government, and that also was forthcoming*
Lord Clarendon, the Foreign Secretary, pointed out that 
the Claims convention and the San Juan convention were sent 
to the Senate without any reference to the Naturalization 
Question* The Senate had rejected one on its demerits and 
had postponed consideration of the other* The British 
Government had set up a Royal Commission to go into the 
intricacies of the Naturalization problem and its report 
of/
1* On 1st March, 1869, Mr* Gladstone outlined to the House 
of Commons the terms of his bill for the disestablish­
ment of the Irish Church; the third reading in the 
Commons was successfully negotiated on 31st May. After 
its passage through the Lords the Bill received the Royal 
assent on 26th July* It will be seen, therefore, that 
the session had been almost wholly occupied with Irish 
disestablishment*
of an extremely complicated subject was not presented till
February, 1869. Other engrossing matters took precedence
over it, and so nothing had been done till the current
(1)
month* Once more, therefore, an Impasse had developed
and, with both sides disgruntled, the possibility of settle­
ment seemed more remote than for some time*
The Civil War had not killed 'Manifest Destiny' 
and in the years immediately afterwards the annexation of 
Canada to the United States became the aim of many eminent 
Americans. Seward, arch-expansionist, had kept it alive and 
he had an able ally in Charles Sumner, Chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, who wanted to acquire "the whole 
zone from Newfoundland to Vancouver," though he wanted to 
secure it peaceably. President Grant later thought the ab­
sorption of Canada to be both inevitable and desirable, and
(2)
in his opinion Canada could be taken in thirty days. The 
purchase of Alaska in 1867, "a lucky chance, the only fruit 
of Seward's multifarious projects for expansion," was in ex­
pansionist eyes a step towards the acquisition of Canada, 
while the achievement of Canadian federation in the same year 
was a reverse which expansionists sought quickly to nullify* 
The plan of annexing Canada in liquidation of the Alabama
Claims was then conceived, and secret agents were sent into
(3)
Canada who were to labour in the direction of annexation*
Secretary Hamilton Fish held similar views, but 
his intimate relations with Thornton convinced him that 
annexation was unlikely to be a simple matter. He understood 
the British Liberal posfcion that Canada herself must determine 
the/
1* Clarendon to Thornton, 11th March, 1870, in same*
2* Allan Nevine, ’Hamilton Fish,' New York, 1937, p. 216*
3* The most important of these agents was James W* Taylor
who was sent by Seward at the end of 1869 to the Red River 
Settlement in Western Canada. The settlement had become 
economically linked with Minnesota, and the inhabitants 
were on the point of rebellion in the late 'sixties* Tay­
lor's task was to see that the rebellion moved in favour 
of annexation* See H* M. Wrlston, 'Executive Agents in 
American Foreign Relations,' London, 1929, p* 742 ff*
the duration of the connection with the mother country. Fish
hoped that Britain would grant independence to Canada, thus
leaving the question of annexation to be settled between the
Canadians and Americans. This must be achieved by the exercise
(i)
of tact and conciliation. He wanted to adjust all dis­
putes with England, await the latter*s voluntary liberation
(2)
of Canada, and then move for annexation.
Fish's attitude towards the San Juan problem under­
went a number of changes. At first, his optimistic view con­
cerning the imminence of annexation made settlement of San 
Juan in favour of the Americans quite certain, but his sub­
sequent modification of opinion on the major difficulty of 
annexation compelled him to modify his views and hopes on San 
Juan. He arranged with Thornton that he would surrender his 
annexation demands and would arbitrate the Alabama Claims if 
Great Britain which, so Thornton had assured him, attached no
importance to the possession of San Juan would relinquish her
(3)
claims upon the Island. Later, when Sir John Rose was
sent by Gladstone to sound the American Government upon the 
outstanding disputes between Britain and the United States,
Fish retreated still further and agreed to work for the sub­
mission of San Juan to arbitration on the understanding that,
(4)
if he failed, England should cede the Island.
4. The Union of British Columbia and Vancouver Island.
With the diplomatic situation so depressed, it 
is disappointing to note that the situation in British 
Columbia itself at this period was also approaching the 
hopeless/
1. Bavins, op. clt., p. 223.
2. Fish consistently sought a 'cordial understanding1 with 
Britain. Nevlns, p. 384.
3. Fish, Diary, 26/9/70, quoted by Nevins, p. 425.
4. Bevins, p. 441.
hopeless stage. Between 1866 and 1870 the annexation of
British Columbia seemed not only possible but inevitable.
In 1846 there had been a slight prospect of the surrender
of the colony, but in 1868 it was doubtful whether England
(1)
either wanted, or would be able, to retain it. Though
British Columbia was completely cut off from the rest of
Canada its people wanted federation with Upper and Lower
Canada. Vancouver Island, on the other hand, which had been
absorbed in 1866 in an attempt to forestall annexation to the
United States, was overwhelmingly in favour of annexation.
At the end of 1869 a memorial seeking annexation was prepared
by the inhabitants and presented to President Grant, who, in
spite of his private predilections, was unable to take any 
<2)
action.
The colony was on the verge of bankruptcy, and
many of the colonists argued that solvency would be best
regained by annexation to the United States. A considerable
portion of the population of the area since 1858 had been
American, while Americans across the border were studying
the passing events very closely. It was suggested that
the colony should be transferred in liquidation of the
(3)
Alabama Claims. Such a transfer was not so improbable
or impracticable as it might seem, particularly since the 
Government of the day, Mr. Gladstone's (1868-74), were 
avowed subscribers to the view that the allegiance of 
colonies to the mother country was purely voluntary; the 
day of parting should be postponed as long as possible; 
when it should inevitably come, it should be made as 
pleasant/
1. H. L. Keenleyside, op. cit. p. 155. Cf. C. Martin, 
'The United States and Canadian Nationality,1 in
the Canadian Historical Review, March, 1937, pp. 1-11.
2. Nevlns, p. 386.
3. Keenleyside, p. 160.
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pleasant as circumstances would allow; let the colonies
11)
be the judges of the duration of the connection. The
Gladstone Government did not merely theorise; they put 
their theories into practice. British garrisons were with­
drawn from Australia and New Zealand, while Mr. Edward 
Cardwell, who was at the War Office under Gladstone, was 
able to boast that, within his first two years of office, 
he had reduced the number of British soldiers in the
colonies from 49,000 to 18,000 and the military expend-
(2)
iture on them from £3,400,000 to £1,900,000*
The British Columbia crisis passed in 1870
when the Canadian Government took over the rights of the
Hudson's Bay Company in the territory between the colony
(3)
and Canada. A transcontinental railway thus became
possible and, with such a concession guaranteed, British 
Columbia joined Confederation in 1871. San Juan, deemed 
so essential to the safety of British Columbia, thus came 
under the wing of the Dominion Government, and the colonists 
felt that the new guardians were likely to be more con­
scientious than the old. There was always before them the 
unfortunate example of the State of Maine, which by the 
Treaty of 1842 had been thrust like a wedge between the 
provinces of New Brunswick and Quebec, and they feared
that San Juan might be allowed to form a similar salient
(3)
between Vancouver Island and British Columbia.
The annexation of Canada to the United States, 
which would have solved the San Juan question at a stroke, 
became less and less practicable as time went on. The 
failure/
1. See Lord Newton, op. cit. I, 292. Cf. J. Morley, 'Life
of Gladstone,' I, 363. Clarendon wrote on 1st June, 1870, 
“We can't throw them off, and it is very desirable we 
should part as friends."
2. J.A.Marriott, 'England Since Waterloo,' p. 411,
London, 1929.
3. The Canadian Privy Council in June, 1870, considered 
the position of San Juan with respect to British Col­
umbia and agreed the loss of San Juan would mean the loss 
of British Columbia. C.O. to P.O., 30/7/70, in P.O. 5/1469
failure to arrange a new reciprocity treaty in 1866, the 
exasperation in Canada at the Fenian raid of that year 
and the failure of the United States1 Government to pay 
for the damage caused by the Fenians, the collapse of the 
Riel Rebellion in Western Canada in the summer of 1870, 
the growing feeling of irritation between the United States 
and Canada over fisheries, the Manitoba-Dakota boundary 
dispute, conflicting transportation rights on railways 
crossing the Canadian-American border, all had developed 
by 1870 to e climax with the despatch to London of Mr# 
Alexander Campbell, Fostmaster-General in the Cabinet of 
Sir John A* Macdonald, to negotiate with the British 
Government for a common front against the United States* 
Thus were shattered the dreams of Grant, Sumner, Fish and 
so many others*
CHAPTER Y11I
NEGOTIATIONS AT WASHINGTONi 1871
Continental complications were rapidly gathering 
for Great Britain in the winter of 1870-71, and it was 
particularly expedient for her to arrive at agreement on 
all outstanding controversial matters with the United 
States* Bismarck was regarded with suspicion in England 
where it was well.known that he wished to establish intimate 
relations with the Americans in order to neutralise British 
influence, and he welcomed the opportunity to trade upon
(i)
the Alabama Claims and other disputes to achieve his aim.
The progress of Prussia, which stood for ideas the very 
reverse of those which Britain cherished, was a great 
threat to the position of leadership which England had 
fairly consistently maintained in Europe since Waterloo*
The death of Lord Clarendon and the advent of the peaoe 
loving Lord Granville to the Foreign Office meant a con­
ciliatory American policy*
As has been noted, the Naturalization Question 
had been the greatest obstacle to a settlement of the San 
Juan controversy after the Civil War, but in August, 1870, 
it/
1* See, passim, the private papers of Lord Granville in 
the Foreign Office* Granville inclined very strongly 
towards France, and he suspected Bismarck at every turn* 
Bismarck had agreed to use his good offices to induce 
Britain to settle the Alabama Claims in return for 
Canada* See Nevins, p* 224*
it was disposed of when ratifications were exchanged and 
an agreement representing the triumph of the United States1 
position was reached* This success was encouraging to the 
American Government who were undoubtedly keen for a peaceful 
settlement of all outstanding differences*
The celebrated question of the Alabama Claims
was now chiefly responsible for the absence of completely
cordial relations between the two countries. The Americans
asserted that Great Britain should be held responsible, not
only for damage inflicted upon individuals by British cruisers
and their tenders during the Civil War, but also for expenses,
notably increased insurance charges, incidental to prolongation
of the war* The connection between the San Juan question
and the Alabama Claims was simple: Great Britain would not
settle the Claims unless by arbitration, while the United
States refused to arbitrate either the Claims or the San
Juan problem* In September, 1870, Secretary Fish suggested
to Thornton that if Britain would cede San Juan the Americans
might agree to arbitrate the Claims, but Thornton rejected
-this proposition on the ground that San Juan involved a
♦point of honour.1 The British Government would readily
and freely surrender the Island, but only after the opinion
(1)
of an arbitrator had been taken. Unfortunately, on the
American side there was the vocal West to reconcile, and the 
politicians of that part of the Union frowned upon the risks 
of arbitrating San Juan.
Public opinion in Great Jritain favoured the 
adjustment of all Anglo-American disputes, and responsible 
nev/spapers like the * Times1 and the 'Spectator* began a 
campaign towards that end. Both the Prime Minister, Mr* 
Gladstone/
1. Fish's Diary: 26/9/70: quoted in Nevins, p* 426*
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of an arbitrator had been taken. Unfortunately, on the
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adjustment of all Anglo-American disputes, and responsible 
newspapers like the 1 Times1 and the ’Spectator* began a 
campaign towards that end. Both the Prime Minister, Mr* 
Gladstone/
1. Fish’s Diary: 26/9/70: quoted in Nevins, p. 426.
(1)
Gladstone, and the Foreign Secretary, Lord Granville, 
wanted a settlement, but their difficulty was to decide 
upon the best means of negotiation* Experience had shown 
that adjustment by convention was hopeless because of the 
difficulties of ratification, and that direct negotiations 
were too slow and ineffective* The time for sending a 
special mission in the Ashburton manner was inopportune, 
and on the advice of Lord Tenterden, Under-Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs, therefore, it was finally decided to pro­
pose the appointment of a joint commission to compose all
(2)
outstanding differences between the two countries. This 
proved acceptable to Fish who immediately set out to convert 
the President, Cabinet, and Senate Foreign Relations com­
mittee to his view* In spite of the strong opposition of 
Sumner, he was able early in 1871 to report to Thornton that 
the way was clear for the meeting in Washington of a joint 
commission to discuss all matters of difference, notably the 
Alabama Claims, the San Juan boundary and the Fisheries*
At the subsequent negotiations in Washington 
Great Britain was represented by Earl de Grey and Ripon, a 
member of the Cabinet, Sir Stafford Northcote (later Earl of 
Iddesleigh), Governor of the Hudson*s Bay Company, Sir Edward 
Thornton, Minister at Washington, Professor Mountague Bernard 
of Oxford, and Sir John A* Macdonald, Prime Minister of Canada* 
The United States were represented by Justice Samuel Nelson, 
Secretary Fish, Judge Ebenezer R* Hoar, former Attorney-
General, General Robert Schenck, Minister to Great Britain,
*
and Senator G. H. Williams of Oregon*
The British commissioners began by proposing 
arbitration as the best method of settling the San Juan 
dispute, but the American representatives retorted that there 
was no/
1* Morley, op. cit., II, p. 7*
2* Memo, of 21st November, 1870, in F.O. 5/1331. Tenterden 
was actually only senior clerk at the Foreign Office, but 
very shortly afterwards he was promoted Under-Secretary•
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no hope of the Senate*s agreeing to submit the question
to an outsider* They pointed out that, by using one of
the methods sometimes employed by Congress for rejecting
a proposed measure, namely, by refusing to take the Claren-
don-Johnson Convention into consideration, the Senate had
shown clearly that they were totally opposed to arbitration*
Surely, it was argued, the British and American commissioners
(1)
were as competent to come to a decision as any arbitrator*
The British representatives refused to agree 
that an adjustment could be arrived at without outside 
assistance, but they professed themselves willing to listen 
to the United States* arguments. This friendly gesture 
produced a long, amicably conducted discussion upon the 
meaning of Article 1 of the Treaty of 1846 and the intentions 
of the negotiators of that Treaty. With the exception of 
some newly-discovered letters of Edward Everett, United 
States* Minister in London in 1845, neither Side was able, 
however, to adduce any fresh evidence.
Lord de Grey, leader and spokesman of the 
British commission, announced the next day that he and his 
colleagues had perused the new evidence, but found that it 
could not alter their views. He asked for an explanation 
of the United States* seemingly incomprehensible opposition 
to arbitration, a method of adjustment which was acknowledged 
to be fair and reasonable by eminent men in both countries* 
The American answer was that there was a feeling 
in the Senate and in their country that the United States* 
negotiators in 1846 had been misled; that Lord Aberdeen, 
after having conversed with Mr* Me Lane, the American Am­
bassador, on 15th May, 1846, when it had been agreed that 
the/
1* F*0* 5/1300* The feeling against arbitration in the United
States was general. As a memorial signed in Washington 
Territory had it: "Having already conceded from the line
of 54° 40* to that of 49° for the sake of peace, neither 
the honour nor the interests of the United States will
~ —  f\■#* ■»!4 i-tVi +• W
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the Haro Channel should form the boundary, immediately 
thereafter sent for Sir J. H. Pelly of the Hudson’s Bay 
Company and proceeded so to word his despatch (which 
accompanied the draft) of 18th May to Mr. fcakenham that 
the phraseology of the Treaty could afterwards be strained 
to the interpretation put upon it in subsequent negotiations 
by the British Government.
This slanderous and grossly untrue statement, 
so unworthy of the American negotiators, roused de Grey 
to high indignation, and he rejected ”unhesitatingly, 
positively and in the strongest manner” the imputation 
which was thus cast upon the integrity and good faith of 
a statesman who had always borne a most unblemished 
reputation. The allegation had the immediate effect of 
stiffening the attitude of the British Commission, and, 
instead of receding from their position, they now demanded 
that the United States should suggest a mode of settlement 
alternative to arbitration.
This was met by the novel and alarming suggestion 
that the whole Treaty of 1846 should be abrogated and negot­
iations begun to draft a new one. The American spokesman, 
Secretary Fish, deplored the existence of a treaty which 
was open to ambiguous interpretation and, since the United 
States could never be party to any treaty which might leave 
the passage of the straits under the absolute command of 
Great Britain, the most sensible course would be to negotiate 
a new treaty.
Such a drastic step would have meant the restor­
ation of the position established in 1818 and was, of course, 
quite unacceptable to Great Britain. The old ’Fifty-Four 
Forty or Fight* agitation would have been resuscitated, 
and there would have been a renewal of the great bitterness 
engendered/
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engendered in the period between 1844 and 1846# The British 
commissioners could hardly believe that the Americans were 
serious in their proposal and considered it to be made on 
strategic rather than genuine grounds. Without reference to 
.the Foreign Office they rejected it, but they resolved to 
meet stratagem by stratagem. They dropped discussion, there­
fore, of the San Juan question and went on to arrange the 
Fisheries articles. Their plan was to proceed with the other 
subjects of discussion until the point of final settlement 
was reached^ when they would intimate that, if the United
States still refused to arbitrate the San Juan problem, the
(1)
whole negotiation must fall to the ground.
By 9th April the negotiators had reached agree­
ment on the Alabama Claims, but the settlement of the 
Fisheries articles was delayed by the pertinacity of Sir 
John A. Macdonald, Canada*s first representative on an 
international tribunal. He refused to accept the terms of 
adjustment agreed upon by his colleagues on the Commission, 
declining to entertain the proposition that Canada should 
be offered free fish and a sum of money as the equivalent 
of the ’inshore* fisheries, or that no free fish should be
Offered but the amount to be awarded should be settled by 
(2)
arbitration. While de Grey sought to convert Macdonald, 
the Commission returned to discussion of the San Juan articles. 
Fish/
1. F.O. 5/1299: approved by the Foreign Office on 22nd March. 
Twice during the negotiations Fish was unsuccessful in 
seeking summarily to settle the controversy by proposing 
the cession of all or part of British Columbia in return 
for a money payment or adjustment of the Alabama Claims.
See Fish, Diary, March 16, 18, 1871, quoted in Nevlns, 480.
2. Though Macdonald ultimately signed the Treaty he remained 
convinced that Canadian interests in the Fisheries "had 
been sacrificed, or made altogether of secondary consider­
ation, for the ake of getting a settlement of the Alabama 
and San Juan matters." Thus he wrote Cartier on 6th May 
after the signing of the Treaty. See J. *ope, ’Sir John 
A. Macdonald,* 2 vols., London, 1894, II, p. 115.
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Fish had seen de Grey privately, and had intimated
that, if the Claims and Fisheries disputes could be settled
upon "terms somewhat reasonable11, he would work for referring
(1)
San Juan to arbitration* This view was endorsed the next
day by President Grant, and Fish set to work to convert leading 
Senators. Earl de Grey, after communication with his Govern­
ment, was able to inform Fish that he had an official assurance 
that the American proposition of free fish and a moneyed pay­
ment, the amount to be determined by arbitration, was acceptable
(2)
to Britain.
Lord Granville, Foreign Secretary since the death
of Lord Clarendon in June, 1870, had intimated to de Grey that
the British Government would be content if necessary with the
adoption of the middle channel as the water-boundary, provided
free navigation of all channels lying between Vancouver Island
and the continent were secured and an undertaking given by
both sides not to fortify any of the islands in the San Juan 
(3)
group. This proposition was now offered, but it was
immediately rejected by the Americans who entered their grave 
objections to the adoption .of an “intricate and tortuous" 
channel as a boundary, particularly since it could not be 
recognised as one of the channels contemplated in 1846.
Fish proposed that the Haro Channel should form 
the line of boundary and, to al3ay British fears, he offered 
to neutralise all three channels, guaranteed to erect no forts 
on San Juan, and -undertook to reserve the claims to lands of 
all British subjects. This proved distasteful to the British 
commissioners who now renewed their proposal to settle the 
dispute by arbitration, stressing their decision that Britain 
would surrender her claim to San Juan only if an arbitrator 
considered/
1. Diary: 12/4/71, quoted by Nevins, p. 477. Cf. Pope, op. 
cit. p. 109.
2. Diary; 19/4/71, quoted by Nevins, p. 478.
3. Granville to de Grey, 1st April, 1871, telegram, "Seen 
by the Queen," in F.O. 5/1299.
considered she had no claim to the Island.
The Americans thereupon agreed to submit the 
dispute to arbitration, but they qualified their concession 
by stipulating that only two channels - Haro and Rosario - 
should come within the purview of the arbitrator. The middle 
channel represented only a compromise, and the United States 
were determined to have a decision, not a compromise. The 
middle channel was devious and intricate and, said Mr. Fish 
unequivocally, the United States could not be induced, by any 
sort of argument, to accept it. To admit the possibility of 
a middle line satisfying the Treaty was to cast doubts upon 
the validity of the United States1 title; to allow the arbiter 
to have a middle line within his power of choice was almost to 
invite a decision in favour of such a line.
De Grey pressed for the consideration of the alter­
native line, though he recognised that his case was hopeless.
He and his colleagues were aware that theii* claim to Rosario 
Strait as line of boundary was not inherently strong, but they 
realised that it was better to make a limited reference of the 
question to an arbitrator than have no reference at all. As 
the Prime Minister subsequently told the Commons: "if they
lamented the chances of arbitration at all events they were. (1)better than the chances of war."
The British negotiators agreed to accept, therefore,
the American proposal that a limited choice of channel should
be set before the arbitrator; so that he was asked to decide
only between Haro and Rosario Channels. The San Juan articles
providing for this were concluded on 22nd April, 1871; the
German Emperor was to be the arbitrator. On 8th May the
(2)
completed treaty of 43 articles was signed.
1. Hansard, CCXV, 3rd Series, 1450.
2. The account of negotiations from the British side is given 
in F.O. 5/J296-1312. The official American account appears 
in Foreign Relations, 1870-71, pp. 508-15. A copy of the 
San Juan articles of the Treaty of Washington may be found 
in the Appendix to this study.
CHAPTER IX
THE AWARD OF 1872
1. The British Statement.
Captain Prevost’s offer of his services to the 
British Government for preparation of the case to be pre­
sented to the arbitrator was accepted with thanks, promise
(1)
of every facility being given him. In preparing his
case Prevost left nothing undone in making the best use of 
his arguments, and he examined almost every source of in­
formation. For instance, he prepared a series of questions 
for the consideration of Sir James Douglas; had Sir Edward 
Thornton ransack the Embassy archives in Washington; wrote 
to the Admiralty for all obtainable material relating to 
Meares and his voyage of 1789-91; opened communication 
with Lord Lisgar, Governor-General of Canada, from whom 
he secured first-hand knowledge; learned from Admiral 
Gordon, who commanded the ’Cormorant1 at Vancouver Island 
in 1846, that the Rosario and nwver the Haro Channel was 
used by him at that time; enlisted the aid of Sir Travers 
Twiss, formerly Professor of International Law at King’s 
College, London, to prepare his case; consulted the log 
of the ’Raccoon’, 1813-18; obtained, through the medium 
of the Spanish Ambassador, translations of much of the 
relevant information about all early Spanish voyages from 
the/
1. Prevost to Hammond, 26th May, 1871, and Hammond to 
Prevost, 22nd June, 1871, in F.O. 5/1470.
-100
the Spanish archives; succeeded, through Lord Lisgar, in
having Mr# McCrelght, Attorney-General of British Columbia,
secure the testimony of local master mariners as to the
extent to which the Rosario Strait was used in 1846#
It cannot be justly argued then that the British
case was ill-prepared or neglected consideration of any of
the available evidence# Prevost had conducted the British
process ever since attempts had been made to decide between
Rosario and Haro Channels; he was familiar with every
argument, both American and British, and had been himself
on the scene of the dispute# We must then subscribe to the
view of Lord Tenterden of the Foreign Office that the case
was "very well drawn and presented a clear, concise and
(1)
closely-sustained argument#" It met with Canadian
approval too, which was certainly not its least valuable 
virtue# Governor J. W# Trutch of British Columbia pro­
nounced it "complete and conclusive and admirably argued
throughout" after having discussed it with his Executive
(2)
Council#
On 18th August, 1871, the German Emperor agreed
to act as arbitrator; on 11th December the United States*
statement was presented; Prevost arrived in Berlin two days
(3)
later and presented the British case#
Great Britain’s case is prefaced by a series 
of preliminary details, calculated to clarify the later 
presentation# The hydrography of the three main straits 
is explained; the origin of the names is indicated and 
the conclusion reached that the name assigned by the Span­
iards to the waters of the Strait of Georgia is used to 
denote/
1# Memorandum by "T(enterden)" of 25th November, 1871, in 
F#0. 5/1470#
2# Trutch to Kimberley, 20th March, 1872, enclosed in 
C#0# to F#0#, 30th April, 1872, in F#0# 5/1472#
3# Exe British case is to be found in F#0# 5/1472#
denote the channel which Britain contends is the true 
continuation of that Strait*
There follows an explanation that there are 
five rules of international law for the interpretation of 
treaties
1. The words of the treaty must be taken in the sense 
they had at the time of signing*
2* Regard must be had to the context and spirit of the 
whole treaty*
3* wThe interpretation should be drawn from the connection
and relation of the different parts*w
4* "The interpretation should be suitable to the reason
of the Treaty*"
5* "Treaties are to be interpreted in a favourable rather
(1)
than an odious sense*"
The arguments in respect to the different rules 
of interpretation are then examineds-
1* The words of the treaty must be taken in the sense 
they had at the time of signing. The British argu-** 
ment here is that in 1846 Rosario Channel was the 
only commonly known and commonly used channel* It 
was used by Captain Vancouver in 1792, by the exploring 
vessels, •Sutil1 and »Mexicana*, in the same year, 
by the •Beaver,* first steam vessel to sail from 
Fuca Strait to Fort Langley, by the United States* 
exploring vessel, *Porpoise,f in 1841, by H. M* S* 
•Cormorant* in 1846;, and by all Hudson*s Bay Company 
ships without exception*
2* and 3* The second and third rules of interpretation, 
in relation to the British argument, may be grouped 
together* These rules stipulate that regard must be 
had/
1# All points are taken from E* de Yattel, *Le droit des 
gens,* 3 vols* - most recently published in 1916*
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had to the context and spirit of the whole Treaty, 
and that the interpretation should be drawn from 
the connection and relation of the different parts.
The only part of the Oregon Treaty, sub­
mits Great Britain, that causes disagreement is the 
second sentence of the first article, namely, "and 
thence southerly through the middle of the said 
channel and of Fuca*s Straits to the Pacific Ocean*" 
Regard must be had, therefore, to the context of the 
sentence and of the preceding sentences in order to 
secure the meaning of the words, "the said channel*" 
There are three phrases in this sentence to be con­
sidered: "thence southerly, through the middle of
the channel:" "the middle of the channel;" "provided 
the navigation of the whole be free." The British 
position is that the second sentence may be read as 
if written in extenso thus: "and thence southerly
through the middle of the channel which separates 
the continent from Vancouver *s Island, and through 
the middle of Fuca*s Straits to the Pacific Ocean*"
The Treaty of 1846 used the term *Fuca*s 
Straits* to denote the lower portion only of the 
larger channel, that is, the inlet of the sea ex­
tending eastward from the Pacific to the entrance 
of the narrow waters through which Vancouver con­
tinued his voyage* The term fFucafs Straits* must 
be taken, therefore, to have been inserted in the 
second sentence of the first article of the Treaty 
for the sake of describing with greater precision 
the course of the boundary line, and it is one of 
the necessary conditions of the line that it should 
be/
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be drawn through the middle of the inlet of the sea 
which has Cape Flattery as south-western and Deception 
Passage north-eastern extremities.respectively*
In order that the navigation of the whole 
of Fuca Straits may be secured to both Great Britain 
and the United States the second phrase must be 
interpreted as requiring the line to be drawn south­
erly through the middle of a 1 channel* which will 
enable it to enter the headwaters of the Straits of 
Fuca and proceed thence to the Pacific; in other 
words, the boundary line, af£er it has entered the 
Straits, must divide some parts of them in such a 
manner as to render necessary the phrase which secures 
free navigation of the whole Straits to both countries* 
This is substantiated by the fact that the Straits 
are eight miles in minimum breadth (between Race 
Island and the south shore)* To maintain that this 
provision would allow an interpretation of the Treaty 
which would continue the boundary line through Haro 
Channel is to deprive the proviso of any rational 
meaning, since American vessels would possess the right 
of navigating the Straits to the eastward of Haro 
without any such proviso, because they would be within 
United States* territory; at the same time, British 
vessels would not require any such liberty to enable 
them to enter or leave the * channel* through which 
the boundary line is to pass from Juan de Fuca 
Straits into the upper witers of the Gulf of GeorglA 
because the west side of the channel would wash 
British territory*
4* The fourth rule of interpretation postulates that 
"the/
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And now, to summarise Britainfs argumentst-
1. Rosario was the only navigable channel in 1846*
2* The first and second phrases of Article I of the 
Treaty of 1846 demand that the boundary be drawn 
through the middle of the channel so as to enter the 
headwaters of Juan de Fuca Straits*
3* The proviso in the third phrase securing free navi­
gation of the whole of Juan de Fuca Straits is not 
comprehensible if Haro Channel is to be the boundary.
4. Rosario Channel satisfied the main objects of both 
parties in 1846*
5. If Haro be adopted as the boundary channel Britain 
will lose the right of access to her possessions*
2* The United States1 Case*
The American case was prepared by George Ban­
croft, Minister at Berlin, who had been a member of President 
Polkfs Cabinet in 1846. He had followed the dispute through­
out its progress and had been particularly forward in 
asserting the extreme United States1 claim* He had strongly 
deprecated the trend of the negotiations after the Civil 
War and deplored the arrangement of January, 1869, whereby 
the President of the Swiss Republic was to arbitrate the 
San Juan controversy with all three channels within his 
purview* When he heard of the terms of the protocol framed 
by Reverdy Johnson and Lord Stanley he immediately wrote 
his Government urging them not to allow a compromise line 
to be considered, advising at the same time that the King 
of Prussia should be appointed arbitrator* The conduct 
of the question in 1871-72, the first presentation of the 
case/
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case as well as the reply to the British case were every
(1)
word composed toy Bancroft*
Bancroft toegins his Memorial with a review of
the Oregon dispute* He makes reference to the correspondence
of Lord Aberdeen, Sir Robert Peel, Senator Benton and Mr*
McLane to show that the opinion held in 1846 was that the
Treaty intended to establish Haro Strait as the boundary
channel* It was the only channel indicated on the maps
of Vancouver and Wilkes; it was the only channel mentioned
by the French geographer, de Mofras; the collection of
maps of the disputed region in the Royal Library at Berlin
contains not a single map anterior to 1846 which mentions
more than Haro Channel.
It is agreed, Bancroft goes on, that •channel*
means navigable channel* Haro is the broadest, deepest,
safest and best channel. It separates the continent from
Vancouver Island, whereas Rosario Strait touches neither
the mainland nor the Island* As a matter of fact, states
the Memorial, Rosario is not a strait at all but is merely
the track of Vancouver*s vessel in 1792 in his voyage from
(2)
Admiralty Inlet to the north.
The testimony of the mariners cited by the 
British Government to prove that Rosario Strait was the most 
used channel in 1846 is next examined* Bancroft succeeds 
in destroying most of this testimony and he asks why only 
obscure men - not prominent individuals like Governor 
Douglas - are selected to testify to mariners* neglect 
of Haro Channel in 1846* De Mofras*s evidence in favour 
of
1* See article by W* M. Sloane, Bancrofts assistant at
Berlin, in Century Magazine, January, 1887* Bancroftfs 
letter to President Grant appears in M* A. de W* Howe,
•Life and Letters of George Bancroft,* II, 225, London,1908* 
2* Papers Relating to the Treaty of Washington, Vol. V, 
pp. 1-17.
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of Haro is 1 clear and unequivocal," and one must conclude
that "if between a channel that had a name and one that had
none, the British Government intended to take the channel
without a name, it should have described it with distinctness
(1)
and care •.... " The Memorial reminds Great Britain that
Haro Channel was the first discovered - by the Spaniard, Eliza, 
in June, 1791, and United States* navigators like Captain
(2)
Kendrick were in the disputed waters before Captain Vancouver*
Bancroft quotes also from contemporaneous evidence,
and points our that Governor Pelly of the Hudson *s Bay Company
had drawn the attention of Lord Aberdeen to the islands of the
Haro or San Juan Archipelago two days before the despatch to
(3)
Washington of the copy of the Oregon Treaty* It was,
moreover, the contemporary view that the Treaty meant to allot 
only Vancouver Island to Great Britain and not the islands of 
the archipelago lying between the Island and the mainland*
The United States contend that the British attach­
ment to the Rosario Channel had not been consistently 
maintained; indeed, Lord John Russell had deserted their t , 
claim to it and had argued for the middle channel; "in 
’other words, he interpreted the treaty simply as giving 
the Island of San Juan to the British by which they could 
gain/
1* The German experts adopted this argument in toto. See 
Page 10 of their*report in Appendix III.
2. Priority of discovery counts little, particularly since 
the results of early Spanish discoveries in the region of 
Juan de Fuca Strait were not published until after the 
publication of Vancouver’s work in 1798* An excellent 
account of the earlier discoveries is to be found in H* R* 
Wagner, *The Cartography of the North West Coast of America 
to 1800,* 2 vols,, Berkeley, 1937. Here it is shown that 
Manuel Qulmper was in charge of an expedition to examine 
the Strait in 1791, and he sent Lieutenant Carrasco to 
examine Rosario Strait which he called *Boca de Fidalgo*'
No examination was made of Haro, but he named it * Lopez de 
Haro* after the pilot of the *San Carlos* which had sailed 
to Nootka in 1788. Vancouver, who seldom changed the Span­
ish nomenclature, called the Strait *Arro.f His maps were 
copied by the famous geographer, Aaron Arrowsmith, and that 
explains the general adoption of Vancouver’s nomenclature. 
See Wagner, II, 253*
3* Papers Relating to Treaty of Washington, V, 139*
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„(1)gain the exclusive possession of the Haro Channel."
5. The Respective Counter-Cases.
Sir Travers Twiss, who had prepared the British
case along with Prevost, became personally involved in a
•cause celebre’ and had to retire from public life before
the preparation of the counter-case. Mr. P. S. Reilly was
(2)
chosen to succeed him. Reilly was as thorough in his 
work as his predecessors and he searched in every direction 
for evidence. The Foreign Office records show that he caused
to be prepared for him an authoritative account of the early
/
history of the Hudson’s Bay Company; he went over the reports 
of all Senate debates on the Oregon Treaty; he examined 
all the maps at the Foreign Office; he consulted all Paken- 
hamfs and Aberdeen’s correspondence of 1846; he asked the 
United States for copies of all McLane’s correspondence 
with Secretary Buchanan relating to Oregon in 1845 and 1846. 
The result was the British Second and Definitive Statement, 
presented to the arbitrator on 11th June.
The Statement divides Bancroft’s arguments into
five partsr-
1. Bancroft assumes that in 1846 the United States had
a clear title to all Oregon, and the Treaty therefore
f
was in the nature of a concession. Britain answers 
that there was joint occupation till 1846 and each 
side had till then claimed that its title was indis­
putable .
2. The object of the Treaty of 1846 was to secure Van­
couver/
1. Idem, p. 141.
2. Granville to the Treasury, 8th April, 1872, in F*0# 
5/1472.
Vancouver Island to Great Britain. The latter
denies this and declares that the intention in 1846
was not merely not to cut off the end of the Island.
"The nature of the motive is not necessarily a measure
(1)
of the scope of the stipulation." If the object
had been this, it would have sufficed to say that all 
Vancouver Island should belong to Britain. Lord 
Aberdeen1s instructions to Mr. Pakenham cannot be 
read to contract the effect of the Treaty. When he 
referred to the "whole of Vancouver’s Island with 
its ports and harbours" he was referring to broad 
geographical features.
. Mr. Bancroft attempts to show that the construction 
placed on the Treaty in 1846 corresponds with that 
of to-day, but the statement of Mr. MeLane to his 
Government can in no way bind Great Britain. Mclane 
was not negotiating with Lord Aberdeen; in any case, 
Aberdeen had never mentioned Haro Channel to Mclane.
It is probable, argues Great Britain, that Senator 
Benton, whose speech in 1846 constituted a strong 
American argument, founded his words upon McLane’s 
letter, and at the very most his speech is only a 
declaration of opinion. Secretary Buchanan signed 
the Treaty with the Minister's despatch before him, 
yet Buchanan made no mention of Haro Strait. Further­
more. we must take into consideration the Secretary's
(2)
words to Mr. Crampton in 1848.
Bancroft's statement that he wrote re­
peatedly to Viscount Palmerston after 1846 without 
reply describing Haro as the Treaty channel can be 
ignored/
British Statement, Paragraph 2, in F.O. 5/1472. 
Supra, p. 4.
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lgiiored because no statement made more than two years
(1)
after ratification can be described as contemporaneous*
4* Bancroft represents the Oregon Treaty as the work of 
Great Britain, and this precludes the maintaining of 
any construction not admitted by the other side*
Britain's answer is that the United States could have 
insisted on any alteration they thought fit to insert, 
and the Senate had an opportunity to change the Treaty 
during their debate from 10th to 12th June, 1846* The 
United States wanted a speedy peace (as Benton admits) 
in view of commercial interests and the Mexican prob­
lem* The words of the Treaty, therefore, are as much 
American as British*
5. The Americans contend that the language of the Treaty 
has reference to Haro Channel* When the word 'channel1 
is employed in treaties the largest channel is meant, 
and Haro is undoubtedly the largest concerned in the 
Oregon Treaty* Great Britain points out that its 
depth is so great that its few anchorages make it 
unsafe for sailing-vessels. Moreover, the argument 
that the Treaty contemplates a continuous channel to 
the Pacific and that this is satisfied by Haro Strait 
and/
1* Reference to the Foreign Office records destroys at
once the point of this part of the United States' case* 
The actual facts are as follows* In July, 1848, Ban­
croft sent a copy of Wilkes's map along with other 
survey maps to Lord Palmerston, the Foreign Secretary, 
intimating that His Lordship could readily trace the 
whole course of Haro Channel, "Through the middle of 
which our boundary line passes**"* To the Foreign office 
copy of this letter is appendeda note by the Under­
secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, H, U* Addington, 
"Shall this letter be acknowledged and Mr* Bancroft 
thanked for it* And, if so, shall the underlined 
assumption of Mr. Bancroft be passed over without 
observation?" Palmerston's answer is clears "Thank 
him and say that the information contained in these 
charts as to soundings will no doubt be of great service
to the commissioners...... " Here is a definite and
obvious statement that Great Britain had never accepted 
Bancroft's interpretation of the boundary line, Adding­
ton's minute and Palmerston's answer are quoted in the 
British Statement to give effect to the British rebuttal.
and Juan de Fuca Straits only can be refuted by 
reference to the fact that the current of water 
from the Gulf of Georgia through Rosario Channel 
is regular, and in the Haro Channel is irregular.
The United States* counter-case ridiculed the 
British notion that Rosario Strait was the channel of the 
Treaty because Vancouver sailed through it; he did not 
even think it worthy of a name. The testimony of the 
mariners cited by Great Britain to prove that Rosario 
was the most used channel in 1846 is analysed and refuted, 
while other points in the British case are taken seriatim 
and examined.
4. The Award.
The German Emperor submitted the whole dispute
to three experts and jurists, Professor Kiepert, Councillor
Goldschmidt of the Imperial High Court of Commerce, and
Vice-President Grimm of the High Court, who delivered their
report in October, 1872. On 21st October the decision was
(i)
made public in the following words
"We, William, by the grace of God, German 
l&nperor,etc., etc., •••••• find after examination of the
Treaty between the Government of Her Britannick Majesty 
and that of the United States of America, dated at Washing­
ton, 6th May, 1871, by virtue of which the above-named 
Governments have, after taking into consideration the state­
ment of the experts and jurists appointed by us to report 
upon the contents of the respective cases and counter-cases 
with their enclosures, given the following decision:- 
"The claim Of the Government of the United
States/
1# A translation of the experts’ report, deposited in the
Reichsarchivs, Potsdam, Germany, will be found as Appendix
III. The report was never published.
States •••••• is most in accordance with the true inter­
pretation of the Treaty concluded •••••."
There was great disappointment in England at 
the nature of the award for, no matter how lightly the 
British people may have estimated the worth of San Juan, 
it was a blow to their national pride to be told that 
during the negotations of half a century they had been 
totally in the wrong, and that the cause which had been 
sustained and prosecuted with so much vigour by some of 
their most distinguished statesmen was worthless* Their 
immediate feeling was one of extreme irritation at the 
German Emperor, or rather at his agent, Chancellor Bismarck, 
and Bancroft* They seemed to think that there had been a 
German-American conspiracy to overreach them, and even the 
staid and usually discreetly careful Hammond (afterwards 
Lord Hammond), Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, inferred
that Bancroft had done "his best to hugger-mugger the lawyers
(1)
while employed in framing their reports."
Some excuse for this suspicion of Bismarck existed*
Mr. J* L. Motley, United States1 Ambassador at the Hague
(2)
in 1872, was a lifelong friend of the Chancellor. It
may have been mere coincidence that in July, 1872, Motley 
offered to visit the friend whom, although he had many times 
been in close proximity to him, he had not seen for fully 
eight/
1* Memo* of 4th July, 1873, on Thornton1s draft to Granville, 
No* 26, in F.O* 5/1474* The ’Daily Telegraph1 said what 
Englishmen were thinking when it wrote: "The Emperor, it
is said, is a soldier, not a jurist, and he decided, not 
on the merits of the case, but, as some say, with a wish 
to conciliate America, or, as others allege, from a desire 
to gratify England’s real, though not avowed, desire to 
cede away territory in every quarter of the globe*” See 
issue of 29th October, 1872. Cf* ’Glasgow Herald’ of 
28th October, 1872.
2* They had been at school together; indeed. Bismarck is the 
’Otto von Rabenmark* of Motley’s novel. "To Motley he had 
given the real love of his life ••••*• he loves the Amer­
ican without reason or purpose.* See Emil Ludwig, 
’Bismarck,’ p* 338, London, 1927*
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eight years. Bancroft was a slavish admirer of Bismarck, and
he was convinced that "our foreign political interests almost
always run parallel with those of Germany •••••• And Bismarck
leves to give the United States prominence in the eyes of
(1)
Europe as a balance to Great Britain."
Anglo-German relations were not good, and Germans 
cwuld not forget that Britain had never shown much enthusiasm 
for German unity during the period of its evolution, 1848 to 
1870, although she had shown enthusiasm for the synchronous 
movement towards Italian unity. The British attitude to Schles­
wig-Holstein and Luxemburg had delayed the establishment of 
German unity, believed the Germans. They thought - rightly so - 
that English public opinion was extremely antipathetic to the 
Prussian cause, and resented the manner in which the English 
press delighted in ridiculing, among other features of the 
German political system* the ’barbarous* administrative system 
and the German legal organisation. The Germans believed that 
the struggle with France had been prolonged, and many German 
lives lost, after Sedan by the arms which the French were able 
to buy in Britain. France had now been crushed, and Bismarck 
was preparing for the inevitable war of revenge. He had 
neutralized Russian influence by alliance, and had acquired 
the power to crush Austria between Slav and German. There 
was much truth in Odo Russell’s estimate of the position: |
"England alone remains unconquered and unconquerable with her 
neutrality, her fleet and her freedom - three black spots on !
r i ( 2 )his Bismarck’s I political horizon."
1. M. A* de W. Howe, ’Life and Letters of George Bancroft,’
2 vols. London, 1908, II, 247. Of Bancroft the Chancellor 
said: "it is known that he is our friend, he has never
concealed it .«•••." See G. W. Curtis, ’Life and Corres- 
/ pondence of J. L. Motley,’ London, 1889, p. 315. When in 
the autumn of 1869 there had been talk of Bancroft’s recall 
Bismarck had used his influence to have him remain.
2. Odo Russell (Ambassador at Berlin) to Granville (Foreign 
Secretary), 30th October, 1872, in F.O. 244/258. Cf. 
Granville to Thornton, 13th October, 1870, in Private 
Papers of Lord Granville In F.O. 362/1.
CHAPTER X
CONCLUSIONS
1, Examination of the Rival Cases*
In general, it Is correct to say that the weight 
of evidence was on the United States* side. The case for 
the Rosario line of boundary was not strong, while the 
arguments for Haro Strait, if we argue from geographical 
considerations and, to a less extent, from the phraseology 
of the Treaty of 1846, rested on a much stronger foundation. 
The great and -unfortunate error of both sides, of course, was 
the failure to attach a map to the Treaty.
The American contention that the Treaty meant
the boundary line to deviate from the 49th parallel only
sufficiently to secure possession of Vancouver Island to
Great Sritain and the corollary that the line was to follow
the channel nearest the Island are very sound, and they can
be supported by reference to the views of contemporary
politicians on both sides, notably McLane, Peel, Benton,
(1)
Aberdeen and Cass. What could be more reasonable than
the contention that the Treaty meant the boundary line to 
follow the channel - Haro - whose'waters actually washed 
the Island? The obvious answer to this, namely, that what 
was necessary for the usufruct of Vancouver Island was also 
intended/
1. The Aberdeen MSS. in the British Museum demonstrate
Lord Aberdeen's views. In indicating the boundary line 
he specifically refers only to “the whole of Vancouver*s 
Island with its ports and harbours;” there is no allusion 
to any other island. In a private letter to Pakenham of 
4th March, 1844, he writes: " •••••• and care should be
taken that the 49th degree of latitude as a boundary is to 
extend only to the sea, and not to Vancouver's Island.”
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intended to be ceded, the line of the Haro Channel impeding 
the usufruct, is not too convincing. It is difficult to main­
tain that the cession of Vancouver Island included the 
surrender of such a large area as that contained in the 
Haro Archipelago.
The American contention, too, is in harmony with 
the detailed definition of the channel mentioned in the 
Treaty, namely, that it separates the mainland from Van­
couver Island. If Rosario Strait had been meant by the 
Treaty, not only Vancouver Island but the whole archipelago 
would have been divided from the mainland; in other words,
Haro Channel, which touches the Island, more correctly 
separates the mainland from the Island.
The main argument of the United States that the 
Haro Channel was the boundary channel adopted by Mr. McLane 
and Lord Aberdeen in 1846 is supported by so much contempor­
aneous positive evidence that, in the absence of any 
corresponding positive evidence for Rosario Strait, it is 
very difficult to refute. Mr. McLane1s despatch of 18th May, 
1846, said that the British proposition would divide the 
territory by the 49th parallel to the sea; ,fthat is to say, 
to the arm of the sea called Birch's Bay, thence by the Canal
de Arro and Straits of Fuca to the Ocean..... " This letter,
placed before the Senate by President Polk on 10th June, and 
the speeches of Senator Benton and General Cass during the 
subsequent Senate debate, delivered so soon after the signing 
of the Treaty and made public in the absence of any parallel 
statements on the British side, or without any denial by the 
British Government, constitute very powerful evidence. In 
this connection also it is to be remembered that Cass, who 
led the opposition in the Senate to ratification of the Treaty 
of 1846, was keen to show up the agreement in the most unfavour­
able light; yet he seems never to have doubted that Haro Strait 
v^ as/
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was intended to form the line of demarcation.
On the other hand, it should be noted that Cass
and Benton would naturally adopt the view of the accredited
United States1 representative - Mr. McLane. We know from Lord
Aberdeen’s papers that McLane was shown a copy of the British
(1)
project of 18th May. It does not appear to have occurred
to him, if he knew more than one channel existed, to suggest
to Aberdeen that he should indicate exactly how the boundary
line should run west of the mainland. It is almost certain
that McLane and Aberdeen never at any time discussed a specific
channel. The knowledge of the topography of the disputed area
possessed by both was, to put it mildly, imperfect. They used
different maps, Aberdeen depending on Vancouver’s and McLane
probably on Wilkes’s. McLane's calling ”Haro" as Wilkes had
it, namely, ”Arro”, rather indicates that he had seen the map
of Wilkes. How recently before 18th May the two negotiators
had consulted their authorities, it is difficult to say;
(2)
probably it had been some time previously.
The geographical argument weighs very heavily 
to the American side. Haro Channel - Richards's Chart 
and Report had proved this conclusively to the British 
Government - was by far the broadest, shortest, most direct 
and deepest channel. The evidence adduced by Britain that 
its excellences were not commonly known to mariners in 1846 
is negative and inconclusive. Moreover, - and this is of 
paramount importance - Haro is the natural connecting passage 
between the Gulf of Georgia in the north and Fuca Strait in the 
south. The Treaty seems to define not the channel most in use 
in/
1. McLane*s despatch of 18th May does not completely bear out 
Aberdeen inasmuch as he states that the proposition to be 
submitted nmost probably will offer substantially.” Aber­
deen states categorically that he showed the project to 
McLane. See Aberdeen to Pakenham, No. 30, 29/6/46-F.0.809.
2. Wilkes definitely shows Haro as the chief channel, and he 
has Rosario in a very minor place. Vancouver, too, names 
Haro but not Rosario. See C. Wilkes, » Narrative of United 
States Exploring Expedition,' 5 vols., 1845, Philadelphia; 
the map is opposite p. 291, Vol. IV*
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in 1846 (the British contention), but the main channel, 
that is, the most conspicuous and open one, most adapted 
to navigation, that separates the mainland from Vancouver 
Island (the American argument)* If Rosario was more used 
by British ships before 1846 it was not because it was the 
main channel, but because it was the shortest route connecting 
up Hudson’s Bay Company forts like Nisqually and Langley*
The British argument that in 1846 they could 
not have intended Haro Strait to be the Treaty channel 
because they had not known it to be navigable and safe for 
shipping is untenable when one recalls that the Company had 
settlements on the shores of Haro Channel at least twenty 
years before the Treaty, and that Vancouver’s chart shows 
several soundings for this channel* On the other hand, the 
American statement that never at any time did they accept 
Rosario as comparable to Haro is supported by the fact that 
soon after, if not actually before, 1846 the pre-eminence 
of Haro as the regularly used channel through which all 
steamships passed, and as the passage used almost solely by 
the inhabitants and traders of British Columbia, was accepted* 
The words of the Treaty, "thence southerly 
through the middle of the said channel and Fuca’s Straits" 
point to Haro Strait as the boundary line* ’Southerly’ 
means deviation to the south from a line running west along 
the 49th parallel; in other words, the line is to take 
the middle of the Gulf of Georgia, and, once it has reached 
the archipelago of which Orcas Island forms the apex, if 
it is to retain the notion of ’southerly’, it must follow 
the shortest connecting line between the fixed point of 
departure in the north (the apex just referred to) and the 
fixed terminus in the south (the centre of Juan de Fuca 
Strait)* A glance at any map of the area, particularly 
Vancouver's chart which the British negotiators used in 
1843-46, shows that Haro Channel rather than Rosario 
satisfies this provision* The same glance will show also
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that the water of the Gulf of Georgia must flow into Haro 
rather than Rosario Strait*
The cartographical side of the problem also
inclined to the American side. The Spaniards, the pioneer
adventurers in the disputed region, clearly show Haro
Strait on their charts* Wilkes, the official United States1
geographer, who was in the waters adjacent to the disputed
area during the years 1841-42, shows two channels, but only
one - Haro - is named, and a glance at his map would lead
one to infer that only one existed* Haro Strait is to be
found clearly marked on Haro's and Elisa's unpublished
maps of 1790 and 1791; on the map of Galiano and Valdes,
1792, which was published in 1802; on Vancouver's chart
of 1798; on the map of the French geographer, Duflot de
(1)
Mofras, of 1844; on Wilkes's map of 1845* The con­
tention that Wilkes considered Haro Strait much superior to 
Rosario and the inference that even Vancouver, who sailed 
via Rosario because he was. instructed to keep close to the
mainland, gave Haro Strait but not Rosario a name on his
(2)
map carry considerable wAight.
There were, of course, angles to the British 
position that demanded straightening* The statement, for 
instance, that the adoption of the Haro Channel as the 
boundary line would deprive England of the right of access 
to her possessions is entitled to some consideration* It 
will be remembered that the British Government in 1846 were 
insistent that the Treaty should secure free navigation of 
the Columbia River so that the Hudson's Bay Company might 
have free access to the interior. Surely the Government, 
in framing the Treaty, would mean it to guarantee the 
Company's/
1* Scholefield and Howay, 'British Columbia,' p* 334*
Vancouver- 1914* Cf* Wagner, op* cit., I, 173, ff*
2. For additional arguments in favour of the United States*
contention see the Report of the German Experts in Appendix*
Company's right of access to the new chief depot on Van­
couver Island, namely, Fort Victoria. If the United States' 
contention were correct, and Haro were the boundary channel, 
Rosario Strait would lie within United States* territory 
and Great Britain would be surrendering, tacitly and without 
apparent protest, the only line of communication she knew. 
Yet she was mcs t careful to secure, by means of a separate 
clause in the Treaty, the free navigation of the Columbia 
River where it flowed through territory ceded to the United 
States by the same Treaty.
2« The Neglect of the Claim to the Middle Channel.
We have seen that the award of 1872 was coldly 
received in England. The Conservatives blamed the Liberal 
Government of the day; the Liberals blamed the Tories of 
1846; those who had not troubled to study the history of 
the problem blamed the German Emperor. The truth is, of 
course, that neither Conservatives nor Liberals were wholly 
right; nor were they wholly wrong.
It is clear that the Peel-Aberdeen Government 
did not know enough of the region about which they were 
negotiating. They insisted upon securing for Great Britain 
possession of Vancouver Island, and they gained their 
point, the Treaty framed by Lord Aberdeen conceding no 
more. If the terms of the Treaty were inadequate, it might 
be said with justice that they were the authors of the 
Treaty and ought, therefore, to suffer the consequneces 
of its inadequacy.
It will be maintained that the decision to be 
content with the middle channel, thereby tacitly sureender- 
ing/
•120-
surrendering the claim to a line along Rosario Strait, 
was a tactical blunder, but it is difficult to affix the 
blame for the mistake. The Government of 1859, which 
first formally made this important concession, cannot be 
held solely responsible. The British claim to the line 
of Rosario was intrinsically weak and, further, Lord John 
Russell, the Foreign Secretary, found himself restricted 
by the concessions of his predecessors in office. The 
middle channel had been suggested as an alternative as 
early as December, 1856, when Lord Clarendon, at that 
time at the Foreign Office, had advised Captain Prevost 
to accept it as boundary if his efforts to induce Mr.
(i)
Campbell to accept the line of Rosario were not successful. 
Lord Napier, too, while Ambassador at Washington, had 
mentioned it as a compromise line in 1858 when he had 
private conversations with Mr. Campbell. The Derby Min­
istry, which had Lord Malmesbury at the Foreign Office, 
would also have been well satisfied to secure the middle 
channel as boundary. Moreover, it was the line of Lord
Aberdeen, Sir Richard Pakenham, and the permanent officials
(2)
of the Colonial and Foreign Offices.
The decision to suggest a middle channel as 
the boundary line was not so great a mistake as the decision 
to allow the arbitrator in 1872 to exclude the middle strait 
from his purview and restrict his judgment to Rosario and 
Haro Channels only. Since a direct line, as obviously 
desired by the Treaty of 1846, could not be conveniently 
adopted because it would run partly overland, the next and 
fairest/
1. S^pra, pp. 20-21.
2. Supra, pp. 25-29.
fairest course would surely have been to lay down a line
involving least deviation from the terms of the Treaty* It
is quite obvious that neither a line of demarcation which ran
close to Vancouver Island (that is, via Haro), nor one which
ran close to the mainland (that is, via Rosario), could exactly
fulfil the terms of the Treaty. Further, if one side had in
mind a certain channel, and the other had in mind another, and
both sides failed to define adequately their positions when
the Treaty was drawn up, the case for subsequently adopting
a compromise line seems very strong. Unfortunately, however,
when the issue was re-opened ten years after the signing of
the Treaty, both sides found their views coloured by their
estimate of the strategic importance of the Island of San
Juan. This was the factor that complicated the whole problem
and made it so difficult of solution. This was the factor also
that was responsible almost solely for any acrimony that was
(1)
allowed to creep into the negotiations and discussions.
It is almost certain that the negotiators of 1846 
thought they were drawing a boundary line west of the mainland 
which would follow the middle of the whole water area between 
that mainland and Vancouver Island. The use of the words in 
the Treaty "whole of the said channel" rather confirms this 
and, in the absence of a precise name, the impression is that 
"s&ld channel" means the whole sea area. It is true that the 
middle channel does not run exactly through the middle of the 
whole area in question, but its course is quite close enough 
to the centre of the area to justify the argument that the 
negotiators meant it to form the line of demarcation. It is 
also true that the middle channel was not, as the Richards 
Report had demonstrated so clearly, the main channel for 
navigation/
1. The German experts appointed by the Emperor were obviously 
mystified by their instructions to Ignore the middle 
channel. See the copy of their Report in Appendix, pp. 4-5.
navigation* Bat the American contention that the Treaty of 
1846 sought to define the main channel could have been success­
fully refuted because the Treaty did not stipulate that the 
boundary line must follow the main or most navigable channel* 
The Treaty set out to establish a line of boundary, and It 
could surely have been argued that the middle channel was quite 
suitable as a boundary, particularly since its adoption would 
leave to each negotiating party possession of a good, navigable 
channel, that is, Britain with Haro and the United States 
with Rosario.
The words of the Treaty could be interpreted, too, 
to sanction the adoption of the middle channel as boundary*
It could be maintained that the third phrase of Article 1 of 
the Treaty provided for free navigation of the 11 said channel 
and straits” because it was realised that a strictly drawn line 
midway through the whole area between the mainland and Vancouver 
Island ran overland part of the way. Article 1 draws the line 
to the middle of the area between the mainland and the Island; 
thence through the middle of the channel; thence through the 
middle of the Strait to the Pacific* Might it not have been 
argued this repetition of the word ’middle* furnished a certain, 
positive clue to the intentions of the negotiators of 1846? 
Surely, it ought to have been contended, negotiators who so 
markedly reiterated the word ’middle* could never have Intended 
their line to be deflected either to the east or west to the
(1)
extent implied in the adoption of Haro or Rosario Channels*
There is little to be said in defence of the 
Government of 1871. Agreeing to ignore the claims of the 
middle channel was tantamount to surrendering the whole 
British case* Unfortunately for Canada and the Province 
of British Columbia, San Juan, in spite of its strategic 
position, was in the eyes of the British Government a 
very/
1* See also in this connection the arguments of the Admiralty 
in 1858; supra, p* 27#
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very minor consideration in the Washington negotiations.
If British statesmen could make the concessions they did 
on the important, major issue of the Alabama Claims, 
what hope was there that on the comparatively unimportant, 
if periodically embarrassing, issue of San Juan and the 
Water-Boundary any real show of resistance would be made 
to American demands? As early as 1857 Great Britain had, 
perhaps negatively, given up hope of securing the adherence 
of the United States to an agreement establishing a line 
along Rosario Strait, and the efforts of her diplomatists 
after that date had been mainly directed towards obtaining 
the middle channel. Yet, most magnanimously, the Govern­
ment of 1871 agreed to waive its claim to the middle ' 
channel and put its faith in a line for which no British 
Government had ever shown any real enthusiasm and for 
which, as the Foreign Office records demonstrate, the 
British title was known to be, to put the position mildly, 
inconclusive•
The Americans knew that the Government of 1871 
were much more concerned with domestic legislation than with 
colonial and foreign affairs, and this emboldened them to 
insist upon their interpretation of what ought to be sub­
mitted to the arbitrator. It should have been pointed out 
to them that, if arbitration were to be resorted to, the 
arbitrator ought to have a completely free hand to decide 
among the three possible channels. But the Americans 
feared that an arbitrator, with the disposition often shown 
by such individuals, unable to declare positively as between 
Rosario and Haro Channels, would be tempted to decide for 
the/
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the middle channel as the boundary line. It was an 
admirable line for compromise, but its adoption would have 
meant for them the loss of the Island of San Juan, a disaster 
which they could not risk. Then, Great Britain was much 
more anxious for an accommodation with the United States 
than were the latter for one with Britain. Besides the 
always present danger of trouble with Russia, whose re­
pudiation in 1870 of the Treaty of Paris of 1856 involved 
a serious loss of prestige for England, there was the fact 
that the Prime Minister, Mr. Gladstone, was aware of the 
extent to which Britain*s power in Europe was reduced by 
the smouldering quarrel with the United States, though he 
took even higher ground than this Min his sense of the 
blessing to the world of an absolute reconciliation in 
good faith between the old England and the new.
It might be argued that to leave the right to 
possession of San Juan unsettled was to invite trouble and 
a possible war; actually, in spite of the Ebeys m d  Barneys, 
to have left the question unsettled would have been profits 
able to Great Britain. The weakness in the British position 
when negotiating on colonial matters was the lukewarmness 
and apathy of the British negotiators. Throughout the 
earlier part of the century the fashionable attitude towards 
the colonies was, as has been seen, one of contempt, or at 
least, of indifference and neglect. After the middle of the 
century that attitude tended to change, and even the Liberals, 
who were consistently strong in their attacks on the policy 
of maintaining colonies, were beginning to modify their 
views. Moderate Liberal opinion, at least, was beginning 
to perceive that it was inconsistent with British tradition 
continually/
!• J. Morley, *Life of Gladstone,* II, 8, London, 1906.
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continually to remind the colonies that they were retained
on sufferance and that they could detach themselves at will.
As the 'Daily News', which was inclined to he radical in
tone, reminded the Government: ffThe guest who is being
repeatedly reminded that the door is open,will very soon
„ (1)ask for his hat.
Had it been decided to refuse to accede to the 
American demands in 1871, and had Great Britain insisted 
that three, and not two, channels should have been within 
the scope of the arbitrator's consideration, it is quite 
safe to say that, in view of the changing attitude towards 
the colonies, no succeeding Government would have agreed 
to abandon the claim to the middle channel. Certainly, 
the Conservative Party, which was beginning to favour a 
policy of imperial expansion, would have exerted itself 
to maintain the British position in the San Juan dispute. 
Furthermore, 'Manifest Destiny' was definitely on the wane 
after the Civil War and the United States1 'thirst for 
territory' had been so effectively quenched that the pur­
chase of Alaska in 1867 was becoming known as 'Seward's 
Felly.'
By 1870, that is, by the time the San Juan 
problem was reaching definite solution, there had grown 
up in England a considerable imperialist movement. The 
market uses of the colonies for English goods, the gradual 
withdrawal of imperial troops and the consequent reduction 
of expenditure, the growth of telegraphic communication, 
the vision of a new, powerful Canada after Confederation 
in 1867, the evident desire of other powers to acquire 
colonies, the decline of the influence of the Manchester 
School, the reaction against the Gladstone Government 
which
1« 'Daily News,' 28th October, 1872.
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which was accused of being anxious to cut the colonies 
adrift at a time when Italy and Germany were achieving 
national unity and consolidation and the United States 
were emerging from a long civil war to vigorous nation­
hood, all these were factors conspiring to encourage the 
new imperialism# A powerful Canada would be the best 
bulwark against United States1 aggression, and would be 
vastly instrumental in establishing a very desirable 
political equilibrium on the North American continent#
When Disraeli, a recent convert to the new 
imperialism, came into office in 1874 the new movement was 
assured of success for the new Prime Minister when putting 
his policy before the country had announced that the future 
of Great Britain lay in the growth and splendour of her 
oversea possessions, and in the terms of rhetoric peculiar 
to politicians he had two years before proclaimed himself 
the enemy of the * Little Englanders.* ,fThere had been no 
effort," he said, "so continuous, so subtle, supported by 
so much energy, and carried on with so much ability and
acumen, as the attempt of Liberalism to effect the dis-
(1)
integration of the British Empire#"
The opinion prevailing in the United States 
during the greater part of the century was thatBritain 
would yield in the end to American demands, however im­
possible, rather than go to war# All British Ministers 
to the United States note this phenomenon, Pakenham and 
Lord Lyons making frequent reference to it# Even Odo 
Russell, Ambassador at Berlin, marvelled at Britain*s 
"most decided terror of the Americans, to whom five
milliards would willingly be paid for the sake of a quiet 
*(2)life." Indded, it was more or less openly asserted in 
1872/
1# Speeches, II, 530, quoted in Egerton, op# cit#, p# 311# 
2m To R# Morier, 21st October, 1873, quoted in Wemyss.
•Memoirs of Sir Robert Morier,* II, 275, London, 1911#
1872, both in England and Canada, that the express exclusion
of a centre line of demarcation from the consideration of the
arbitrator was conceived purposely as a device to conciliate
‘ (1)
the United States by ceding San Juan to them. The ordin­
ary American politician believed that Great Britain would sub­
mit to anything rather than fight. Both political parties in 
the United States made capital consistently out of relations 
with England, and each sought to be able to boast that it had 
made Britain yield without fighting.
5. The Government of 1846 and the Award.
What are we to say of the negotiators of 1846?
How, for example, explain the failure of those responsible 
statesmen, outstanding in their century, during negotiations 
and deliberations almost continuous over a period of years re­
garding the possession of a huge tract of land, to use a modern 
map at all and to consult frequently and know accurately even 
the ancient maps at their disposal? How was it possible for 
eminent diplomatists, who decided upon the line of boundary they 
would demand as early as 1844, to proceed with intensive dis­
cussions during the succeeding two years apparently without once 
realising that the line they had chosen was very imperfectly 
marked beyond the mainland? It is amazing to find Aberdeen, 
Peel, Pakenham and their assistants troubling so little about 
the complex nature of the area between Vancouver Island and 
the mainland.
It is difficult to believe that Lord Aberdeen, 
who did not even know the correct name of the waterway 
between the mainland and Vancouver Island on the 49th 
parallel/
1. Even Lord Granville, the Foreign Secretary, suggested to 
Mr. Gladstone the liquidation of the Alabama Claims by the 
cession of San Juan. See E. Fitzmaurlce, ’Life of Second 
Lord Granville,* London, 1905, II, 83.
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(1)
parallel, and Sir Robert Peel, who, according to the
terms of his speech of 29th June, 1846, in the House of
Commons, was under the impression that the 49th parallel
actually touched the Strait of Fuca, had adequate knowledge
of the topography of the disputed area. Yet that they knew
of the existence of the network of islands between the
mainland and Vancouver Island seems certain from the words
of H. U. Addington, Permanent under-Secretary at the Foreign 
(2)
Office, and of Sir J. H. Pelly, Governor of the Hudson1s
Bay Company. When news of the Senate’s decision to abrogate
the Convention of 1827 reached London in May, 1846, Lord
Aberdeen, we noted, immediately got in touch with Pelly
to discuss the boundary question, the celebrated despatch
of 18th May being the outcome of their deliberations. Four
days later Pelly wrote to Aberdeen giving the explicit
views he had conveyed verbally a few days before, and this
statement of his contains clear mention of the complex
nature of the area directly west of the mainland at the 
(3)
49th parallel. This would indicate almost conclusively
that Lord Aberdeen knew of the existence of the Haro 
Archipelago, though probably not of the existence of more 
than one navigable channel, and deliberately ignored it 
in case admission of the presence of islands between Van­
couver Island and the mainland would delay settlement of 
the greater issue. The clue to this unfortunate negligence 
is to be found in the Foreign Office records. Trouble 
over the line of demarcation had been foreseen in 1846,
"but/
1. Lord Aberdeen talks of "King George’s Sound" (a name never 
before nor afterwards used) when presumably he means the 
Gulf of Georgia. In his book Captain Vancouver gives the 
name, "King George Third’s Sound" to the sound outside 
the modern town of Albany In South-West Australia. See 
Vancouver, ’Voyage of Discovery,» London, l801, 1, 161.
2. Supra, p. 6.
3. P.O. 5/809. A photostat copy of Vancouver’s chart is in 
the Appendix to this monograph.
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"but this consideration being of less importance than the
conclusion of the Treaty, the Treaty was concluded and 
n (1)signed•
In the light of this positive evidence it is 
clear that the British negotiators of 1846 could easily 
have inserted in their draft of the Oregon Treaty a clause 
which would have obviated the controversy over San Juan 
of the subsequent quarter-century. We can only say in 
extenuation of this neglect that the American negotiators 
of 1846, notably Secretary Buchanan, also entered the dis­
cussions with befogged minds. Buchanan!s views definitely 
required clarifying. He understood the boundary was to 
follow the ’main, navigable channel* which narrowed the 
issue for him to Haro and Rosario Straits, and he left the 
matter there. When he heard McLane, Benton and Cass speak 
of Haro he assumed it to be the *main, navigable channel.1 
The possibility of the existence of more than one channel 
seems never to have entered into Buchanan’s discussions 
with Pakenham, or into McLane *s with Aberdeen. The British 
negotiators could argue in defence that the Americans were 
as culpable as they in failing carefully to define the 
boundary/
1* See Aldington’s memorandum of 27th February, 1854, in 
F.O. 5/809.
When Viscount Palmerston took over control of the Foreign 
Office, he was reminded almost at once of the disputed 
islands. Pelly saw him on 29th July, 1846, and recalled 
to him the fact "that there are numerous islands and I 
believe passages between them •••••• but I believe the
largest to be the one Vancouver sailed through and coloured 
red in the tracing and I think this is the one which 
should be the boundary." (F.O. 5/809). Another inter­
esting fact in this connection may be noted. When, in 
December, 1859, Lord John Russell was drawing up in­
structions on the San Juan controversy for Lord Lyons, 
he spoke of Aberdeen’s failure in 1846 to draw the line 
through the islands of the Haro Archipelago as being 
owing to "the absence of precise information as to the 
water and lands in question," and he also asserted that, 
"imperfect as was the information then before the British 
Government," they wanted access to all possible harbours. 
But a significant marginal note by the Permanent official 
explains that the two phrases just quoted were omitted 
from the final draft "because Sir J. Pelly’s letter shows 
that Lord Aberdeen had accurate information." (F.O. 5/814).
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boundary channel* Had the American demanded a minor change 
in the projected terms in 1846, such as a phrase accurately 
defining the channel to be taken as boundary, we know that 
Pakenham had power, as well as time, so to emend the draft*
4* Rival Diplomatic Methods*
Experience should have taught the British the 
futility and folly of leaving lacunae in treaties, especially 
in treaties with the United States* The American diplomats 
were always shrewd and quite properly alert to interpret 
treaties in the sense most beneficial to the United Stab es*
As in the Oregon negotiations credit for initiating dis­
cussions over San Juan is clearly due to Great Britain 
although, since her representatives composed the terms of 
the Treaty of 1846 and were therefore responsible for the 
difficulty of interpretation, it was meet that she should 
take the first steps towards securing a clarification of 
those terms. That put Britain at a disadvantage because 
when the United States* Government saw their eagerness for 
adjus'tment they disguised their own attitude under an appear­
ance of Indifference and apathy* The American policy was 
to affect surprise when the British representatives mentioned 
Rosario Strait as boundary, just as it was the British policy 
to affect surprise when the Americans mentioned Haro* In 
negotiations with her it was the settled United States* 
policy to refuse every initial offer made by Britain with 
the expectation that the next one would be more favourable.
This policy, it must be admitted, worked rather well,
particularly in the Oregon negotiations, although in the 
Water/
1. Buchanan noticed that Aberdeen’s projet, which became the 
Oregon Treaty, did not provide for the line passing through 
Haro, but he thought "this would probably be the fair con­
struction.1 See Buchanan to McLane, 6th June, 1846, quoted
in Moore, "Works of James Buchanan," VII, p. 3*
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Water-Boundary controversy, where there was choice among 
three lines only, it had not much scope for operation*
The Americans always knew what they wanted, 
and are to be admired for the tenacity with which they 
held their views and the determination they consistently
t
displayed In the presentation of their case* They were 
always confident of the issue though their demonstrations 
of confidence may at times have appeared boorish* The 
conduct of Archibald Campbell, the United States1 com­
missioner in the negotiations of 1856-59 whose views were 
markedly coloured by his assessment of the military im­
portance of the Island of San Juan, illustrates this* H© 
was convinced that his country had a clear title to the 
line of the Haro Channel and his treatment of Captain 
Prevost, who had the temerity to propose Rosario Channel 
as boundary, was the reverse of considerate.
Great Britain was often dilatory through care­
lessness; if the Americans were at any time dilatory it 
was a stroke of policy* For instance, Governor Douglas 
found it necessary to make repeated reports and complaints 
about the position at San Juan before anything was done; the 
Americans could always be sure of an Ebey, or a Cutler, or 
a Harney to keep the subject to the fore*
On the whole, the British case in the San Juan 
controversy was handled much more satisfactorily than the 
Oregon dispute* The old apathy is not so often apparent, 
and there is displayed - not consistently, it is true - 
real anxiety to gain a point. Lord John Russell is partic­
ularly to be congratulated for his conduct even though he 
made at least one unfortunate tactical mistake* Within 
two months of assuming office he had initiated attempts to 
conclude the dispute and, if he had remained at the Foreign
r
Office/
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Office, it is more than possible that the middle channel 
would have become the adopted line of boundary*
The value of the islands in dispute was fully 
appreciated, and it is almost ludicrous to think that Great 
Britain was prep red to do so very much more for their 
retention than she had ever imagined doing to hold the 
vast area of Oregon* It had never occurred to her, for 
instance, to people Oregon with British immigrants, although 
the suggestion was seriously made - a memorandum in the 
Foreign Office records it - that immigration to San Juan 
might be encouraged in order to prejudice adjustment of 
the dispute* This is explained, at least partially, by 
the extreme importance attached to possession of the Island 
of San Juan by the military experts on both sides* It 
was realised that occupation of San Juan meant virtual 
control of the very important Vancouver Island, and control 
of Vancouver Island comprehended control of the coast of 
British Columbia* It is true that the Admiralty inclined 
to minimise the importance of San Juan beause of their 
overwhelming naval preponderance, particularly in the 
Pacific, but they did not foresee the aerial warfare of 
to-day or the day of Anglo-American naval parity* It was 
fortunate for Britain that the Colonial and Foreign Offices 
were inclined, if anything, to magnify the strategic value 
of the Island*
In this respect and in several other ways,
Great Britain displayed a vigour in the conduct of the 
Water-Boundary negotiations that had often been lacking 
during the Oregon controversy, and it is interesting to note 
that this vigour made its appearance in spite of the absence 
of/
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of strict departmental unanimity in the deliberations of 
the Government*
5* Canada and the Award*
Mention of the intrinsic value of San Juan 
leads to a question already raised in considering the 
Oregon Treaty* What was the value to Canada of the Island, 
and could the Canadians complain legitimately that by giving 
up San Juan the British Government were ignoring them and 
showing a want of regard for their security? Some Canadian 
historians may denounce the ap&thy and carelessness of the 
British diplomatists in dealing with matters affecting 
Canada, but their denunciation in the case of the San Juan 
controversy, particularly in that part of its progress 
concerned with the Treaty of Washington negotiations in 
the post-Confederation period, is not wholly just.
There had been considerable agitation in 
Canada previous to the signing of the Treaty of Washington 
lest Canadian interests be sacrificed* The Fisheries 
Question, however, was in the forefront after 1866 and, 
luckily or unluckily, San Juan did not intrude itself too 
prominently* The construction of a trans-continental 
railway was being mooted and though the railway was not begun 
till 1885,. the possibilities which it envisaged were 
beginning to impress themselves upon the minds of the 
Canadian people* More especially was this true now that 
British Columbia was a province of the Dominion* San Juan 
lay at the western outlet of Canada, and the Island would 
assume an entirely new significance now that there existed 
the possibility of the development of the vast prairie 
lands/
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lands of the North-West Territories. Though even in our
own day this western outlet for the wheat of the prAirie
provinces has not been fully exploited, in those days -
the danger was seen by some that the Americans might
establish San Juan as a powerful fort which would threaten
the safety of the western terminus of the railway*
Cartier, one of the’Fathers of Confederation,1
had thought fit to see Lord Granville, the Colonial
Secretary, and to write to the British Government in
1868, putting before them the Canadian attitude towards
San Juan* He stressed the vital importance of the Island
to British Columbia, and reminded Great Britain that Canadafs
experience of past diplomacy in the settlement of boundaries
in North America, where the disposition on the one side to
concede, and on the other to encroach, was always present
and always resulted disastrously for Canada, suggested that
a similar disposition and parallel results might be feared 
(1)
in the future. Yet when the terms of the Treaty of
Washington, submitting the subject to a restricted form
(2)
of arbitration, were made public, there was no complaint 
from/
1* F*0* 5/810* " •••••• every resource of diplomacy, and
every argument derived from the practice and policy of 
coterminous nations, from the geographical position 
and maritime requirements of the respective countries 
in the gulf, as well as from the language of the Treaty 
should be exhausted before a strategic position be 
given up, which future generations of loyal subjects 
may have occasion to regret ...*••"
2* A ’Very Pressing’ minute by Lord Tenterden. dated 3rd 
November, 1872, to the following effect: "Lord Gran­
ville [ now Foreign Secretary] wants to know whether 
there was any criticism from Canada or from Sir John 
Macdonald as to the terms of the submission of the 
San Juan question before the award was made," and 
the answer that "the Colonial Office are not aware of 
any such criticisms having been made," prove that Canada 
made no complaint in 1871. Moreover, in the division 
that took place on the matter of the Treaty in the 
Canadian House of Commons all six British Columbia 
members voted for the Treaty* Hansard, CCXV, 1441*
-155-
from the Canadian public nor from the Canadian Government, 
either that a mistake was being made in referring the whole 
question to arbitration or that an error was being committed 
in ruling out the possibility that the middle channel might 
be adopted. Had they offered criticism then, that is, in 
1871, they would have been justified later in denouncing 
the award of October, 1872. They accepted the decision 
without demur and, indeed, were able to predict the 
arbitrators terms some time before their publication*
The •British Colonist1, published in British Columbia, 
for instance, the best informed newspaper on the subject 
of San Juan, was able on 20th September to anticipate the 
adverse decision.
While the Tre. ty of Washington was being drawn 
up, Sir John A* Macdonald, the Canadian representative, 
was too preoccupied with the Fisheries controversy to be 
greatly concerned with San Juan* His correspondence proves 
this conclusively, and while he had misgivings about signing 
the Treaty he seems only to have hesitated over the fish­
eries articles. His biographer sayss "in Sir Johnfs 
opinion at the time they were the weak spot in the Treaty*
As to everything else, he considered, speaking generally, 
that the Treaty was a fair one, but in regard to the Fish­
eries Canada*s interests had been subordinated to imperial
(1)
necessities." Macdonald at first thought of declining
to sign the Treaty because of his dissatisfaction with the 
Fisheries clauses, but he could not contemplate the •terrible 
consequences* if the Treaty became a total failure* Had 
he refused to sign, the Treaty would have gone to the Senate 
with the Fisheries question left open and, therefore, sure 
to be rejected. The hopes of the American people would 
have/
1* Pope, *Sir John A* Macdonald,' London, 1894, p* 140
have been replaced by a feeling of great irritation, and 
the conviction would have grown that there was no chance of 
a peaceable solution of the difficulties between the two 
countries, and that the only solution would be war whenever 
the United States thought they might profitably undertake it.
Macdonald!s first suggestion to his colleagues 
who negotiated the Treaty of Washington was that Joint occup­
ation of San Juan for twenty-five years should be tried. This, 
he felt, would give adequate time for the settlement of the 
future of British Columbia. The Americans felt that its 
annexation to the United States was imminent, but the Can­
adians were confident that its future would be linked with 
that of Canada. When arbitration was finally agreed upon by 
the negotiators Sir John A. suggested that, no matter what 
line of boundary the arbitrator decided upon, all three 
channels should be free to both sides and no fortifications 
should be erected in the islands of the Haro Archipelago.
It was his conviction that, if San Juan were left unfortified,
and war came, Britain with her naval superiority could seize"
(1)
it and hold it against all attackfl.
If the San Juan articles of the Treaty of 1872
were unfortunate from a Canadian point of view, the Treaty
was, nevertheless, a landmark in Canadian history because it
"liquidated a decade of the worst relations since the War of
1812," and it was a double achievement, "a place in British
policy for the newly-federated dominion which supplied one of
the British plenipotentiaries and ratified the Treaty, and a
recognition (it was hoped) on the part of the United States
(2)
of another •manifest destiny* in North America." If San
Juan had been used by the negotiators merely as a bargaining 
weight, its loss, in Canadian eyes, was not catastrophic.
1. See L.B. Shippee, *Cana4ian-American Relations, 1849-1874,* 
New York, 1939.
2. C. Martin, *The United States and Canadian Nationality,1 
Canadian Historical Review, March, 1937, p. 9.
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APPENDIX II
REPORT OP CAPTAIN RICHARDS
"REMARKS ON THE STRAIT OP GEORGIA,
WITH THE CHANNELS LEADING INTO THE STRAIT OP FUCA 
IN CONNEXION WITH THE BOUNDARY QUESTION 
BETWEEN HER MAJESTY*S GOVERNMENT AND THAT OP 
THE UNITED STATES OP AMERICA"
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The 49th parallel of north latitude first enters 
the waters of the Pacific at the eastern side of the Strait of 
Georgia, and passing through Semiahmoo Bay, an extensive open­
ing 10 miles from east to west, it intersects a narrow penin­
sula the extreme of which was named by Vancouver Point Roberts. 
This point appears from the Southward as a bold white-faced 
cliff; it is 200 feet high and extends for one mile and three 
quarters south of the parallel; there is a fair anchorage on 
either side of it; to the northward it falls in elevation and 
at the distance of two miles merges into the low swampy land 
which forms the southern entrance of the Fraser River, - the 
entrance being 7 miles from the extreme of the point* Contin­
uing across the Strait of Georgia, at the distance of 19 miles 
the parallel crosses a chain of narrow islands which lie along 
and parallel with Vancouver Island,, at the distance of 7 miles 
from it.
Strait of Georgia.
The Eastern Coast of this chain of islands may 
here be considered as the western boundary of the Strait of 
Georgia, while the shore of the peninsula, of which Point 
Roberts is the extreme, may be taken as its eastern limit*
From the point on the parallel in the centre of 
this Strait its true direction towards the Strait of Fuca is 
S* E. by E* for a distance of about 19 miles, when it gradu­
ally expands to a width of nearly 40 miles and may be said to 
lose entirely the characteristic features of a single strait*
The space now entered upon is encumbered by numer­
ous islands varying in size and character, among which are 
three distinct navigable ship channels leading into Fuca Strait* 
The two principal of these have been named Rosario 
and Haro Straits; and the third, the Middle Channel* There 
are/
are besides other smaller channels; the Bellingham and the 
Lummi on the continental side, and the Swanson and Sansum on 
the Vancouver Island side; but they may scarcely be considered 
as a highway for ships passing through the Strait of Georgia, 
especially the two latter which have no convenient entrance to 
the northward.
From the point where I have considered the Strait 
of Georgia to cease, viz., midway between Saturna Island on 
the Vancouver side, and 4 miles south of Point Whitehorn on the 
shore of the Continent, and 2-g- miles due north of Patos Island, 
its waters merge on almost the same line of bearing (S. E. by 
E* ) into that of Rosario, passing eastword of Patos, Lucia, 
Mata, and Clark Islands, thence between the large island of 
Lummi and Orcas; at Point Lawrence, the eastward point of 
Orcas, it trends a little westward of south for 3 or 4 miles 
and then leads by a due south course into the Strait of Fuca; 
the whole distance, from the point just mentioned as where the 
Strait of Georgia ends, being 30 miles*
The width of Rosario Strait varies from 6 miles 
to lj* At its northern entrance between the Island of Sucia 
and Sandy Point on the mainland, it is 6 miles across, but 
the Alden Shoal which lies almost between these two points 
interferes in some measure with the navigation of this entrance.
There is however a clear channel of 4 miles, east­
ward of it, and one of 1-g- miles westward of it. The least 
water in the shoal is 2j fathoms; it is an extensive patch, 
being 2i miles north and south, and more than a mile east and 
west* On the greater part of it anchorage may be had in from 
5 to 9 fathoms*
I consider it rather an advantage than an impedi­
ment to the Channel; the shoal part which would bring a ship 
up/
up is of small extent, and is easily avoided by good natural 
leading marks during the day, and by the beach f?"j at night.
It is a manifest advantage to be able to anchor in a moderate 
depth should calms, strong tides, or fogs render it desirable, 
and when it would probably be impossible to reach a harbour.
The width of the Strait, southward of the Alden 
shoal, soon decreases to 3j§- and 2 miles, which latter is about 
its average breadth. Between Cypress and Blakely Islands it 
is as little as 1^ mile, but soon opens out again to 2%, The 
Bird and Belle rocks, which lie almost in the centre of the 
Strait 3j miles within its southern entrance, are the greatest 
dangers which exist to impede its navigation. The former is 
an extensive rock 15 feet above high water, the latter lies 
N, N, E, of it more than half a mile and only uncovers at low 
water. The tides which sweep with considerable strength over 
these rocks must render the channel dangerous to sailing vessels 
in calms or fogs, and it is of great importance that a light­
house should be erected on one of them. The passage eastward 
of them is if miles wide, while that to the westward is li 
miles.
The Williamson and Dennis Rocks which extend about 
1 of a mile off the S, W, side of Allan Island must also be 
avoided by vessels working up the Strait: the former is 12
feet above high water, the latter only awash at low springs,
A sunken rock lies f of a mile E, by S, of Colville 
Island so that vessels entering Rosario Strait from the south­
ward or westward should give that island a good berth. This 
rock is marked by Kelp,
The only other hidden dangers which have been dis­
covered to exist in Rosario Strait are the Panama Reef, which 
extends i of a mile off the N, W, end of Sinclair Island, it 
is marked by Kelp and -uncovers at low water, and a rock the 
Bame/
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same distance west of Rock Islet near the north end of Cypress 
Island; this rock is also marked by Kelp and uncovers at low 
water*
The tides in Rosario Strait run with considerable 
strength; in the narrow part between Cypress and Blakely 
Islands they have been found during springs to exceed 6 miles 
an hour, in the other parts of the Strait their velocity is 
from 2 to 5 miles. The general depth of water being from 25 
to 35 fathoms over the greater part of the Strait admits of 
vessels anchoring should it be necessary; but the most desir­
able stopping-places are Fidalgo Bay on the western side of the 
Island of; the same name; Watmouth Bight on the S. E. side of 
Lopez Island; the G-uemes passage; and Strawberry Bay on the 
west side of Cypress Island. Very fair anchorage may be found 
a mile off the shore of the mainland, from Sandy Point to 
Semiahmoo Bay, and Birch Bay affords good shelter.
Haro Strait.
Haro Strait from the point where the Strait of 
Georgia is considered to cease takes a direction nearly S. W. 
(true) between the east point of Saturna and the small island 
of Patos, for a distance of 8 miles, then W. by S. for almost 
an equal distance or -until between Stuart and Moresly Islands, 
where like the Rosario, it runs almost due south until It 
reaches the Strait of Fuca, a further distance of about 20 
miles.
The width of Haro Strait at its northern entrance 
between East Point and Patos Island is 2i miles, where from 
the strong tides and irregularity of the bottom heavy races 
occur; about the same width is carried for 12 miles, when 
between Turn Point and Moresly Island it decreases to something 
less than 2 miles, and the narrowest part which is between 
Stuart Island and Cooper Reef is if miles; after passing 
south of Henry Island it gradually widens and at its southern 
entrance/
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entrance is 6 miles in breadth*
The water is deeper and more irregular in the Haro 
Strait than in that of Rosario, and though the tides run with 
about equal velocity in both, the former is more subject to 
irregularities and races*
The western shores of San Juan Island, which form 
the eastern side of the Strait, are bold and steep close to, 
and should be kept on board \ % \•
In passing up the Strait, when northward of Henry 
Island, vessels should not stand far into the Spieden Channel 
as rocks and very strong and irregular tides occur there* There 
is however a clear channel through*
Off Turn Point of Stuart Island there are strong 
whirls and eddy tides, and, unless with a commanding breeze, 
a sailing vessel is liable to be turned round by them and lose 
the power of her helm*
The western side of the Haro Strait is not free 
from dangers.
The Zero Rock and its neighbouring shoals in Cor­
dova Bay, also the Kelp reefs, which extend southward and 
east-ward of Darcy Island, must be avoided.
Cormorant and Cordova Bays however afford good 
anchorage. To enter the former vessels should stand in mid­
way between Gordon Head and Zero Rock and anchor in 9 fathoms, 
where they will be free from any considerable tide* The low 
and bare islands, northward of Sidney Island, should not be 
approached very close and the Cooper Reef should be particular­
ly avoided. It must be borne in mind that the flood tide sets 
strongly to the N. W. through the Miness Channel, and sailing 
vessels would be very liable to be set into it during light 
winds.
Plumper Sound which separates Satuma and Pender 
Islands is an excellent anchorage with moderate depth of water, 
and/
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and one of the few among the Archipelago which is of easy 
access to a sailing vessel* Bedwell Harbour 2 miles eastward 
of it is also a snug anchorage.
Cowlitz Bay on the western side of Waldron Island 
is an excellent stopping-place easy of access or egress*
There are two small anchorages on Stuart island
- Reid and Prevost Harbours - but they are only suited to 
small vessels or steamers.
I have now enumerated all the anchorages in the 
Haro Strait which a vessel might take advantage of in passing 
through* The great depth and irregular nature of the bottom 
would render it impossible for a vessel to anchor anywhere in 
the centre*
Relative Capabilities of the Two Straits.
As regards the comparative merits of the two Straits
- Haro and Rosario - I would observe that owing to strong tides 
and the general absence of steady winds, the navigation of 
either must always be attended with considerable risk and great 
delay to sailing vessels; the comparatively moderate depth
of water in Rosario Strait which enables a vessel to anchor if 
caught in a critical position, gives it some advantage to such 
a class of vessel* As navigable steam channels I think they 
possess equal advantages, both being perfectly safe and easy 
during day time; to make them so at night they would require 
to be lighted*
Vessels passing through the Strait of Fuca and 
bound for the Fraser River or Nanaimo, would, unquestionably, 
take the Haro Strait as they would save a distance of from 
12 to 15 miles*
Those from Port Townshend, or any of the United 
States ports southward, bound to the same places or to their
h-
own sebblements in Bellingham Bay would certainly adopt the 
Rosario/
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Rosario Strait.
Middle Channel.
The Middle Channel, which is bounded on the west 
by San Juan Island, and on the east by Orcas, Lopez, and some 
smaller islands, though inferior in capacity to the Haro or 
Rosario is yet a perfectly safe channel for steamers; it is 
open to the same objections for sailing vessels, and in a great­
er degree, in consequence of its width, which on the average 
is not much over a mile. Prom the northward after passing 
between East Point and Patos Island, or eastward of Patos,(the 
former to be preferred) It may be entered on either side of 
Waldron Island. The Douglas Channel however to the eastward 
Is recommended on account of the regularity of the tide and its 
entire freedom from hidden dangers. Vessels passing westward 
of Waldron Island must avoid the white rock with Its offlying 
reefs; they may be passed on either side, but the ebb/setting 
southward through Douglas Channel would be liable to drift a 
vessel on them, unless with a commanding breeze, if passing 
on their eastern side.
Flattop Island may be passed on either side, but 
if the Douglas Channel is not taken, then the best course is 
westward of white rocks and Flattop Island.
The centre or western side of the Middle Channel 
should be taken until approaching Point Caution, when a vessel 
haul over on the eastern shore to avoid the Reid Rock, which 
is a dangerous patch with 12 feet on it, lying almost in the 
centre of the channel, also the Turn rocks which lie off the 
Island of the same name and are covered at high water; the 
tide sets very strongly over these rocks;- after passing them 
the prairie land on the west side of Griffin Bay is seen and 
good anchorage is to be found a mile off it in 10 fathoms. A 
vessel should anchor, however, immediately she gets 10 fathoms, 
as/
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as the water should suddenly within that depth*
The southern entrance to the Middle Channel is 
scarcely f of a mile wide, tha tides are strong, and the bottom 
very irregular, which causes races; a sailing vessel should 
not attempt it -unless with a leading wind and fair tide, and 
the winds are rarely steady in the entrance* A bank extends 
for 2 miles south of the western entrance point with as little as 
3 fathoms on it at low water; the shortest part, however, is 
little more than a mile south (magnetic) from the point* A 
ship should give the point a berth for two miles*
When fairly in the Strait of Fuca the passage to 
the open sea will be clear and easy at all times, so soon as 
the Strait is properly lighted. The excellent lights already 
established on Smith Island and New Dungeness by the United 
States Government enable vessels to sail out of Rosario Strait, 
or from their numerous ports in Admiralty Inlet at all times, 
and to proceed to sea with the utmost confidence; the latter 
is scarcely lost sight of when that of Cape Flattery, a light 
of the first order, comes in view, and is a boon to ships of 
all nations entering or leaving the Strait*
The Haro Strait from its position with reference to 
British ports, its entrance scarcely 10 miles from the Harbour 
of Esquimalt, the port of entry, must be almost entirely used 
by British vessels*
To the commerce of British Columbia; to the rising 
port of Nanaimo, which probably for many years will be the
A,
great coal depot, to the coasting trade, which will rapidly 
rise into importance so soon as Vancouver Island Is open to 
the enterprise of the Agriculturist and the Settler, this Strait 
Is of equal interest. As yet there are no lights to facilitate 
access to or egress from it, or the Harbour of Esquimalt, and 
there can be but little doubt that the colony even in its present 
infant state has suffered considerably in consequence*
The/
-9-
The position in which I consider it would be of 
the first importance to place a light house is the Great Race 
Rock, one of a dangerous cluster which lie a mile from the S. E. 
point of Vancouver Island. This rock is 9 miles from Esquimalt 
Harbour and visible from its entrance. It is admirably adapted 
as the Site of a lighthouse, its extent 250 yards by 150, 
its light 25 feet above high water, excellent stone for building 
to be obtained on the spot without trouble, and sheltered land­
ing when communication with the mainland would rarely be inter­
rupted. A light here would in connexion with those on Cape 
Flattery and New Dungeness render the navigation of the Strait 
of Fuca safe and easy. Secondly, a Harbour Light on Fissard 
Island at the entrance of Esquimalt Harbour. This is also an 
excellent position, could be established at a trifling cost, 
and would enable vessels to enter at all times instead of, as 
is now frequently the case, being obliged to wait outside for 
daylight, and perhaps swept away by the strong tides.
A light on Trial or Discovery Islands the turning
point into the Haro Strait would also be of great value; though
until commerce increases so much as to justify the lighting of
the upper part of the Strait, this may not be considered as
(1)
absolutely necessary.
(1). Copy in F. 0. 5/810; enclosure No. 1 Prevost to Malmes­
bury of 30/11/58.
APPENDIX III
THE REPORT OF THE EXPERTS
APPOINTED BY THE EMPEROR OF GERMANY
TO ARBITRATE THE SAN JUAN WATER BOUNDARY DISPUTE BETWEEN
(1)
GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES: 1872
(1) Translated from the report in the Reichsarchivs, 
Potsdam, Germany.
On 20th October, 1818, an agreement was made by 
Great Britain and the United States concerning the boundary line 
in North-West America. By this Treaty the forty-ninth parallel 
of north latitude was to be the boundary from the Lake of the 
Woods westward to the Rocky Mountains. The land to the west of 
the Rockies (between 42° and 54° 40*, the so-called Oregon 
territory), which was claimed by one or other of the Powers, 
together with its harbours and shipping rights on the river of 
Oregon was to remain open for ten years to the citizens and 
subjects of both countries, quite apart from the rights of each
of the Powers to the land claimed by them.
However, before the termination of the ten years, 
negotiations were entered upon to fix the boundary on the west 
of the Rocky Mountains, thereby finally settling the Oregon 
question. The sole result was to extend the conditions of the 
Treaty of 20th October, 1818, for an unlimited time, with the 
reservation that either side might give twelve months* notice 
of abrogation.
The matter was again under review in 1842 and 
continued in the subsequent years, resulting in the Treaty of 
15th June, 1846. According to Article 1 of this Treaty (the
wording of which is given below), the boundary line was to go
partly through the middle of a channel indicated in the said
Treaty. Later, a difference of opinion between the signatories
arose as to which channel was intended in the Treaty. The British 
asserted it was the channel now named Rosario Strait, whereas 
the Americans said it was the Haro Channel.
By the Treaty of 8th May, 1871, Article 34, the
two Powers agreed to submit their case to the German Emperor, 
who graciously consented to act as arbiter.
After receiving memorials from each side in support 
of their claims and in refutation of the opponent*s claim 
(together with notes on the opponent*s memorial), the Emperor 
said/
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said that in view of the decision he was to give within three 
months, he would await the advice of Vice-President Grimm of 
the High Court, and Councillor Goldschmidt of the Imperial High 
Court of Commerce, and Professor Kiepert.
The first Article of the Treaty of 15th June, 1846, 
runs thus: ”Prom the point on the forty-ninth parallel of
north latitude, where the boundary laid down in existing Treaties 
and Conventions between Great Britain and the United States 
terminates the line of boundary between the territories of Her 
Britannic Majesty and those of the United States shall be 
continued westward along the said forty-ninth parallel of north 
latitude, to the middle of the channel which separates the 
continent from Vancouverfs Island; and thence southerly, through 
the middle of the said channel, and of Pucafs Straits, to the 
Pacific Ocean; provided however, that the navigation of the 
whole of the said channel and straits, south of the forty-ninth 
parallel of north latitude, remain free and open to both Parties•”
How we are to understand this Treaty and the problem 
arising from it depends on the geographical position. As it 
is not asserted by either side that by mutual agreement any 
particular map was the basis £of negotiationJ, we must take 
the position as it was on the maps in current use at the time 
of the framing of the Treaty as the one accepted by the contracting 
parties.
Now, each of the Powers has produced several maps, 
some of which are earlier than 15th June, 1846; others again are 
of more recent date. Amongst the earlier are two, produced by 
both parties, a Spanish one based on a survey begun in 1789 and 
completed in 1792 by an expedition with the ships, *Sutil1 and 
^exicana,* and published in 1798, and an English one which 
Captain Vancouver inserted in his book (published in 1798) on 
an expedition undertaken in 1792 at the instigation of the 
British Government.
This Vancouver map is said by the British to have
3been the standard map from 1798 up to some time after 1847 for 
all British ships sailing between the mainland and Vancouver: 
it had been in general use up to the end of 1846; in fact, they 
said it was the one referred to when the British Government 
drafted the first Article of the Treaty of 1846.
This map will therefore be mainly considered in the 
reading of the Treaty, though attention must also be given to 
the one compiled by Lieutenant Wilkes, the American, and 
published by him in 1845 in England and in America.
A glance at the Vancouver map (to which the Wilkes 
map only adds details) shows at once how inexact the relation is 
between the Treaty and the geographical position as given by the 
map. There does not exist one single wide arm of the sea between 
the forty-ninth parallel of north latitude and Fuca Straits that 
might be considered indubitably a boundary; there is, however, 
one only (the most southerly part of the Gulf of Georgia) for 
about a quarter of a degree south of the forty-ninth parallel of 
latitude, while farther to the south at the Fuca Straits, i.e., 
at a distance of about a third of a degree of latitude ^ 5 German 
geographical milesJ , the sea between Vancouver Island and the 
mainland has a group of islands between which three different 
arms of the sea or channels connect the Gulf of Georgia in the 
north with the Fuca Straits in the south.
Of these channels one is nearer the mainland in the 
east; it is not indicated by name on the Vancouver map, but is 
merely designated as the one which Vancouverfs ship had taken in 
its course. On the older Spanish map already mentioned, it is 
called the Fidalgo Channel; since 1849 it has been known as the 
Rosario Strait or Rosario Channel, and it is averred by the 
British Government that this is the channel of the Treaty. The 
other channel extends westward partly along Vancouver Island and 
is called in the Vancouver map 1 Canal de Arro,1 now more 
correctly spelt Haro, and according to the American Government it 
is the channel intended by the Treaty. Now, according as the 
former/
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former or the latter channel Is the correct one, the group of 
islands of about eight German square miles between the two 
channels will belong to Britain or to America.
The third.channel, now called the Middle Channel, is 
roughly mid-way between the other two channels.
t
Whether and how far the third channel may be 
considered is to be judged according to the deciding Treaty 
which is in these words:-
"And whereas the Commissioners appointed 
by the two High Contracting Parties to determine that portion 
of the boundary which runs southerly through the middle of the 
channel aforesaid were unable to agree upon the same; and 
whereas the Government of Her Britannic Majesty claims that 
such boundary line should, under the terms of the Treaty above 
recited, be run through the Rosario Straits, and the Government 
of the United States claims that it should be run through the 
Canal de Haro, it is agreed that the respective claims of the 
Government of the United States and of the Government of Her 
Britannic Majesty shall be submitted to the arbitration and 
award of His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, who, having regard 
to the above-mentioned article of the said Treaty, shall decide 
thereupon, finally and without appeal, which of those claims 
is most in accordance with the true interpretation of the Treaty 
of June 15, 1846."
According to these words in the arbitration Treaty, 
the question to be decided is not whether the boundary is to pass 
through the Rosario or the Haro or the Middle Channel, but 
whether it passes through the Rosario Straits or the Haro 
Channel. Therefore it cannot be established by the arbitrator 
that according to the Treaty of 1846 the boundary was to be drawn 
through the Middle Channel.
Were the supposition possible that only the line 
through the Middle Channel was consistent with the meaning of the 
Treaty, that consequently the claims made for the other two 
ehannels/
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channels appeared invalid, and algo that there was no pre­
ponderating evidence in favour of either the Rosario Channel or 
the Haro, the decision would only have a negative result, neither 
claim would be in accordance with the proper reading of the 
Treaty of 15th June, 1846, and on neither side would the arguments 
outweigh those of the other.
In that case the aim of both parties to have this 
controversy settled by the award of His Majesty would not be 
attained; and to have the matter finally settled they would 
either have to get a new arbiter or they would have to draw up a 
new treaty altogether and agree again upon a boundary.
However, this eventuality cannot be considered likely. 
When the contracting Powers are agreed that the one has not 
proposed the Middle Channel as boundary and the other has not 
accepted it as such, then there exists no treaty saying that the 
Middle Channel should form the boundary, no matter how consistent 
this would be with the meaning of the original Treaty. Yet 
neither side has explicitly declared that the Middle Channel is 
not the channel intended. As this channel was known in 1846, 
when the Treaty was drawn up, it cannot be overlooked by the 
signatories. Yet neither has even suggested it as the channel 
corresponding to the one indicated in the Treaty, though it would 
be more favourable to each than the one claimed by the opponent. 
However, if there had been any doubt on this score the 
Arbitration Commission would have been asked to consider this 
Middle Channel; but it is not so, therefore there can be no 
question of the Middle Channel.
As for the other channels, it is true that neither 
of the Powers was absolutely convinced that the boundary claimed 
by it was the channel of the Treaty of 1846, to the exclusion of 
all doubt that the opponent*s claim did not deserve the preference. 
In view of this, and in the light of a desire to arrive at some 
award that would not be negative and that would end the 
controversy, we are to understand the nature of the Arbitration 
Treaty/
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Treaty according to wMch the Emperor was to give his decision.
Which of the two claims was in greater accord with 
the proper reading of the Treaty of 1846? The question to be 
decided is whether it is more consistent with the Treaty of 
15th June, 1846, that the boundary line should go through the 
Rosario Channel or through the Haro Channel. In other words, 
for which of the two alternatives is there greater evidence?
According to the Treaty, the boundary line is to 
follow the forty-ninth parallel of latitude as far as "the 
middle of the channel that separates the mainland from Vancouver 
Island; and thence southerly, through the middle of the said 
channel and of Fuca Straits, to the Pacific Ocean.”
The channel, through the middle of which the forty- 
ninth parallel passes, is the Gulf of Georgia. As the boundary 
is to go through the same channel (in a southern direction), it 
is surely obvious that with the latter definition the totality of 
sea is understood, extending from the forty-ninth parallel to 
Fuca Straits. On the other hand, can a stretch of water from the 
point where it is divided by intervening islands into three 
channels, two of which at least are not unimportant, be called a 
single channel? In addition, there is the important point that 
the Middle Channel forms the middle of the whole stretch of water, 
and that this channel, as has been proved already, by mutual 
agreement of the parties, is not the channel of the Treaty. 
Therefore, by the words, 1 said channel,1 in so far as the 
boundary is to go through the middle of it in a southern 
direction, we must understand either the Rosario Channel or the 
Haro Channel•
The more particular definition of the channel that it 
separates the mainland from Vancouver Island is in favour of the 
Haro Channel. Because it touches the Island we can say that it 
separates the mainland from the Island. Perhaps it would have 
been clearer had the wording been, "which separates Vancouver 
Island from the mainland," and in fact, in the interests of the 
British/
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British Government, the difference has been pointed out. But 
there cannot he any appreciable difference in the two modes of 
expression as the reason why the mainland is mentioned first was 
that the boundary began in the mainland and was defined westwards.
If, on the other hand, they had had the Rosario 
Channel in mind, they could not have said the channel dividing 
the mainland from Vancouver Island, for then it would not have 
been merely this island which was divided by the channel from 
the mainland but the whole group of islands already mentioned, 
especially San Juan Island; it would be difficult to see why 
this group had not also been designated as divided from the 
mainland by the channel.
The words too, "thence southerly, through the middle 
of the said channel and Fuca Straits," point rather to the Haro 
Channel•
It is true, the point in the channel (Gulf of Georgia) 
where the line is to be drawn in the southerly direction is not 
really fixed; there is really a difference of a few minutes, 
according as we follow the Vancouver map, the standard one at 
the time of the making of the Treaty, although defective just at 
this point, or the later nautical charts, and also according as 
we accept the starting points for measuring those points on the 
mainland (continued along the forty-ninth parallel) and on 
Vancouver Island, or whether we accept the points on the small 
islands and peninsulas under consideration. The difference 
arising from either method is so slight that it may be left out 
altogether.
The ideal boundary line cannot be drawn through the
fixed point in a straight line southwards as is shown by the blue
line on the map 0 in the American memorial, for such a line would
be contrary to the terms of the Treaty that the line should go
"through the middle of the said channel." In fact, this condition
makes it necessary to take the expression ’southerly1 in the
wider meaning of deviation to the south from the line running 
directly/
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directly west, and here especially, having regard to the south­
east direction of the Gulf of Georgia as shown on the Vancouver 
map* This divergence from the literal meaning of the expression 
Southerly* that is so eminently important for the question at 
issue can only be justified by the geographical position, i*e., 
as far as the open, wide arm of the sea, the Gulf of Georgia, 
extends to the south, therefore as far as 48° 45*. For the 
channels between the islands whose courses diverge from that 
south-easterly direction in a different sense, the expression 
Southerly1 as the description of the normal direction of the 
boundary line begins to have meaning again. This interpretation 
will correspond all the more with the meaning of the Treaty, the 
more closely it agrees with the due southerly direction and with 
the shortest connecting line between the fixed point of departure 
in the north and Fuca Straits defined as the southern terminal 
in the Treaty. Starting from this, a glance at the map, 
especially the Vancouver one, is sufficient to show that the 
Haro Channel and not the Rosario Channel is more consistent with 
the terms of the Treaty.
However, the British memorial maintains that the 
condition that the line should be extended through Fuca Straits 
is only possible if it go through the Rosario Channel and not 
the Haro.
In support of this, it is represented that Fuca 
Straits from the undisputed western end, Cape Flattery, right to 
its head-waters, flows past the Island of Whidbey which is close 
to the mainland. But that part of the southern channel which is 
then to form the beginning of Fuca Straits does not belong at all 
to Fuca Straits, according to the Vancouver map, but is a part 
of the Gulf of Georgia.
On the other maps also, on those preceding 1846 as 
well as in later ones, the term Fuca Straits is so used that it 
is not possible to see where the Rosario Channel joins it. An 
earlier/
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earlier Spanish map even gives this part of the sea the special 
name of Seno de Santa Rosa* If the Rosario Channel does not 
flow into the Fuca Straits then not only does the British defence 
fall through entirely but it is even an argument against the 
assumption that the Rosario Channel can be the channel intended 
in the Treaty.
The proviso at the end of Article 1 of the Treaty, 
flthat the navigation of the whole of the said channel and the 
Straits * south of the forty-ninth parallel of north latitude 
remain free and open to both parties’1 is said, according to the 
British memorial, to be only comprehensible as a necessary 
precaution if the line should go through the Rosario Channel 
but unnecessary and incomprehensible if the line be drawn 
through the Haro Channel. Behind this assertion is the sup­
position that the words, ’’through the whole of Fuca Straits,” 
had the meaning ’’through Fuca Straits in its entire length.”
But against this we have the geographical position already stated, 
according to which the Rosario Channel does not lead into Fuca 
Straits. Then too, the words, ”through the whole of the Strait,” 
are not synonymous with ’’through the Strait in its entire length.” 
If it had been intended to emphasise the ’whole,” it would have 
been expressed otherwise than by a mere proviso. According to 
a natural reading, the words are to be understood thus: the
drawing of a line through the middle of Fuca Straits shall not 
have the result that the division of the area affected thereby 
may prejudice the rights of free navigation of either Power, in 
the whole channel as far as the boundary goes through it. The 
proviso has so comprehended the meaning that each Power was 
entitled to carry on navigation in those parts of Fuca Straits 
which are within the so-called three-mile limit, to which the 
adjoining land is supposed to extend and which, therefore, may 
not be entered against the desire of the owner (this in terms of 
international law). Besides, no special importance need be 
attached to provisos of the kind, their general purpose being 
merely/
merely to give explicit assurance and promise of rights that are 
already implicit as general principles.
Further, the point is stressed by the British side 
that the Treaty does not define the channel by name. This would 
have been natural if the Rosario Channel had been meant, as it 
had no name at the time, whereas it is difficult to see why the 
Haro Channel, if it had been intended, had not been mentioned by 
its name. Firstly, however, it is not correct to say that the 
Rosario Channel had no name. In the Spanish map of 1791 - one 
of the maps produced - it is called the 1 Canal de Fidalgo.1 
Secondly, the whole part of the channel indicated in the Treaty 
immediately on the forty-ninth parallel is called the Gulf of 
Georgia in the Vancouver map, although not mentioned by name in 
the Treaty. From the nature of things, when boundaries are being 
fixed, especially in less well known regions, no great importance 
is attached to names, because these are liable to change. An 
example of this is given by that very name Rosario Channel; this 
name indicating quite a different part of the sea on the Vancouver 
map, namely, a channel to the north of the forty-ninth parallel.
On no condition can it be assumed that they would have wished 
to exclude a channel possessing a name on the map fitting in with 
the given description merely because it has not been mentioned 
by name in the Treaty. On the other hand, it was surely evident 
that they would have excluded a channel, outstanding among 
nameless channels from the fact of its having a name, if it had 
not been the channel intended.
The British memorial goes on to emphasise the point
that the Rosario Channel is the one through which the expedition
of the 1 Sutil* and *Mexicanaf passed as well as the Vancouver
ships. In the Vancouver map, soundings are given for the
navigation of the Rosario Channel, but not for that of the Haro
Channel. Nor do we find depth marks for the Haro Channel in any
map anterior to 15th June, 1846, known to the British Government*
At the time of the Treaty, the Rosario Channel was the only one 
generally/
generally known, and the one usually taken by sailors between 
the mainland and Vancouver Island. From the ships* logbooks 
used by the Hudson*s Bay Company in the years before 1847, it 
appears that they had invariably used the Rosario Channel as the 
main channel leading from Fuca Straits to the upper waters. In 
1837, when the »Beaver,* the first steamship of the Hudson's Bay 
Company, went up to Fort Langley from Fuca Strait, it made use 
of the Rosario Channel; and not till 1846 did it mnirq a survey 
of the Haro Channel. The American survey boat, the 'Porpoise,' 
also sailed to the upper gulf from Fuca Strait by way of the 
Rosario Channel. The boats of the 'Vincennes,' its consort, 
which had remained behind at Dungeness, were sent to the Haro 
Channel to survey it, and the boats of the 'Beaver,' as Lieutenant 
Wilkes says in his report, had been busy for three days ascertain­
ing all the important information relating to the navigation of 
this channel. The 'Cormorant,* the first steamship of the 
British navy, which navigated the sea between the mainland and 
Vancouver Island, passed northwards through the Rosario Channel 
in September, 1846, and returned through it again to Fuca Straits. 
From information given by captains and others in the service of 
the Hudson's Bay Company, it was seen that the only channel they 
had used was the Rosario Channel. It was the only channel the 
British Government had known to be navigable and safe. Not only 
had they not known the Haro Channel to be this, but they had the 
firm belief that it was a dangerous channel. Therefore, it could 
not be assumed that they would have wished to relinquish the one 
channel leading to their own possessions and confine themselves 
to the Haro Channel.
In the American memorial the retort is made that 
importance is not to be attached to the passage Vancouver took 
in his voyage, as he, in accordance with the instructions given 
him to seek out channels and rivers leading to the interior of 
the mainland, was to keep as near as possible to the eastern 
coast. Vancouver would never have thought the Rosario Channel - 
whi€&/
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which he did not even consider worthy of a name - as important 
as the Haro Channel# As for the soundings, on the Vancouver 
map there are two for the Rosario Channel while five or six are 
indicated on an arm of Haro Channel and one near the coast, which 
show that the navigable water was more than 200 feet deep# The 
mariners1 chart of this channel, published in 1795 by the Spaniards, 
contains many soundings for the easier sailing of the Haro 
Channel# If this chart gives no depths in the middle of the channel, 
it is because - and Vancouver reiterates this point - the 
sounding lines in use at that time were not long enough to reach 
the bottom in those deep waters «where there were great volcanic 
rocks that went down perpendicularly hundreds of feet# With regard 
to the asserted regular use of the Rosario Channel, at the time 
of the Treaty, the trade in those waters was really not of much 
importance# Very careful research does not show any proof that 
even a single ship of the United States had entered those waters 
in the period between 1810 and the arrival of the American 
exploration expedition in charge of Wilkes in 1841# The reason why 
the ships of the Hudson^ Bay Company passed through the Rosario 
Channel was that on the half-yearly sailings from Port Vancouver 
to the settlements, Nlsqually, at the upper end of Puget Sound, 
was the first point to be called at, and a ship sailing from there 
to Port Langley on the Fraser River would naturally pass through 
the Rosario Channel# Therefore the latter had been used, not 
because it was the channel between Fuca Straits and the north,
but because it was the shortest way between the settlements at 
which the boats had to call#
The American exploration expedition under Wilkes in 
1841 did not attach greater importance to the Rosarld Channel 
than to the Haro Channel# Rather did the Commander, Wilkes, depute 
to an inferior officer of the Vincennes* the task of surveying 
the channels between the islands of the archipelago, reserving 
to himself the more important charge of the Haro Channel survey#
The/
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The evidence submitted (by the British) was really 
of no weight as it had been submitted by one side only without 
informing the opponent and without cross-examination. It would 
require adjustment and rectification in accordance with the 
evidence brought forward by the Americans. In any case, and the 
whole question revolves round this, the Treaty does not talk of 
the channel that was most in use or not in use at the time of 
the Treaty, but it does talk of the channel separating the 
mainland from Vancouver Island; this channel, the Americans 
maintain, is the Haro Channel. It is now generally acknowledged 
to be the best and most convenient passage for British sailors.
It is the only connecting passage they make regular use of; 
steamers use it alone; it is the widest, deepest, and shortest 
channel; therefore, it alone is used by the Government, traders, 
immigrants, and the inhabitants of British Columbia. The 
assertion of the British about their ignorance of the navigability 
and safety of the Haro Channel at the time of the Treaty is 
really fnon proven* and irrelevant. It is unnecessary to prove 
minutely whether and how far the allegations can be established 
in all their individual essentials.
The British do not deny that the Haro Channel is a 
navigable channel as it is known at the present day; they only 
say that at the time of the Treaty they looked upon it as un- 
navigable and unsafe for shipping, and that therefore they could 
not have intended it as the channel indicated.
Against this, however, is the fact that eighteen 
years earlier there were British settlements in its immediate 
neighbourhood (Port Langley since 1827); that in 1841 it had 
been surveyed by Captain Wilkes and described exactly in a book 
published by him in 1845, likewise in his official report which 
appeared simultaneously in Washington and London. After this 
then, the assertion of the British is to be considered *non 
proven* and there is no need to argue which evidence deserves 
greater credence - the British, that the Haro Channel was 
mmavigable/
unnavigable, or the American, that it was navigable*
But if we had even to assume that the British Govern­
ment had proceeded from the supposition that the Rosario Channel 
was the only navigable channel through which ships could pass 
from the northern waters into Fuca Straits yet, as they do not 
assert, and still less prove, that the American Government shared 
this view, the question could only arise as to whether the 
Treaty, perhaps because of some genuine error, might be cancelled 
at the suggestion of the British Government* But they have not 
made such a motion, and according to the statement in the American 
counter-memorial, they have rather declined the proposal of the 
American Government to annul the Treaty on this point and to 
settle the boundary by a new agreement.
If it is quite out of the question to consider the 
cancellation of the Treaty because of a misunderstanding, and 
if we are to prove, by adhering to it, which of the two claims 
fits in best with the proper reading of the Treaty, the point 
of view we must insist upon is, that in the fixing of a boundary 
line, consideration is to be given to the geographical position 
on the most correct and most complete map, and that other 
elements not affecting the position or affected by it must be 
relegated to the background; if it is not clearly shown that 
they are being considered by the two parties in mutual agreement. 
There is nothing in favour of our giving consideration to the 
way earlier expeditions took, to the greater or less use of the 
channel, to the soundings in that channel and such aspects at 
the time of the drawing up of the Treaty.
In the British memorial it is stated with reference to 
the rules for interpreting the Treaty as Vattel presented them, 
that the boundary line drawn through the middle of the Rosario 
Channel was favourable to both parties, according to the 
knowledge possessed by both Governments at the time of the Treaty 
of 15th June, 1846, whereas the line through the Haro Channel 
would have deprived Britain of the right of reaching her own 
possessions/
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possessions by way of the only channel which was known at that 
time as navigable and safe for shipping. It would be more 
equitable if it were decided to make the line go through the 
Rosario Channel rather than through the Haro Channel. A decision 
in the former sense would assure to the citizens of the United 
States of America the free use of that channel which their ships 
had used before 15th June, 1846, while a decision in favour of 
the line through the Haro Channel would deprive the British 
subjects of the navigation rights in that channel they had 
sailed in since its exploration by Vancouver.
Apart from the fact that this argument breaks down
from the lack of proof that the Haro Channel was not known to
be navigable and not used before 15th June, 1846, there is this
point to be considered. After the signing of the Treaty, "a
definite end was to be made to the state of doubt and uncertainty
relating to the sovereignty and government of the territory situate
to the west of the Rocky Mountains by a friendly understanding of
those rights that were claimed by both parties.” The Treaty
itself does not confine itself to Article 1, but contains further
agreements and promises in three subsequent Articles. It would
be inconsistent with the nature of such a Treaty if, for its
interpretation; one would wish to search into a purely actual
connection (even presupposing this could be proved), the legality
of which was continually being contested by the other side, and
fail to understand that presumably each party would seek to
obtain all the advantages it could, without consideration of the
disadvantages accruing therefrom to the opponent; if one were
to disregard the fact that disadvantages which might be submitted
to in one Article of a Treaty would be compensated for, if
possible, by advantages in another Article. Especially with
treaties of this kind, we can only interpret tha law as it is
made by the parties themselves. But if we confine ourselves to
notions of equity we could not consider that erroneous notion of
one party concerning the poor navigability of the Haro Channel 
at/
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at the time of the Treaty; we should have to speak only of its 
real nature. In actual fact, the Haro Channel explored as it 
has been at the present time, is not only a good, navigable 
channel, it is by far the broadest and deepest of the various 
arms of the sea, especially in comparison with the Rosario 
Channel; it is the natural, main connecting passage between the 
Gulf of Georgia and Fuca Straits and, according to the basic 
principles of physical geography, it is the natural continuation 
of that Gulf, so that, when mention is made of the Gulf and the 
waters leading in a southerly direction to Fuca Straits as being 
one and the same channel, this expression, !said channel,1 fits 
the Haro Channel.
In the memorials of both parties, but especially the 
American, there are finally references to negotiations and 
correspondence, either preceding the Treaty of 15th June, 1846, 
or following it. From the great quantity of material produced 
we must sort out the notes of more recent date than 15th June, 
1846, as being not quite relevant, especially the writings of 
November, 1846, and later months and years. These papers do not 
contain any statements by either party that might be construed 
as being in favour of the opponent, and in so far as they 
express opinions and views of each party in its own particular 
form, they are too remote from the time of the signing of the 
Treaty - in fact some of them were only expressed after the 
controversy had begun, and they are not to be considered.
From the papers which remain for review, there 
emerges the fact that after the American Government, throughout 
a fairly long period, had asked for the continuation of the 
boundary line from the Rockies along the forty-ninth parallel, 
as far as the Pacific, whereas the British wished to have it 
drawn several degrees to the south, a genuine rapprochement came 
about when, on 18th May, 1846, Lord Aberdeen sent Mr. Pakenham, 
the British Ambassador, a note having as its purpose the 
resumption of negotiations. In it there is,among other matters, 
the/
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th© statement that for a distance of eight hundred or a thousand
miles from the Lake of the Woods to the Rocky Mountains, the
forty-ninth parallel of latitude has been accepted as the
boundary; it would seem natural and reasonable to extend it
along the same degree for a distance about half as great. Only
this boundary would have obvious defects; especially, it would
exclude Great Britain from that convenient and accessible
harbour on the coast and deprive her of that long used sea
connection with the interior; so that if the forty-ninth parallel
of latitude was to be taken as a basis of agreement, these
inconveniences would have to be obviated. The Ambassador,
*
therefore, had to propose to the American Secretary of State that 
the boundary should be drawn along the forty-ninth parallel 
"to the sea, and from there, in a southerly direction, through 
the centre of King George *s Sound £this ought to be Gulf of 
Georgia J and the Straits of Juan de Fuca to the Pacifick Ocean," 
at the same time leaving the whole of Vancouver Island with Its 
harbours and road-steads in possession of the British.
On the same date (18th May) the American Ambassador 
in London, Mr. McLane, wrote to the Secretary of State, Mr.
Buchanan, reporting a fairly long interview with Lord Aberdeen 
in connection with the resumption of the negotiations for the 
settlement of the Oregon question. The British Ambassador in 
Washington would receive instructions from his government about 
a proposal to be made which would probably run thus:
Firstly; to divide the territory by a continuation
of the line along the forty-ninth parallel as far as the sea,
i.e., as far as the arm of the sea called Birch Bay, thence 
through the Haro Channel and Fuca Straits to the Pacific, thereby 
confirming to the United States of America what they in fact 
would possess without special confirmation, the right of using 
and navigating Fuca Straits in its whole extent.
Towards the close of the letter, Mr. McLane remarks 
also that he had not the slightest ground for assuming that it
I
would/ *
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would be possible so to effect the continuation of the forty-ninth
parallel to the sea that the southern part of Vancouver would
fall to the lot of the United States of America.
On 12th June, 1846, the Senate empowered the President
to accept the proposal of the British Government, but on the
18th, at a meeting of the body dealing with the ratification of
the Treaty, Senator Benton made a speech in which there is this
passage: ”The line established by the first article of the
treaty - the continuation of the boundary on the east side of
v
the Rockies - follows the forty-ninth parallel of latitude to 
the sea, with a slight deflection through Fuca Straits to avoid 
cutting the south end of Vancouver1s Island. When the line 
reaches the channel which separates Vancouver!s Island from the 
continent, it passes through the middle of the channel, and from 
there, turning in a southerly direction through the Haro Channel 
(wrongly written Arro on the maps) to the Straits of Fuca and 
thence west to the middle of that Strait to the sea.”
Finally, we have in a speech delivered in the House 
of Commons on 28th June, 1846, by Sir Robert Peel - in whose 
ministry the Treaty was signed - ”Those who can visualize the 
geographical position of the country will understand that what 
we have been proposing is to continue the line along the forty- 
ninth parallel of latitude to the point where it reaches the Fuca 
Strait; that this line cannot be extended along that degree 
through Vancouver, thus depriving us of part of the island, but 
that the middle of the channel shall be the boundary in the 
future, so that we shall remain in possession of Vancouverfs 
Island with equal shipping rights in the Straits.”
These statements of British and American statesmen 
are not of such a nature that as a result either government would 
be held bound, nor are they entirely free of geographical errors, 
e.g., Lord Aberdeen talks of King George’s Sound instead of the 
Gulf of Georgia and Sir Robert Peel supposes the forty-ninth 
parallel touches Fuca Straits. But in any case it is clear that,
£ on/
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on both sides, the deviation from the forty-ninth parallel as 
the norm is being considered with the view (but not solely for 
this purpose) of retaining the whole of Vancouver Island in the 
hands of the British* As a result, the supposition that the 
channel nearest Vancouver Island is the one intended by the 
Treaty, gains considerable support.
Some weight cannot be denied to the circumstance that 
at the time when the Treaty was signed, American statesmen 
expressed their opinion that the boundary passed through the 
Haro Channel while a contrary view was not given by the British, 
but we must also remember that the American view was not 
communicated to the British negotiators.
If we take the contents of the Treaty as it stands and 
examine and weigh its important points and special grounds; that 
the condition of the Treaty of June 15th, 1846, whereby the 
channel separating the mainland from Vancouver Island can only 
refer to the Haro Channel which touches Vancouver island and 
cannot refer to the Rosario Channel.
That the further condition whereby the boundary shall 
pass through the middle of the channel corresponds more exactly 
with the direction and nature of the Haro Channel as being the 
natural, the widest, and deepest passage between the Gulf of 
Georgia and Fuca Straits, and as being that stretch of water 
which is the natural continuation to the south of that Gulf and 
therefore can be regarded as forming with it one channel.
We reach this finding:
That the assertion of the 
American Government that the channel through the middle of 
which, according to the wording of the Treaty of 15th June, 1846, 
the boundary shall be drawn in a southern direction is the Haro 
Channel, is most consistent with the proper reading of the Treaty.
APPENDIX IV
TREATY OF WASHINGTON 
(SAN JUAN ARTICLES)
TREATY OF WASHINGTON 
(SAN JUAN ARTICLES)
ARTICLE XXXIV.
Whereas it was stipulated by Article I of the Treaty concluded 
at Washington on the 15th of June, 1846, between the United 
States and Her Britannic Majesty, that the line of boundary 
between the territories of the United States and those of Her 
Britannic Majesty, from the point on the forty-ninth parallel 
of north latutude up to which it had already been ascertained, 
should be continued westward along the said parallel of north 
latitude ”to the middle of the channel which separates the 
continent from Vancouver1s Island, and thence southerly, 
through the middle of the said channel and of Fuca's Straits, 
to the Pacific Ocean;” and whereas the Commissioners appointed 
by the two High Contracting Parties to determine that portion 
of the boundary which runs southerly through the middle of the 
channel aforesaid were unable to agree upon the same; and 
whereas the Government of Her Britannic Majesty claims that 
such boundary line should, under the terms of the Treaty above 
recited, be run through the Rosario Straits, and the Government 
of the United States claims that it should be run through the 
Canal de Haro, it is agreed that the respective claims of the 
Government of the United States and of the Government of Her 
Britannic Majesty shall be submitted to the arbitration and 
award of His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, who, having regard 
to the above-mentioned article of the said Treaty, shall decide 
thereupon, finally and without appeal, which of those claims 
is most in accordance with the true interpretation of the Treaty 
of June 15, 1846.
ARTICLE XXXV.
The award of His Majesty the Emperor of Germany shall be con­
sidered as absolutely final and conclusive; and full effect 
shall be given to such award without any objection, evasion or
delay/
delay whatsoever. Such decision shall be given in writing and 
dated; it shall be in whatsoever form His Majesty may choose 
to adopt; it shall be delivered to the Representatives or other 
public Agents of the United States and of Great Britain, res­
pectively, who may be actually at Berlin, and shall be con­
sidered as operative from the day of the date of the delivery 
thereof.
ARTICLE XXXVI.
The written or printed case of each of the two Parties, accom­
panied by the evidence offered in support of the same, shall 
be laid before His Majesty the Emperor of Germany within six 
months from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of 
this Treaty, and a copy of such case and evidence shall be 
communicated by each Party to the other through their respective 
Representatives at Berlin.
The High Contracting Parties may include in the 
evidence to be considered by the Arbitrator such documents, 
official correspondence, and other official or public state­
ments bearing on the subject of the reference as they may 
consider necessary to the support of their respective cases.
After the written or printed case shall have been 
communicated by each Party to the other, each Party shall have 
the power of drawing up and laying before the Arbitrator a 
second and definitive statement, if it think fit to do so, in 
reply to the case of the other party so communicated, which 
definitive statement shall be so laid before the Arbitrator, 
and also to be mutually communicated in the same manner as 
aforesaid, by each Party to the other, within six months of the 
date of laying the first statement of the case before the 
Arbitrator.
ARTICLE XXXVII.
If, in the case submitted to the Arbitrator, either Party shall 
specify or allude to any report or document in its own possession 
without/
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without annexing a copy, such Party shall he bound if the other 
Party thinks proper to apply for it, to furnish that Party with 
a copy thereof, and either Party may call upon the other, 
through the Arbitrator, to produce the originals or certified 
copies of any papers adduced as evidence, giving in each in­
stance such reasonable notice as the Arbitrator may require*
And if the Arbitrator should desire further elucidation or 
evidence with regard to any point contained in the statements 
laid before him, he shall be at liberty to require it from 
either Party, in relation to any matter, and at such time, and 
in such manner as he may think fit*
ARTICLE XXXVIII.
The Representatives or other public Agents of the United States 
and of Great Britain at Berlin respectively, shall be considered 
as the Agents of their respective Governments to conduct their 
cases before the Arbitrator, who shall be requested to address 
all his communications and give all his notices, to such 
Representatives or other public Agents, who shall represent 
their respective Governments generally in all matters connected 
with the Arbitration*
ARTICLE XXXIX.
It shall be competent to the Arbitrator to proceed in the said 
arbitration, and all matters relating thereto, as and when he 
shall see fit, either in person, or by a person or persons named 
by him for that purpose, either in the presence or absence of 
either or both Agents, and either orally or by written discussion 
or otherwise*
ARTICLE XL.
The Arbitrator may, if he think fit, appoint a secretary or 
clerk for the purposes of the proposed arbitration, at such 
rate of remuneration as he shall think proper. This, and all 
other expenses connected with the said arbitration, shall be 
provided/
provided for as hereinafter stipulated.
ARTICLE XLI.
The Arbitrator shall be requested to deliver, together with his 
award, an account of all the costs and expenses which he may 
have been put to in relation to this matter, which shall forth­
with be repaid by the two Governments in equal moieties.
ARTICLE XLII.
The Arbitrator shall be requested to give his award in writing 
as early as convenient after the whole case on each side shall 
have been laid before him, and to deliver one copy thereof to 
each of the said Agents.
(1)
PHOTOSTATIC COPY OP MAP SHOWING ALL THREE CHANNELS
1* Taken, from map in Public Record Office, London, used 
by Captain Prevost*
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